Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Nickolas Trabucco parked at a gas station in Hernando, Mississippi, where Officer Andres Rivera was filling up his patrol car. Rivera approached Trabucco’s car, and after a brief interaction, Trabucco exited his vehicle. The subsequent events, partially obscured by the car, are disputed. Trabucco claimed Rivera grabbed and tackled him without provocation, while Rivera testified that Trabucco resisted and attempted to flee, prompting Rivera to tackle him. Surveillance footage showed Rivera restraining Trabucco, who continued to struggle. Rivera then used a taser on Trabucco, who fell and was subsequently arrested.In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, Trabucco sued Rivera under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force. The jury found that Rivera used excessive force but was entitled to qualified immunity. Trabucco’s motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial were denied by the district court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court first addressed whether Trabucco waived his right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence by not properly moving for judgment as a matter of law. The court found that Trabucco’s actions sufficiently alerted the court and Rivera to the sufficiency issue, allowing the court to consider the evidence. The court then held that Rivera’s use of force was not unreasonable in light of clearly established law, distinguishing this case from precedents like Trammell v. Fruge and Hanks v. Rogers due to factual differences. The court also found no error in the jury instructions and upheld the district court’s denial of Trabucco’s motion for a new trial, concluding that the evidence supported the jury’s verdict. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Trabucco v. Rivera" on Justia Law

Following Hurricane Ida in 2021, Terrebonne Parish requested assistance from Lafayette Utilities Systems (LUS) to help restore power in Houma, Louisiana. LUS, in turn, requested help from the City of Wilson, North Carolina. Agreements were signed to facilitate emergency assistance, and the City of Wilson dispatched employees to Louisiana. Due to a shortage of hotels in Houma, the employees stayed in Lafayette and commuted daily. Kevin Worrell, a City of Wilson employee, was involved in a vehicle collision while driving from Houma to Lafayette, resulting in injuries to Edward and Linda Breaux and Jessie and Vickie Blanchard.The plaintiffs filed separate negligence lawsuits in Louisiana state court, which were removed to the federal district court in the Western District of Louisiana. The cases were consolidated, and the defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting immunity under the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act. The district court granted summary judgment, finding statutory immunity, and dismissed the plaintiffs' claims with prejudice. The plaintiffs appealed, challenging the district court's interpretation of the Act's immunity provision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted the need to interpret the Louisiana emergency preparedness law and expressed doubt about its ability to make a reliable Erie guess. Consequently, the court certified two questions to the Louisiana Supreme Court: (1) whether an employee of a city from another state working under an emergency assistance agreement is a "representative" of Louisiana or its political subdivisions, and (2) whether an individual providing emergency assistance is "engaging in emergency preparedness and recovery activities" while commuting from the recovery site to lodging. The Fifth Circuit will resolve the case based on the Louisiana Supreme Court's guidance. View "Breaux v. Worrell" on Justia Law

An inmate at Rayburn Correctional Center in Louisiana, Torriana Clark, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against prison officials, alleging that Lt. Lance Wallace used excessive force against him, violating his constitutional rights. Clark claimed that after feeling sick and seeking medical help, he was forcibly restrained and assaulted by Wallace, resulting in injuries. The prison officials' reports contradicted Clark's account, stating that Clark was combative and resisted orders, necessitating the use of force to restrain him.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted partial summary judgment in favor of the defendants, ruling that Clark's § 1983 claim was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, which prevents prisoners from seeking damages under § 1983 if a judgment in their favor would imply the invalidity of their conviction or sentence. The district court also denied Clark's motion to amend his petition and remanded his state-law claims to state court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Clark's § 1983 claim was indeed barred by Heck because success on his claim would require proof of facts inconsistent with his disciplinary convictions, which resulted in the loss of good-time credits. The court also agreed with the district court's denial of Clark's motion to amend his petition, concluding that any amendment would be futile as it would not change the Heck analysis. The appellate court's decision upheld the partial summary judgment and the denial of the motion to amend. View "Clark v. Dept of Public Safety" on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs, including individuals and community organizations, challenged the constitutionality of Louisiana’s Infrastructure Trespass Statute, arguing that amendments to the statute rendered it unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, violating the Due Process Clause and the First Amendment. The statute criminalizes unauthorized entry into critical infrastructure, including pipelines, and imposes significant penalties for violations.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, including the Louisiana Attorney General, the District Attorney of the 16th Judicial District, and the Sheriff of St. Martin Parish. The district court dismissed claims against the Attorney General on sovereign immunity grounds and found that the Advocacy and Landowner Plaintiffs lacked standing. The court also dismissed the Arrested Plaintiffs' as-applied claims as moot due to the expiration of the statute of limitations for their alleged violations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of claims against the Attorney General, agreeing that the Ex Parte Young exception to sovereign immunity did not apply. The court also upheld the dismissal of the Advocacy and Landowner Plaintiffs for lack of standing, finding that their alleged injuries were not traceable to or redressable by the remaining defendants. The court agreed that the Arrested Plaintiffs had standing for their facial challenges but affirmed the dismissal of their as-applied claims as moot.On the merits, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Infrastructure Trespass Statute was neither impermissibly vague nor violative of the First Amendment. The court found that the statute provided sufficient notice of prohibited conduct and did not authorize arbitrary enforcement. The court also determined that the statute was not overbroad, as it served a substantial governmental interest in protecting critical infrastructure and did not substantially burden protected speech. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "White Hat v. Murrill" on Justia Law

A group of staffing companies in Texas challenged a memorandum issued by the former General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), Jennifer Abruzzo. The memorandum outlined a plan to urge the NLRB to reverse its holding in a previous case, Babcock, which allowed employers to compel employees to attend meetings where they were urged to reject union representation. The staffing companies argued that the memorandum violated their First Amendment rights by restricting their speech about unionization and sought an injunction and declaratory judgment against its enforcement.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the plaintiffs were challenging unreviewable prosecutorial decisions by the NLRB General Counsel, that the NLRA's scheme precluded jurisdiction, and that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The staffing companies appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its dismissal and that they had standing because the memorandum applied to them and was a final agency action reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the staffing companies lacked standing. The court noted that the plaintiffs had not provided evidence of a credible threat of enforcement of the memorandum causing them direct injury. The court also found that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate an intent to engage in conduct regulated by the memorandum, as there was no known unionization attempt at their businesses. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to establish a credible threat of enforcement or a substantial risk of future injury.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case for lack of standing. View "Burnett Specialists v. Cowen" on Justia Law

In March 2020, Jose Gonzalez visited a Walgreens store in Austin, Texas. An unidentified customer had clogged the toilet in the men's restroom and was given a plunger by a Walgreens employee to fix it. While the customer was attempting to unclog the toilet, Gonzalez entered the restroom and slipped on water that had accumulated on the floor. Gonzalez sued Walgreens for his injuries.The case was initially filed in Texas state court but was removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas based on diversity jurisdiction. Gonzalez asserted a theory of vicarious liability and a claim for premises liability against Walgreens. The district court dismissed the vicarious liability theory and denied Walgreens's motion for summary judgment on the premises liability claim. After Gonzalez presented his case at trial, Walgreens moved for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL), which the district court granted, finding that Walgreens had no actual or constructive knowledge of the wet floor. Gonzalez's motion for a new trial was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's JMOL, holding that no reasonable jury could find that Walgreens had actual or constructive knowledge of the wet floor. The court found that Gonzalez failed to provide sufficient evidence that Walgreens knew or should have known about the hazardous condition. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Gonzalez's vicarious liability theory, stating that the allegations constituted a premises liability claim, not a basis for vicarious liability. The court concluded that Walgreens did not have a policy or practice that it knew routinely created an unreasonable risk of harm, distinguishing this case from others where such knowledge was established. View "Gonzalez v. Walgreen" on Justia Law

Mark Hamilton, the former Chief of the Fire Department of Wilmer, Texas, was terminated after testifying at a probation revocation hearing for a former employee, Craig Lawrence, who had hidden recording devices in fire station bathrooms. Hamilton testified in uniform, drove a city car to the hearing, and did not take leave from work. He claimed his termination was in retaliation for his protected First Amendment activity.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed Hamilton's complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court found that Hamilton did not state a claim for First Amendment retaliation, as his speech was not protected under the First Amendment. Hamilton appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Hamilton did not speak as a citizen on a matter of public concern, as his testimony was given pursuant to his official duties as Fire Chief. The court also found that even if Hamilton's speech were protected, the City of Wilmer had adequate justification for treating him differently from any other member of the public due to his use of city resources and uniform during his testimony. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Hamilton's claims and denied his request for leave to amend his complaint, finding that any amendment would be futile. View "Hamilton v. City of Wilmer, Texas" on Justia Law

Casey Cotton rear-ended Caleb Crabtree, causing significant injuries. Cotton, insured by Allstate, faced potential liability exceeding his policy limit. Allstate allegedly refused to settle with Crabtree and failed to inform Cotton of the settlement negotiations or his potential liability, giving Cotton a potential bad-faith claim against Allstate. The Crabtrees sued Cotton, who declared bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court allowed the personal-injury action to proceed, resulting in a $4 million judgment for the Crabtrees, making them judgment creditors in the bankruptcy proceeding. Cotton’s bad-faith claim was classified as an asset of the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court allowed the Crabtrees to purchase Cotton’s bad-faith claim for $10,000, which they financed through Court Properties, Inc.The Crabtrees sued Allstate, asserting Cotton’s bad-faith claim. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the assignments of Cotton’s claim to Court Properties and then to the Crabtrees were champertous and void under Mississippi law. Consequently, the court found that the Crabtrees lacked Article III standing as they had not suffered any injury from Allstate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court certified a question to the Supreme Court of Mississippi regarding the validity of the assignments under Mississippi’s champerty statute. The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the statute prohibits a disinterested third party engaged by a bankruptcy creditor from purchasing a cause of action from a debtor’s estate. Based on this ruling, the Fifth Circuit held that the assignment of Cotton’s claim to Court Properties was void, and thus, the Crabtrees did not possess Cotton’s bad-faith claim. Therefore, the Crabtrees lacked standing to sue Allstate, and the district court’s dismissal was affirmed. View "Crabtree v. Allstate Property" on Justia Law

In 2008, a class action was filed against officials from the City of Tenaha and Shelby County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs claimed that the officials had an illegal practice of targeting and seizing property from racial or ethnic minorities. A settlement agreement, including a consent decree, was reached, requiring the defendants to follow specific procedures to prevent future illegal stops. The decree also included a court-appointed monitor to ensure compliance. The consent decree was initially entered in 2013, amended in 2019, and expired in July 2020. Plaintiffs' motion to extend the decree was denied, and the County Defendants settled, leaving only the City Defendants in the case.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas handled the case, where class counsel filed four motions for attorney fees. The first three motions were granted, totaling $324,773.90. The fourth motion requested $88,553.33 for fees from April to December 2020. Initially denied as untimely, the decision was vacated and remanded by the appellate court. On reconsideration, the district court awarded $16,020, reducing the hourly rates and the hours deemed reasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court failed to provide class-wide notice of the attorney-fee motion as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h). This failure deprived class members of the opportunity to object to the fee motion. The appellate court held that the district court abused its discretion by not enforcing the notice requirement and vacated the fee award, remanding the case for further proceedings to ensure compliance with Rule 23(h). View "Morrow v. Jones" on Justia Law

Dow Construction, L.L.C. leased property within a forced pooled drilling unit operated by BPX Operating Company. Dow received proceeds from the unit but disputed the deduction of post-production costs by BPX. Dow sought a judgment to recover these costs, while BPX sought dismissal and summary judgment on various grounds.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana held that Dow had standing to sue and that the Louisiana doctrine of negotiorum gestio allowed operators to recover post-production costs. The court also ruled that the forced-pooling statute’s forfeiture provision included post-production costs and that claims under this statute were subject to a ten-year prescriptive period. BPX's motions to dismiss and for summary judgment were partially granted and denied, leading to an interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s interpretation that La. Rev. Stat. § 30:10(A)(3) applies to mineral interest owners unleased by the operator. However, it vacated the district court’s ruling that negotiorum gestio allows operators to recover post-production costs, following a Louisiana Supreme Court decision in Self v. BPX Operating Co. The court affirmed that post-production costs are included within the forfeiture provision of La. Rev. Stat. § 30:103.2. Finally, the court reversed the district court’s finding on the prescriptive period, holding that claims under § 30:103.2 are subject to a one-year prescriptive period, not ten years.The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings. View "Dow Construction v. BPX Operating Co." on Justia Law