Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff is a former federal employee and participant in a health-insurance plan (“Plan”) that is governed by the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act (“FEHBA”). The Plan stems from a contract between the federal Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) and Blue Cross Blue Shield Association and certain of its affiliates (together, “Blue Cross”). Blue Cross administers the Plan under OPM’s supervision. Plaintiff suffered from cancer, and she asked Blue Cross whether the Plan would cover the proton therapy that her physicians recommended. Blue Cross told her the Plan did not cover that treatment. So Plaintiff chose to receive a different type of radiation treatment, one that the Plan did cover. The second-choice treatment eliminated cancer, but it also caused devastating side effects. Plaintiff then sued OPM and Blue Cross, claiming that the Plan actually does cover proton therapy. As against OPM, she seeks the “benefits” that she wanted but did not receive, as well as an injunction directing OPM to compel Blue Cross to reform its internal processes by, among other things, covering proton therapy in the Plan going forward. As against Blue Cross, she seeks monetary damages under Texas common law. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s suit.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that neither the advance process nor the proton-therapy guideline poses an immediate threat of injury, so injunctive relief is therefore unavailable. Further, the court found that FEHBA preempts Plaintiff’s common-law claims against Blue Cross. Accordingly, the court held that no relief is available under the relevant statutory and regulatory regime. View "Gonzalez v. Blue Cross Blue Shield" on Justia Law

Four police officers unlawfully arrested Plaintiff. Plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The officers appeal the district court’s denial of their summary judgment motion as to (1) excessive force (Officer W.), (2) false arrest (all officers), and (3) fabrication of evidence (Officer L.).   The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal and held that it lacked jurisdiction. The court explained that Officer W. argued that Plaintiff took a defensive and threatening posture, resisted being pulled from the vehicle, struggled after being removed, and willfully and aggressively refused to follow commands while resisting the officer’s detainment. Contrary to Officer W.’s argument, those facts are of a genuine dispute. Officer W. failed to take the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, instead relying on facts different from those assumed by the district court. Accordingly, the court wrote that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Officer W.’s appeal of the genuineness of the district court’s factual determinations.   Further, the court addressed the basis of our jurisdiction over Officer L.’s appeal, which does not invoke qualified immunity. Federal courts of appeal have jurisdiction over “appeals from all final decisions of the district courts.” Denial of summary judgment is not a final decision. Thus, the court explained that it lacked jurisdiction over Officer L.’s appeal of this claim. View "Ducksworth v. Landrum" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Lewisville Independent School District (“LISD”) and seven school board members, alleging that the district’s at-large election system violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”) and seeking injunctive relief. The district court determined that Plaintiff lacked standing to bring his Section 2 claim because he is white. The district court then granted Defendants’ motion for sanctions against Plaintiff, his attorneys, and their law firm based on the findings that Plaintiff’s lawsuit was frivolous under 52 U.S.C. Section 10310(e) and his attorneys multiplied proceedings unreasonably and vexatiously under 28 U.S.C. Section 1927.   
The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s sanctions order and remanded to determine the extent to which the order is footed upon specific contemptuous conduct in the attorneys’ prosecution of the case. The court held that Plaintiff’s lawsuit did not merit sanctions. The court concluded that sanctions against Plaintiff were unwarranted because precedent in the circuit did not squarely foreclose his legal argument and because he sought to extend existing law. Critically, LISD points to no precedent in the circuit considering whether a voter in his position has standing under the VRA, let alone “squarely controlling precedent.” Further, as Plaintiff’s s lawsuit was not frivolous and relied on an “unsettled legal theory,”  his attorneys cannot be sanctioned under Section 1927 simply for filing the action. View "Vaughan v. Lewisville Indep Sch Dist" on Justia Law

Springboards for Education (“Springboards”) brought trademark infringement claims against McAllen Independent School District (“MISD”), a public school district in Texas, and IDEA Public Schools (“IDEA”), a nonprofit organization operating charter schools in Texas. The district court dismissed the suit against IDEA, concluding it was an arm of the state and therefore shared Texas’s sovereign immunity. As for MISD, the court found that it did not have sovereign immunity but ultimately granted summary judgment in MISD’s favor.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment for MISD. The court explained that while it disagrees with the district court’s conclusion that IDEA has sovereign immunity, the court affirmed the judgment for IDEA on alternate grounds. The court reasoned that in determining whether an entity is an arm of the state, the court balances the so-called “Clark factors,” which our court first articulated decades ago in Clark v. Tarrant County. Those factors are: (1) whether state statutes and case law view the entity as an arm of the state; (2) the source of the entity’s funding; (3) the entity’s degree of local autonomy; (4) whether the entity is concerned primarily with local, as opposed to statewide, problems; (5) whether the entity has the authority to sue and be sued in its own name; and (6) whether it has the right to hold and use property. The court held that factors one and three favor sovereign immunity while factors two, four, five, and six do not. The court concluded that IDEA is not an arm of the state and does not share in Texas’s sovereign immunity. View "Springboards v. IDEA Public Schools" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, entered the United States without authorization in 2000. In 2017, Petitioner accidentally hit a pedestrian with her car and then fled the scene. She entered a guilty plea to Texas Transportation Code Sec. 550.021 and was sentenced to five years’ deferred adjudication.While on deferred adjudication, the Department of Homeland Security arrested Petitioner and charged her with being present without admission or parole under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. In 2020, Petitioner filed an application for cancellation of removal with the immigration court; she also requested voluntary departure. The Immigration Judge denied her application, finding her 2017 conviction was for a crime of moral turpitude, rendering her ineligible for cancellation. The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") affirmed and denied Petitioner's motion to reconsider.In reviewing Petitioner's claim, the BIA applied outdated precedent. Under controlling precedent, outlined in Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016), the proper focus is on the minimum conduct prohibited by the statute, not on the Petitioner's particular actions. Here, The minimum conduct that can trigger liability is the failure to remain at the scene of the accident and provide one’s name and other information. However, this question was not addressed by the BIA. Thus, the court vacated the BIA's order and remanded to determine whether the failure to share information under Sec. 550.021(a)(4) is a CIMT. View "Zamaro-Silvero v. Garland" on Justia Law

After prevailing in state court on claims that he was fired in retaliation for exercising his state constitutional right to freedom of expression, Plaintiff filed a federal suit alleging the same set of facts but asserting for the first time a First Amendment claim. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s suit, finding that Defendants’ factual attack showed that the only remedy not barred by sovereign immunity was impossible to grant and that Kling’s claim was prescribed. On appeal, Plaintiff contends that a factual attack on a district court’s subject matter jurisdiction is improper at the pleadings stage and that his state lawsuit interrupted prescription on his newly asserted federal claim because both rely on the same set of operative facts.   The Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff’s official capacity claims as barred by sovereign immunity and accordingly affirmed that ruling in the district court’s decision. However, because there are no clear controlling precedents from the Louisiana Supreme Court as to whether prescription on Plaintiff’s federal claim was interrupted by his state action, the court certified to that court to answer the following:In Louisiana, under what circumstances, if any, does the commencement of a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue interrupt prescription as to causes of action, understood as legal claims rather than the facts giving rise to them, not asserted in that suit? View "Kling v. Hebert" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellees, emergency care physician groups in Texas (the “Plaintiff Doctors”), have provided various emergency medical services to patients enrolled in health insurance plans insured by Defendants-Appellants UnitedHealthcare Insurance Company or UnitedHealthcare of Texas, Incorporated (collectively, “UHC”). The Plaintiff Doctors are not within UHC’s provider network. In their operative complaint, the Plaintiff Doctors allege (among other claims) that UHC has failed to remit the “usual and customary rate” for the emergency care that the Plaintiff Doctors provide to patients insured by UHC in violation of the Emergency Care Statutes. UHC moved to dismiss the Plaintiff Doctors’ complaint, which was denied in part by the district court. The district court rejected UHC’s argument that the Emergency Care Statutes did not authorize a private cause of action. UHC immediately sought interlocutory review of two issues: (1) whether the Emergency Care Statutes authorize an implied private cause of action, and (2) whether the Plaintiff Doctors’ claim under the Emergency Care Statutes is otherwise preempted by ERISA.   The Texas Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative, holding that the Texas Insurance Code “does not create a private cause of action for claims under the Emergency Care Statutes.” Therefore, the Fifth Circuit found that the Plaintiff Doctors’ claim for violation of the Emergency Care Statutes must be dismissed. Because there is no private cause of action under the Emergency Care Statutes, the second issue before the court—whether the Plaintiff Doctors’ claim under the Emergency Care Statutes is otherwise preempted by ERISA—is now moot. View "ACS Primary v. UnitedHealthcare" on Justia Law

A man was shot and killed in his jewelry shop in 1983, and Decedent was sentenced to death for the crime. Thirty years later, Louisiana vacated Decedent’s conviction because new evidence identified the real murderer. After his release from prison, Decedent filed a Section 1983 suit seeking damages from police officers, prosecutors, and the local government for suppressing, fabricating, and destroying evidence. Decedent died shortly thereafter, leaving Plaintiff as the executrix of his estate. In 2021, the district court dismissed Plaintiff’s amended complaint in its entirety based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) as to some defendants and 12(c) as to others.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff brought a traditional negligence claim. Louisiana uses the typical reasonable-person standard to assess an individual’s liability for negligence. For the same reasons that Plaintiff did not adequately plead constitutional violations due to the defendants’ suppression, fabrication, and destruction of evidence, she also fails to plead sufficient factual matter to show that they violated the standard of care of a reasonable officer. Accordingly, the court found that the district court thus properly dismissed this claim. View "Armstrong v. Ashley" on Justia Law

Believing Texas intends to enforce its abortion laws to penalize their out-of-state actions, Plaintiffs sued Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton. Paxton moved to dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs then issued subpoenas to obtain Paxton’s testimony. Paxton moved to quash the subpoenas, which the district court initially granted. On reconsideration, however, the district court changed course, denied the motion, and ordered Paxton to testify either at a deposition or evidentiary hearing. Paxton petitioned the Fifth Circuit for a writ of mandamus to shield him from the district court’s order.   The Fifth Circuit granted the writ. The court held that the district court clearly erred by not first ensuring its own jurisdiction and also by declining to quash the subpoenas. The court held that the district court committed a “clear abuse of discretion” by finding that exceptional circumstances justified ordering Paxton to testify. Paxton has therefore shown a clear and indisputable right to relief. Further, the court explained that because mandamus is a remedy of last resort, the writ cannot issue unless the petitioner has no other adequate means of obtaining the relief he seeks. Here, not only has Paxton sought the writ, but he has also filed a separate interlocutory appeal. Plaintiffs argued that this appeal is an adequate alternative avenue for relief, making the writ inappropriate. In re FDIC controls here because Plaintiffs have moved to dismiss Paxton’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Paxton’s only remaining source of relief is the writ. Without it, he will be compelled either to submit to testifying or risk contempt charges for violating the court’s order. View "In Re: Ken Paxton" on Justia Law

This case concerns attorney misconduct in the Court-Supervised Settlement Program established in the wake of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil rig disaster. Appellant, a Louisiana attorney representing oil spill claimants in the settlement program, was accused of funneling money to a settlement program staff attorney through improper referral payments. In a disciplinary proceeding, the en banc Eastern District of Louisiana found that Appellant’s actions violated the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct and suspended him from practicing law before the Eastern District of Louisiana for one year. Appellant appealed, arguing that the en banc court misapplied the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct and abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sanction.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the en banc court’s order suspending Appellant from the practice of law for one year each for violations of Rule 1.5(e) and 8.4(a). The court affirmed the en banc court’s holding that Appellant violated Rule 8.4(d). Finally, the court remanded to the en banc court for further proceedings, noting on remand, the court is free to impose on Appellant whatever sanction it sees fit for the 8.4(d) violation, including but not limited to its previous one-year suspension. The court explained that the en banc court misapplied Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.5(e) and 8.4(a) but not Rule 8.4(d). Additionally, the en banc court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a one-year suspension on Appellant for his violation of 8.4(d). View "In re Jonathan Andry" on Justia Law