Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Gene Cleveland Battieste, a veteran, underwent surgery at a Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Jackson, Mississippi in 2006. Although he had consented to surgery on certain cervical vertebrae, an additional procedure was performed on his C2 vertebra without his knowledge or consent. Following the surgery, Mr. Battieste experienced post-operative complications, including infection and increased pain. He applied for VA disability benefits in 2008, which were ultimately approved in 2020. The 2020 decision by the VA Board of Veterans’ Appeals was the first time Mr. Battieste or his family learned of the unauthorized surgery and the VA’s failure to provide proper informed consent or adequate post-operative care. Mr. Battieste died in 2022.In November 2022, the administrator of Mr. Battieste’s estate filed an administrative claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which the VA denied. In May 2024, a lawsuit for medical negligence was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The district court dismissed the case, finding that Mississippi’s medical malpractice statute barred any action brought more than seven years after the alleged negligence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court determined that Mississippi Code Annotated § 15-1-36(2)’s seven-year period is a statute of repose, not merely a statute of limitations. The court found that Mississippi’s intermediate appellate courts consistently interpret the seven-year provision as an absolute bar to claims, and the statute’s structure and language support this reading. Because the suit was filed more than seven years after the surgery, the court held the claim was time-barred and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Battieste v. United States" on Justia Law

Alisha Strife, a former U.S. Army service member with disabilities, requested that her employer, Aldine Independent School District (AISD), allow her service dog to accompany her at work. Strife's disabilities include PTSD and physical impairments, and her service dog, Inde, assists her with these conditions. Strife submitted her accommodation request on August 30, 2022, but AISD took six months to approve it, during which time Strife provided multiple medical documents supporting her need for the service dog.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed Strife's claims for failure to accommodate and hostile work environment. The court also granted AISD's motion for summary judgment on Strife's claims of disability discrimination, retaliation, and interference. The district court found that Strife did not suffer a physical injury during the six-month period and that she failed to allege a hostile work environment. The court also concluded that AISD had legitimate reasons for its actions and that Strife did not demonstrate that AISD's rationale was pretextual.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the hostile work environment claim, agreeing that Strife's allegations did not meet the standard for a hostile work environment. The court also affirmed the summary judgment on the disability discrimination, retaliation, and interference claims, finding that AISD had legitimate reasons for its actions and that Strife did not provide sufficient evidence of pretext.However, the Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Strife's failure-to-accommodate claim. The court found that Strife had pled sufficient facts to suggest that AISD's six-month delay in granting her accommodation request could constitute a failure to accommodate her disability. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings on this claim. View "Strife v. Aldine Independent School District" on Justia Law

Christian N. Davis, a former Army corporal, was convicted by a general court-martial in 1993 of multiple offenses, including attempted premeditated murder, conspiracy to commit murder, premeditated murder, arson, and adultery. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. After his conviction, Davis sought clemency and parole but was denied. He was later transferred to a federal civilian prison, where his parole was again denied.Davis filed a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, citing his age, health conditions, low risk of recidivism, and rehabilitative efforts. The magistrate judge recommended dismissing the motion for lack of jurisdiction, as § 3582 requires such motions to be filed in the sentencing court, and Davis's sentence was imposed by a military court. The district court accepted the magistrate judge's findings, dismissed Davis's motion for compassionate release for lack of jurisdiction, and denied his habeas claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that 18 U.S.C. § 3582 does not apply to sentences imposed under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and that such motions must be filed in the sentencing court. Since Davis's sentence was imposed by a general court-martial, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider his motion for compassionate release. The court also rejected Davis's arguments based on 10 U.S.C. § 858(a) and the case Bates v. Wilkinson, concluding that neither authorized civilian courts to modify military sentences. View "Davis v. USA" on Justia Law

Seven plaintiffs, all members of the Air Force, challenged the Air Force’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate, arguing it violated their religious beliefs. They sought religious exemptions, which were denied, leading to administrative discharge proceedings. One plaintiff, Byron O. Starks, Jr., was separated from service, allegedly for a preexisting medical condition, though he claimed it was due to his refusal to get vaccinated.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana dismissed the case as moot after the Air Force rescinded the vaccine mandate. The court also dismissed Starks’s claims for lack of standing, citing his separation from service and failure to exhaust administrative remedies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the rescission of the mandate did not address all alleged harms, particularly the claim that the Air Force’s religious exemption process was a sham. The court held that Starks had standing because his separation caused ongoing harm, such as ineligibility for certain veteran benefits. The court also clarified that RFRA claims are not subject to the Mindes exhaustion requirement, allowing Starks to proceed without exhausting intraservice remedies.The Fifth Circuit determined that the claims of the six still-serving plaintiffs were not moot, as they alleged ongoing harm from the Air Force’s religious exemption process. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the plaintiffs to continue their challenge against the Air Force’s broader vaccination policies and religious accommodations process. View "Crocker v. Austin" on Justia Law

Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin ordered all members of the Armed Forces to be vaccinated against COVID-19. Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro followed suit soon after, mandating vaccination for all Navy servicemembers. Plaintiffs are thirty-five members of Naval Special Warfare Command units. Each sought an exemption due to a sincere religious objection to the Navy’s authorized vaccines. Plaintiffs sued Secretary Austin, Secretary Del Toro, and the Department of Defense (collectively, “the Navy”), alleging that the mandate violated the First Amendment and RFRA. They also sought a preliminary injunction to block enforcement of the policies described above. Specifically, they asked the court to enjoin “any adverse action” based on their vaccination status, such as job loss, ineligibility to deploy, and restrictions on promotion and training opportunities. The district court granted a preliminary injunction. The district court twice enjoined the Navy’s policies as likely illegal under RFRA. After the entry of those injunctions, however, Congress ordered the military branches to rescind their mandates. The Navy complied with that directive and then rescinded all the challenged policies and formally announced that COVID-19 vaccines would not be imposed on any servicemember.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal and remanded. The court explained that the interlocutory appeal is moot because the Navy’s vaccine policies challenged here have been rescinded and because no exception to mootness applies. That does not end the litigation, however, and Plaintiffs’ case remains before the district court, which will decide in the first instance whether any of Plaintiffs’ claims are justiciable. View "U.S. Navy SEALs 1-26 v. Joseph Biden, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked at Huntington Ingalls Incorporated as a sheet-metal mechanic. After leaving the company, Plaintiff complained of hearing loss. Plaintiff selected and met with an audiologist. An administrative law judge denied Plaintiff’s Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA). Plaintiff appealed this decision to the Department of Labor’s Benefits Review Board. The Board reversed its initial decision on whether Plaintiff could choose his own audiologist. The Company timely petitioned for review. The question is whether audiologists are “physicians” under Section 907(b) of LHWCA.   The Fifth Circuit denied the Company’s petition for review. The court reasoned that based on the education they receive and the role that they play in identifying and treating hearing disorders, audiologists can fairly be described as “skilled in the art of healing.” However, audiologists are not themselves medical doctors. Their work complements that of a medical doctor. But, the court wrote, Optometrists, despite lacking a medical degree, are able to administer and interpret vision tests. And based on the results of those tests, optometrists can prescribe the appropriate corrective lenses that someone with impaired vision can use to bolster his or her ability to see. Audiologists are similarly able to administer hearing tests, evaluate the resulting audiograms, and then use that information to fit a patient with hearing aids that are appropriately calibrated to the individual’s level of auditory impairment. Because the plain meaning of the regulation includes audiologists, and because that regulation is entitled to Chevron deference, audiologists are included in Section 907(b) of the LHWCA’s use of the word “physician.” View "Huntington Ingalls v. DOWCP" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, in this case, are a group of Mississippi municipalities and associations harmed and threatened by this turn of events. They sued the Army Corps of Engineers (the “Corps”) under Administrative Procedure Act (APA) Section 706(1) for the Corps’ refusal to prepare a supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) as assertedly required by NEPA and accompanying regulations. Invoking the federal government’s sovereign immunity, the Corps moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The parties agreed on the legal question at issue—namely, whether NEPA and related regulations impose on the Corps a discrete duty to act that a federal court can compel it to honor under APA Section 706(1)—but disagreed on the answer to the question.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling granting summary judgment to the Corps. The court explained that because the Corps has no duty to prepare the supplemental EIS the plaintiffs seek, Plaintiffs have no APA claim for unlawful agency inaction, and the Corps is immune from their suit claiming otherwise. For better or worse, Congress and the Corps have authority to act on Plaintiffs’ dire environmental concerns. The federal courts do not. View "Harrison County, MS v. U.S. Army Corps" on Justia Law

This case arises from major flooding events in the Houston area in 2016 and 2017. Local political subdivisions sued the United States Army Corps of Engineers, seeking compliance with alleged regulatory obligations. The district court dismissed with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The fundamental issue in the case is whether the Corps has violated any enforceable, legal obligation in the management of the relevant dams and reservoirs. A potential source for obligations imposed on the Corps is the 2012 Water Control Manual (“WCM”) adopted by the Corps for flood control in the relevant watershed.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that Section 702 of the APA has been satisfied in that the complaint alleges Plaintiffs have been aggrieved by agency action, that the suit is not one for money damages, and that the injury arises from an officer or employee who has acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of law. Further, the court held that the Tucker Act does not provide an “adequate remedy” to the County’s claims within the meaning of Section 704. Further, the court wrote that since the regulation does not specify when such conditions require the Corps to update a WCM, the Corps must exercise discretion in deciding when updating a WCM is necessary. Such discretion is antithetical to a mandatory duty. Thus the court concluded there is no discrete, mandatory duty to revise. View "Ft Bend Cty v. US Army Corps" on Justia Law

A former military prisoner violated a condition of his supervision. After being arrested and while being detained, he brought the current lawsuit claiming that the condition he violated was unconstitutional. He has been released, and his term of supervision has ended. He has been denied all veterans’ benefits due to the violation. The court addressed whether the denial of the benefits is a collateral consequence sufficient to avoid finding his claim to be moot now that he has completed his term of supervision.Plaintiff argues that his claims remain viable because of collateral consequences resulting from his alleged violation of the special condition. The Department of Veterans Affairs notified him that his benefits were terminated because he was a “fugitive felon”. The VA stated to Plaintiff that he would have to provide evidence showing that he was not a fugitive felon to resume his benefits.The court explained that there is little authority on whether the denial of VA benefits would be a collateral consequence sufficient to defeat an otherwise moot habeas petition. The loss of VA benefits due to his violation of the condition challenged in his petition may be an ongoing collateral consequence that prevents this case from being moot. However, the court stated while some of Plaintiff's claims are moot they cannot make a holding in the absence of briefing from the government. Thus, the court remanded the issue for the district court to consider. View "Foster v. Warden, et al" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied defendants' motion for a partial stay of the district court's preliminary injunction enjoining the Department of Defense, United States Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, and United States Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro from enforcing certain COVID-19 vaccination requirements against 35 Navy special warfare personnel and prohibiting any adverse actions based on their religious accommodation requests. Specifically, defendants seek a partial stay pending appeal insofar as the injunction precludes them from considering plaintiffs' vaccination statuses "in making deployment, assignment and other operational decisions."The court weighed the Mindes abstention factors and determined that this dispute is justiciable. However, the court concluded that defendants have not carried their burden to warrant the issuance of the stay. The court agreed with the district court that defendants have not shown a compelling interest to deny religious accommodations under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 to each of the 35 plaintiffs at issue. Rather, the "marginal interest" in vaccinating each plaintiff appears to be negligible and thus defendants lack a sufficiently compelling interest to vaccinate plaintiffs. The court also concluded that the preliminary injunction does not irreparably damage the Navy and the public; partially staying the preliminary injunction pending appeal would substantially harm plaintiffs; and issuance of the requested stay would disserve the public interest. View "U.S. Navy SEALs 1-26 v. Biden" on Justia Law