Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Texas LNG, a company seeking to construct a liquid natural gas terminal in Brownsville, Texas, received a permit from the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) to build its facility. The company faced delays due to litigation and the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in three successive extensions of its construction deadline granted by TCEQ’s executive director. The South Texas Environmental Justice Network (STEJN), an environmental advocacy group, moved to overturn the third extension, arguing that Texas LNG did not meet the requirements under Texas law to receive it and that the executive director lacked authority to grant the extension.Prior to the current appeal, both federal and state agencies reviewed Texas LNG’s permit. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and TCEQ initially granted the necessary permits, but subsequent legal challenges led to a remand by the D.C. Circuit to FERC (which ultimately reaffirmed the permit) and a dismissal by the Third Court of Appeals in Austin for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction regarding the TCEQ permit. TCEQ’s Office of Public Interest recommended granting the motion to overturn on the basis of updated air quality standards, but TCEQ did not issue a decision, resulting in a denial of STEJN’s motion by operation of law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed STEJN’s direct petition for review of TCEQ’s denial. Applying de novo review under the Texas Administrative Procedure Act, the Fifth Circuit held that STEJN had standing but found that TCEQ’s executive director had the authority under section 116.120 of the Texas Administrative Code to grant the third extension. The court determined that Texas LNG met the regulatory requirements for a third extension, and substantial evidence supported TCEQ’s decision. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit denied STEJN’s petition for review. View "S Texas Environmental Justice v. Commission on Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

Margaret Woods, proceeding without an attorney, sued her former employer STS Services, L.L.C., after being terminated from her job. In her Third Amended Complaint, Woods alleged that she was fired because she is a black woman and replaced by white men. Earlier versions of her complaint included claims for breach of contract and race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which she abandoned, leaving only claims of race and sex discrimination under Title VII. Woods did not provide factual details about her qualifications for the position from which she was terminated.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas reviewed Woods’s successive complaints. Each time, the district court dismissed her complaints for failure to state a claim but allowed her opportunities to amend and refile. Woods submitted her Second Amended Complaint late, which was also dismissed. Her Third Amended Complaint was timely, but again found deficient for failing to plead facts regarding her qualifications. The court gave her another chance to amend, but Woods did not file a Fourth Amended Complaint within the deadline, or at all. The district court ultimately dismissed the case with prejudice and entered judgment in favor of STS Services, assessing costs against Woods.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that Woods failed to state a Title VII claim because her complaint did not include sufficient factual allegations to establish that she was qualified for her position, a necessary element of a prima facie case under Title VII. The Fifth Circuit also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Woods’s complaint with prejudice after repeated deficiencies and failures to amend. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Woods v. STS Services" on Justia Law

Several individuals and organizations sought to circulate a petition to place a campaign finance ordinance on Houston’s ballot, but the city’s charter at that time required petition circulators to be both residents and registered voters of Houston. The plaintiffs did not meet these requirements. They notified the city of their intent to circulate petitions and challenge the constitutionality of the residency and voter registration requirements. The city initially did not clarify its position but later stated it would not enforce the challenged provisions. Despite this, the plaintiffs filed suit in federal court, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, arguing that the requirements were unconstitutional under Supreme Court precedent.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas first granted the plaintiffs a temporary restraining order barring enforcement of the requirements. After the petition circulation period ended, the court dismissed the claims as moot following a stipulation by the parties. The plaintiffs moved to alter or amend the judgment, which was denied. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the plaintiffs had standing and that the case was not moot, and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the district court granted the plaintiffs declaratory relief and, after the city repealed the challenged provisions, awarded the plaintiffs attorneys’ fees as prevailing parties. However, in a subsequent appeal, a different Fifth Circuit panel concluded there was no case or controversy because all parties agreed the provisions were unconstitutional, vacated the judgment, and remanded for dismissal.On remand, the district court vacated the attorneys’ fees award and ordered reimbursement to the city. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed this ruling, holding that after the prior appellate decision vacated the underlying merits judgment for lack of a case or controversy, there was no basis for a fee award under Rule 60(b)(5). The court also clarified that the city was not required to appeal the fee award directly, and the plaintiffs’ claims of prejudice were unavailing. View "Pool v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

On July 29, 2007, Noel Dean’s wife, Shannon, died from a gunshot wound at their home after she became severely intoxicated and after Noel confronted her with evidence of an affair. Noel reported that Shannon shot herself, but law enforcement suspected homicide. The next day, Dr. Darshan Phatak, an assistant medical examiner, performed the autopsy. Initially, he could not determine whether the death was a homicide or suicide and marked the cause as “pending.” After meeting with colleagues and reviewing police interviews and other evidence, Dr. Phatak concluded the gun’s orientation at the time of the shooting was inconsistent with Noel’s account and classified the death as a homicide in the official autopsy report. This report contributed to Noel’s arrest and indictment for murder. During a subsequent trial, photographic overlays created by Dr. Phatak’s supervisor suggested the gun orientation matched Noel’s story, prompting a change in the autopsy report’s classification to “undetermined” and a dismissal of charges.Noel Dean then filed a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Dr. Phatak intentionally fabricated the autopsy report. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied Dr. Phatak’s summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity, relying on allegations rather than evidence. On initial appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded for proper consideration of the summary judgment record. After further briefing and significant delay, the district court again denied summary judgment, applying a “deliberate indifference” standard.On this second interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the district court applied the wrong legal standard by using a “deliberate indifference” test rather than determining whether a rational juror could find Dr. Phatak intentionally misstated his conclusions. The appellate court vacated the denial of summary judgment and remanded for reconsideration under the correct standard. View "Dean v. Phatak" on Justia Law

A Singapore-based company that supplies offshore vessels entered into a charter agreement with a Mexico-based marine oil and gas company. The agreement allowed the Mexican company to charter a vessel for eighteen months, with provisions for termination if payments were not made and an obligation to redeliver the vessel at the end of the term. After the charter expired, the Singaporean company alleged that the Mexican company failed to pay required fees and did not return the vessel, leading to arbitration in Singapore. The arbitrator awarded the Singaporean company damages and ordered the vessel’s return, but the Mexican company did not comply. Meanwhile, an email revealed that the Mexican company was set to receive a large refund from a third party, to be sent to a U.S. bank account in the name of a related U.S. entity.The Singaporean company filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, seeking to attach the funds in the U.S. account as security for the arbitration award under federal maritime law and, later, Texas state law. The district court initially granted the writ of garnishment, but after limited discovery, vacated the writ, finding no evidence that the Mexican company owned the funds in the U.S. account. The district court also denied the plaintiff’s request for leave to amend its complaint to assert an alter ego theory, which would have permitted attachment based on state law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider relevant evidence and legal standards regarding ownership and control of the funds. The appellate court also determined that the district court erred in denying leave to amend without adequate explanation. The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case, instructing the district court to allow the plaintiff to amend its complaint. View "CH Offshore v. Mexiship Ocean" on Justia Law

A passenger, after being injured in a hit-and-run rear-end collision while riding in a vehicle arranged through a rideshare application, sought damages for bodily injuries. The passenger alleged that the rideshare company, its subsidiary, and its insurer either provided or were required by law to provide uninsured motorist (UM) coverage, and that their rejection of such coverage violated Louisiana law.The action began in Louisiana state court, initially naming only the insurer as a defendant. The passenger later amended the complaint to add the rideshare company and its subsidiary, arguing that they were not permitted to reject UM coverage. With all defendants’ consent, the insurer removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, citing diversity jurisdiction. Multiple motions followed, including motions to dismiss by the rideshare entities and a motion for summary judgment by the insurer. The district court found that Louisiana statutes allow transportation network companies to reject UM coverage and that the defendants had properly done so. Accordingly, the district court dismissed all claims with prejudice and denied the passenger’s request to certify a question to the Louisiana Supreme Court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo. The court concluded that Louisiana Revised Statute § 45:201.6 incorporates, by general reference, the provisions of § 22:1295, including the right to reject UM coverage. The court found support for this interpretation in state appellate decisions and statutory context. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and denied the motion to certify the question to the Louisiana Supreme Court. The holding is that transportation network companies in Louisiana may reject uninsured motorist coverage if they follow the procedures in § 22:1295. View "Guerrera v. United Financial Casualty Co." on Justia Law

Michelle Evans attended a debate at the Texas Capitol in May 2023 regarding gender reassignment treatments for children. While at the Capitol, Evans encountered a transgender politician in the women’s restroom. A photo of this individual washing their hands was posted to Facebook by someone in Evans’s group, and Evans subsequently tweeted the same photo with a caption expressing her belief that the politician should not have used the women’s restroom. The tweet led to controversy and an investigation by the Department of Public Safety, prompted by Travis County District Attorney José Garza, to determine if Evans’s actions violated Texas Penal Code § 21.15(b), which prohibits transmitting images of individuals in bathrooms or changing rooms without consent and with intent to invade privacy.Evans sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, aiming to prevent Garza from investigating or prosecuting her for disseminating the photograph. She argued that the statute was unconstitutional both facially and as applied to her conduct, citing First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds. The district court denied her requests for injunctive relief, reasoning that the equities weighed against granting the injunction, and that the values underlying abstention doctrines informed its decision. The court found no ongoing state judicial proceeding that would trigger abstention and did not make explicit findings on the likelihood of success on the merits.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that Evans had standing but agreed that she failed to meet her burden to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits or that the balance of harms justified injunctive relief. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the statute was not facially unconstitutional and that Evans had not shown it was unconstitutional as applied to her situation. The district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Evans v. Garza" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on insurance policies purchased by several Louisiana public entities, including the Town of Vinton, from a group of foreign and American insurers. The policies included an arbitration clause and a contract endorsement stating that each policy is a “separate contract” between the insured and each insurer. After alleged breaches, the insured entities sued all participating insurers in Louisiana state court. Subsequently, the insureds dismissed the foreign insurers with prejudice, leaving only American insurers as defendants.Following the dismissal of the foreign insurers, the remaining American insurers removed the cases to the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. They sought to compel arbitration under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and the Federal Arbitration Act. The district court denied these motions, holding that the contract endorsement created separate agreements between each insurer and the insured, and, since the foreign insurers were no longer parties, no agreement involved a non-American party. The court also rejected the American insurers’ equitable estoppel argument, finding it precluded by Louisiana law, which expressly bars arbitration clauses in insurance contracts covering property in the state.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Fifth Circuit held that the Convention does not apply because no foreign party remains in any agreement to arbitrate. The court further concluded that Louisiana law prohibits enforcement of arbitration clauses in these insurance contracts and that equitable estoppel cannot override this prohibition. Lastly, the court determined that the delegation clause in the arbitration agreement could not be enforced because Louisiana law prevents the valid formation of an arbitration agreement in this context. View "Town of Vinton v. Indian Harbor" on Justia Law

In this matter, a relator initially brought claims under the False Claims Act against a group of defendants for fraudulent conduct, later joined by the United States. After years of litigation, the district court imposed a receivership over the defendants’ assets and ultimately entered a large monetary judgment against them. The defendants satisfied the reduced judgment following an appeal, but the receivership remained active to resolve additional matters, including a claim by the Estate of Robert Johnson. Johnson had obtained a $200,000 wrongful death judgment in state court against a receivership entity and sought to intervene in the federal court to enforce the judgment, as the receivership order prevented execution in state court.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi granted Johnson’s motion to intervene, subsequently granting summary judgment in his favor and directing payment of the state court judgment. The defendants appealed the order granting intervention before the district court had resolved their motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment order. The district court’s intervention order was a preliminary step in addressing Johnson’s claim, not a final resolution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether it had jurisdiction over the defendants’ interlocutory appeal from the order granting intervention. Citing established precedent, the Fifth Circuit determined that orders permitting intervention are generally not immediately appealable, as they are procedural steps toward a later final judgment on the intervenor’s claim. The court concluded that the intervention order was not a final, appealable order and that the appeal was premature. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court’s holding is that an order granting intervention, when not resolving the merits of the intervenor’s claim, is not immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. View "Johnson v. Stone County" on Justia Law

Bridgelink Engineering LLC, managed by two individuals, entered into a loan agreement with two banks in August 2021. The loans, totaling $34 million, were initially guaranteed by several LLCs also managed by the same individuals. A few months later, the individuals personally guaranteed Bridgelink’s loan obligations, with a guaranty agreement containing an early-release clause. This clause allowed the individuals to be released from liability if specific conditions were met, including the borrower’s loan being in good standing and compliance with financial covenants for two consecutive quarters. After a default in July 2022, the banks and Bridgelink amended the agreement, but Bridgelink later failed to meet the conditions for waiver of default and remained in default into 2023. Neither Bridgelink nor its guarantors made payments on the loans.The banks sued Bridgelink, the individuals, and the LLCs for breach of contract in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, asserting diversity jurisdiction. The individuals argued they had satisfied the guaranty’s early release conditions, and later challenged the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, contending that one of the banks was a Texas citizen, which would destroy diversity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed both the jurisdictional challenge and the merits. The appellate court held that complete diversity existed as the banks and all defendants were citizens of different states, confirming the district court’s jurisdiction. The court further held that the individuals had not satisfied the conditions for early release from their guaranty obligations because the borrower’s loan was in default and the required confirmations of compliance were not provided for two consecutive quarters. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment holding the individuals liable as guarantors for the loans. View "Cadence Bank v. Johnson" on Justia Law