Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A customer dined at a Mississippi restaurant specializing in local seafood, ordering premium snapper on three occasions between 2013 and 2018. The restaurant, along with its supplier and several managers, was later criminally charged for a long-running scheme to mislabel imported frozen fish as locally caught premium fish. All parties pled guilty, admitting to substituting and fraudulently selling over 29 tons of imported fish as local species during a multi-year period. The customer alleged that he paid high prices for what he believed to be premium Gulf snapper, but was instead served inferior imported fish, and he brought a class action seeking damages under federal and state law.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(1), finding no cognizable Article III injury. The court reasoned that since the plaintiff consumed his meals without complaint, paying for fish he would not have otherwise purchased was not a concrete injury. It also found the allegations insufficiently particularized, as the plaintiff did not specifically allege that imported fish was served on the dates he dined or that all snapper sold on those dates was misbranded. The court denied motions to amend the judgment and complaint, concluding any amendments would be futile.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and reversed the district court’s dismissal. The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff plausibly suffered a concrete and particularized injury in fact under Article III, either by being fraudulently induced to purchase inferior fish or by overpaying due to fraud. The court concluded that the allegations of widespread and routine fish substitution at the restaurant plausibly affected the plaintiff’s meals, particularly his August 21, 2018, visit. The denial of leave to amend was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "McCain v. Mary Mahoney's" on Justia Law

A Texas-based energy company, structured as a subsidiary of a Chinese corporation, sought to develop renewable energy projects in Texas, including the Blue Star Solar Project, and to interconnect these projects to the Texas electric grid managed by the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT). The Texas Lone Star Infrastructure Protection Act (LSIPA), enacted in 2021, prohibits entities majority-owned or controlled by Chinese citizens or corporations from owning or controlling critical infrastructure, including the state’s electric grid. In 2022, ERCOT, applying LSIPA, denied the company’s request to interconnect the Blue Star project and rejected subsequent efforts to repurpose the project.The company sued in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, arguing that LSIPA was preempted by federal law—specifically, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) regime under the Defense Production Act and its amendments. The company also asserted constitutional claims, but ultimately narrowed its appeal to the preemption issue. The district court dismissed the claims, holding that LSIPA was not preempted by the federal CFIUS regime, finding no conflict or field preemption.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Fifth Circuit held that the federal CFIUS regime does not impliedly preempt LSIPA. The court found that LSIPA and CFIUS operate in purposive harmony, with LSIPA providing additional state-level protections without conflicting with federal objectives. The court also held that CFIUS is not a pervasive federal regulatory scheme that would field-preempt state law in this area. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the preemption claims. View "GH America v. Fohn" on Justia Law

A parish resident attended a council meeting intending to comment on an agenda item involving the retention of special legal counsel related to ethics laws. Shortly before this meeting, she had filed an ethics complaint against the Parish President, alleging a conflict of interest regarding a zoning decision. When she began to speak, she was interrupted by the Parish President and Council Chairman, who told her that discussing her ethics complaint was off-topic and cited a Louisiana statute prohibiting public discussion of private ethics investigations. This statute had been declared unconstitutional years prior, but the officials nonetheless enforced it, leading the resident to end her remarks prematurely. She later sued the parish, the Parish President, and the Council Chairman under federal civil rights law and state law, claiming her First Amendment rights had been violated.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana presided over a jury trial where the jury found in favor of the defendants on all claims. During trial, defense counsel repeatedly violated court instructions, asked improper legal questions, referred to irrelevant and prejudicial matters, and made inappropriate comments. The plaintiff objected to these actions, and the court sustained many objections and issued curative instructions. Despite these issues, the district court denied the plaintiff’s post-trial motion for a new trial, relying in part on a juror’s public interview and noting that curative instructions had been given and no motion for mistrial had been made.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by relying on evidence barred by Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), specifically the juror’s public comments. The appellate court further held that the cumulative effect of defense counsel’s misconduct so thoroughly permeated the trial proceedings that even curative instructions could not remedy the prejudice. The Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Banner v. Wright" on Justia Law

A group of petitioners, including a telecommunications reseller and several consumers, challenged the Federal Communications Commission’s calculation of the Universal Service Fund’s Fourth Quarter 2025 contribution factor. The FCC collects billions of dollars from telecommunications companies each year to subsidize communication services for underserved communities, using a private corporation, the Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC), to administer the fund and calculate the contribution factor. Petitioners argued, among other things, that the FCC’s creation and reliance on USAC violated federal law.Previously, after USAC submitted its projections for the fourth quarter, the FCC issued a public notice adopting USAC’s data (with a minor adjustment) to set a 38.1% contribution factor. The petitioners filed timely comments with the FCC and, after the FCC’s inaction, sought judicial review. The Supreme Court had recently rejected a broader nondelegation challenge to the universal service statute, but left open other statutory and constitutional questions. The current challenge centered on whether the FCC had statutory authority to establish USAC.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It concluded that the FCC established USAC to act as an instrumentality for administering the Universal Service Fund and that Congress had not specifically authorized the FCC to create such a corporation, as required by the Government Corporation Control Act. The court found that neither the general statutory provisions cited by the FCC nor subsequent congressional actions amounted to the necessary specific authorization. As a result, the court held that the FCC exceeded its statutory authority by relying on USAC’s projections in setting the contribution factor. The court granted the petition for review, vacated the Fourth Quarter 2025 contribution factor, and remanded the matter to the FCC for further proceedings. View "Consumers' Research v. FCC" on Justia Law

SEACOR Marine, L.L.C., a company that owns and operates marine vessels, entered into a Brokerage Agreement with GOL, L.L.C., a broker connecting vessel owners with oil and gas companies. Under this agreement, GOL acted as SEACOR’s agent to obtain charters, and was responsible for remitting payments to SEACOR if charterers paid GOL. GOL brokered SEACOR’s vessels to Cox Operating, LLC, invoicing Cox for $2.7 million plus a brokerage fee. Cox did not pay, subsequently filing for bankruptcy. GOL submitted a prepetition claim in Cox’s bankruptcy, which included SEACOR’s invoices. The bankruptcy court permitted Cox to pay $13 million toward GOL’s prepetition claim to incentivize continued services during bankruptcy, with GOL agreeing to use these funds for claims secured by liens, including SEACOR’s.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted summary judgment in favor of GOL. It found GOL was not obligated to pay SEACOR from the $13 million, reasoning that GOL had not received payment specifically for SEACOR’s invoices, and that the Trade Agreement required payment only to vendors continuing to provide services to Cox. The court also determined GOL had fulfilled its duty to make reasonable efforts to collect from Cox and dismissed SEACOR’s claims, denying reconsideration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that genuine disputes of material fact exist as to whether any part of the $13 million payment was for SEACOR’s services and whether GOL breached its contractual and fiduciary duties by not remitting payment to SEACOR. The court found the Trade Agreement did not prohibit GOL from paying SEACOR and reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Seacor Marine v. GOL" on Justia Law

A chiropractor who owned and operated a clinic in Louisiana was found to have carried out a scheme to defraud a private health insurer over three and a half years. The fraudulent scheme involved submitting reimbursement claims for services that were either not rendered as described, not medically necessary, or not performed or supervised by a licensed provider as required. Testimony from employees revealed that the owner pressured staff to fabricate treatment notes, and that many records showed signs of copying and pasting with little differentiation between patients. Some employees and patients testified that certain billed services were not actually provided, while massage therapists stated they performed generic massages rather than medically necessary treatments.A jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana convicted the clinic owner of six counts of health care fraud and one count of wire fraud, but acquitted him of making a false statement to federal agents. At sentencing, the district court accepted that the intended loss equaled the actual payments made by the insurer, but declined to exclude payments for claims the defendant asserted were legitimate, finding the fraud so pervasive that it was not feasible to separate legitimate from fraudulent claims. The court sentenced the defendant to 84 months in prison, below the calculated guideline range, and explained that the loss calculation was based on the evidence of a widespread fraudulent scheme.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed only the district court’s finding that the fraud was pervasive. Applying clear error review, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court’s finding was at least plausible given the trial evidence and affirmed the sentence. The holding is that, where fraud is pervasive and separating legitimate from fraudulent claims is not reasonably practicable, the district court may treat all claims as fraudulent for loss calculation purposes. View "USA v. Tekippe" on Justia Law

A mortgage issuer, Reverse Mortgage Funding, LLC (RMF), participated in a federal program allowing it to securitize reverse mortgages. When RMF entered bankruptcy, Texas Capital Bank provided debtor-in-possession financing, secured by RMF’s interests in certain collateral, specifically incremental balances on the mortgages known as “tails.” After RMF defaulted on its agreement, the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), under its statutory and contractual authority, extinguished RMF’s interests in the underlying mortgages and assumed ownership of the loans, also extinguishing Texas Capital’s lien interest in the mortgage tails. Texas Capital argued that Ginnie Mae’s actions violated federal law and Texas tort law.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas initially allowed Texas Capital’s claims for statutory authority under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and tortious interference to proceed, but dismissed the promissory estoppel claim due to sovereign immunity. Later, the district court granted summary judgment to Ginnie Mae, finding it acted within its statutory authority and concluding that the extinguishment of RMF’s interests necessarily eliminated Texas Capital’s derivative interest in the mortgage tails. The court also dismissed Texas Capital’s tortious interference claim, citing sovereign immunity and a lack of legal basis, and refused to consider Texas Capital’s arbitrary-and-capricious APA theory because it was not sufficiently pled.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that Ginnie Mae acted within its statutory and contractual authority under 12 U.S.C. § 1721(g)(1) in extinguishing both RMF’s and Texas Capital’s interests in the mortgages. The court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment, finding Texas Capital’s tortious interference claim barred by sovereign immunity and ruling that Texas Capital’s failure to plead an arbitrary-and-capricious APA theory justified the district court’s refusal to consider it. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Texas Captl Bank v. Govt Natl Mtge" on Justia Law

A federal prisoner, sentenced in August 2020 for enticement of a minor, spent approximately ten months in various facilities before arriving at his designated Bureau of Prisons (BOP) institution in June 2021. He filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that under the First Step Act (FSA), he was entitled to earn time credits for the period between his sentencing and his arrival at the designated facility. He claimed these credits should count toward his eligibility for home confinement and that the BOP was required to recognize his calculation of credits, leading to an earlier projected transfer date.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed his petition. The court found that, under the FSA and relevant BOP regulations, the prisoner was not eligible to earn credits before arrival at his designated BOP facility. The court also held it lacked authority to order the BOP to place him in home confinement or otherwise direct his placement.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that, regardless of any debate over when FSA credit earning may begin, the petitioner failed to show any participation—or even attempted participation—in recidivism reduction programs or productive activities during the period in question. Participation is a statutory prerequisite for earning such credits under the FSA. The court further held that only the BOP has the authority to designate a prisoner’s place of confinement, and the courts cannot review such decisions. Allegations of judicial bias were found to be conclusory and did not meet the standard for plain error. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Hogan v. FCI, La Tuna Case Mgr" on Justia Law

MIECO, L.L.C., an energy trading firm, entered into a contract with Pioneer Natural Resources USA, Inc. to purchase a specified quantity of natural gas daily on a Firm basis from November 2020 to March 2021. The contract included a force majeure clause excusing performance for certain uncontrollable events. In February 2021, Winter Storm Uri struck Texas, causing severe weather that disrupted natural gas production and delivery. Pioneer failed to deliver the contracted amount from February 14 to 19 and issued a force majeure notice. MIECO purchased replacement gas at higher prices and later sued Pioneer for breach of contract, seeking over $9 million in damages. Pioneer admitted nonperformance but argued it was excused by the force majeure provision.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas initially granted summary judgment in favor of Pioneer, finding the storm was a force majeure event and Pioneer had exercised due diligence. MIECO appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that genuine disputes of material fact remained regarding whether Pioneer’s performance was truly prevented and if Pioneer exercised reasonable efforts and due diligence. The Fifth Circuit remanded the case for a bench trial. After the trial, the district court again found for Pioneer, determining the storm prevented performance and Pioneer had made reasonable efforts both before and after the storm to mitigate its impacts.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal issues de novo. The court held that the district court complied with its mandate, properly found that Winter Storm Uri prevented Pioneer’s performance, and that Pioneer exercised due diligence. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the admission of Pioneer’s expert testimony and exclusion of MIECO’s expert testimony. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Mieco v. Pioneer Natural Resources" on Justia Law

A seventy-year-old man with dementia and Alzheimer’s disease was involved in a late-night domestic violence incident at his home in El Paso, Texas. Police were called after his wife reported that he had become violent and tried to strangle her. Officer Jaso responded and found the man outside, where he ignored commands, picked up and threw objects at Jaso—striking him with at least one object. After repeated noncompliance and object-throwing, Jaso deployed his taser once, causing the man to fall and lose consciousness. The man was hospitalized and subsequently died.The man’s daughter, on behalf of his estate, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Jaso for excessive force and against the City of El Paso for municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas granted summary judgment to both defendants. The court found Jaso was entitled to qualified immunity, concluding that the plaintiff failed to show Jaso’s single use of the taser violated clearly established law. The court also determined there was no evidence of the City’s deliberate indifference to a known or obvious risk of constitutional violation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that, even assuming a Fourth Amendment violation, no precedent clearly established that Jaso’s conduct was unlawful under the specific circumstances—namely, facing an actively resisting, noncompliant suspect who was throwing objects. The court also found that the plaintiff failed to show a pattern of similar constitutional violations or deliberate indifference by the City, and that arguments or evidence not presented to the district court could not be considered on appeal. The court denied the request for additional discovery and affirmed dismissal of all federal claims. View "Navejas v. City of El Paso" on Justia Law