Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute between the law firm Abraham Watkins Nichols Agosto Aziz & Stogner and its former associate, Edward Festeryga. Abraham Watkins terminated Festeryga’s employment after discovering that he attempted to take clients and firm files to a new firm. Abraham Watkins sued Festeryga in Texas state court for conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and tortious interference with contract. Festeryga moved to dismiss the suit under Texas’s anti-SLAPP statute, the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA), which stayed the expedited discovery sought by Abraham Watkins. Despite agreeing to produce certain documents, Festeryga filed a notice of removal to federal court, claiming diversity jurisdiction as a Canadian citizen.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas remanded the case back to state court. The district court did not address whether Festeryga had shown diversity of citizenship but concluded that Festeryga waived his right to remove by participating in state court proceedings, specifically by filing a TCPA motion to dismiss. The district court found that this action demonstrated an intent to invoke the jurisdiction of the state court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case to determine if it had appellate jurisdiction over the remand order. The court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction, citing its precedent in In re Weaver, which held that waiver-based remand orders are jurisdictional under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) and thus unappealable under § 1447(d). The court noted that although it disagreed with the reasoning in Weaver, it was bound by the rule of orderliness to follow the precedent. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Abraham Watkins Nichols Agosto Aziz & Stogner v. Festeryga" on Justia Law

Marek Matthews, a seaman and captain, filed a lawsuit against Tidewater, Inc. and Tidewater Crewing, Ltd., alleging that he was exposed to toxic chemicals during his employment, resulting in severe health issues including end-stage renal failure and stage IV cancer. Matthews, a Florida resident, claimed that the exposure occurred while working on offshore supply vessels in the Red Sea. His employment contract included a forum-selection clause mandating that any disputes be litigated in the High Court of Justice in London, England.Initially, Matthews and other plaintiffs filed the suit in Louisiana state court, asserting claims under the Jones Act and general maritime law. Tidewater removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana and moved to dismiss it based on the forum-selection clause and, alternatively, for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds, finding the forum-selection clause valid and enforceable. Matthews's subsequent motion to reconsider the dismissal was denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the forum-selection clause was enforceable. The court applied a de novo review to the enforceability of the clause and an abuse of discretion standard to the forum non conveniens analysis. It concluded that Matthews did not meet the heavy burden of proving the clause was unreasonable under the circumstances, despite his health conditions and Louisiana's public policy against such clauses. The court emphasized the federal policy favoring the enforcement of forum-selection clauses in maritime contracts, which outweighed the conflicting state policy. View "Matthews v. Tidewater" on Justia Law

Dean Dabbasi was terminated by his employer, Motiva Enterprises, in 2019. Dabbasi filed a lawsuit alleging age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA), as well as disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the TCHRA. He claimed that his termination was due to his age and a cardiac incident he experienced during a performance improvement plan (PIP) meeting. Motiva argued that Dabbasi was terminated for poor performance and attitude.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of Motiva. The court found that Dabbasi's claims related to his transition to a different role and the failure to place him in a promised position were time-barred or not actionable. The court also held that Dabbasi failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination because he was not replaced by someone younger in his final position. Additionally, the court concluded that Dabbasi was not disabled at the time of his termination, as he returned to work without restrictions after his medical leave.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court erred in evaluating Dabbasi's age-discrimination claim in isolation rather than considering the totality of the evidence. The appellate court determined that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Dabbasi was terminated because of his age. However, the court agreed with the district court that Dabbasi failed to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, as he was not disabled at the time of his termination.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Dabbasi's disability-discrimination claim but reversed the summary judgment on his age-discrimination claim, remanding it for further proceedings. View "Dabbasi v. Motiva Enterprises" on Justia Law

Caris MPI, Inc. (Caris) provided cancer diagnostic services to UnitedHealthcare, Inc. (United) for over ten years without a written contract. United audited Caris’s past claims and determined that Caris had used incorrect billing codes, resulting in overpayments. United began recouping these overpayments by offsetting them against new payment claims from Caris. Caris challenged United’s recoupment through United’s internal process, but after United rejected Caris’s appeals, Caris filed suit in Texas state court alleging various state law claims.United removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, asserting federal officer jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). The district court denied Caris’s motion to remand and dismissed Caris’s claims without prejudice, finding that Caris failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the Medicare Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and agreed that federal officer jurisdiction existed. However, the court found that the district court erred in dismissing Caris’s claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Fifth Circuit held that the administrative review process under Medicare Part C does not extend to claims where an enrollee has no interest, and there were no administrative remedies for Caris to exhaust. The court distinguished this case from others by noting that no enrollee had requested an organization determination or appeal, and all enrollees had already received the services for which United sought recoupment. Consequently, the court affirmed the denial of the remand motion, reversed the dismissal of Caris’s claims, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Caris MPI v. UnitedHealthcare, Incorporated" on Justia Law

John Craig First purchased an agricultural combine from Rolling Plains Implement Company, which was manufactured by AGCO Corporation. First was told the combine was part of AGCO’s Certified Pre-Owned Program, had roughly 400 hours of use, and had never been to the field. However, these representations were false; the combine was not certified and had over 1,200 hours of use. After experiencing numerous issues with the combine, First discovered in 2019 that it had an extensive repair history and over 900 hours of use. He then filed a lawsuit against Rolling Plains, AGCO Corporation, AGCO Service, AGCO Finance, and other related entities.Initially, First filed his lawsuit in the District Court of Oklahoma County, but it was removed to federal court in Oklahoma, which dismissed the case without prejudice and transferred it to the Northern District of Texas. First amended his complaint multiple times, asserting claims of fraud, breach of warranty, and failure of essential purpose. The district court dismissed the fraud claims against AGCO Corporation, AGCO Service, and AGCO Finance for lack of particularity and granted summary judgment in favor of AGCO Finance on the warranty claims. The case proceeded to trial on the remaining claims, where the jury found that First knew or should have known of the fraud by April 13, 2017, and awarded him $96,000 in damages. However, the district court entered judgment in favor of Rolling Plains based on the statute of limitations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It vacated the district court’s judgment as a matter of law in favor of Rolling Plains, finding insufficient evidence to support the jury’s selected date for the statute of limitations. The case was remanded for retrial on when First’s cause of action accrued. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of fraud claims against AGCO Corporation, AGCO Service, and AGCO Finance, and upheld the summary judgment in favor of AGCO Finance on the warranty claims. View "First v. Rolling Plains Implement Co." on Justia Law

The case involves Lion Elastomers, a synthetic rubber manufacturer, and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Lion Elastomers had been found guilty of unfair labor practices by the NLRB for threatening, disciplining, and discharging an employee, Joseph Colone, for engaging in protected activities. The NLRB applied the Atlantic Steel standard to assess whether Colone's behavior lost its protected status. However, before the appeal of the Board’s decision had been briefed, the NLRB issued a new interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) in a case called General Motors, which overruled Atlantic Steel. The NLRB then sought a remand to apply this new interpretation to the Lion Elastomers case.The case was remanded to the NLRB by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. However, instead of applying the new interpretation from General Motors as expected, the NLRB used the remand proceeding to overrule General Motors and return to the Atlantic Steel standard. Lion Elastomers argued that the NLRB exceeded the scope of the remand and violated its due-process rights during the remand proceeding.The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Lion Elastomers. The court found that the NLRB had exceeded the scope of the remand by not applying the General Motors standard as expected. The court also found that the NLRB had violated Lion Elastomers's due-process rights by not giving the company an opportunity to be heard before deciding to overturn General Motors. The court vacated the NLRB's decision and remanded the case back to the NLRB, instructing it to apply the General Motors standard to this case. View "Lion Elastomers v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

The case involves Holston Banks, a convicted prisoner, who sued John Spence for excessive use of force in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. The incident occurred in 2017, and Banks filed his lawsuit in October 2019. In April 2022, Spence moved to extend the deadline for filing an amended pleading, which was initially set for May 2, 2022. The court denied the motion but later extended the deadline to May 25, 2022, after a joint motion for an agreed amended scheduling order. On May 24, Spence filed an amended answer to Banks's complaint.Spence moved for judgment on the pleadings in September, arguing that Banks's Fourteenth Amendment claim was not applicable to convicted prisoners. He also claimed that Banks failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim. Banks's counsel became aware of the Eighth/Fourteenth Amendment distinction in August. On October 6, 134 days after the deadline and 38 days after Banks's counsel became aware of the issue, Banks moved to amend his claim to assert an Eighth Amendment claim. The district court denied the motion and granted judgment on the pleadings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court applied the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4), which requires the party seeking relief to show that the deadlines could not reasonably be met despite their diligence. The court found that Banks's counsel's failure to understand the applicable law until after the deadline had passed was not an adequate explanation for the delay in amending the claim. The court cited previous cases where a lack of explanation for delay was sufficient to deny amendment. Therefore, the court affirmed the denial of Banks's motion to amend. View "Banks v. Spence" on Justia Law

The case involves First Baptist Church of Iowa, Louisiana (FB Church) and Church Mutual Insurance Company, S.I. (CM Insurance). FB Church sued CM Insurance for failing to pay benefits for property damage caused by Hurricane Laura under an insurance policy. The property included three buildings: the main church, a parsonage, and a vacant building. After the hurricane, FB Church reported the loss to CM Insurance, which then hired a third-party administrator to adjust the loss. The administrator estimated the total loss at $630,000 before deductibles. However, FB Church was dissatisfied with how its claim was being handled and hired a public adjuster, who prepared an estimate of over $1 million in damages. FB Church then sued CM Insurance, alleging claims for additional covered losses and for statutory penalties, costs, and attorney’s fees under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 22:1892.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana found in favor of FB Church, awarding it damages, statutory penalties, attorney’s fees, and costs. CM Insurance appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court agreed with the district court that CM Insurance failed to adjust the claim and that FB Church was entitled to statutory penalties. However, the court found that the district court erred in calculating damages based on prices in January 2023 instead of at the time of loss, and in awarding any damages for slab repair and damages in excess of $4,500 for the sanctuary’s electrical repair. The case was remanded for recalculation of damages. View "First Baptist Church of Iowa, Louisiana v. Church Mutual Insurance, S.I." on Justia Law

Three Black citizens of Caddo Parish, Louisiana, Darryl Carter, Diane Johnson, and Theresa Hawthorne, were struck from jury duty during voir dire in 2015. They alleged that their removal violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, claiming that the Caddo Parish prosecutors peremptorily struck them based on their race. The plaintiffs joined an ongoing litigation challenging the Caddo District Attorney's alleged custom of racially biased peremptory strikes. They sued District Attorney James E. Stewart, in his official capacity, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.The district court dismissed all plaintiffs except Carter, Johnson, and Hawthorne. The District Attorney then moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The plaintiffs appealed this decision, leading to a de novo review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the plaintiffs could not establish a predicate constitutional violation, which is necessary for a Monell claim. The prosecutors had provided race-neutral explanations for each plaintiff's dismissal. For Carter, the prosecutor noted his expressed bias against evidence from Shreveport. For Johnson, the prosecutor highlighted her potential bias against the police department due to a family member's felony conviction. For Hawthorne, the prosecutor found her colloquies with defense counsel problematic due to her preconceived notions about firearm possession. The court found these explanations sufficient and not merely pretexts for race-based dismissals. The court also noted that the plaintiffs' statistical evidence did not prove discriminatory motive. Without an underlying Equal Protection claim, the plaintiffs' Monell claim failed. View "Pipkins v. Stewart" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of civil rights organizations, voters, and an election official who sought to challenge recent amendments to Texas's election code, alleging that these amendments violated the United States Constitution and several federal statutes. The defendant was the District Attorney for Harris County, sued in her official capacity. The district court denied the District Attorney's motion to dismiss, holding that she was not immune from the plaintiffs' constitutional claims and that the plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims against her.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal and that the district court should have dismissed the plaintiffs' constitutional claims as barred by sovereign immunity. The court did not reach the issue of standing. The court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings.The court's decision was based on the principle of sovereign immunity, which generally protects state officials from being sued in their official capacities. However, there is an exception to this rule, known as the Ex parte Young exception, which allows federal courts to enjoin state officials from enforcing unconstitutional state statutes. The court found that the District Attorney did not have a sufficient connection to the enforcement of the challenged laws to fall within this exception. Therefore, the court concluded that the District Attorney was immune from the plaintiffs' constitutional claims. View "Mi Familia Vota v. Ogg" on Justia Law