Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Methylene chloride is a chemical used in various commercial applications, including paint removal and manufacturing of products like air conditioner coolants and EV batteries. While useful, over-exposure to methylene chloride can cause serious health risks, including injury and death. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), determined that nearly all uses of methylene chloride posed an “unreasonable risk of injury to health” and issued a rule severely limiting its manufacture, processing, distribution, and use, allowing only thirteen conditions of use under strict exposure limits.Prior to this rule, EPA had completed risk evaluations for methylene chloride, first in 2020 and then revised in 2022. The revised evaluation adopted a “whole chemical” determination, finding all but one use posed unreasonable risk, and assumed workers did not use personal protective equipment (PPE), contrary to prior practice and OSHA standards. Industry petitioners, including manufacturers and the American Chemistry Council, filed for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing that EPA’s determinations and rule were arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by substantial evidence. Sierra Club also challenged the rule, asserting EPA did not go far enough to protect vulnerable populations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that EPA’s “whole chemical” risk determination violated TSCA, which requires separate evaluations for each condition of use. The court also held that EPA’s assumption of no PPE use was unsupported by substantial evidence and contrary to law. EPA’s exposure limits for methylene chloride were deemed excessively conservative and not supported by the record. The court granted the industry petitioners’ review, vacated EPA’s rule and associated risk determination, denied Sierra Club’s petition, and remanded to EPA for further proceedings. View "East Fork Enterprises v. EPA" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a Texas death-row inmate, was convicted of capital murder following his involvement in a multi-victim robbery homicide associated with gang activity in Hidalgo County, Texas. The prosecution’s case relied, in part, on the petitioner’s own recorded confession, which detailed his participation in the crime and described receiving an AK-47 prior to the robbery. The trial lasted thirteen days, and after a day of deliberation, the jury found the petitioner guilty of capital murder and sentenced him to death. At sentencing, the jury heard limited information about the petitioner’s background, despite the existence of extensive juvenile records documenting significant mental health issues.On direct appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) held that only one count of capital murder could stand due to double jeopardy concerns and otherwise affirmed both the conviction and the death sentence. Subsequent state habeas proceedings, including those before the TCCA, did not lead to relief. The petitioner then filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, raising numerous claims. The district court, relying on a lengthy magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, denied the habeas petition and a certificate of appealability (COA).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the petitioner’s request for a COA on two claims: ineffective assistance of trial counsel for not admitting juvenile records under the business-records hearsay exception, and error in admitting his confession as involuntary. The Fifth Circuit denied the COA, holding that the petitioner had not shown that reasonable jurists could debate the district court’s resolution of either claim. Specifically, the court found that the ineffective assistance claim was procedurally barred because it was raised too late, and the voluntariness claim was not properly before the court due to procedural defaults in presenting new evidence and exhaustion theories. View "Ramirez v. Guerrero" on Justia Law

Several owners of shoreline properties along Lake Austin challenged a 2019 ordinance enacted by the City of Austin. The ordinance declared that their properties had always been within Austin’s full-purpose jurisdiction, repealed a 1986 ordinance that had previously classified the properties as limited-purpose (which restricted taxation until city services were provided), and subjected the properties to full taxation. The plaintiffs alleged that Austin taxed their properties as if they were full-purpose residents but provided fewer municipal services than other full-purpose residents, raising federal and state law claims.Initially, the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed all claims under the Tax Injunction Act. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal of all but two claims and remanded the case. Upon remand, the City reasserted several grounds for dismissal, including the political-question doctrine, Pullman abstention, Burford abstention, and failure to state a claim. The magistrate judge recommended Pullman abstention, which the district court adopted, dismissing the claims without prejudice and entering final judgment. The plaintiffs appealed again.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision and held that the case was not moot, as recent state legislation neither refunded taxes nor automatically disannexed the properties. The Fifth Circuit concluded that Pullman abstention was inappropriate because the plaintiffs’ federal equal protection claim did not hinge on any uncertain or disputed question of Texas law. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for consideration of the City’s remaining grounds for dismissal, expressly declining to reach those grounds itself. View "Harward v. City of Austin" on Justia Law

A television production company maintained insurance coverage for its shows, including one chronicling the struggles of obese individuals to lose weight. In 2011, the insurer added an exclusion to the general liability portion of the policy, barring coverage for “any/all reality shows.” The company did not object to this exclusion. Years later, several participants or their families sued the production company for injuries allegedly arising from the show’s filming. The insurer refused to defend or indemnify the company, citing the “reality show” exclusion.The insurer brought a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, seeking confirmation that it had no duty to defend or indemnify. The production company counterclaimed for breach of contract, fraudulent inducement, and violations of Texas consumer protection statutes. The district court granted summary judgment to the insurer, finding that the exclusion unambiguously barred coverage for bodily injuries arising from reality shows like the one at issue. At a subsequent bench trial, the district court rejected the company’s fraud and statutory claims, finding no misrepresentation by the insurer and concluding the company could not have justifiably relied on any representation given its knowledge of the exclusion and the show’s nature.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Fifth Circuit held that the company forfeited its argument about the ambiguity of "reality show" by not raising it in the district court and, in fact, previously represented the show as a “reality show.” The appellate court also found no clear error in the district court’s factual findings rejecting the fraud and consumer protection claims, noting substantial evidence of the company’s understanding of the exclusion. The district court’s judgment was affirmed in full. View "Megalomedia v. Philadelphia Indemnity" on Justia Law

A former student at a New Orleans university was reported by a fellow student for stalking after a school-sponsored trip to Honduras. The report included allegations that he had made threatening statements about his ability to build bombs and use chemical agents, and referenced chemical burns. Based on this report, a warrant was issued and he was arrested for misdemeanor stalking. After his arrest, a university police officer gave statements to the campus newspaper, which published articles suggesting he possessed chemical materials capable of killing people and had made threatening posts on social media. The student withdrew from the university shortly after his arrest, and the criminal case was later dismissed with no charges related to weapons or chemicals.The student filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, asserting various claims including defamation and negligence against the university. The university responded by filing a special motion to strike under Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP statute (Article 971), which provides an expedited procedure for dismissal of claims arising from protected speech or petitioning activity. The district court denied the motion, holding that Article 971 does not apply in federal court when jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed whether Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP statute applies in federal court. The Fifth Circuit held that Article 971 conflicts with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 56 because it imposes additional procedural requirements not found in the federal rules, such as burden-shifting and limitations on discovery. As a result, the court concluded that Article 971 does not apply in federal court. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the university’s special motion to strike. View "Sahs v. Loyola Univ New Orleans" on Justia Law

Federal and state agencies enacted a rule listing two distinct population segments of the lesser prairie-chicken as "endangered" and "threatened" under the Endangered Species Act. The rule divided the bird’s range into Northern and Southern segments, based on habitat and genetic differences. Conservation groups, including one that originally petitioned for the listing, were active throughout the process. After a change in presidential administration in 2025, the federal government signaled a shift in environmental policy and, in ongoing litigation, ultimately conceded error in applying the "distinct population segment" policy. The government and various state and industry plaintiffs sought to settle by vacating the listing rule.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas consolidated the lawsuits challenging the listing. Conservation groups moved to intervene twice: the first motion was denied because the court found the government would adequately represent their interests, and the second was denied as untimely and for failure to rebut that presumption. Meanwhile, the district court granted the government’s motion for voluntary vacatur and remand, finding the listing rule unlawful due to the agency’s conceded error.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of intervention de novo and the timeliness determination for abuse of discretion. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in finding the second motion to intervene untimely, as the conservation groups acted promptly after government conduct revealed a divergence of interests. The court found all requirements for intervention of right satisfied and reversed the denial of intervention. However, the Fifth Circuit determined the conservation groups lacked appellate standing to challenge the vacatur and remand of the listing rule, so it did not reach the merits of the district court’s substantive ruling. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Texas v. Dept of the Interior" on Justia Law

Twin brothers, both Black international students, were enrolled as doctoral candidates at the University of Mississippi’s Department of Pharmacy Administration. One brother, Bennard, disagreed with changes to his faculty mentorship arrangement, objected to mandatory in-person meetings, and declined to complete a required program assessment called the Abilities Transcript. After being repeatedly warned and given extensions, he was placed on provisional status for failing to complete the requirement, which also caused the loss of his graduate assistantship. Bennard and his brother each filed lawsuits against the University and several faculty members, alleging constitutional, statutory, and contract violations related to academic sanctions and alleged discriminatory treatment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi consolidated the brothers’ cases. It dismissed Bennard’s claims against the University on sovereign-immunity grounds, dismissed his remaining federal claims under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his individual-capacity state contract claims. Bennard appealed, while his brother’s appeal was dismissed for failure to prosecute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed Bennard’s remaining claims. The court held that sovereign immunity barred claims against the University, claims against one defendant in her official capacity, and official-capacity state-law contract claims; those dismissals must be without prejudice. The court further found that Bennard failed to plausibly allege First or Fourteenth Amendment violations, and that the faculty defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on individual-capacity claims. The court affirmed the district court’s refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining contract claims and upheld consolidation of the cases and dismissal of moot preliminary injunction motions. The judgment was affirmed as modified to clarify the proper form of dismissal for sovereign-immunity-barred claims. View "Eriakha v. University of MS" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between a company and a port authority over responsibility for securing permits to dredge a ship channel in Lake Charles, Louisiana. The company had leased the channel to develop a grain terminal, but the lease did not specify which party was responsible for obtaining the dredging permit. After the terminal was built but could not be fully used without dredging, the company and the port disagreed over who bore this responsibility. The company sued in federal court, and, by consent of both parties, a U.S. Magistrate Judge presided over a bench trial and awarded the company nearly $125 million.After the trial and the entry of judgment, the port discovered that the magistrate judge and the company’s lead trial counsel had been close family friends for four decades—a relationship that was not fully disclosed. The only disclosure had been that the lead counsel’s daughter was the judge’s law clerk, who would be screened from the case. Upon learning about the undisclosed relationship, the port moved to vacate the magistrate judge referral. The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana held an evidentiary hearing and found that the port’s consent to the referral had not been knowing, as it had lacked crucial information about the judge’s conflict, and vacated the referral.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion. The Fifth Circuit held that a party’s consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction waives a fundamental constitutional right and, therefore, must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. The court rejected the argument that constructive knowledge by the party’s counsel—rather than actual knowledge—could suffice to establish valid consent. Because the district court applied the correct standard and found no actual knowledge, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the vacation of the referral. View "I F G Port v. Lake Charles Harbor" on Justia Law

Several Starbucks stores in Buffalo, New York, were the site of intense union organizing activity between August 2021 and July 2022, led by Workers United. After the Union launched its campaign, Starbucks responded with a series of actions: dispatching senior executives and support managers to Buffalo, implementing fast-tracked renovations, soliciting employee grievances, offering benefits and promotions, strictly enforcing workplace policies, and terminating several employees, many of whom were union supporters. The Union won certification at eight stores but lost the vote at the Camp Road location, leading to allegations that Starbucks’s conduct affected the fairness of the election.The National Labor Relations Board’s General Counsel investigated, resulting in consolidated complaints. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found Starbucks violated sections 8(a)(1), (3), (4), and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and sustained the Union’s objections to the Camp Road election. The NLRB issued an extensive order adopting the ALJ’s findings, concluding that Starbucks engaged in unlawful surveillance, coercive interrogation, solicited grievances, promised and granted benefits, threatened employees, changed policies and fired employees without bargaining, closed the Galleria kiosk discriminatorily, and disciplined union supporters. Remedies included a bargaining order at Camp Road, reopening the Galleria kiosk, compensating employees for pecuniary harm, and requiring a public notice reading.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the NLRB’s order. Applying a deferential standard to the Board’s factual findings and reviewing legal conclusions de novo, the Fifth Circuit denied enforcement as to one finding of unlawful surveillance, the sole findings of unlawful interrogation and coercive threats, remanding those portions. It granted enforcement for the Board’s findings under sections 8(a)(3), (4), and (5). The court denied enforcement of the consequential damages remedy and reopening the Galleria kiosk, but enforced the bargaining order at Camp Road and the public notice-reading requirement. View "Starbucks v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Lucid USA, Inc., which manufactures and sells electric vehicles, sought to sell its vehicles directly to consumers in Texas through its own retail studio. However, Texas law prohibits motor vehicle manufacturers and their affiliates from directly selling vehicles to consumers, instead requiring sales to occur through independent franchised dealers. In 2021, after the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles notified Lucid that it could not sell vehicles at its Plano studio due to this prohibition, Lucid filed suit against officials of the Department, alleging that the law violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Texas Automobile Dealers Association intervened as a defendant.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment and ruled against Lucid. The district court concluded that the Texas prohibition was rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest and, therefore, did not violate either the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses. Lucid appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment ruling de novo. Relying on its previous decisions in Ford Motor Co. v. Texas Department of Transportation, International Truck & Engine Corp. v. Bray, and Tesla, Inc. v. Louisiana Automobile Dealers Association, the Fifth Circuit found those precedents controlling. The court held that the Texas law survives rational basis review because the legislature has a legitimate interest in curtailing vertical integration and preventing monopolistic practices in the automobile market. The court rejected Lucid’s arguments that its as-applied challenge was distinct from the facial challenges previously considered. The court also found that Lucid's substantive due process claim fails for the same reasons. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Lucid Group USA v. Johnston" on Justia Law