Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Several property owners in New Braunfels, Texas, challenged a city zoning ordinance that prohibits short-term rentals in residential districts. The ordinance, originally enacted in 2006 and amended in 2011, was in place prior to the appellants’ purchase of their properties. Despite knowing about the restrictions, the appellants either engaged in or sought to engage in short-term rental activities and, after being denied zoning changes to permit such use, filed suit against the city. Their claims alleged the ordinance violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of both the United States and Texas Constitutions.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially dismissed the appellants’ claims under Rule 12(b)(6). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a prior decision, vacated and remanded, allowing the appellants to proceed to discovery. After discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court again ruled in favor of the city, granting summary judgment on all claims. The appellants then sought review of this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Texas law does not recognize a protected property interest in the right to lease one’s home on a short-term basis, which is required for a due process claim. It further found that the ordinance’s restrictions on short-term rentals survive rational-basis review under the Equal Protection Clause, as the city’s goal of preserving the residential character of neighborhoods is a legitimate government interest, and the line drawn between short-term and longer-term rentals was not arbitrary. Accordingly, the court found no constitutional violation and affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the city. View "Marfil v. City of New Braunfels" on Justia Law

After law enforcement arrested the defendant for unlawfully discharging a firearm, they executed a search warrant at his home. During the search, officers seized multiple firearms, suspected silencers, and other related paraphernalia. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives evaluated the items and determined the suspected silencers met the statutory definition of devices designed for silencing, muffling, or diminishing the report of a firearm. The defendant admitted to manufacturing and possessing the silencers.A federal grand jury charged the defendant with possession of unregistered firearms, specifically silencers, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), and possession of a firearm without a serial number under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(i). He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that both statutes violated the Second Amendment facially and as applied to him. The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana denied the motion, finding silencers to be “dangerous and unusual weapons” not protected by the Second Amendment. The defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the constitutional issue, and was sentenced to twenty-four months in prison and three years of supervised release.Reviewing the appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied de novo review to the preserved constitutional questions. The court acknowledged that, per Supreme Court precedent, silencers qualify as Second Amendment “Arms.” However, in light of United States v. Peterson, 161 F.4th 331 (5th Cir. 2025), the Fifth Circuit held that the National Firearms Act’s shall-issue regime for silencer registration is presumptively lawful unless a challenger shows it has been put toward abusive ends, such as through exorbitant fees or lengthy delays. Because the defendant did not allege such abuse, the court held that § 5861(d) did not violate his Second Amendment rights and affirmed the conviction. View "USA v. Comeaux" on Justia Law

A maintenance worker was injured when a small derrick tipped over during work on a defective transformer. Two years after the incident, the injured individual and his spouse filed suit against the derrick’s manufacturer and several corporate entities that leased the equipment to the worker’s employer. The complaint was filed on the last day permitted by the Texas statute of limitations. Plaintiffs received service citations the next day, and forwarded them to a process server three days later. Service was completed about fifty days after filing, with delays attributed to confusion over defendants’ identities and addresses, as well as disruptions caused by a courthouse fire in an unrelated case involving plaintiffs’ counsel.After defendants were served, they removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The district court dismissed the claims against the manufacturer for insufficient diligence in service and granted summary judgment for the corporate defendants. The district court found that plaintiffs had waited too long at several points—three days before forwarding citations, several weeks before following up with the process server, and additional days before clarifying instructions—thus concluding that plaintiffs failed to exercise sufficient diligence as required by Texas law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court applied a more demanding standard than Texas law requires. Under Texas law, a plaintiff must show ordinary diligence in effecting service after timely filing suit. The appellate court found that plaintiffs’ explanations for the short delays, including handling a complex service task involving multiple corporate defendants and temporary distractions from an unrelated courthouse fire, were sufficient to raise a genuine factual dispute regarding diligence. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and summary judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Larkins v. S.D.P. Manufacturing" on Justia Law

A freight service company chartered two barges to a third party, Work Cat, under an agreement that included a “no-lien” clause, prohibiting the charterer from incurring liens on the barges. Work Cat, in turn, chartered two tugboats from another company to tow the barges. While Work Cat initially paid for the tug services, it defaulted on the majority of payments and eventually filed for bankruptcy. The tug owner, seeking to recover unpaid invoices, filed maritime lien notices against the barges and demanded payment from the original barge owner, who refused, arguing that the “no-lien” clause prevented such a lien.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana held a bench trial. It determined that the tug owner had valid maritime liens against both barges for the value of towage services provided, but excluded the costs of fuel and lubricants. The district court initially awarded attorney’s fees to the tug owner but later reversed this decision, ordering each party to bear its own legal costs. Both parties appealed, challenging the existence, scope, and value of the liens, as well as the award of attorney’s fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. It held that a maritime lien attached to the barges because the tug owner provided necessary services without actual knowledge of the “no-lien” clause at the time the towage contract was executed. The court clarified that actual knowledge of such a clause, not constructive knowledge or a duty to investigate, is required to defeat a maritime lien under current law. The value of the lien properly included all towage services but excluded fuel and lubricant costs. The appellate court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of attorney’s fees and its award of prejudgment interest. View "Trailer Bridge v. LA Intl Marine" on Justia Law

James Baldemoro pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography in 2014 and received a statutory maximum sentence of ten years in prison followed by ten years of supervised release. After completing his prison term, Baldemoro began supervised release but twice violated its conditions. For each violation, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas revoked his supervised release and imposed a six-month term of reimprisonment, followed by a new period of supervised release. At each revocation hearing, Baldemoro argued that having already served the statutory maximum prison sentence for his offense, any further imprisonment was unlawful.The district court rejected Baldemoro’s arguments both times, ruling that reimprisonment following revocation of supervised release was authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), regardless of whether it resulted in more total time in custody than the statutory maximum for the initial offense. Baldemoro appealed both revocation sentences. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit consolidated the appeals and considered whether his challenges were moot and whether his new sentences were lawful.The Fifth Circuit held that Baldemoro’s appeals were not moot because a favorable decision could allow him to seek a reduction or termination of his supervised release. On the merits, the court held that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) authorizes reimprisonment beyond the statutory maximum for the underlying offense, limited only by the felony class, not the maximum sentence for the conviction. The court also found that such reimprisonment does not violate the Fifth or Sixth Amendments, as the constitutional protections involved in criminal prosecutions do not apply to supervised release revocation proceedings. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA v. Baldemoro" on Justia Law

The United States initiated a lawsuit against Dr. Dongxin Ma and Ma Acupuncture Center, P.C., alleging violations of the False Claims Act. The government claimed that the defendants submitted inflated reimbursement requests for acupuncture services provided to veterans, resulting in improper payments from the Department of Veterans Affairs. The United States sought substantial damages and civil penalties, while the defendants denied liability and asserted they acted in good faith.Following mediation, the parties reached significant agreement regarding the terms of settlement. The mediation resulted in an oral agreement that included payment by the defendants of $2.3 million over 42 months, an initial $100,000 payment, dismissal and release of civil claims by the government, reasonable efforts by Dr. Ma to sell certain property, and the government’s right to place liens if obligations were not met. The United States filed a notice of settlement and submitted a written agreement containing additional standard terms. The defendants, later represented by new counsel, contested the validity of the settlement, arguing that the written agreement included material terms not discussed at mediation and that Dr. Ma had not authorized settlement above $1 million.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas held an evidentiary hearing, ultimately concluding that the parties had orally agreed to all material terms at mediation and that the additional terms in the written agreement were immaterial. The court amended its judgment to enforce only the material terms agreed orally. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion and affirmed. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in enforcing the oral settlement agreement, finding that all material terms were agreed to at mediation and that additional terms in the written agreement were not material. The court also found that the defendants had forfeited certain arguments on appeal. View "USA v. Ma" on Justia Law

Three named plaintiffs, all working for Schlumberger in oilfield drilling positions, challenged their employer’s compensation system under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Their pay structure included both a fixed, predetermined salary paid biweekly and substantial additional daily or activity-based payments, which often comprised the majority of their earnings. The plaintiffs regularly worked more than forty hours per week but did not receive overtime pay. They brought a collective action, arguing that their hybrid compensation arrangement did not meet the requirements for the Fair Labor Standards Act’s “salary basis” exemption, and therefore they were entitled to overtime pay.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas denied Schlumberger’s motion for partial summary judgment, finding that material factual disputes prevented judgment as a matter of law on whether the plaintiffs were paid on a salary basis. The court allowed notice to a proposed collective of Directional Drillers but denied notice to another group, and it later certified an interlocutory appeal due to the unsettled state of the law regarding hybrid pay schemes.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of summary judgment de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the hybrid compensation plan, which included a guaranteed, predetermined salary paid on a weekly or less frequent basis, satisfied the regulatory requirements for the salary basis exemption under 29 C.F.R. § 541.602(a), regardless of additional day-based or incentive payments. The court reversed the district court’s decision and ordered summary judgment for Schlumberger as to the named plaintiff Guilbeau, finding him overtime-exempt. However, the court remanded the case for further proceedings regarding other collective members, as their exemption status required additional individualized determinations. View "Guilbeau v. Schlumberger Technology" on Justia Law

Mark and Courtney Wightman, who own a dental clinic in Louisiana, entered into an agreement with DenteMax, a preferred provider organization (PPO), allowing DenteMax to offer their services at discounted rates to its network subscribers in exchange for access to more patients. Unbeknownst to the Wightmans, DenteMax also entered into a separate agreement with Ameritas Life Insurance Corporation, which permitted Ameritas to pay DenteMax’s network providers, including the Wightmans, at the same discounted rates. The Wightmans only became aware of this arrangement when Ameritas reimbursed them at the discounted rates rather than their standard rates for services rendered to Ameritas-insured patients.The Wightmans filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against Ameritas and DenteMax, alleging breach of contract, violations of Louisiana’s Preferred Provider Organization Act (PPO Act), and unjust enrichment. The district court initially dismissed several claims, partly on the ground that the suit was prescribed (time-barred). On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified a question to the Louisiana Supreme Court, which held that PPO Act claims are contractual for prescriptive purposes, making the claims timely. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s prior dismissal. DenteMax settled, and on remand, the district court granted summary judgment to Ameritas, concluding that dental services are not “healthcare services” under the PPO Act, and that the Wightmans had abandoned their non-PPO Act claims.On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that dental services are “healthcare” under the PPO Act, reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment on those claims. The court also found error in the district court’s treatment of the abandonment of non-PPO Act claims and remanded for further proceedings. The denial of leave to amend was affirmed. View "Wightman v. Ameritas Life Ins" on Justia Law

A company that owned several billboards in Texas faced administrative action by the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT), which sought to cancel four of its billboard permits due to alleged noncompliance with state regulations. The company requested an administrative hearing, after which TxDOT dismissed its claims for cancellation of three permits but proceeded against one. An administrative law judge recommended canceling the remaining permit and imposing significant administrative penalties for violations related to the other permits. The Texas Transportation Commission (TTC) adopted this decision.The company then filed for judicial review in a Texas state district court, but its petition was dismissed because it was filed past the statutory thirty-day deadline. This dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was affirmed by the state appellate court, and the Supreme Court of Texas declined review. While the state proceedings were ongoing, the company separately filed a federal lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas against TxDOT, TTC, and TxDOT’s Executive Director, asserting five claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. The district court dismissed most claims on sovereign immunity grounds, and held that the remaining claims were barred by res judicata, entering final judgment for the defendants.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that it lacked jurisdiction over all of the company’s claims. The court found that the company had failed to adequately allege the necessary connection between the individually named official and the enforcement of the challenged law, a requirement under the Ex parte Young doctrine for suits against state officials. As a result, the Fifth Circuit modified the district court’s judgment to dismiss all claims without prejudice and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "Gannon v. Texas Dept of Trans" on Justia Law

EnvTech, Inc., a company specializing in cleaning products and services for hydrofluoric acid alkylation (HF alky) units in oil refineries, alleges that Patrick DeBusk, CEO of USA DeBusk LLC (USAD), orchestrated the theft of its proprietary neutral pH chelation cleaning formula and process. EnvTech claims that DeBusk directed the hiring of key former EnvTech employees, who were privy to EnvTech’s trade secrets, and used their knowledge to allow USAD to enter and compete in the specialized market for HF alky unit cleaning. EnvTech further asserts that this conduct was part of a broader pattern, with USAD hiring competitors’ employees to misappropriate trade secrets under DeBusk’s direction.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed EnvTech’s amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court found that EnvTech had not plausibly alleged that DeBusk personally engaged in trade secret theft with the necessary mental state or that a pattern of racketeering activity under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was sufficiently pleaded. The court dismissed the case with prejudice after EnvTech’s amended complaint did not cure the perceived deficiencies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo and found that EnvTech plausibly alleged DeBusk’s knowing direction and participation in the theft and use of EnvTech’s trade secrets, as well as a broader pattern of similar conduct involving other competitors. The Fifth Circuit held that EnvTech’s allegations were sufficient to state a RICO claim based on a pattern of trade secret theft and conspiracy, and that the continuity and relatedness requirements for a RICO pattern were satisfied. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "EnvTech v. DeBusk" on Justia Law