Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two police officers, Eric Bruss and Wayne Schultz, arrived at the scene of an active arrest where another officer, Robert Johnson, was already present and handling two suspects. The situation was tense: dispatch had reported a weapon, and one suspect, Kerry Thomas, repeatedly acted erratically and made statements suggesting he wanted to be killed. Johnson, a canine handler, released his police dog on Thomas after repeated warnings, resulting in a 43-second bite while Johnson handcuffed Thomas. Bruss and Schultz, who arrived after the scene had escalated, did not intervene during the dog bite.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied qualified immunity to Bruss and Schultz at both the motion to dismiss and summary judgment stages. The district court determined there were genuine disputes of fact regarding whether the bystander officers had a reasonable opportunity to intervene and concluded that the law was clearly established regarding bystander liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failing to prevent the use of excessive force.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. The Fifth Circuit held that, under the specific facts presented—including the short duration of the dog bite, the officers’ late arrival, and absence of direct participation or encouragement—existing precedent did not clearly establish that Bruss and Schultz had a constitutional duty to intervene during an active canine-assisted apprehension. The court emphasized that no controlling or analogous case law put the constitutional question “beyond debate” for reasonable officers in these circumstances. As a result, the Fifth Circuit rendered judgment dismissing the claims against Bruss and Schultz on qualified immunity grounds. View "Thomas v. Bruss" on Justia Law

Jonathan M. Tampico was convicted in 1999 of possession, receipt, and distribution of child pornography, receiving concurrent sentences totaling 360 months in prison, five years of supervised release, and a $5,000 fine. After beginning his supervised release in March 2024, the district court modified the conditions of his release in October 2024 to include home detention for six months, with the possibility of continuation until he completed a sex offender treatment program. The court also found that $1,992.86 in interest had accrued on his fine and ordered monthly payments of $200.Previously, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas had not included home detention as a condition of supervised release when Tampico was originally sentenced or resentenced. In 2024, after evidentiary hearings, the district court modified the conditions in response to concerns about Tampico’s progress in treatment. Tampico objected to the location monitoring and home detention but did not appeal the initial March 2024 order. He also contested the October 2024 findings regarding interest on his fine, arguing that no interest was required and that the fine had been fully paid, relying on Bureau of Prisons records showing a zero balance.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s order. The court held that the district court did not impose an illegal sentence by modifying supervised release conditions to include home detention, finding that the statutory maximums applicable to imprisonment were not implicated because home detention was added as a modification during supervised release, not at sentencing or after revocation. The Fifth Circuit also affirmed the district court’s finding that interest on the fine was due and that the Government was not estopped from collecting it. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA v. Tampico" on Justia Law

Michael Kevin Adams was convicted of capital murder after evidence showed he drugged, sexually assaulted, and repeatedly threatened his former fiancée, N.L. Following the assault, Adams violated a protective order and continued to harass N.L., prompting her and her son to relocate for safety. Six months after the assault, N.L. was found shot to death in her home, with evidence at the scene including DNA, condom wrappers, and cartridge casings. Investigators found circumstantial evidence, such as Adams’s DNA at the scene, photographs of firearms similar to the murder weapon, and a screw possibly from a gun in his vehicle. Adams denied involvement and provided an uncorroborated alibi.At trial in Texas state court, the prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence and witness testimony to establish Adams’s guilt. The jury convicted him of capital murder, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Adams appealed to the Texas Fifth Court of Appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient under the standard set by Jackson v. Virginia. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, finding the evidence sufficient, though one judge dissented. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals declined discretionary review, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. Adams’s subsequent state habeas petition was also denied.Adams then filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, arguing the state court unreasonably applied Jackson’s sufficiency standard. The district court denied relief and a certificate of appealability. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Adams failed to show that every reasonable jurist would find the state court’s sufficiency determination unreasonable under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and Jackson. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and denied habeas relief. View "Adams v. Guerrero" on Justia Law

A local news publisher brought suit against a technology company that operates a news aggregation app and website. The publisher alleged that the aggregator, through its app, displayed the publisher’s articles either by framing them within the aggregator’s interface (so that users viewed the publisher’s website content within an app frame) or by reproducing the full text of articles under the aggregator’s own URL due to a technical glitch. The publisher claimed this conduct violated its exclusive right to publicly display its content under the Copyright Act, and further alleged that the removal or alteration of its website’s URLs—when articles were shown under the aggregator’s URLs—constituted improper removal of copyright management information (CMI) under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi addressed the publisher’s claims through cross-motions for summary judgment. Relying on the “server test” from Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., the district court held that the aggregator’s framed linking did not infringe the publisher’s display right, because the content was not stored on the aggregator’s servers but only linked to the publisher’s own server. The court also held that URLs do not constitute CMI under the DMCA, as they function merely as locational addresses and do not inherently convey protected copyright information.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed two questions: whether the server test is the proper standard for evaluating copyright display right infringement, and whether URLs can be CMI under the DMCA. The Fifth Circuit rejected the server test as inconsistent with the text of the Copyright Act, and instead adopted a “transmit requirement”—finding infringement only if the alleged infringer actually transmits (rather than merely links to) the copyrighted content. The court also held that the DMCA does not categorically foreclose URLs from being CMI, but for a URL to qualify as CMI, it must clearly convey the characteristics specified by statute. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "Emmerich Nwspr v. Particle Media" on Justia Law

The defendant pled guilty to a single count of illegal reentry after removal from the United States. His presentence report detailed a criminal history that included prior convictions for driving under the influence, obstruction of justice, unlawful possession or consumption of alcohol by a minor, domestic battery, drug trafficking, and a previous illegal reentry. After being deported for his earlier illegal reentry, the defendant returned to the United States, purportedly to assist his wife, who was recovering from a significant injury and mental health issues. About ten months after his return, he was arrested for assaulting his wife, but the charges were later dismissed. The presentence report indicated the incident involved the defendant throwing water bottles at his wife, causing minor injuries, but made no mention of direct physical contact or biting.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas conducted a brief sentencing hearing, during which it adopted the presentence report but made several factual errors. The court incorrectly referenced a 2020 illegal reentry conviction that did not exist and mistakenly asserted that the defendant had bitten his wife during the alleged assault. The district court treated these purported facts as aggravating factors and sentenced the defendant to 46 months, at the top of the Guidelines range, without stating whether the same sentence would have been imposed absent these errors. No contemporaneous objections were raised by the parties.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case under the plain error standard. The court found that the district court relied on clearly erroneous facts, that the errors were clear under established law, and that they affected the defendant’s substantial rights by likely increasing his sentence. The Fifth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, holding that sentencing based on unfounded facts violates due process and undermines the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings. View "USA v. Palencia-Berrum" on Justia Law

The plaintiff financed his home with a VA loan in 2003, qualifying due to his military service. After failing to make payments for at least ten years, the loan was assigned to HSBC Bank USA and serviced by Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (SLS). HSBC eventually foreclosed on the property in 2022 and sold it to Northsky, LLC. The VA Servicing Guidelines, which were incorporated into the mortgage contract, required HSBC to notify the plaintiff of the default and explore options to cure it. SLS claimed to have mailed multiple payoff statements and a notice of default to the plaintiff, but he asserted he never received these communications.The plaintiff brought suit in Texas state court against HSBC, SLS, and Northsky, alleging violations of federal and Texas law and seeking to set aside the foreclosure sale. HSBC and SLS removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The district court granted partial summary judgment for HSBC and SLS, permitting the plaintiff to proceed on claims for violations of the VA Servicing Guidelines, quiet title, and trespass to try title. At a bench trial, HSBC and SLS presented circumstantial evidence of mailing, relying on business records and testimony from a corporate representative. The district court found this evidence sufficient and, applying the mailbox rule, presumed the plaintiff received the notices, concluding the defendants fulfilled their obligations under the VA Servicing Guidelines.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the appeal, applying a deferential standard to the district court’s factual findings. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court correctly applied the mailbox rule based on the evidence presented and that the plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of receipt. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Rummans v. HSBC Bank" on Justia Law

A group of associations representing infusion centers, cancer patients, and pharmaceutical manufacturers challenged the constitutionality of a program created by the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, which directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), through the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), to negotiate prices for high-expenditure prescription drugs under Medicare Parts B and D. The program allows HHS to select drugs based on certain criteria, negotiate a “maximum fair price” with manufacturers, and impose an excise tax on manufacturers who refuse to negotiate. The tax is calculated as a high percentage of sales reimbursed by Medicare. Manufacturers may avoid the program by withdrawing from Medicare and Medicaid participation. The statutory scheme also limits administrative and judicial review of key program decisions and allows HHS to implement early cycles of the program through guidance rather than notice-and-comment rulemaking.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and improper venue. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that at least one plaintiff had standing and venue was proper. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the government, holding that the program did not violate the nondelegation doctrine, that the Anti-Injunction Act barred the plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claim, and that the plaintiffs lacked a protected property interest to support their due process claim.Upon further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the statute provided an “intelligible principle” sufficient to withstand a nondelegation challenge, that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the Eighth Amendment claim but the excise tax did not constitute a punitive fine, and that neither manufacturers, providers, nor patients possessed a protected property or liberty interest implicated by the program. The government’s summary judgment was affirmed in full. View "Natl Infusion Center v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Officers responding to a reported burglary encountered Maurice Mitchell near a storage facility, leading to his flight, capture, and discovery of a loaded revolver in a bag on his bicycle. Mitchell has a history of felony convictions, including drug possession and attempting to disarm a peace officer, the latter involving an attempt to grab pepper spray from an officer during an arrest. Based on the January 2023 incident, Mitchell was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana denied Mitchell’s pretrial motions to dismiss the indictment, which asserted Second Amendment protections against prosecution. The court focused on Mitchell’s drug convictions as predicates, not addressing the attempted disarmament conviction. At trial, the court issued a flight instruction over Mitchell’s objection, directing the jury to consider his flight as evidence of consciousness of guilt. The jury ultimately returned a guilty verdict, and Mitchell was sentenced to prison and supervised release. He timely appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed Mitchell’s Second Amendment challenge de novo. The court held that Mitchell’s conviction for attempting to disarm a police officer is analogous to robbery, historically a crime for which individuals could be disarmed under firearm regulations. Thus, the application of § 922(g)(1) to Mitchell was constitutional. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the flight instruction, and the evidence was sufficient to support Mitchell’s conviction under the stringent “manifest miscarriage of justice” standard. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USA v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Roy Hill, founder and CEO of Clean Energy Technology Association, Inc. (CETA), solicited investments by representing that CETA owned patented carbon capture technology and promised investors returns from these assets. CETA, however, operated as a Ponzi scheme, using funds from new investors to pay returns to earlier ones. UniBank, a Washington-based commercial bank, provided secured loans to investors who used the funds to buy interests in CETA’s purported assets. UniBank perfected its security interests in the distributions from CETA. After the SEC initiated an enforcement action alleging fraud and sought appointment of a receiver, Albert Black was appointed to marshal CETA’s assets for the benefit of creditors and investors.In parallel litigation, investors sued UniBank in Washington state court for fraud and negligence, but UniBank obtained summary judgment on the basis that it owed no duty to the investors. Meanwhile, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, the receiver recommended a pro rata distribution of the remaining CETA estate funds to all investors and creditors based on net cash losses, aggregating UniBank’s claims with those of other victims rather than honoring UniBank’s asserted secured creditor priority. UniBank objected, arguing its perfected liens should grant it priority recovery. The district court overruled UniBank’s objection, adopted the receiver’s recommendation, and ordered pro rata distributions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s order. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court failed to provide UniBank with adequate due process because it adopted the receiver’s recommendation with only a cursory analysis and without giving UniBank a meaningful opportunity to present its evidence and arguments, particularly given the extensive record. The court vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings consistent with due process requirements, without expressing a view on the merits. View "Black v. Unibank" on Justia Law

Raymond Luna was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The only felony conviction supporting this indictment was Luna’s prior conviction for possession of a controlled substance. The district court found that applying § 922(g)(1) to Luna violated the Second Amendment as applied to him and dismissed the indictment. After the dismissal, the Government moved for reconsideration, providing new evidence from Luna’s prior conviction that suggested he was involved in drug trafficking, rather than mere possession. The district court denied the motion for reconsideration, reasoning that the Government could have, but did not, present this evidence earlier.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion, as the district court declined to consider the new evidence presented by the Government after the original dismissal. The Fifth Circuit observed that the Government did not argue in its opening appellate brief that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to consider the late-submitted evidence, thereby forfeiting that argument. The appellate court further declined to revisit the district court’s ruling based on the late-submitted evidence.The Fifth Circuit held that, with only the fact of Luna’s conviction for simple possession before it, binding precedent established that such a conviction cannot support a § 922(g)(1) prosecution post-Hembree. The court also rejected the Government’s alternative arguments, including the assertion that historical regulations on illicit marketplaces justified disarmament, and found that Luna’s indictment status for a separate firearm offense was irrelevant under circuit precedent. As a result, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the indictment. View "USA v. Luna" on Justia Law