Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A group of small-business manufacturers of e-liquids and a trade association representing vapor product manufacturers challenged a rule issued by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) under the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009. The 2009 Act requires FDA authorization before new tobacco products—including electronic nicotine delivery systems—can be marketed, mandating that applications demonstrate the product is “appropriate for the protection of the public health.” The FDA’s 2016 “Deeming Rule” extended these requirements to e-liquids and vapor products, and in 2021, the FDA issued a Final Rule detailing requirements for premarket tobacco product applications (PMTAs). Plaintiffs argued the Final PMTA Rule violated the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) because the FDA’s certification that the rule would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities was arbitrary and capricious.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of the FDA. It found the agency satisfied the procedural requirements of the RFA by considering and certifying the economic impact of the Final PMTA Rule, and that plaintiffs’ objections were substantive disagreements with the factual basis rather than procedural defects.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The Fifth Circuit applied a deferential standard, focusing on whether the FDA made a “reasonable, good-faith effort” to comply with the RFA’s procedural requirements. The court held that the FDA’s certification was supported by the factual record, including analysis in the 2016 Deeming Rule, and that the agency provided adequate consideration and reasoned rejection of regulatory alternatives. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the FDA complied with the Regulatory Flexibility Act when promulgating the Final PMTA Rule. View "Kealani Distribution v. FDA" on Justia Law

David Lopez, Jr. pleaded guilty to two counts of transportation of child pornography and two counts of possession of child pornography. He participated in online chatrooms where access to child pornography was conditioned on submitting such images to the group. These chatrooms required frequent submission of materials to avoid expulsion as a “lurker.” Upon his conviction, the district court relied on the presentence investigation report, which concluded that Lopez’s conduct warranted sentencing enhancements, including a five-level increase for distributing child pornography in exchange for valuable consideration (but not for pecuniary gain) and another five-level increase for engaging in a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas imposed both enhancements, resulting in an offense level of forty-two and a criminal history category of V, with a Guidelines range of 360 months to life imprisonment. The court sentenced Lopez to 360 months, the low end of the Guidelines range, with concurrent sentences for all counts and a life term of supervised release. Lopez timely appealed, disputing both enhancements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the application of the enhancements. The appellate court held that the district court properly applied the distribution enhancement because evidence supported that Lopez implicitly agreed to exchange child pornography with chatroom participants to obtain more such material. However, the appellate court found that the district court plainly erred in applying the pattern enhancement, as Lopez’s convictions and prior state offense did not establish two qualifying instances of sexual abuse or exploitation. The Fifth Circuit vacated Lopez’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, instructing the district court to reconsider the pattern enhancement and addressing whether new evidence may be presented. View "USA v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Bradford entered into a service agreement with a Texas-based pest control company, Sovereign Pest Control, and as part of this agreement, provided his cell phone number to the company. Bradford later acknowledged that he gave his number so the company could contact him if needed. During their business relationship, Sovereign Pest made several pre-recorded calls to Bradford’s cell phone, including calls to schedule renewal inspections, after which Bradford scheduled inspections and renewed his service plan multiple times.Bradford initiated a putative class-action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, alleging that Sovereign Pest violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA) by sending him unsolicited pre-recorded calls without his “prior express written consent.” The district court granted summary judgment for Sovereign Pest, holding that the calls did not constitute telemarketing and that Bradford had given prior express consent. Bradford appealed, arguing that the calls were telemarketing and that he had not given the required consent.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the summary judgment de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the TCPA only requires “prior express consent,” which can be either oral or written, for any pre-recorded call to a wireless number, regardless of whether the call is telemarketing or informational. The court found that Bradford had provided prior express consent by voluntarily giving his cell phone number to the company in connection with the service agreement and by his subsequent conduct. It concluded that the statute does not require “prior express written consent” for telemarketing calls and that Bradford’s arguments to the contrary were unavailing. The Fifth Circuit therefore affirmed summary judgment in favor of Sovereign Pest. View "Bradford v. Sovereign Pest" on Justia Law

Michael Hickson, who had become severely disabled following cardiac arrest and anoxic brain injury in 2017, was hospitalized multiple times for recurring infections but recovered from several serious episodes. In June 2020, while hospitalized for pneumonia, sepsis, and suspected COVID-19, his doctors at St. David’s Healthcare assessed him as having a 70% chance of survival. Despite this, he was placed on hospice care and a do-not-resuscitate order was issued, with medical staff indicating that his inability to walk or talk equated to a poor quality of life. Life-sustaining treatment, including food and fluids, was withdrawn, even as his condition temporarily improved. Michael’s family, led by his wife Melissa Hickson, sought answers and attempted to visit him, but were repeatedly denied access and information. Michael ultimately passed away, and subsequent public statements by the hospital disclosed protected health information and cast aspersions on Melissa’s fitness as a guardian.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed or granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims, including disability discrimination under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and § 1557 of the ACA, § 1983 claims, state-law medical negligence, informed consent, wrongful death, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiffs objected to the recommendations for dismissal of the disability discrimination and § 1983 claims; the district court overruled these objections and dismissed those claims with prejudice. The remaining state-law claims were later resolved on summary judgment.Upon de novo review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that disability discrimination claims based on alleged denial of medical treatment solely due to disability are cognizable and may proceed. The court also vacated and remanded the dismissals of the informed consent and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, but affirmed dismissal of the § 1983 claims and other state-law claims. View "Hickson v. St. David's Healthcare Partnership" on Justia Law

A woman was reported to military authorities at Joint Base San Antonio Lackland by a concerned parent in April 2022. The parent alleged that the woman sent explicit text messages to her thirteen-year-old son, provided him a cell phone, and facilitated meetings between him and her own twelve-year-old daughter. An investigation revealed that the woman encouraged and orchestrated sexual activity and explicit exchanges between the children. She was charged with several federal sex offenses but, pursuant to a plea agreement, pleaded guilty to a single offense—Sexual Performance by a Child—under the Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), which incorporates Texas Penal Code § 43.25 into federal law.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas classified her conviction as a Class A felony by reference to the Texas statute’s penalties. The Presentence Report (PSR) and the district court applied 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k), which governs supervised release for enumerated federal sex offenses, sentencing her to 325 months in prison and thirty years of supervised release. She appealed her sentence, arguing that the proper statutory maximum for supervised release should be five years under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b), not the five years to life provided by § 3583(k). The government responded that the sentence was permissible, as it did not exceed the Texas statutory maximum and that the most analogous federal offense fell within § 3583(k).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that § 3583(k) applies only to the specific federal offenses enumerated within it and not to offenses assimilated under the ACA. The court found the statutory text unambiguous and determined that the supervised release term for the assimilated state offense was subject to the general five-year maximum set by § 3583(b). The court vacated the thirty-year supervised release term and remanded for resentencing within the proper statutory maximum. View "USA v. Swarner" on Justia Law

A former employee of a Mississippi school district brought a lawsuit alleging employment discrimination and retaliation, claiming she was forced to resign after ending a coerced sexual relationship with a school administrator in exchange for ADA accommodations and job security. She asserted that the resulting discrimination led to significant mental and physical health issues. Throughout the proceedings, the plaintiff alternated between being represented by counsel and representing herself. She cited deteriorating mental health and financial hardship, repeatedly sought appointment of counsel, and submitted medical documentation supporting her claims of severe mental illness.Proceedings in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi were marked by multiple disputes over compliance with court orders, particularly the court’s order that the plaintiff undergo a mental examination at her own expense. The plaintiff objected, stating she could not afford the examination and claimed to be competent to understand her case but not to represent herself. After failing to attend several hearings and not communicating as ordered, the court interpreted her actions as contumacious conduct—deliberately resisting court authority. The district court ultimately dismissed her case with prejudice, assigned all costs to her, and ordered her to pay the school district’s attorneys’ fees for hearings she failed to attend.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), finding a clear record of contumacious conduct and concluding that lesser sanctions would not have served the interests of justice. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal with prejudice but vacated and remanded the portion of the judgment concerning attorneys’ fees. View "Boudy v. McComb School District" on Justia Law

A school administrator responsible for special education at a high school in Texas alleged that his employment was terminated in retaliation for reporting incidents of child abuse by teachers under his supervision and for cooperating with a subsequent Child Protective Services (CPS) investigation. He reported the incidents to his principal, participated in a CPS interview, and raised concerns about disciplinary actions and workplace conduct. After additional workplace conflicts and an EEOC complaint, his contract was ultimately terminated by the district’s Board of Trustees following a hearing, and his administrative appeal was unsuccessful.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas reviewed the administrator’s claims, which included constitutional violations under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, retaliation for whistleblowing, and a civil conspiracy to violate his rights. The district court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, denied leave to amend the complaint, and denied a motion to alter or amend the judgment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fifth Circuit held that the administrator’s speech—reporting child abuse to his supervisor, participating in the CPS investigation, and refusing to characterize events as his supervisor wished—was made in his official capacity as an employee, not as a citizen, and was therefore not protected by the First Amendment. The court also found that he received appropriate procedural due process related to his termination and did not state a claim for substantive due process. The individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, and the civil conspiracy claim failed because there was no underlying constitutional violation. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to take judicial notice of the administrative record and found other claims waived. View "Castille v. Port Arthur Independent School District" on Justia Law

A group of insurance companies sued various medical providers and related individuals in federal court, alleging that the providers engaged in a fraudulent scheme in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Specifically, the insurance companies claimed that the defendants submitted fraudulent reports and billing documents for patients involved in car accidents, seeking payments under insurance policies. The allegations included overbilling, billing for services not rendered, and unnecessary procedures.After the insurance companies filed their initial complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, the parties held several conferences to address potential deficiencies. Defendants argued that the complaint failed to adequately allege the existence of a RICO “enterprise,” particularly a consensual decision-making structure among the alleged participants. The insurance companies amended their complaint, but the defendants again moved to dismiss, challenging the sufficiency of the RICO allegations. The magistrate judge recommended granting dismissal due to the complaint’s failure to plead an adequate enterprise. The district court agreed, granting dismissal but allowing the plaintiffs to file a post-judgment motion to amend.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether the district court erred in denying leave to further amend the complaint after judgment. The appellate court held that even though the district court referenced the Rule 59(e) standard rather than the more liberal Rule 15(a) standard for amendment, it was appropriate to affirm if there were “ample and obvious” reasons for denial, such as undue delay. The Fifth Circuit found that the insurance companies had delayed seeking amendment and stood by their pleading’s sufficiency despite repeated notice of its deficiencies, and thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend. The judgment was affirmed. View "Farmers Texas County Mutual Insurance Co. v. 1st Choice" on Justia Law

An individual reported to police that a debit card had been stolen from his car and used at a Southaven, Mississippi, Best Buy. The Southaven Police Department obtained receipt evidence and surveillance footage but did not immediately identify a suspect. Separately, police in another Mississippi county arrested Stephen Lewis for an unrelated burglary and searched his cell phone without a warrant, discovering images of receipts from the Southaven Best Buy. The investigating officer from the Washington County Sheriff’s Department shared these images with Detective Walley of the Southaven Police Department, informing her that a search warrant had been completed, though in reality, no warrant had been issued at the time. Walley reviewed the images, which matched the fraudulent purchase, and secured an arrest warrant for Lewis, who was later indicted; charges were eventually remanded.Lewis brought multiple constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Walley in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi. The district court dismissed all but one claim, allowing Lewis’s Fourth Amendment search claim to proceed. The district court found that Walley’s review of the photographs constituted a warrantless search, violating the Fourth Amendment, and denied Walley’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, as well as her qualified immunity defense.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the denial of qualified immunity de novo. The appellate court held that it was not clearly established at the relevant time that reviewing images of receipts from a phone, sent by another officer, constituted a Fourth Amendment search requiring a warrant. The court found that Walley’s reliance on information provided by the other officer was objectively reasonable. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and rendered a judgment of dismissal in Walley’s favor. View "Lewis v. Walley" on Justia Law

A group of parents challenged a Louisiana statute, H.B. 71, which requires public schools to display the Ten Commandments in each classroom. The parents argued that this statute is facially unconstitutional under both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The statute specifies certain minimum requirements regarding the text and accompanying statements but delegates significant discretion to local school boards regarding the nature, content, and context of the displays. Essential details about the displays, such as their prominence, accompanying materials, and instructional use, are unknown until implementation.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana granted a preliminary injunction against enforcement of H.B. 71, finding the parents’ claims ripe for adjudication and concluding that they were likely to succeed on the merits. A panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed the injunction. Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit decided to rehear the case en banc.Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that the challenge was not ripe for judicial resolution. The Court emphasized that federal courts can only decide concrete disputes grounded in real facts, not abstract or speculative constitutional questions. Because the statute leaves many aspects of implementation unresolved and the constitutionality of the displays depends on factual context that does not yet exist, the Court concluded that equitable relief was premature. The Court held that the plaintiffs’ claims are nonjusticiable at this stage, as there is no substantial controversy sufficiently developed for judicial determination. The Fifth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction, clarifying that its holding does not foreclose future as-applied challenges once H.B. 71 is implemented and a concrete factual record is established. View "Roake v. Brumley" on Justia Law