Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two development companies owned land in Johnson County, Texas, within the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the City of Mansfield but outside the city’s corporate boundaries. To develop this land, the companies needed access to retail water services, which, under state law, could be provided only by the Johnson County Special Utility District (“JCSUD”) because it held the exclusive certificate of convenience and necessity (CCN) for the area. However, a contract between JCSUD and the City of Mansfield required JCSUD to secure Mansfield’s written consent, which could be withheld at the City’s discretion, before providing water services within the city’s extraterritorial jurisdiction. The developers’ efforts to obtain water service were unsuccessful, as Mansfield demanded annexation and additional fees, ultimately refusing to formalize an agreement.After unsuccessful negotiations and attempts to compel service through the Texas Public Utility Commission, the developers sued the City of Mansfield in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. They alleged violations of the Sherman Act and brought state-law claims. The district court, adopting a magistrate judge’s recommendation, dismissed the antitrust claims with prejudice, holding that Mansfield was entitled to state-action antitrust immunity under Texas law, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether Mansfield was entitled to state-action immunity. The Fifth Circuit held that, although Texas law authorizes monopolies for water utilities through CCNs, it does not clearly articulate or authorize the City of Mansfield to act anticompetitively concerning the area in question, since the CCN belonged to JCSUD. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s grant of state-action immunity and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Megatel v. Mansfield" on Justia Law

A real estate developer, HK Baugh Ranch, LLC, petitioned the Texas Public Utility Commission (PUC) to release its undeveloped land, River Bend Ranch, from the certificate of convenience and necessity (CCN) issued to Crystal Clear Special Utility District (Crystal Clear). Crystal Clear, a federally indebted utility district, sued the PUC’s Chair and Commissioners in federal court, alleging that Texas Water Code § 13.2541, which allows for decertification, was preempted by 7 U.S.C. § 1926(b). This federal statute protects certain federally indebted utilities from curtailment of their service areas while their loans are outstanding.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas issued a preliminary injunction preventing the PUC from decertifying River Bend Ranch. The district court applied the “physical ability” test from Green Valley Special Utility District v. City of Schertz, determining that Crystal Clear likely made its service available to HK Baugh and was thus entitled to the protections of § 1926(b). The court concluded that § 1926(b) likely expressly preempts Texas Water Code § 13.2541, resolving the remaining preliminary injunction factors in favor of Crystal Clear.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that Crystal Clear would likely satisfy the “physical ability” test. However, the appellate court found that the district court erred in holding that § 1926(b) expressly preempts Texas Water Code § 13.2541. The appellate court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether § 1926(b) otherwise preempts Texas Water Code § 13.2541 and to address all preliminary injunction factors as necessary. The preliminary injunction remains in place pending further proceedings. View "Crystal Clear v. HK Baugh Ranch" on Justia Law

The case involves the City of Jackson, Mississippi's water-related utilities, which faced significant failures. The United States and the State of Mississippi brought enforcement actions under the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) against the City for violations, including allowing raw sewage to be discharged into waterways and failing to comply with the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) orders. The district court appointed a federal receiver, Edward Henefin, as interim third-party manager (ITPM) to manage the City's water and sewer systems. Henefin, operating through JXN Water, Inc., developed new utility rates, including a discount for residents receiving Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi ruled that the ITPM's rate-setting activities constituted a federal assistance program under the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 (FNA), thereby allowing access to SNAP recipient data. The United States and Mississippi opposed this, arguing that such disclosure violated the FNA's privacy protections for SNAP recipients.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the ITPM's rate-setting activities did not qualify as a federal assistance program under the FNA. The court emphasized that the term "federal assistance program" implies administration by a federal entity, and the ITPM's authority derived from municipal law, not federal law. The court also noted that the statutory history and context supported a narrow interpretation of "federal assistance program." Consequently, the court reversed the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mississippi v. JXN Water" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that sovereign immunity bars the ratepayers' claims against the Mississippi Public Service Commissioners. The court also agreed that the Johnson Act does not preclude federal jurisdiction over the claims against the utility. However, the court disagreed with the accrual date the district court used in dismissing the case on limitations grounds. The court explained that the ratepayers' claims did not accrue on August 6, 2015, when the Commission approved the refund plan, or on August 16, 2016, when an economist concluded that Mississippi Power shorted them. The court affirmed the dismissal of the claims against the Commissioners but vacated the district court's dismissal of the claims against Mississippi Power on imitations grounds. Given the uncertainties in the record and the possible benefit of limited discovery on the limitations issue, the court remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Turnage v. Britton" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint alleging that Southern Pine is required to distribute to them $112.5 million in "excess revenues." Because the previously-enacted 1936 Electric Power Association Act, Miss. Code Ann. 77-5-201, did not grant plaintiffs a vested right, the court concluded that the modern statute provides the applicable law. Under the modern statute, the court concluded that plaintiffs have not stated a claim for relief. In this case, plaintiffs seek to impose a specific asset-to-equity ratio beyond which any and all revenues must be deemed excessive and returned to the member-ratepayers. The court explained that plaintiffs do not have a right to revenues until the board deems that those revenues are "not needed" for other purposes. Because the board has not done so, plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. View "Harper v. Southern Pine Electric Cooperative" on Justia Law

The Texas Public Utility Commission issued two orders decertifying territory from the certificate of convenience and necessity (CCN) issued to Green Valley for sewer (wastewater) service. Green Valley filed suit alleging that, because it had "provided or made available" sewer service, 7 U.S.C. 1926(b) protected that service from encroachment.The Fifth Circuit granted en banc review and held that a utility has "provided or made available" service under section 1926(b) if it (1) has adequate facilities to provide service to the relevant area within a reasonable time after a request for service is made and (2) has the legal right to provide service. Therefore, the court overruled North Alamo Water Supply Corp. v. City of San Juan, 90 F.3d 910 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). The court modified the dismissal of Green Valley's preemption claim as to TWC 13.254(a-1) to make it without prejudice and affirmed as modified; vacated the judgments invalidating the PUC's orders and remanded with instructions to dismiss those claims as barred by state sovereign immunity; vacated the remaining judgments related to the GVDC Order and remanded with instruction to dismiss those claims as moot; and vacated the judgments on Green Valley's section 1926(b) claims related to the Schertz Order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Green Valley Special Utility District v. City of Schertz" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, members of three rural power cooperatives, filed suit alleging that the cooperatives failed to refund excess "patronage capital" to their members as required by state law. In this case, the cooperatives argued that Mississippi Code 77-5-235(5)'s refund requirement conflicts with Congress's purposes and objectives as expressed in the Rural Electrification Act, federal regulations, and the cooperatives' loan agreements with the Rural Utility Service. Furthermore, they argued that plaintiff's for request appointment of a trustee or receiver conflicts with federal interests and the provision in their loan agreements that appointment of a receiver constitutes an event of default. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's decision to remand these consolidated cases to state court, holding that the cooperatives have a colorable federal preemption defense and were entitled to remove under 28 U.S.C. 1442's provision for federal officer removal. View "Butler v. Coast Electric Power Assoc." on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether a certain Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUCT) order conflicted with a prior Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) order. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's order and rendered judgment in favor of PUCT and TIEC, holding that PUCT's order was not in conflict with any FERC order. The court held that FERC's orders requiring the Entergy compliance filing did not call for a retroactive reallocation of 2007 Bandwidth Payments; Entergy's compliance filing did not contain a retroactive reallocation that FERC approved in the 2015 FERC Order; the 2015 FERC Order did not retroactively reallocate 2007 Bandwidth Payments; and PUCT's Order was consistent with the 2015 FERC Order. View "Entergy Texas, Inc. v. Nelson" on Justia Law

After negotiations failed between plaintiff and Trans-Pecos regarding the construction of a pipeline on plaintiff's land, Trans-Pecos invoked Texas eminent domain power via Tex. Util. Code 181.004. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of plaintiff's application for a preliminary injunction under the Anti-Injunction Act. The district court held that the Act barred the injunction because the injunction would enjoin a state condemnation process that culminates in a judicial proceeding. As a preliminary matter, the court denied a motion to dismiss on mootness grounds. The court then held, on alternative grounds, that plaintiff could not meet the demanding standard for issuance of an injunction. The court explained that the significant differences between the Texas delegation of power to private entities and those delegations the Supreme Court has held unconstitutional mean that plaintiff's due process challenge faced long odds. Because of plaintiff's inability to establish a likelihood of success, much less a substantial one, he was not entitled to a preliminary injunction. View "Boerschig v. Trans-Pecos Pipeline, LLC" on Justia Law

Green Valley filed suit seeking an injunction based on its claim that 7 U.S.C. 1926(b) prohibits the City of Cibolo from encroaching on its sewer service. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, holding that the district court's interpretation was inconsistent with the statute's plain language. The court held that section 1926(b)'s plain language does not limit the statute's protection to services that have received federal financing. The court declined the city's invitation to read adjectives into section 1926(b) and remanded. View "Green Valley Special Utility District v. City of Cibolo" on Justia Law