Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Several entities affiliated with Allstate sued a group of individuals and entities that own, manage, and operate Memorial Heights Emergency Center in Houston, Texas. The plaintiffs alleged that, starting in 2018, defendants entered into agreements with personal injury attorneys to refer clients to the Center under letters of protection, guaranteeing future payment from insurance settlements. Defendants billed these patients—primarily car accident victims—using emergency billing codes at rates far above standard charges, often conducting expensive diagnostic tests without documented medical necessity and discharging patients without additional treatment. The bills were then sent to attorneys, who submitted them to Allstate for inclusion in settlement demands. Between August 2018 and November 2022, Allstate settled with 635 claimants and subsequently alleged it discovered a fraudulent scheme, seeking to recover $4.7 million plus treble damages and attorney fees.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed all claims with prejudice. The district court held that Allstate failed to sufficiently allege reliance on the fraudulent bills, undermining its RICO, common-law fraud, conspiracy, unjust enrichment, and money-had-and-received claims. The court also found Allstate had not adequately pleaded direct or proximate causation, concluded that Allstate was “complicit” in the alleged fraud due to its continued settlements after learning of the scheme, and determined that the complexity of the case made it unmanageable as a single lawsuit.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court applied the wrong legal standards to Allstate’s RICO claims by requiring reliance, which is not necessary for a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud. The appellate court further found that Allstate adequately pleaded proximate cause, damages, and the elements of its common-law and equitable claims. The judgment of the district court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Allstate Indemnity Co v. Bhagat" on Justia Law

Brent Dubois was convicted in 2011 of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, receiving a sentence of 188 months in prison and three years of supervised release. As part of his supervised release, a condition required him to participate in a substance abuse program, allowing the probation office to decide whether that would be inpatient or outpatient treatment. After a relevant amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines, Dubois’s sentence was reduced to 151 months. Upon completing his incarceration in 2023, Dubois began supervised release, but struggled to comply with outpatient treatment requirements. After repeated difficulties and four revocation hearings, his probation officer filed a petition for revocation, leading Dubois to admit to violations except one allegation, which the government withdrew.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas sentenced Dubois to ten months in prison and 32 months of supervised release, reimposing the original supervised release conditions. Notably, it again permitted the probation office to determine whether Dubois’s substance abuse treatment would be inpatient or outpatient. Dubois did not object to this condition at sentencing, but later appealed, arguing that the delegation of this decision to the probation office was improper.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case under the plain error standard, given Dubois’s lack of objection in district court. The Fifth Circuit held that permitting the probation office to decide between inpatient and outpatient treatment constituted an impermissible delegation of the district court’s core judicial sentencing function, particularly since the sentence following revocation was only ten months. The court found this error to be clear under existing precedent, affected Dubois’s substantial rights, and warranted discretionary correction. The Fifth Circuit vacated the supervised release condition at issue and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Dubois" on Justia Law

Wilson and two associates attempted to purchase a firearm from D.J. at a gas station, only to discover that the firearm was fake. In retaliation, Wilson retrieved a handgun modified with a machinegun conversion device and an extended magazine from his vehicle. He confronted D.J. and fired multiple rounds, fatally wounding him. Wilson and his companions then robbed D.J. and fled the scene. Police subsequently located Wilson, who confessed to the shooting and acknowledged the weapon was equipped with a machinegun conversion device.Wilson was charged in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas with unlawful possession of a machinegun under 18 U.S.C. § 922(o). He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(o) violated the Second Amendment, but the district court denied the motion. Wilson pleaded guilty without a written plea agreement. At sentencing, the Presentence Investigation Report applied the Sentencing Guidelines cross-reference to second-degree murder due to the death resulting from Wilson's conduct, resulting in a recommended sentence of 120 months, the statutory maximum. Wilson objected, claiming the cross-reference failed to account for his self-defense claim, but the district court overruled his objection, adopted the PSR, and imposed the recommended sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed Wilson’s appeal. He challenged his conviction on Second Amendment grounds and the application of the second-degree murder cross-reference during sentencing. The Fifth Circuit held that circuit precedent, specifically Hollis v. Lynch, forecloses any Second Amendment protection for machineguns, and that Supreme Court precedent in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen does not overrule this holding. The court also found no plain error in the district court’s application of the second-degree murder cross-reference. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Wilson" on Justia Law

The defendant repeatedly contacted a 13-year-old girl, H.H., via Snapchat, demanding nude photographs and videos of explicit acts. He threatened to expose her, specified the exact nature and timing of the images he wanted, and coerced her compliance by threatening to inform her mother when she refused or delayed. On one occasion, he met H.H. in person, where he engaged in sexual intercourse with her despite knowing her age. Electronic evidence later revealed that the defendant had engaged in similar conduct with at least ten other female victims aged 12 to 16. He was charged with one count of coercion and enticement of a minor to engage in sexual activity and pleaded guilty.In the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, the Presentence Report (PSR) recommended a two-level sentencing enhancement for distribution of material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(3). The defendant objected to this enhancement, arguing that his conduct amounted to “mere solicitation” rather than distribution, as he had not transferred the images to others. The probation officer and the district court disagreed, finding that the defendant’s coercive actions in inducing the victim to produce and send child pornography constituted distribution as contemplated by the guideline. The district court overruled the objection, adopted the PSR, and sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether the district court erred in applying the distribution enhancement. The Fifth Circuit held that the enhancement was appropriate because the defendant exercised significant control over the victim and actively participated in the distribution by coercing and directing the production and delivery of child sexual abuse material. The court distinguished “mere solicitation” from the defendant’s conduct and affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. Lowe" on Justia Law

The case concerns an individual who was convicted in Texas state court in 2021 for sexually assaulting a thirteen-year-old child. After serving his sentence, he was deported to Honduras due to his lack of lawful immigration status. He later reentered the United States illegally and, following his detention for immigration violations in 2024, admitted that he had not registered as a sex offender, as required by federal law. He pleaded guilty in federal district court to failing to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA).The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas classified the defendant as a tier III sex offender—the most serious category under SORNA—and sentenced him to 24 months’ imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. This classification was based on the court’s determination that his Texas conviction was comparable to the federal offenses of aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse. The defendant did not object to the presentence report’s findings at sentencing but appealed, arguing that he should have been classified as a tier I offender, the least severe category.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the appeal for plain error, as the argument was raised for the first time on appeal. The court concluded that the Texas statute under which the defendant was convicted criminalizes a broader range of conduct than the comparable federal offenses referenced by SORNA for tier II and tier III classification. Specifically, the Texas law punishes consensual sexual acts with minors under 17, while the federal statutes require nonconsensual conduct or involve narrower age ranges. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant does not qualify as either a tier II or tier III offender and must be classified as a tier I offender. The court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Quintanilla-Matamoros" on Justia Law

Tony Lee Johnson, a convicted felon on supervised release, was arrested by law enforcement officers after he violated his release conditions by failing drug tests. The arrest was executed at Johnson’s residence when he and his girlfriend, Beatrice Simmons, were found in his vehicle. After Johnson was removed and arrested, Simmons was temporarily detained but not handcuffed. Officer Pringle, suspecting Johnson might be hiding something, conducted a warrantless search of the vehicle's driver area and center console, discovering a loaded handgun. Simmons stated she was unaware of the firearm and confirmed she was on parole for a prior drug offense.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas held a hearing on Johnson’s motion to suppress the handgun, which he argued was seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied the motion, finding the search constitutional under the protective-sweep exception outlined in Michigan v. Long, reasoning that Simmons posed a potential threat to officer safety due to her criminal history, relationship with Johnson, and emotional proximity to the arrest. Johnson then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the denial of the suppression motion, which led to his appeal to the Fifth Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the warrantless search was not justified under the protective-sweep exception because no specific, articulable, contemporaneous facts suggested Simmons was potentially dangerous or would access a weapon. The court reversed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion and vacated Johnson’s conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Juan Carlos Alvarez, a member of the Southwest Cholos gang, was convicted of capital murder for his involvement in two separate fatal shootings in Houston, Texas in June 1998. The first incident resulted in the deaths of Adrian and Michael Aguirre at an apartment complex, while the second led to the murder of sixteen-year-old Jose Varela and Hugo Perez. Alvarez was identified through eyewitness accounts, testimony from co-participants, forensic evidence, and his own admissions to police. The prosecution presented overwhelming evidence, including ballistics linking Alvarez’s firearm to the shootings and DNA evidence connecting his shotgun to one of the victims. At trial, Alvarez was represented by two attorneys; the defense focused on challenging witness credibility and provided mitigation evidence through family members and a psychologist.On appeal, Alvarez’s counsel raised numerous claims in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA), which affirmed the conviction and death sentence. Subsequent state habeas proceedings involved multiple attorneys and filings, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and issues regarding consultation with the Mexican consulate. Alvarez also asserted the introduction of tainted DNA evidence and misconduct by the Houston Crime Lab. The TCCA dismissed some of these habeas applications as an abuse of the writ, finding certain claims procedurally barred. Alvarez then sought federal habeas relief in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, which denied all claims and refused to grant investigative funding or a certificate of appealability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of habeas relief, analyzing three certified claims: deprivation of counsel due to one attorney allegedly sleeping during trial, ineffective assistance for failing to present additional mitigation evidence, and claims regarding tainted DNA evidence. The Fifth Circuit held that Alvarez was not constitutionally deprived of counsel since his second attorney was actively engaged, and there was no unreasonable application of federal law or unreasonable factual determination by the state courts. It also found no ineffective assistance in the mitigation phase and concluded the DNA-related claims were procedurally barred and, alternatively, meritless. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment denying habeas relief. View "Alvarez v. Guerrero" on Justia Law

Three business entities and individuals associated with the operation of a retail store in Cedar Park, Texas, were subject to enforcement under a city ordinance banning “head shops”—stores selling items commonly used to ingest or inhale illegal substances. After receiving notices from the City, two of the appellants were charged in municipal court and fined for violating the ordinance, while the third appellant, a related business entity, was not charged. Following the municipal court’s judgment, the two charged parties appealed for a trial de novo in the county court, which annulled the municipal court’s judgment and began new criminal proceedings. They also pursued state habeas relief, which was still ongoing at the time of this appeal.Separately, the appellants filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, challenging the ordinance’s validity and constitutionality under federal and state law, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court dismissed all claims as barred by the doctrine announced in Heck v. Humphrey, which precludes certain civil claims that would imply the invalidity of existing criminal convictions. The district court also dismissed a distinct claim related to termination of utility services.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that because the municipal court’s judgments were annulled by the trial de novo and criminal proceedings were still pending under Texas law, there were no outstanding convictions to trigger the Heck bar. Thus, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the claims challenging the ordinance and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the standalone water termination claim, as the appellants had disclaimed any intent to pursue it. View "Kleinman v. City of Cedar Park" on Justia Law

The essential facts of this case involve an individual who was convicted in Mississippi state court for failing to pay child support, an offense punishable by up to five years in prison but for which he ultimately received only probation. After repaying the owed child support and completing probation, the individual was later indicted under federal law, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits firearm possession by anyone previously convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. The predicate offense for the federal charge was the non-payment of child support.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, the defendant twice moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to him, among other constitutional challenges. The district court denied both motions. The defendant subsequently pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement that preserved his right to appeal the Second Amendment issue, leading to this appeal before the Fifth Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that, under the historical inquiry required by the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, there is no historical tradition supporting the permanent disarmament of a person convicted solely of non-payment of child support, particularly where the debt had been repaid and probation completed. The court rejected the government’s analogy between debtors and thieves, noting that founding-era practices treated debtors differently, allowing for temporary disarmament only until the debt was paid. The Fifth Circuit therefore held that the application of § 922(g)(1) to the defendant violated the Second Amendment and reversed the conviction, remanding for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "United States v. Cockerham" on Justia Law

The case centers on Kristal Glover-Wing, who founded and operated Angel Care Hospice (ACH) in Louisiana, a Medicare-certified hospice provider. ACH’s business model involved recruiting local physicians as medical directors who referred patients and certified them as terminally ill, even when evidence showed many patients maintained active lifestyles inconsistent with terminal illness. Glover-Wing instructed staff to emphasize patients’ worst conditions in records and resisted discharging patients who no longer qualified, sometimes directing staff to falsify records or reenroll patients after hospitalizations. An investigation revealed that, for at least twenty-four patients, hospice services were provided and Medicare reimbursed ACH over $1.5 million, despite the patients not meeting eligibility criteria.Following a whistleblower complaint and investigation, a federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana indicted Glover-Wing and two physicians for conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud and three counts of healthcare fraud. During trial, the jury asked if the conspiracy charge could include ACH employees as coconspirators, leading to a dispute over jury instructions. Glover-Wing requested judicial estoppel to prevent the government from expanding the conspiracy beyond named defendants, arguing she relied on prior government representations. The district court denied her requests, and the jury convicted Glover-Wing on all counts while acquitting the physicians. Post-trial, the district court denied Glover-Wing’s motions for acquittal and a new trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed Glover-Wing’s sufficiency-of-evidence and judicial estoppel claims. The court held that sufficient evidence supported all convictions, as a rational jury could find Glover-Wing knowingly participated in fraud and conspiracy. It further held that judicial estoppel did not apply because the government’s positions were not plainly inconsistent, nor accepted by the court, and Glover-Wing failed to show unfair detriment. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Glover-Wing" on Justia Law