Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this case, a Delaware statutory trust, NB Taylor Bend, DST (Taylor Bend), borrowed $13 million from Prudential Mortgage Capital Company, LLC (Prudential) to acquire property in Lafayette County, Mississippi. Patrick and Brian Nelson, who were guarantors of the loan, signed an Indemnity and Guaranty Agreement (the Guaranty) in December 2014, personally guaranteeing the loan. After the loan documents were executed, Prudential assigned the loan to Liberty Island Group I, LLC (Liberty), which in turn assigned the loan to North American Savings Bank, FSB (NASB). By May 2020, Taylor Bend struggled to find tenants for the property due to the COVID-19 pandemic and informed NASB of their financial problems. In May 2021, NASB declared Taylor Bend to be in default after the borrower continually failed to make timely loan payments. NASB then filed an action against the Nelsons in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, asserting claims for breach of the Guaranty, for recovery of the loan balance, and for declaratory judgment.The district court entered partial summary judgment for NASB, holding the Nelsons “breached the [G]uaranty and thus owe[d] to [NASB] the amount remaining due on the subject loan.” The court determined that the Guaranty was “freely assignable” and that Prudential adequately assigned all of its rights and interests to Liberty, which in turn assigned all of its rights and interests to NASB, including those conferred by the Guaranty. The court also concluded that the defenses raised by the Nelsons were “unavailable given the borrower’s absence from this litigation.” The court also granted Brian’s motion for summary judgment against Patrick, ruling that the indemnity agreement between the brothers was valid and binding and that Patrick was contractually required to indemnify Brian for “any and all obligations arising out of or relating to this litigation.”The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the Guaranty was properly assigned from Prudential to Liberty and from Liberty to NASB. NASB could therefore properly bring its claims for breach of guaranty and declaratory judgment against the Nelsons to recover the loan deficiency. Moreover, under Mississippi law, Patrick may not interpose equitable defenses that were available only to Taylor Bend to defeat his liability under the Guaranty. The court also held that the deficiency judgment awarded to NASB pursuant to the Guaranty need not be reduced by the third-party sale of the Apartments to Kirkland. NASB had no duty to mitigate its damages under either Mississippi law or the terms of the Guaranty. View "North American Savings Bank v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Congress assigned implementation of the PPP to the Small Business Administration (SBA). Potential borrowers must have answered “No” to whether “any individual owning 20% or more of the equity of the Applicant [was] subject to an indictment, criminal information, arraignment, or other means by which formal criminal charges are brought in any jurisdiction, or presently incarcerated, or on probation or parole.” When completing a PPP loan application on behalf of law firm Ramey & Schwaller, L.L.P., owner William Ramey answered “No” to that question. Zions Bancorporation, NA, doing business as Amegy Bank, approved the law firm’s application and disbursed a $249,300 loan. Later, the bank learned that Ramey had actually been subject to a criminal complaint accusing him of attempted sexual assault in Harris County, Texas. So the bank held the law firm in default and froze the firm’s accounts as an offset to the loan balance. The law firm then filed this action against the bank, seeking a declaratory judgment that Ramey did not answer the application question falsely. The bank alleged a counterclaim for breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment to the bank and dismissed the law firm’s claims.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that because Ramey was, at least, subject to “means by which formal criminal charges are brought” at the time he completed the Application, he answered Question 5 falsely on behalf of Ramey & Schwaller. Accordingly, the law firm was in default under the PPP loan documents, and the district court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of Amegy Bank. View "Ramey & Schwaller v. Zions Bancorp" on Justia Law

The principal issue in this appeal of a 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) discovery order is whether, in response to the ex parte order authorizing discovery by “interested parties” for use in foreign litigation, the respondents have a right to challenge the order’s validity pursuant to statutory requirements and the Supreme Court’s “Intel factors.”    The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that the district court here misconstrued the court’s precedent and erroneously rebuffed Respondents’ challenge on its face. The court explained that the uncontested facts suggest the possibility that (a) some of the sought discovery is accessible currently in the foreign courts; (b) Appellees’ object here is to obtain unredacted copies of that which may be protected by law in the Portuguese proceedings; and (c) therefore, the requests in many aspects pose an undue burden on the appellants. The court wrote it does not express an opinion on these points but notes that they were never thoroughly vetted in the district court because of the court’s refusal to reconsider the Intel factors and the truncated discussion of “interested parties” under Section 1728(a). Thus, by refusing to consider Appellants’ arguments and evidence challenging whether the Appellees satisfied the statutory criteria and the Intel factors to obtain Section 1782(a) discovery, the district court misapplied the law and abused its discretion. View "Banca Pueyo SA v. Lone Star Fund IX" on Justia Law

Triller Inc., a social media company was being sold to a group of owners, including Carnegie Technologies, Inc. Prior to the sale, Triller executed a promissory note in favor of Carnegie and then immediately assigned the note to a group of “legacy” owners—including Carnegie—as part of the deal’s closing. After the note was defaulted, Carnegie sued Triller to collect the amounts due. Triller claimed that it had no obligations under the note because it had been assigned, resulting in novation. The district court rejected Triller's novation defense and Triller appealed.The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that the plain meaning of the agreement was silent on the extinction of any obligation between Triller and Carnegie. The laws of both California and Texas require clear evidence illustrating the parties' intent to replace an earlier agreement, and the agreement's merger clause precludes evidence of a contemporaneous or earlier agreement. Thus, the court held that Triller failed to raise an issue of material fact regarding whether its obligations under the note were extinguished. View "Carnegie Technologies. v. Triller" on Justia Law

Plaintiff took out a home equity loan on a house in Texas (“Property”). Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (“Deutsche Bank”) is the trustee of the loan. Deutsche Bank sought a non-judicial foreclosure order on the Property.   Plaintiff sued Deutsche Bank in Texas state court, alleging violations of the Texas Debt Collection Act (“TDCA”), breach of the common-law duty of cooperation, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. Despite the stipulation, Deutsche Bank removed the case to federal district court. Plaintiff then moved to remand the case back to Texas state court because, in his view, the amount in controversy could not exceed the stipulated maximum of $74,500. The district court denied Plaintiff’s motion to remand.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and concluded that the district court erred in denying Plaintiff’s motion to remand, and it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction when it entered final judgment. The court reasoned that Deutsche Bank failed to establish that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional floor of $75,000.   The court first noted that the bank points out that Plaintiff’s suit requested relief which might be read to suggest Plaintiff also sought injunctive relief. But the bank makes that argument only to establish that Plaintiff’s initial pleading seeks nonmonetary relief not to establish that the requested nonmonetary relief put the house in controversy. Whatever the merit of that latter contention might otherwise be, the court held that Deutsche Bank forfeited it. Moreover, the mere fact that Plaintiff pleaded a demand for specific damages cannot support bad faith. View "Durbois v. Deutsche Bank Ntl Trust" on Justia Law

Plaintiff experienced financial difficulties and applied for a loan modification. In response, CitiMortgage mailed Plaintiff an offer to participate in a Trial Period Plan (“TPP”). The TPP provided that “the terms of your  TPP are effective on the day you make your first trial period payment, provided you have paid it on or before the last day of [January 2019].” Plaintiff effectively accepted the terms of the TPP when he made the first trial period payment of $1,293.66. CitiMortgage sent him a letter informing him that he was “ineligible” for the loan modification and then posted Plaintiff’s property for foreclosure.   Plaintiff filed suit against CitiMortgage in state court, asserting claims for breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment to CitiMortgage concluding that Plaintiff failed to comply with the TPP’s payment deadlines.   The Fifth Circuit reversed finding that Plaintiff met his obligations under the TPP by making timely payments. CitiMortgage, by contrast, violated its obligations by refusing to grant the permanent loan modification and proceeding with foreclosure. The court explained that the TPP establishes a grace period. It accepts payment so long as it is made “in the month in which it is due.” Neither the TPP nor the parties use the term “grace period” to describe this language. But that is plainly what the text contemplates. And no one disputes that Plaintiff’s payments comply with the governing grace periods. CitiMortgage has offered no reason why favoring the monthly deadlines and ignoring the grace period would “do the least damage” to the text of the TPP. View "Burbridge v. CitiMortgage" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's putative class action against the Bank for failure to state a claim because extended overdraft charges were not "interest" under the National Bank Act of 1864. In this case, deference to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency's interpretation of these regulations is appropriate, and the agency's determination in Interpretive Letter 1082 that the type of bank fees at issue here—that the Bank refers to as extended overdraft charges—are noninterest charges is a sufficient basis to resolve this case. The court explained that, because extended overdraft charges are non-interest charges, they are not subject to the Act's usury limits. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiff already availed herself of the opportunity the district court provided to conduct discovery, and because plaintiff's complaint is deficient under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, she is not entitled to discovery. View "Johnson v. BOKF National Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the FDIC receiver (FDIC-R) and the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) dismissal of Lexon's Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) claim against the FDIC in its corporate capacity. In this case, Lexon filed suit against the FDIC-R alleging violations of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA).The court concluded that the district court did not err in sua sponte granting summary judgment. Although the district court erred in failing to notify the parties, that error was harmless. The court held that letters of credit are repudiable contracts for the purposes of 12 U.S.C. 1821(e)(1); the FDIC-R repudiated the letters of credit within a "reasonable period" under section 1821(e)(2); and Lexon lacks "actual direct compensatory damages" under FIRREA. The court also concluded that Lexon failed to establish an analogous private liability and the district court correctly dismissed Lexon's FTCA claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Lexon Insurance Co., Inc. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp." on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the tax court and held that MoneyGram, a global payment services company, is not a "bank" under the tax code, 26 U.S.C. 581, because customers do not give MoneyGram money for safekeeping, which is the most basic feature of a bank. The court explained that purchasers of money orders are not placing funds with MoneyGram for safekeeping. Nor are the financial institutions that use MoneyGram to process official checks doing so for the purpose of safekeeping. In this case, examining the substance of MoneyGram's business confirms how the company has long described itself on its tax returns: as a nondepository institution. Therefore, without deposits, MoneyGram cannot be a bank. View "MoneyGram International, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

After Wells Fargo foreclosed on plaintiffs' home, they filed suit to set aside the foreclosure sale, to cancel the trustee’s deed, to quiet title, and for trespass to try title (collectively, the foreclosure-sale claims). Plaintiffs also filed claims for alleged violations of the Texas Debt Collection Act (TDCA), Texas Financial Code sections 392.301(a)(8) and 392.304(a)(8), and of their due process rights. Alternatively, plaintiffs asserted claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and money had and received.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the foreclosure-sale claims where the undisputed evidence shows that Wells Fargo properly served notice; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the due process claim where it was not only untimely, but also inextricably tied to the non-meritorious foreclosure-sale claims; and dismissed the remaining claims. In this case, Wells Fargo was not prohibited by law from foreclosing and the district court did not err in dismissing this TDCA claim; Wells Fargo did not violate the Texas Finance Code; and the claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and money had and received are unpersuasive. View "Douglas v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law