Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Harvard Maintenance, a janitorial contractor in New York City, employed Carina Cruz as a cleaner. Cruz raised several complaints alleging violations of the collective bargaining agreement, including assignment of certain cleaning tasks and concerns about working conditions. In response to her complaints, Cruz faced threats from supervisors, was suspended following workplace disputes, and ultimately terminated in June 2020. Cruz filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), claiming her suspension and termination were unlawful reprisals for protected union activity.An administrative law judge (ALJ) for the NLRB found that Harvard Maintenance unlawfully threatened, suspended, and fired Cruz in violation of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and ordered remedies including backpay, reimbursement for job search expenses, and compensation for “direct or foreseeable pecuniary harms.” The NLRB adopted the ALJ’s findings and order. Harvard Maintenance petitioned for review with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, challenging the findings of coercive statements, unlawful discharge, and the scope of the awarded remedies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the NLRB’s findings regarding coercive statements and unlawful discharge were supported by substantial evidence and affirmed those parts of the Board’s order. However, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the award of consequential damages for “direct or foreseeable pecuniary harms” exceeded the NLRB’s statutory authority under the NLRA, which permits only equitable remedies. Therefore, the court denied Harvard Maintenance’s petition for review as to the findings of unlawful conduct, but granted relief and vacated the portion of the order awarding consequential damages. The Board’s application for enforcement was granted except as to the consequential damages remedy. View "Harvard Maintenance v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

An international commodity trading company supplied marine fuel oil to a cargo vessel that was time chartered to a German company. Because the charterer had poor credit, a UAE-based sister company guaranteed its obligations under the charter. In October 2022, an employee of the guarantor sought fuel through a broker, which then contacted the trading company to arrange delivery. The broker communicated the quote and order details, and the fuel was delivered to the vessel in Spain. The trading company issued an invoice to the guarantor, but no payment was made by any party involved. The contract for the sale included a choice-of-law provision referencing United States law and incorporated general terms and conditions by reference.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana reviewed the case after the vessel was arrested in New Orleans and the owner posted bond. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, both of which were denied due to factual disputes. Following a bench trial, the district court found that the choice-of-law provision was effectively incorporated, and that the trading company was entitled to a maritime lien under American law. The court determined that the guarantor had apparent authority to bind the charterer in procuring the fuel, which in turn could bind the vessel. The district court awarded the trading company the amount invoiced, prejudgment interest, and custodia legis expenses.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fifth Circuit held that United States law governed the dispute due to valid incorporation of the choice-of-law provision and that the trading company was entitled to a maritime lien under the Commercial Instruments and Maritime Liens Act. The court found that the guarantor had apparent authority to act for the charterer and that the price charged for the fuel was reasonable under industry standards. View "Three Fifty Markets v. Argos M M/V" on Justia Law

A state trooper observed David Davalos commit a traffic violation by failing to signal a lane change. The trooper initiated a stop as Davalos pulled into the driveway of the home he shared with his parents. The driveway was open, with no fence or gate, and was adjacent to a public sidewalk and street. After blocking Davalos’s car, the officer instructed Davalos to exit the vehicle, which he did, leaving the driver’s side door open. The officer, concerned for his safety and unable to see into the car due to heavily tinted windows, approached and smelled marijuana, saw ashes, and noticed the driver’s side door appeared tampered with. After Davalos admitted to recently smoking marijuana and possessing a small amount, the officer searched the car and discovered marijuana and a firearm.Davalos was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. Prior to trial, he moved to suppress the evidence from the warrantless search, arguing the search violated the Fourth Amendment because the car was within the home’s curtilage and no exigent circumstances existed. A magistrate judge found the driveway was not part of the curtilage and recommended denying the motion, concluding the officer had probable cause and exigent circumstances justified the search. The district court adopted this recommendation, and Davalos entered a conditional guilty plea preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the officer’s actions were permissible under the Fourth Amendment. The court found that probable cause and exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search of the car, regardless of curtilage questions, and affirmed the denial of Davalos’s motion to suppress. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Davalos" on Justia Law

Eugene Lockhart pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud under federal law and was sentenced to 54 months in prison, followed by supervised release and joint restitution of over $2.4 million. Although Lockhart attempted to appeal pro se, his appeal was dismissed for lack of prosecution. Later, several of his codefendants successfully reduced their restitution obligations on appeal. Lockhart completed his supervised release in May 2017. In September 2023, he filed a petition for writ of coram nobis, seeking to vacate his conviction and restitution order, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel due to his attorney’s failure to appeal and preserve issues regarding restitution.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied Lockhart’s petition. The court found the petition untimely and determined it lacked jurisdiction to vacate the restitution order, reasoning that such a challenge could only be raised on direct appeal. The district court also concluded that Lockhart’s ineffective assistance claim did not warrant coram nobis relief because he had not diligently sought prompt relief after his supervised release ended.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision, applying de novo review to jurisdictional issues and abuse of discretion to the denial of the writ. The Fifth Circuit clarified that a coram nobis petition may seek to vacate a conviction, and if granted, any related restitution order would be vacated as well. However, the court held that Lockhart failed to exercise reasonable diligence in seeking relief, as he waited over six years after his supervised release ended to file the petition without justification. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Lockhart’s writ of coram nobis. View "United States v. Lockhart" on Justia Law

Charles Hembree was previously convicted in Mississippi state court in 2018 for simple possession of methamphetamine, a felony offense. In 2022, he was indicted under federal law for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Hembree moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that applying § 922(g)(1) to him violated the Second Amendment, particularly in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen. The district court denied his motion, after which Hembree entered a guilty plea under an agreement that reserved his right to challenge the denial of his motion to dismiss on Second Amendment grounds. He was sentenced to six months in prison and three years of supervised release.After sentencing, Hembree appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, preserving only his as-applied Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1). He argued that there was no historical tradition justifying the disarmament of individuals based solely on a conviction for simple drug possession. The government contended that historical analogues, such as laws disarming dangerous persons or severely punishing possession of contraband, supported the statute’s application to Hembree’s circumstances.The Fifth Circuit held that the government failed to meet its burden of demonstrating a historical tradition supporting the permanent disarmament of individuals convicted only of simple drug possession. The court concluded that neither the tradition of punishing possession of contraband nor the disarmament of “dangerous persons” provided a sufficient analogue for Hembree’s predicate offense. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit found § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional as applied to Hembree and reversed his conviction. The court did not address Hembree’s additional constitutional claims, as resolution of the as-applied challenge was dispositive. The court also granted Hembree’s motion to supplement the record. View "United States v. Hembree" on Justia Law

A dispute arose when a company alleged that its proprietary process for manufacturing polycarbonate, a valuable industrial material, was misappropriated by a group of former employees and several consulting and engineering firms. The process involved multiple stages and technological innovations developed over decades, and had been licensed to partners around the world. After one former employee, who had extensive knowledge of the process, began consulting internationally and sharing information—including plant designs marked confidential—questions arose about whether these actions led to the improper use of trade secrets in the development and marketing of similar technology to other manufacturers.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas presided over a jury trial in which the jury found that four out of ten asserted trade secrets were misappropriated by the defendants, including the consulting companies and engineering firm. The jury awarded substantial damages to the plaintiff, including reasonable royalties and unjust enrichment amounts. However, the district court later granted the defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter of law, vacating the damages award on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to properly apportion damages among the trade secrets found to be misappropriated, instead presenting an “all-or-nothing” damages model. The district court also granted summary judgment against the plaintiff's alternative claim for misappropriation of confidential information, finding it preempted by state trade secrets law, denied a new trial on damages, and entered a permanent injunction against the defendants.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings in all respects. The Fifth Circuit held that, where multiple trade secrets are alleged and only some are found misappropriated, the plaintiff must provide a reasonable basis for the jury to apportion damages among the proven secrets. The court also affirmed the preemption of alternative confidential information claims and upheld the permanent injunction. View "Trinseo v. Harper" on Justia Law

Sirius Solutions, L.L.L.P. is a limited liability limited partnership organized under Delaware law, operating as a business-consulting firm. The partnership consisted of both limited partners and a general partner, Sirius Solutions GP, L.L.C. For the tax years 2014, 2015, and 2016, Sirius reported all ordinary business income as allocated to its limited partners and excluded those distributive shares from net earnings from self-employment, claiming an exemption under 26 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(13) for limited partners. This resulted in Sirius reporting zero net earnings from self-employment in each year.The Internal Revenue Service audited Sirius’s returns and, through Notices of Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment, determined that Sirius’s limited partners did not qualify as “limited partners” for purposes of the statutory exception. Therefore, the IRS reclassified the distributive shares of income as subject to self-employment tax, substantially increasing Sirius’s net earnings from self-employment for the years at issue. Sirius petitioned the United States Tax Court for readjustment, and the cases for all three years were consolidated. The Tax Court, relying on its decision in Soroban Capital Partners LP v. Commissioner, 161 T.C. 310 (2023), held that only passive investors qualify as “limited partners” under § 1402(a)(13), and thus upheld the IRS’s adjustments.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the meaning of “limited partner” under § 1402(a)(13). The Fifth Circuit held that a “limited partner” is a partner in a state-law limited partnership who has limited liability, rejecting the narrower “passive investor” test applied by the Tax Court and IRS. The Fifth Circuit vacated the Tax Court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings, instructing that the distributive shares of limited partners with limited liability should be excluded from self-employment earnings for tax purposes. View "Sirius Solutions v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Genesis Marine, LLC owned and operated the towing vessel M/V Anaconda and two barges, collectively valued at $12.5 million. Brandon Darrow, a tankerman employed by Genesis, suffered a severe back injury on December 23, 2020 while working aboard the vessel. Following the injury, Darrow underwent multiple surgeries and was ultimately deemed permanently disabled and unable to return to work. His medical records and expert evaluations indicated extensive pain, ongoing disability, and significant future care needs. Darrow’s counsel sent Genesis periodic updates regarding his medical condition and proposed damages, including an eventual settlement demand exceeding $20 million.Darrow filed a tort lawsuit against Genesis in Louisiana state court in December 2021, alleging negligence and unseaworthiness and seeking various categories of damages. Genesis filed an answer in August 2022, which included an affirmative defense invoking limitation of liability under federal law. Discovery continued, during which Genesis received detailed documentation of Darrow’s injuries, treatments, and expert reports estimating damages in excess of the vessel’s value. In August 2024, Darrow’s experts further confirmed his total and permanent disability and submitted updated damage estimates.On December 13, 2024, Genesis initiated a limitation of liability action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, arguing it was timely because it was filed within six months of Darrow’s August 2024 settlement demand. Darrow moved for summary judgment, asserting the limitation action was untimely under 46 U.S.C. § 30529(a) because Genesis had received written notice of a reasonable possibility that damages would exceed the vessel’s value well before June 2024. The district court granted summary judgment for Darrow, and Genesis appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that Genesis’s limitation action was untimely because Genesis had received sufficient written notice of a reasonable possibility that the claim would exceed the vessel’s value more than six months before filing the limitation action. View "Genesis Marine v. Darrow" on Justia Law

More than a decade ago, Peconic Bay Medical Center submitted an Adverse Action Report (AAR) to the National Practitioner Data Bank regarding Dr. John Doe. Dr. Doe made repeated efforts to have the AAR removed, including seeking review from the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and filing federal lawsuits in Washington, D.C. These lawsuits were unsuccessful, with courts such as the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejecting his claims. During the course of litigation, Dr. Doe obtained documents in discovery that he believed supported his renewed request for reconsideration to HHS regarding the AAR.HHS denied Dr. Doe’s request for reconsideration, stating that he was “not eligible for additional administrative review of the Report.” Dr. Doe then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, alleging, among other things, that HHS’s denial violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The district court dismissed Dr. Doe’s APA claim, concluding that the denial of reconsideration was unreviewable because Dr. Doe had not presented new evidence.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that HHS violated the Chenery principle by changing its rationale for denying reconsideration during the litigation. The Fifth Circuit held that judicial review of agency action must be based solely on the grounds set forth by the agency at the time of its decision. Because HHS’s stated reason was incorrect—Dr. Doe was eligible for reconsideration under department guidance—the appellate court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Dr. Doe’s APA claim and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Doe v. Department of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

Jose Fuentes-Pineda, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States unlawfully in 2022 and requested deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Fuentes-Pineda testified that he was forced to join the Barrio 18 gang as a teenager and later left the gang after becoming a Christian. He has tattoos indicating his former gang affiliation and was previously convicted of a gang-related homicide in El Salvador. He claimed Salvadoran police had tortured him twice in the past and argued that, if removed, he would likely be detained and subjected to torture or severe mistreatment due to his gang history.An Immigration Judge (IJ) found Fuentes-Pineda’s testimony credible but concluded he could not demonstrate a clear probability of future torture by Salvadoran authorities. The IJ noted his prior encounters with police and instances of torture but determined that most mistreatment did not rise to the level of torture. The IJ found it speculative to assume the same officers would be involved in any future detention and concluded that poor prison conditions in El Salvador were not specifically intended to inflict torture. After remand for further proceedings, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed both the BIA’s order and the underlying IJ decision, applying a highly deferential substantial evidence standard to factual findings and de novo review to legal questions. The court held that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s determination that El Salvador’s prison conditions, while harsh, were not intentionally designed to inflict torture. The court also found the risk of future torture to Fuentes-Pineda to be speculative, given the lack of compelling evidence he would be targeted. The Fifth Circuit accordingly denied Fuentes-Pineda’s petition for review. View "Fuentes-Pineda v. Bondi" on Justia Law