Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Derrick Durrell Jones, a convicted felon, pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm and appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Jones argued that the law under which he was convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), was unconstitutional because it violated the Commerce Clause and the Second Amendment. Addressing the Commerce Clause argument, the court stated that their circuit precedent has consistently upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1), and that Jones had not presented any Supreme Court decisions that had expressly overruled this.In response to the Second Amendment argument, the court noted that Jones' challenge came in light of a new test for assessing the constitutionality of a statute under the Second Amendment as set forth by the Supreme Court in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen. However, the court pointed out that it had previously held that § 922(g)(1) did not violate the Second Amendment, and a concurring opinion in Bruen had stated that the decision should not cast doubt on prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons. The court also observed that there was no binding precedent holding that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional, and that two other federal circuits have reached conflicting conclusions on the issue.Given these considerations, the court concluded that Jones had failed to demonstrate that the district court’s application of § 922(g)(1) constituted clear or obvious error, and thus affirmed the decision of the lower court. View "USA v. Jones" on Justia Law

Sammy Tawakkol sued two Texas state officials, alleging that they violated his right to procedural due process when they notified him that he was required to register as a sex offender under Texas law. The district court ruled in Tawakkol's favor. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that Tawakkol's suit was barred by sovereign immunity and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the case.The case began when Tawakkol was required to register as a sex offender under the federal Sex Offender Registry and Notification Act (SORNA) because of a crime he committed while he was a cadet at the United States Air Force Academy. After he moved to Houston, Texas, state officials determined that he also needed to register as a sex offender under Texas's system. Tawakkol sued the state officials, alleging that their registration determination violated his procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.The district court ruled in favor of Tawakkol, but the Court of Appeals vacated this decision and remanded the case back to the district court with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals found that the suit was barred by sovereign immunity, a legal doctrine that prevents certain lawsuits against state officials. The court concluded that Tawakkol's case did not meet the criteria for an exception to sovereign immunity established in Ex parte Young, a Supreme Court case that allows lawsuits against state officials to prevent them from enforcing state laws that violate federal law.The court reasoned that unlike in Ex parte Young, the district court's order did not enjoin the state officials from enforcing a state law that violated federal law. Instead, the district court invalidated federal law and prohibited the state officials from enforcing a state law that was consistent with that federal law. The court determined that this type of relief fell outside the narrow parameters of the Ex parte Young exception and did not serve its purpose, which is to vindicate federal rights. View "Tawakkol v. Vasquez" on Justia Law

This case involves Rolando Villarreal who pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. His sentence was enhanced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) due to a prior burglary and two prior aggravated assaults. Villarreal challenged the enhancement under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that his sentence was improperly enhanced under the ACCA's elements or force clause based on the predicate offense that allowed conviction for reckless conduct, a claim subsequently termed a "Borden claim."The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that Villarreal did assert a Borden claim in his § 2255 motion and that his sentence was "in excess of the maximum authorized by law." This was due to the fact that, after the ruling in Borden v. United States, the convictions under the relevant aggravated assault statute could not constitute predicate offenses under the ACCA as they do not require the "physical use of force against the person of another."As a result, the Court of Appeals vacated Villarreal’s sentence and remanded the case back to the district court with instructions to resentence Villarreal without consideration of the ACCA. View "USA v. Villarreal" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Sterling Robinson, was convicted by a jury on one count of possessing a firearm or ammunition as a convicted felon and one count of attempted obstruction of a federal proceeding. He appealed these convictions on the grounds of sufficiency challenges, errors relating to evidence admitted at trial, the trial court's jury instructions, and the prosecutor's remarks during opening and closing arguments. Robinson also appealed his sentence, arguing that the district court misunderstood its authority to order that his sentence run concurrently with another federal sentence.The case originated from an incident where Robinson's ex-girlfriend, Candace Anderson, accused him of shooting at her car while her nine-year-old son was inside. After the incident, Robinson repeatedly urged Anderson to change her story during phone calls from jail.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed Robinson's convictions, stating that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Robinson was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the stated charges. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its admission of evidence, the failure to give an impeachment instruction, or any improper remarks by the prosecutor.However, the court agreed with Robinson's argument that the district court misunderstood its sentencing authority. The district court initially stated that Robinson’s sentence would run concurrently with a sentence imposed upon his revocation of supervised release, but later retracted this after the government pointed out that another judge had ordered the sentences to run consecutively. The appellate court clarified that one district court has no authority to instruct another district court on how to impose its sentence for a different offense in a different case. As a result, the court vacated Robinson’s term of imprisonment and remanded the case for a narrow resentencing limited to the sole issue of whether Robinson’s prison sentence in this case should run concurrently or consecutively with his other federal sentence. View "USA v. Robinson" on Justia Law

In a collision between two vessels on the Mississippi River, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that Louisiana law, not general maritime law, governs the burden of proof for the pilot's error.On January 3, 2019, the M/V STRANDJA, piloted by Captain Robert Johnson, drifted from its anchorage into the middle of the river, colliding with the M/V KIEFFER E. BAILEY, owned by Marquette Transportation Company Gulf-Inland LLC. The collision caused damage to both vessels. Marquette brought claims against STRANDJA's owner, Balkan Navigation Ltd, and manager, Navigation Maritime Bulgare JSC (collectively referred to as "Balkan"), alleging their negligence caused the collision.A jury found that Marquette was not negligent and that Balkan and Captain Johnson were each 50% at fault. The jury awarded Marquette $114,000 in damages and awarded Balkan $0 in damages. Both Balkan and Captain Johnson appealed the judgment.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment that Marquette was not negligent, and therefore not liable for the accident. However, the court found that the district court erred in instructing the jury to apply general maritime law, which only requires a finding of ordinary negligence by a preponderance of the evidence, to the claim against Captain Johnson. Instead, the court held that Louisiana law, which requires clear and convincing evidence of gross negligence or willful misconduct, should have been applied.As a result, the court vacated the judgment against Balkan and Captain Johnson and remanded the case for a new trial, applying the correct standard of proof under Louisiana law. The court also ordered Marquette to amend its complaint within 14 days to allege admiralty jurisdiction as the jurisdictional basis for its claim against Balkan. View "Marquette Transportation Company Gulf-Inland, L.L.C. v. Navigation Maritime Bulgare" on Justia Law

In this case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, a state pretrial detainee, Rashaud L. Robinson, scheduled for a second trial, sought a writ of habeas corpus. Robinson claimed that when a poll of jurors at his 2021 trial showed ten of its members would acquit on four of five counts, retrial on those counts became barred under then-existing Louisiana law. The state trial court judge declared a mistrial instead, and the federal district court denied any relief.On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that that Robinson's claim was not about his release from or reduction in length or level of custody. Once it became clear that the arguments about acquittals did not apply to all counts, the suit was not about a release from or reduction in length or level of custody. The question was whether nonunanimous verdicts of acquittal prevented Robinson’s retrial on four counts. He was not requesting release from detention as he awaits trial on only one charge. Therefore, the court concluded that this Section 2241 habeas proceeding must be dismissed. The court did not evaluate the district court’s finding that when the state courts held Robinson had not been acquitted, those courts had relied at least in part on state law. The decision was based only on the unavailability of any relief appropriate in a habeas proceeding for Robinson’s claims. That was the only issue the court considered, and, solely for that reason, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. Though the court could not rule on the merits of Robinson’s arguments, nothing in this opinion should be interpreted as preventing Robinson from presenting similar arguments in the future as appropriate. View "Robinson v. Lopinto" on Justia Law

In 2023, the State of Texas, under the direction of Governor Greg Abbott, installed a floating barrier in the Rio Grande near Eagle Pass, Texas. The United States government filed a civil enforcement action against Texas, alleging that the installation of the barrier violated the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 (“RHA”). The United States sought a preliminary injunction, which was granted by the district court, ordering Texas to cease work on the barrier and to relocate it to the Texas riverbank. Texas appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The Court of Appeals found that the United States demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of its RHA claims. The court determined that the part of the Rio Grande where the barrier was installed was a navigable waterway and that the barrier constituted an obstruction to this waterway. The court also found that the barrier was a structure as defined by the RHA and that it had been constructed without necessary authorization.In addition, the court found that the United States had demonstrated that it was likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief. The court noted that the barrier strained diplomatic relations with Mexico, interfered with the ability of the International Boundary and Water Commission to implement the provisions of a treaty concerning the allocation of waters in the Rio Grande, and posed a risk to human life.The court also held that the balance of equities favored the United States and that the issuance of a preliminary injunction was in the public interest. Specifically, the court noted that the barrier threatened navigation and federal government operations on the Rio Grande, and also posed a potential threat to human life.Taking all of these factors into account, the court ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction ordering Texas to cease work on the barrier and to relocate it. View "USA v. Abbott, No. 23-50632 (5th Cir. 2023)" on Justia Law

The case at hand involves Bradley Lane Croft, who owned and operated Universal K-9, a school primarily training handlers and dogs for police work. Seeking to expand his business, he applied for certification from the Texas Veterans Commission (TVC) to receive G.I. Bill funds for veteran students. The certification required that the organization employed qualified dog trainers, and Croft submitted an application listing four instructors. However, three instructors testified at trial that they had not given permission to be named in the application and had not served as instructors. The fourth instructor had died two years before the application. Croft was convicted of several counts, including four counts of aggravated identity theft, under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A.The case was remanded from the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of its decision in United States v. Dubin, which clarified the meaning of "during and in relation to" in § 1028A. The Court held that a defendant "uses" another person's means of identification "in relation to" a predicate offense when this use is central to the criminality of the conduct.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, upon reconsideration, affirmed Croft's convictions under § 1028A. The court found that Croft's misrepresentations about "who" was teaching courses were the basis of his wire fraud convictions. Croft's fraudulent conduct lied in misrepresenting who would be teaching the classes, not in who received the services. Thus, there was a direct link between the use of the four men's names and information and the predicate felony of wire fraud. Consequently, the court also affirmed the district court's denial of Croft's motion for a new trial and denied his motion for release pending appeal. View "USA v. Croft, No. 21-50380 (5th Cir. 2023)" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was bitten and injured by a police dog after Plaintiff’s partner called 911 to report that Plaintiff was suicidal, had hurt herself, and had left her house on foot. In the operative third amended complaint, Plaintiff asserted various claims against Sutton and Montes in their individual capacities as well as claims against the City of Conroe and Montgomery County. Specifically, as relevant to this appeal, she asserted (1) a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 excessive force claim against Sutton; (2) a Section 1983 failure-to-intervene/bystander liability claim against Montes; (3) a Section 1983 municipal/Monell liability claim against the City of Conroe; and (4) various failure-to-accommodate claims under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act against both the City of Conroe and Montgomery County. Montgomery County and Montes jointly moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, raising, inter alia, a qualified immunity defense as to Montes.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff failed to allege specific and nonconclusory facts that would show that the City was deliberately indifferent in adopting its training policy. Accordingly, the court found that the district court did not err in dismissing Sligh’s failure-to-train claim against the City of Conroe. Further, the court explained that Plaintiff can “prevail only by showing that ‘the disability, resulting limitation, and necessary reasonable accommodation’ were ‘open, obvious, and apparent’ to the entity’s relevant agents.” But she does not attempt to make this showing. Nor could she. View "Sligh v. City of Conroe" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed this action as unleased mineral owners whose interests are situated within forced drilling units formed by the Louisiana Office of Conservation and operated by Chesapeake. Plaintiffs have not made separate arrangements to dispose of their shares of production, so the unit operator can sell the shares but must pay the owners a pro rata share of the proceeds within one hundred eighty days of the sale. Chesapeake timely removed this action to the district court, based on diversity jurisdiction. The district court certified its ruling for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b).   The Fifth Circuit explained that this case concerns the interplay between Louisiana’s relatively new conservation laws and its deeply rooted negotiorum gestio doctrine. The court wrote that because it cannot make a reliable Erie guess as to the applicability of Louisiana’s negotiorum gestio doctrine. Accordingly, the court certified the following determinative question of law to the Louisiana Supreme Court: 1) Does La. Civ. Code art. 2292 applies to unit operators selling production in accordance with La. R.S. 30:10(A)(3)? View "Johnson v. Chesapeake Louisiana, L.P." on Justia Law