Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After being released from a psychiatric hold, Reginald Humbles traveled from Lafayette to New Orleans, Louisiana, with little money and a firearm. When he ran out of gas, he encountered a waste removal truck and, after allegedly receiving a message from God, took the truck at gunpoint from its driver. Humbles then led police on a lengthy chase, which ended after officers deployed spike strips. Upon arrest, a loaded revolver was found in his possession. Humbles, a U.S. Army veteran with a history of mental illness, was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana accepted Humbles’s guilty plea. During sentencing, the court adopted a presentence report that cross-referenced the robbery Sentencing Guideline, applied an enhancement for reckless endangerment during flight, and included a criminal history point for an uncounseled misdemeanor DUI conviction. The court denied Humbles’s motions for a downward variance and departure based on mental health and military service, and sentenced him to 92 months’ imprisonment. Humbles appealed, challenging the application of the robbery Guideline, the enhancements, the inclusion of his DUI conviction, and the denial of his motions for a lower sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and found no reversible error. The court held that the district court did not err in cross-referencing the robbery Guideline, as Humbles failed to meet his burden to prove legal insanity at the time of the offense. The court also upheld the enhancements for reckless endangerment and the inclusion of the uncounseled DUI conviction, finding that Humbles knowingly waived his right to counsel. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and denied the request to reassign the case to a different judge. View "United States v. Humbles" on Justia Law

An employee at a meatpacking plant in Texas died after contracting COVID-19, allegedly from a coworker who continued working after testing positive. The decedent’s family sued the plant manager, the safety manager, and the coworker in Texas state court, claiming negligence and gross negligence due to unsafe working conditions and inadequate precautions against COVID-19. The complaint alleged that the employer, Tyson Foods, failed to protect employees, and that the managers were responsible for workplace safety. The coworker was accused of coming to work and failing to take precautions after testing positive.The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, arguing that the Texas-based managers were improperly joined to defeat diversity jurisdiction. The district court agreed, dismissed the claims against the managers with prejudice, and denied the plaintiffs’ motion to remand. Tyson Foods was later added as a defendant. The district court then dismissed the claims against Tyson on the grounds that they were preempted by the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA), and dismissed the claims against the coworker for failure to state a claim, finding no individual duty to prevent the spread of disease under Texas law. The court denied leave to amend the complaint as futile and entered final judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to remand and the dismissal of the coworker, holding that the managers were improperly joined and that Texas law does not impose an individual duty on coworkers to prevent the spread of disease. However, the Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the claims against Tyson, holding that the PPIA does not preempt state law negligence claims based on workplace safety unrelated to food adulteration. The court vacated the denial of leave to amend and remanded for further proceedings. View "Williams v. Wingrove" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, born in Mexico in 1976 to a U.S. citizen father and a Mexican citizen mother, sought recognition of U.S. citizenship based on his father’s physical presence in the United States prior to his birth. His father, born in Texas, had lived in the U.S. for a cumulative sixteen years, including seven years after turning fourteen. The plaintiff’s parents were unmarried at his birth but married in Texas the following year. In 2012, the plaintiff applied to the United States Citizenship & Immigration Services (USCIS) for a certificate of citizenship, submitting various documents to establish his father’s physical presence in the U.S. prior to his birth.USCIS denied the application in 2015, finding insufficient proof of the father’s physical presence. The plaintiff appealed to the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO), which dismissed the appeal in 2018. He then filed a timely motion to reconsider and reopen, submitting additional evidence, but the AAO denied this motion in September 2018. Nearly five years later, in August 2023, the plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a), seeking a declaration of citizenship.The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, reasoning that the five-year statute of limitations in § 1503(a) was jurisdictional and had expired, starting from the AAO’s dismissal of the appeal rather than the denial of the motion to reopen. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the five-year time bar in § 1503(a) is not jurisdictional but a nonjurisdictional claims-processing rule. The court further held that a timely motion to reconsider or reopen extends the time to file suit, and since the plaintiff’s motion was timely, his suit was not time-barred. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sarabia v. Noem" on Justia Law

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted two rules intended to increase transparency in the securities lending and short sale markets. Securities lending involves temporarily transferring securities from a lender to a borrower for a fee, and is closely tied to short selling, where investors sell securities they do not own, hoping to profit from a price decline. The SEC found both markets to be opaque, making regulatory oversight difficult. To address this, the SEC, under authority from the Dodd-Frank Act, promulgated the Securities Lending Rule (requiring prompt reporting of securities loans) and the Short Sale Rule (mandating monthly aggregate reporting of short sale positions by institutional investment managers).The petitioners, associations representing institutional investment managers, challenged both rules before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. They argued that the rules were arbitrary and capricious, exceeded the SEC’s statutory authority, conflicted with each other, and that the SEC failed to consider their cumulative economic impact. They also raised procedural objections, including inadequate opportunity for public comment and concerns about the extraterritorial application of the Short Sale Rule. The SEC defended its process and statutory authority, maintaining that the rules addressed distinct regulatory gaps and that its economic analysis was sufficient.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the SEC acted within its statutory authority in adopting both rules and provided adequate opportunity for public comment. The court also found that the SEC reasonably explained its choices regarding reporting systems and that the Short Sale Rule did not have impermissible extraterritorial reach. However, the court concluded that the SEC failed to consider and quantify the cumulative economic impact of the two interrelated rules, as required by the Administrative Procedure Act and the Exchange Act. The court granted the petition for review in part and remanded both rules to the SEC for further proceedings on this issue, while denying the remainder of the petition. View "Natl Assoc Priv Fund Mgr v. SEC" on Justia Law

The case concerns a former CEO of a Texas credit union who was removed from his position after the credit union was placed into conservatorship by state authorities, with the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) appointed as conservator. The NCUA terminated the CEO, seized property, and allegedly withheld post-termination benefits. The CEO initially sued in Texas state court for those benefits. Before the credit union responded to that suit, the NCUA initiated an administrative enforcement action against him. In response, the CEO filed a federal lawsuit challenging the NCUA’s authority and the constitutionality of the administrative proceedings, raising claims about the removal protections for the administrative law judge, the lack of a jury trial, due process, and the non-delegation doctrine.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed the federal suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that 12 U.S.C. § 1786(k)(1) explicitly precludes district court jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin or otherwise affect NCUA enforcement proceedings. The district court reasoned that the statutory language was clear and that any challenge to the administrative process must proceed through the statutory review scheme, which provides for review in the courts of appeals after the agency action is final.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that § 1786(k)(1) explicitly precludes district court jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin or otherwise affect NCUA enforcement actions, relying on its recent decision in Burgess v. Whang and Supreme Court precedent interpreting similar statutory language. The court rejected the argument that Congress must specifically reference 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to preclude federal question jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Moats v. Natl Crdt Un Admin Bd" on Justia Law

Cornelius Burgess, the former CEO of Herring Bank, was the subject of a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) enforcement action that began with an investigation in 2010 and formal proceedings in 2014. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) recommended in 2017 that Burgess be removed from his position, barred from the banking industry, and fined $200,000. The FDIC Board adopted this recommendation, but the enforcement order was stayed pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucia v. SEC, which addressed the constitutionality of ALJ appointments. After Lucia, the case was remanded for a new hearing before a properly appointed ALJ, who again recommended the same sanctions in 2022. Before the FDIC Board could issue its final order, Burgess filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, seeking to enjoin the Board from issuing its decision on constitutional grounds.The district court found it had jurisdiction to hear Burgess’s claims despite 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1), which generally precludes such jurisdiction. The court denied injunctive relief on Burgess’s claims regarding unconstitutional removal protections for the Board and ALJs, finding he had not shown harm from those provisions. However, it granted an injunction based on his Seventh Amendment claim, concluding he was likely to succeed on the merits and that the other factors for injunctive relief were met. The FDIC appealed the injunction, and Burgess cross-appealed the denial of relief on his removal claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1) explicitly strips district courts of subject matter jurisdiction to enjoin or otherwise affect the issuance or enforcement of FDIC orders, including on constitutional grounds. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of injunctive relief and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, declining to reach the merits of Burgess’s constitutional claims. View "Burgess v. Whang" on Justia Law

Ernest Clark, while on probation for a Louisiana felony conviction of aggravated assault with a firearm, was found in possession of a firearm. He was indicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits felons from possessing firearms. Clark moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to him under the Second Amendment, violated the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee, and exceeded Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause. The district court denied his motion. Clark then pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, which included a waiver of most appellate rights except for a direct appeal of the district court’s order denying his motion to dismiss under the Second Amendment, as interpreted in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi sentenced Clark to 64 months in prison and three years of supervised release. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Clark raised several claims, but acknowledged that most were foreclosed or waived by his plea agreement, except for his as-applied Second Amendment challenge and his Fifth Amendment equal protection claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that disarming individuals convicted of violent felonies, such as aggravated assault with a firearm, and those found in possession of a firearm while on probation, is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court relied on its own recent precedents to conclude that Clark’s as-applied Second Amendment challenge failed. The court also found that Clark’s equal protection claim was waived by his plea agreement. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "USA v. Clark" on Justia Law

Fire Protection Service, Inc. (FPS), a Texas business, served as a non-exclusive dealer for Survitec Survival Products, Inc., which manufactures and distributes marine safety products, including life rafts. These life rafts, each valued at over $15,000 and capable of accommodating up to 30 people, are required by federal law and international treaties to be installed on various types of navigable vessels used in industries such as offshore oil and gas, commercial fishing, and maritime shipping. In August 2017, Survitec terminated its dealership agreement with FPS without citing cause and did not repurchase FPS’s unsold inventory.FPS filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, alleging that Survitec’s actions violated the Texas Fair Practices of Equipment Manufacturers, Distributors, Wholesalers, and Dealers Act (“Dealer Act”). After a bench trial, the district court granted Survitec’s Rule 52(c) motion, ruling that the life rafts did not qualify as “Equipment” under the Act, and therefore the Act did not apply to the parties’ agreement.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s legal conclusions de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that Survitec’s life rafts are “Equipment” under the Dealer Act because they are used “in connection with” commercial activities covered by the Act, including construction, maintenance, mining (which encompasses oil and gas extraction), and industrial activities. The court found that the Act’s language and legislative intent support a broad interpretation, and that the life rafts meet the statutory definition. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Fire Protection v. Survitec Survival" on Justia Law

Three employers—SpaceX, Energy Transfer, and Findhelp—each faced unfair labor practice complaints before the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Before administrative proceedings began, each employer filed suit in a different federal district court in Texas, challenging the constitutionality of the NLRB’s structure. Specifically, they argued that the dual for-cause removal protections for both NLRB Board Members and Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) unconstitutionally insulated these officials from presidential removal, violating Article II and the separation of powers.Each district court granted a preliminary injunction, halting the NLRB’s proceedings against the respective employer. The courts found that the removal protections for ALJs (and, in one case, for Board Members) were unconstitutional, that the employers would suffer irreparable harm if forced to proceed before an unconstitutionally structured agency, and that the balance of equities and public interest favored injunctive relief. The NLRB appealed, arguing that the district courts lacked jurisdiction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act and that the employers had not shown a likelihood of success or irreparable harm.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the consolidated appeals. The court held that the district courts had jurisdiction to enjoin the NLRB’s proceedings, as the employers’ constitutional challenges to the agency’s structure did not “grow out of a labor dispute” within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. On the merits, the Fifth Circuit held that the dual for-cause removal protections for NLRB ALJs are unconstitutional, following its own precedent in Jarkesy v. Securities & Exchange Commission. The court further held that the removal protections for Board Members likely violate Article II, as the NLRB’s structure does not fit within the narrow exception recognized in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States. The court also found that being subjected to proceedings before an unconstitutionally structured agency constitutes irreparable harm. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunctions granted by the district courts. View "Space Exploration v. NLRB" on Justia Law

A predecessor of BP America Production Company obtained an offshore oil and gas lease from the United States in 1983. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. later acquired the lease and assigned it to Linder Oil Company, retaining certain deep operating rights. Linder Oil assumed all decommissioning obligations and indemnified Chevron. Linder Oil then assigned its interest to Reserves Management and Destin Resources, who later conveyed interests to Sojitz Energy Venture. Sojitz eventually transferred its interests back, and Linder Oil released Sojitz from decommissioning obligations. The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management required Linder Oil to provide performance bonds, which Lexon Insurance Company issued. After Linder Oil and related entities filed for bankruptcy and failed to complete decommissioning, the government called the bonds, and Lexon paid over $11 million. Chevron and Sojitz completed the decommissioning work, and Lexon sought reimbursement from them and BP America.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment based on stipulated facts. The magistrate judge recommended summary judgment for the defendants, finding Lexon was not entitled to reimbursement under theories of subrogation, contribution, or unjust enrichment, primarily because Louisiana law did not support Lexon’s claims. The district judge adopted this recommendation and dismissed Lexon’s claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Fifth Circuit held that federal law, including 31 U.S.C. § 9309, did not provide Lexon with a right to subrogation against the defendants, and that any gap in federal law was properly filled by Louisiana law, which did not entitle Lexon to subrogation, contribution, or unjust enrichment recovery under the circumstances. The court concluded that Lexon had no recourse against the defendants as required by Louisiana law and that any enrichment of the defendants was contractually justified. View "Lexon Insurance v. Chevron U.S.A." on Justia Law