Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Intuit, Inc., the seller of TurboTax tax-preparation software, advertised its “Free Edition” as available at no cost for “simple tax returns.” However, the majority of taxpayers did not qualify due to various exclusions, and those individuals were prompted during the tax preparation process to upgrade to paid products. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) brought an administrative complaint in 2022, alleging that these advertisements were deceptive under Section 5 of the FTC Act. After an initial federal court suit for a preliminary injunction was denied, the FTC pursued the matter through its internal adjudicative process instead.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that Intuit’s advertisements were likely to mislead a significant minority of consumers. The FTC Commissioners affirmed this decision, issuing a broad cease-and-desist order that barred Intuit from advertising “any goods or services” as free unless it met stringent requirements. This order was not limited to tax-preparation products. Intuit petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for review, asserting, among other arguments, that the FTC’s adjudication of deceptive advertising claims through an ALJ, rather than an Article III court, was unconstitutional.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that deceptive advertising claims under Section 5 of the FTC Act are akin to traditional actions at law or equity, such as fraud and deceit, and thus involve private rights. According to recent Supreme Court precedent in SEC v. Jarkesy, such claims must be adjudicated in Article III courts, not by agency ALJs. The Fifth Circuit granted Intuit’s petition, vacated the FTC’s order, and remanded the case to the agency for further proceedings consistent with its holding. View "Intuit v. Federal Trade Commission" on Justia Law

An 18-year-old high school senior from Texas was indicted by a federal grand jury for transmitting threats in interstate commerce, based on statements he made while using the online gaming platform Roblox. The statements, made in a virtual “Church” experience, referenced possessing firearms, preparing munitions, and intentions to commit violence at a Christian event. Other Roblox users, located in Pennsylvania and Nevada, reported these statements to the FBI, believing them to be serious threats rather than mere role-play or trolling. The government alleged the defendant's remarks corresponded to a real concert scheduled in Austin and supported its case with evidence from the defendant’s internet history and statements captured by a keylogger.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed the indictment before trial, concluding no reasonable juror could find that the defendant’s statements constituted “true threats” outside the protection of the First Amendment. The court found the context—a role-playing video game environment filled with extreme and offensive avatars—undermined the seriousness of the statements, and excluded evidence of the defendant’s conduct outside Roblox as irrelevant. The district court released the defendant without conditions, later imposing some conditions after a government request.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the question of whether the statements were “true threats” is a factual issue that should ordinarily be decided by a jury at trial, not by the judge on a pretrial motion. The court found that disputed facts and contextual uncertainties required a trial on the merits, and that the district court erred by resolving these issues prematurely. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the indictment and remanded for further proceedings. The appeal regarding the defendant’s release was dismissed as moot. View "United States v. Burger" on Justia Law

Police in Gautier, Mississippi, used an automatic license plate reader (LPR) system to identify a vehicle associated with Elijah Porter, who was wanted on an outstanding warrant for aggravated assault. Officer Hoggard received an LPR alert, confirmed the vehicle’s connection to Porter through a computer check, and conducted a traffic stop. During the stop, Hoggard detained Porter and, while interacting with him, observed the barrel and slide of a firearm, as well as a silver automatic conversion switch, protruding from under the driver’s seat. The officer later retrieved the firearm—a Glock pistol equipped with a machinegun conversion switch—during an inventory search of the vehicle.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi denied Porter’s motions to suppress both the LPR-derived vehicle location data and the firearm, ruling that use of the LPR data did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, that the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, and that the plain view and inevitable discovery doctrines applied to the firearm. The court also rejected Porter’s argument that 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), which prohibits possession of a machinegun, was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. Porter waived a jury trial and was found guilty in a bench trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. It held that use of the LPR system to identify Porter’s vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment because there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in movements on public roads or in license plate information, and the LPR data was not as comprehensive as cell-site location data. The court further held that the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, the firearm was lawfully seized under the plain view doctrine, and Fifth Circuit precedent foreclosed Porter’s Second Amendment challenge to § 922(o). The conviction was affirmed. View "United States v. Porter" on Justia Law

The defendant, employed as a daycare worker, took and distributed a sexually explicit photograph of an infant in her care. She pleaded guilty to one count of production and attempted production of child pornography under a plea agreement that included a waiver of her right to appeal, except in certain circumstances. At sentencing, the government advocated for the statutory maximum sentence and, in doing so, referenced the defendant’s sex as making her conduct more shocking and suggested that a lengthy sentence would prevent her from having children in the future. The district court ultimately imposed the statutory maximum sentence but did not mention the defendant’s sex as a reason for the sentence.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas accepted the guilty plea and sentenced the defendant to 360 months in prison, 10 years of supervised release, and restitution. The defendant did not object to the prosecutor’s comments regarding her sex at the sentencing hearing. She appealed, arguing that the government’s statements violated her Fifth Amendment right to equal protection and that the appeal waiver in her plea agreement did not bar her appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and applied the plain-error standard, as the defendant had not objected to the statements in the district court. The appellate court concluded that the district court did not rely on the prosecutor’s references to the defendant’s sex when imposing sentence. Because the defendant could not show that the government’s statements affected her substantial rights or that a structural error had occurred, the Fifth Circuit held that there was no reversible error. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

In this case, a witness in Laredo, Texas, reported hearing multiple gunshots fired from a black Cadillac SUV with a missing right rear taillight. Police responded, gathered shell casings, and located a gray Cadillac SRX matching the description, which had been previously stopped by police several days earlier with Jesus Eloy Garcia as one of the passengers. Based on the witness’s account, investigative findings, and past police encounters, law enforcement issued a “be-on-the-lookout” (BOLO) alert identifying the vehicle, its distinguishing features, and possible occupants. Later that day, officers located the Cadillac with three occupants, including Garcia, and conducted an investigatory stop. During the stop, Garcia was questioned, and bodycam footage was recorded.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied Garcia’s motion to suppress the bodycam evidence, ruling that the investigatory stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. Garcia subsequently pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm but reserved his right to appeal the denial of the suppression motion. He argued on appeal that the stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion and that the BOLO lacked the necessary specificity, so the evidence derived from the stop should be excluded.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the investigatory stop was supported by reasonable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances. The court found that the BOLO contained sufficient detail, was based on multiple sources, and provided an adequate basis for the stop. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, rejecting Garcia’s arguments and upholding the denial of the motion to suppress. View "United States v. Garcia" on Justia Law

A teacher at a Texas junior high school, who is a practicing Christian, regularly engaged in prayer and Bible study with other teachers before the school day. In September 2023, she invited staff to join her in prayer at the school flagpole prior to a student-led prayer event. The school principal responded by stating that district policy prohibited employees from praying “with or in the presence of students” and clarified that even if students were not directly involved, teachers could not pray where students might see them, even before official school hours. When the teacher and colleagues prayed near the flagpole, the principal stopped them, reiterating the prohibition on visible religious conduct.The teacher filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, alleging violations of her First Amendment free speech and free exercise rights, as well as Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due process claims, and state law claims. The district court denied the principal’s motion to dismiss on the grounds of qualified immunity regarding the First Amendment and equal protection claims, but granted dismissal of the due process claim. The court held that the complaint plausibly alleged a categorical, visibility-based restriction on teacher prayer, and that Kennedy v. Bremerton School District had clearly established the unconstitutionality of such conduct.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the denial of qualified immunity de novo. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity for the free speech and free exercise claims, holding that a categorical ban on visible private prayer by teachers, merely because students might observe, violated clearly established First Amendment rights. However, the appellate court reversed as to the equal protection claim, finding that the teacher had not alleged facts showing the principal individually treated her differently than similarly situated employees. The disposition was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Barber v. Rounds" on Justia Law

In 1995, a woman was murdered in Houston, and Carlos Ayestas was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. Years later, Ayestas’s counsel discovered an internal memorandum from the prosecution recommending the death penalty in part because Ayestas was not a U.S. citizen. This memorandum had not been disclosed during Ayestas’s trial. Ayestas then sought to amend his federal habeas petition to add Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment selective-prosecution claims, arguing that the prosecution’s decision was improperly influenced by his non-citizen status.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied Ayestas’s motion to amend, finding it constituted a “second or successive habeas corpus application” barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) because the claims could have been discovered earlier with due diligence. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions clarified the law on what constitutes a “second or successive” application, prompting Ayestas to seek relief under Rule 60(b). The district court granted this motion, allowed discovery on Ayestas’s selective-prosecution claims, and ordered the Harris County District Attorney’s Office (HCDA) to produce decades of charging memoranda and the full prosecutorial file.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the discovery order was immediately appealable by the HCDA under the collateral-order doctrine. The Fifth Circuit determined the district court lacked jurisdiction over Ayestas’s selective-prosecution claims because both his 2015 motion to amend and his later Rule 60(b) motion constituted successive habeas applications barred by § 2244(b). The court concluded that Ayestas had not shown the claims were based on a new rule of constitutional law or that the underlying facts could not have been discovered earlier with due diligence. The Fifth Circuit vacated the discovery order and dismissed the selective-prosecution claims. View "Ayestas v. Harris County" on Justia Law

The case involves an early-morning stop of Juan Jose Ponce at a border checkpoint in Sarita, Texas, where a Border Patrol agent, Carlos Garcia, questioned him and observed unusual features in his vehicle. Ponce was driving an SUV with a roof rack but was transporting a ladder inside the car, which Garcia found atypical. Ponce appeared nervous and wore a surgical mask despite traveling alone. Upon request, Ponce consented to unlocking and opening the back hatch of his SUV for Garcia to look inside. During this inspection, Garcia noticed a speaker box with loose screws, which—based on his experience—suggested it might conceal contraband or a person. Garcia opened the speaker box and found a woman unlawfully in the United States. Ponce was indicted for transporting an undocumented person.Proceedings began in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, where Ponce moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the search of the speaker box exceeded his consent and lacked probable cause. The district court held a hearing where both Ponce and Garcia testified. The court found Ponce’s consent to be valid, voluntary, and extending to containers within the vehicle. Even if consent did not reach the speaker box, the court determined Garcia obtained probable cause during his inspection. The district court denied the suppression motion, and Ponce entered a conditional guilty plea while preserving his right to appeal.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the lower court’s findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that, based on the totality of the circumstances, Garcia obtained probable cause to search the speaker box during the consensual inspection. The court affirmed that Garcia’s actions were consistent with the Fourth Amendment, and upheld the denial of Ponce’s motion to suppress. View "USA v. Ponce" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with possessing a firearm after having been convicted of felonies, including drug trafficking and DUI. At the time he allegedly possessed the firearm, he was on supervised release for the DUI offense. He was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits firearm possession by felons. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional on multiple grounds. After the district court denied his motion, he pleaded guilty while preserving his right to appeal the constitutional issues.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment, rejecting his constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1). Following his guilty plea, the defendant appealed, raising several arguments: that the statute was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment (both facially and as applied), violated Equal Protection, exceeded Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause, and was unconstitutionally vague. The court noted that Fifth Circuit precedent foreclosed all arguments except the vagueness challenge.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the preserved vagueness challenge de novo. The court held that § 922(g)(1) is not void for vagueness, emphasizing that the statute clearly defines the prohibited conduct—possession of a firearm by a felon. The court further held that recent developments in Second Amendment jurisprudence, including New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen and United States v. Diaz, did not render the statute vague in the defendant’s case, as these precedents did not affect the clarity of the statutory language or create confusion for ordinary persons. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. Landrum" on Justia Law

A woman was reported to military authorities at Joint Base San Antonio Lackland by a concerned parent in April 2022. The parent alleged that the woman sent explicit text messages to her thirteen-year-old son, provided him a cell phone, and facilitated meetings between him and her own twelve-year-old daughter. An investigation revealed that the woman encouraged and orchestrated sexual activity and explicit exchanges between the children. She was charged with several federal sex offenses but, pursuant to a plea agreement, pleaded guilty to a single offense—Sexual Performance by a Child—under the Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), which incorporates Texas Penal Code § 43.25 into federal law.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas classified her conviction as a Class A felony by reference to the Texas statute’s penalties. The Presentence Report (PSR) and the district court applied 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k), which governs supervised release for enumerated federal sex offenses, sentencing her to 325 months in prison and thirty years of supervised release. She appealed her sentence, arguing that the proper statutory maximum for supervised release should be five years under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b), not the five years to life provided by § 3583(k). The government responded that the sentence was permissible, as it did not exceed the Texas statutory maximum and that the most analogous federal offense fell within § 3583(k).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that § 3583(k) applies only to the specific federal offenses enumerated within it and not to offenses assimilated under the ACA. The court found the statutory text unambiguous and determined that the supervised release term for the assimilated state offense was subject to the general five-year maximum set by § 3583(b). The court vacated the thirty-year supervised release term and remanded for resentencing within the proper statutory maximum. View "USA v. Swarner" on Justia Law