Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This dispute centers on two companies selling tequila products under similar marks. One company, known for its luxury tequila brand marketed as “Clase Azul,” has been selling its product in the United States since 2003 and registered its mark in 2008. The opposing company, Casa Azul Spirits, began selling tequila sodas in 2022 and later introduced bottled tequila in 2023, both under the “Casa Azul” mark. Casa Azul targets a younger demographic with affordable products, while Clase Azul’s offerings appeal to affluent consumers and are sold at a premium price point. The plaintiff claims that Casa Azul’s use of the mark creates consumer confusion and infringes upon its trademark.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas held a bench trial and found in favor of Casa Azul, concluding that Clase Azul had not demonstrated a likelihood of consumer confusion. The court denied requests by Clase Azul to expand its witness list and extend discovery for additional surveys. It also denied a preliminary injunction and ultimately dismissed claims for trademark infringement, unfair competition, and cancellation of Casa Azul’s trademark registration.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s findings for clear error and legal mistakes. The Fifth Circuit determined that the lower court erred in its analysis of the strength of the mark, similarity of products, retail outlets, and actual confusion evidence. Specifically, the district court misclassified the mark as descriptive instead of suggestive, overlooked substantial evidence of actual confusion, and incorrectly assessed third-party use and product similarity. The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, but affirmed the district court’s evidentiary and discovery rulings. View "Casa Tradicion v. Casa Azul" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between two parties who had entered into a contractual agreement to jointly develop and market a therapeutic tabletop role-playing game. The plaintiffs, including the individual who originally developed the game and his company, had created intellectual property related to the game and later formed a business entity to market and distribute it. The defendants, including a psychologist and his companies, operate a business that integrates therapeutic practices with “geek” culture, and they sought to develop and sell the game using their resources. The parties executed a second licensing agreement (SLA) that allowed the defendants to use, market, and sell the game content, while the plaintiffs retained ownership of the intellectual property until a future sale was negotiated. Disagreements arose after a potential change to a third-party game license led the plaintiffs to propose significant changes to the game, which the defendants opposed due to business concerns. Communication broke down, and the plaintiffs eventually demanded that the defendants cease use of the game and related intellectual property.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas found in favor of the defendants, granting summary judgment and dismissing all claims. The district court determined that the SLA was a valid, binding contract authorizing the defendants to use the content, and that the plaintiffs’ failure to bill for certain services did not constitute a breach allowing them to terminate the agreement. The court also rejected claims related to derivative works, trademark use, and the use of the individual plaintiff’s name and likeness, finding the actions authorized by the contract.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fifth Circuit held that the SLA was valid and enforceable, that it authorized the defendants’ use of the game content and associated intellectual property, and that the plaintiffs’ claims for intellectual property infringement, name-and-image misappropriation, and unjust enrichment were properly dismissed. View "Thomas v. Leyline Publishing" on Justia Law

The defendant led a prostitution operation involving several girls, some as young as 13, 15, and 16 years old. He did not dispute that he trafficked these minors but claimed he was unaware of their ages. The government charged him under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) for sex trafficking of children and under 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c) for conspiracy, alleging that he acted knowingly or in reckless disregard of the victims’ ages. At trial, the government presented substantial evidence indicating the defendant knew or was reckless as to the minors’ ages, including his statements and his actions toward individual victims.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas conducted the trial. During the trial, the court instructed the jury that it could convict the defendant if it found he either knew or recklessly disregarded the victims’ ages, or if he had a reasonable opportunity to observe them—an alternative theory not included in the indictment. The defendant did not object to this instruction at trial. After conviction on all counts and a life sentence, he appealed, arguing that the jury instructions constructively amended the indictment, warranting reversal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the conviction for plain error, as the defendant had not timely objected to the jury instruction. The court concluded that although the instruction was a plain error, it did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights because he had ample notice of the government’s alternative theory and overwhelming evidence supported a finding of knowledge or reckless disregard. The Fifth Circuit also determined that discretionary reversal was unwarranted in light of the substantial evidence against the defendant and affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "USA v. Herndon" on Justia Law

After the death of Juan Chavez, his family members brought a wrongful death action in Texas state court against several defendants, including United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) and a group of other companies alleged to be involved in the incident. After the initial suit was voluntarily dismissed, the plaintiffs filed a new action in state court, naming the same defendants as well as an additional Texas-based defendant, Fusion Recycling, LLC. UPS removed the case to federal court, asserting diversity jurisdiction, but plaintiffs argued that Fusion’s inclusion defeated diversity. UPS countered that Fusion was improperly joined and should not be considered for jurisdictional purposes.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, acting sua sponte, remanded the case to state court. The court found that UPS’s notice of removal failed to establish the plaintiffs’ citizenship, as it relied only on allegations of residency and not citizenship. The district court did not give UPS an opportunity to cure this deficiency and did not make an affirmative finding that complete diversity was lacking.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered whether it had jurisdiction to review the remand order. The Fifth Circuit determined that the district court’s remand was based on a procedural defect—specifically, insufficient pleading of citizenship—rather than a determination of subject matter jurisdiction. Because the remand was sua sponte and not based on a plaintiff’s motion, the appellate bar under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) did not apply. The Fifth Circuit held it had jurisdiction to review the remand order and found that UPS’s allegations of citizenship, made upon information and belief and supported by residency facts, were sufficient at this early stage. The court vacated the remand order and returned the case for further proceedings. View "De Chavez v. UPS" on Justia Law

A company based in Texas purchased a group of telecommunications patents and soon after sued another company for patent infringement in several European courts, including the European Union’s Unified Patent Court (UPC) and a German district court. The defendant in those foreign proceedings argued that its products did not infringe the patents and, in the alternative, that the patents must be licensed on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms. To support its FRAND defense, the defendant sought access to an unredacted patent purchase agreement, which it believed contained information relevant to the appropriate licensing terms.After the UPC denied the defendant’s request for production of the unredacted agreement—finding the request unsubstantiated and the information likely irrelevant at that stage—the defendant applied to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas for discovery under 28 U.S.C. § 1782. A federal magistrate judge granted the discovery request, and the district court affirmed, applying a deferential standard of review and requiring the plaintiff to provide “authoritative proof” that the European courts would not be receptive to the discovery.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in both its standard of review and its allocation of the burden of proof. The Fifth Circuit clarified that district courts must review magistrate judge recommendations on § 1782 applications de novo, as such applications are dispositive. The Court further held that respondents are not required to provide authoritative proof of foreign court non-receptivity and that the lower court misapplied the discretionary factors set out in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. The appellate court found that the balance of factors weighed against permitting discovery at this time and reversed the district court’s order granting discovery. View "Motorola v. Advanced Standard Communication" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute under federal law. He ultimately pled guilty and, as part of his plea agreement, he waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence, except for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. During the plea process, the defendant confirmed in open court that he had read, discussed, and understood the terms of the plea agreement, including the appeal waiver. He was sentenced to 240 months in prison. The conduct underlying the sentencing enhancements involved the defendant fleeing law enforcement by driving through residential property, which led to the district court applying certain enhancements to his sentence.Following sentencing, the defendant appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, challenging the application of sentencing enhancements and arguing his appeal waiver was not knowing and voluntary. The government argued that the appeal should be dismissed based on the waiver. The Fifth Circuit initially dismissed the appeal, enforcing the waiver. The Supreme Court of the United States then decided Hunter v. United States, establishing that appeal waivers are unenforceable if enforcing them would result in a miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court vacated the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration under the Hunter standard.On remand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that the defendant’s waiver was knowing and voluntary. The court further found that, under the Hunter standard, the alleged sentencing errors were not the type of egregious errors that would constitute a miscarriage of justice. As a result, the Fifth Circuit enforced the appeal waiver and dismissed the appeal. The court’s holding was that no miscarriage of justice occurred, and the appeal waiver remained enforceable. View "USA v. Harris" on Justia Law

The plaintiff worked as a cleanup worker in Pascagoula, Mississippi, following the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill, allegedly exposed to crude oil and chemical dispersants through inhalation and direct contact. He claimed this exposure caused a chronic worsening of his preexisting asthma. The plaintiff sued BP Exploration & Production, Inc. and BP America Production Company under the Back-End Litigation Option (BELO) of the Medical Settlement Agreement related to the Deepwater Horizon class-action litigation. The parties stipulated to venue in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.The litigation required the plaintiff to prove that his injuries were legally caused by exposure to oil spill-related substances. He proffered two experts, Dr. Michael Freeman and Dr. Shawn French, to establish causation. BP moved to exclude their testimony and for summary judgment. The district court denied the plaintiff’s request for an evidentiary hearing, excluded the expert testimony, and granted summary judgment in favor of BP, finding that the expert evidence was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to causation. The plaintiff timely appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that toxic tort causation standards, requiring expert testimony to establish both general and specific causation, apply under maritime law for BELO claims involving non-readily observable injuries with multiple possible etiologies. The Fifth Circuit found the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the plaintiff’s experts, both for lack of reliability and relevance under Rule 702 and Daubert, and for deficiencies in qualifications and methodology. The district court’s grant of summary judgment was affirmed. View "Dufour v. BP Exploration & Production" on Justia Law

Eva Stramaski, an academic advisor at Texas A&M University, was concerned her paycheck might arrive late after returning from medical leave. Despite being paid on time, her supervisor, Mark Lawley, accused her of being “aggressive” about the issue, sent her home, and issued a “coaching letter” citing performance problems. Stramaski disputed these allegations, and Lawley fired her a few days later. She then brought suit against Lawley in his personal capacity under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), claiming retaliation for asserting her right to timely pay.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas first heard the case. Lawley moved to dismiss the suit, arguing sovereign immunity and qualified immunity. A magistrate judge recommended dismissing claims for injunctive and declaratory relief but rejected both immunity defenses, and the district court adopted the recommendations over Lawley’s objections. Lawley appealed. In its first review (Stramaski I), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that sovereign immunity did not bar the case against Lawley personally but left open the issue of qualified immunity, remanding for further analysis. On remand, the district court again denied Lawley’s qualified immunity defense, and Lawley appealed a second time.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in this second appeal, addressed whether a public official may invoke qualified immunity in an FLSA retaliation suit. The court held that qualified immunity does not apply to such claims. It reasoned that, at the time Congress authorized private FLSA retaliation suits, the common law did not shield officials from malicious retaliation, and the purposes underlying qualified immunity are incompatible with the FLSA’s anti-retaliation protections. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of Lawley’s motion to dismiss. View "Stramaski v. Lawley" on Justia Law

James Bien worked as a conductor for Union Pacific Railroad Company. In 2013, he failed two vision tests required for his job and was subsequently removed from his conductor position, receiving a work restriction that prevented him from performing duties requiring color signal recognition. After several months, he was employed by Union Pacific in a different, lower-paying role. In 2015, following a notification from the company, Bien took another vision test, which he passed. He then requested a follow-up test to potentially remove his work restriction and be reinstated as a conductor. Union Pacific denied this request, determining that his prior test failures were dispositive and that the new test had been administered in error. Bien filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC in April 2020 and later brought suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in January 2025.Prior to Bien's lawsuit, a class action had been filed in the District of Nebraska, Harris v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, challenging similar employment actions by Union Pacific. The initial class definition was broad, but the court later certified a narrower class. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas concluded that Bien fell within the original class definition but not the certified, narrower one, reasoning that his 2015 testing and related correspondence did not constitute a “fitness-for-duty examination” under the certified class. As a result, the district court held that the statute of limitations barred Bien’s claim and dismissed his case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo and reversed the district court’s decision. The Fifth Circuit held that, under American Pipe tolling, a plaintiff must be unambiguously excluded from a class definition to terminate tolling of the statute of limitations. Because Bien was not unambiguously excluded from the certified class, he was entitled to tolling, and his suit was not time-barred. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Bien v. Union Pacific" on Justia Law

A coach and teacher employed by a Texas school district, along with his wife and their son, brought suit after two separate incidents involving the school and its employees. The first incident occurred when the coach’s son was accused by a fellow student of inappropriate conduct, resulting in the seizure of a phone, a public escort through the school by security personnel, and alleged detention and interrogation of the son. The father was sanctioned and ordered not to return to work, and the family claims these actions harmed their reputations and career prospects. The second incident took place the following year when the coach attended a school board meeting to celebrate his team’s achievements. During the event, he refused to shake hands with certain board members and employees, citing both personal grievances and a desire to avoid the appearance of political endorsement. He was subsequently warned and transferred to another school, which he alleges was retaliation.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed several of the plaintiffs’ claims. The court found no Fifth Amendment violation because the plaintiffs did not allege that any compelled statements were used against them in a criminal case. Regarding the First Amendment claim, the court concluded that the coach’s conduct at the board meeting was undertaken in his official capacity, not as a private citizen, and primarily concerned personal matters rather than public concern. The court also dismissed the related Texas constitutional claim for similar reasons. Other claims were voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiffs, and a final judgment was issued.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissals de novo and affirmed. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs failed to allege a plausible Fifth Amendment violation under Chavez v. Martinez because no compelled statement was used in a criminal case. It further held that the coach’s actions at the board meeting were not protected speech under the First Amendment, as they arose from his official duties rather than as a private citizen. The dismissal of related claims under state law was also affirmed. View "Lucio v. Brownsville Independent School District" on Justia Law