Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two consumers challenged two rules issued by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) that imposed new water-use standards for residential dishwashers and clothes washers. Their argument was that the DOE exceeded its statutory authority under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), which, they claimed, only authorized DOE to regulate four specific appliances (showerheads, faucets, water closets, and urinals). The DOE had issued direct final rules (DFRs) in 2024 that further reduced water-use limits and changed measurement schemes for dishwashers and clothes washers. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief in federal district court, asking it to invalidate the DOE’s rules and restore the standards set by Congress.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court found that EPCA’s statutory-review mechanism, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 6306(b), vested exclusive jurisdiction for challenges to rules prescribed under § 6295 in the circuit courts, not the district courts. The court rejected plaintiffs’ arguments for concurrent jurisdiction and their reliance on the EPCA’s “savings clause” in § 6306(b)(4), holding that neither provided a jurisdictional basis for their claims. The district court also denied a motion to alter or amend the judgment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit first determined that the plaintiffs had standing, as their alleged reduction in market choices constituted an injury in fact traceable to the challenged DOE rules. The Fifth Circuit then affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that the circuit courts have exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to DOE rules under EPCA and that the district court was properly stripped of jurisdiction. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Word v. Department of Energy" on Justia Law

Methylene chloride is a chemical used in various commercial applications, including paint removal and manufacturing of products like air conditioner coolants and EV batteries. While useful, over-exposure to methylene chloride can cause serious health risks, including injury and death. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), determined that nearly all uses of methylene chloride posed an “unreasonable risk of injury to health” and issued a rule severely limiting its manufacture, processing, distribution, and use, allowing only thirteen conditions of use under strict exposure limits.Prior to this rule, EPA had completed risk evaluations for methylene chloride, first in 2020 and then revised in 2022. The revised evaluation adopted a “whole chemical” determination, finding all but one use posed unreasonable risk, and assumed workers did not use personal protective equipment (PPE), contrary to prior practice and OSHA standards. Industry petitioners, including manufacturers and the American Chemistry Council, filed for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing that EPA’s determinations and rule were arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by substantial evidence. Sierra Club also challenged the rule, asserting EPA did not go far enough to protect vulnerable populations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that EPA’s “whole chemical” risk determination violated TSCA, which requires separate evaluations for each condition of use. The court also held that EPA’s assumption of no PPE use was unsupported by substantial evidence and contrary to law. EPA’s exposure limits for methylene chloride were deemed excessively conservative and not supported by the record. The court granted the industry petitioners’ review, vacated EPA’s rule and associated risk determination, denied Sierra Club’s petition, and remanded to EPA for further proceedings. View "East Fork Enterprises v. EPA" on Justia Law

Federal and state agencies enacted a rule listing two distinct population segments of the lesser prairie-chicken as "endangered" and "threatened" under the Endangered Species Act. The rule divided the bird’s range into Northern and Southern segments, based on habitat and genetic differences. Conservation groups, including one that originally petitioned for the listing, were active throughout the process. After a change in presidential administration in 2025, the federal government signaled a shift in environmental policy and, in ongoing litigation, ultimately conceded error in applying the "distinct population segment" policy. The government and various state and industry plaintiffs sought to settle by vacating the listing rule.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas consolidated the lawsuits challenging the listing. Conservation groups moved to intervene twice: the first motion was denied because the court found the government would adequately represent their interests, and the second was denied as untimely and for failure to rebut that presumption. Meanwhile, the district court granted the government’s motion for voluntary vacatur and remand, finding the listing rule unlawful due to the agency’s conceded error.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of intervention de novo and the timeliness determination for abuse of discretion. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in finding the second motion to intervene untimely, as the conservation groups acted promptly after government conduct revealed a divergence of interests. The court found all requirements for intervention of right satisfied and reversed the denial of intervention. However, the Fifth Circuit determined the conservation groups lacked appellate standing to challenge the vacatur and remand of the listing rule, so it did not reach the merits of the district court’s substantive ruling. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Texas v. Dept of the Interior" on Justia Law

Twin brothers, both Black international students, were enrolled as doctoral candidates at the University of Mississippi’s Department of Pharmacy Administration. One brother, Bennard, disagreed with changes to his faculty mentorship arrangement, objected to mandatory in-person meetings, and declined to complete a required program assessment called the Abilities Transcript. After being repeatedly warned and given extensions, he was placed on provisional status for failing to complete the requirement, which also caused the loss of his graduate assistantship. Bennard and his brother each filed lawsuits against the University and several faculty members, alleging constitutional, statutory, and contract violations related to academic sanctions and alleged discriminatory treatment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi consolidated the brothers’ cases. It dismissed Bennard’s claims against the University on sovereign-immunity grounds, dismissed his remaining federal claims under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his individual-capacity state contract claims. Bennard appealed, while his brother’s appeal was dismissed for failure to prosecute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed Bennard’s remaining claims. The court held that sovereign immunity barred claims against the University, claims against one defendant in her official capacity, and official-capacity state-law contract claims; those dismissals must be without prejudice. The court further found that Bennard failed to plausibly allege First or Fourteenth Amendment violations, and that the faculty defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on individual-capacity claims. The court affirmed the district court’s refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining contract claims and upheld consolidation of the cases and dismissal of moot preliminary injunction motions. The judgment was affirmed as modified to clarify the proper form of dismissal for sovereign-immunity-barred claims. View "Eriakha v. University of MS" on Justia Law

A group of associations representing infusion centers, cancer patients, and pharmaceutical manufacturers challenged the constitutionality of a program created by the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, which directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), through the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), to negotiate prices for high-expenditure prescription drugs under Medicare Parts B and D. The program allows HHS to select drugs based on certain criteria, negotiate a “maximum fair price” with manufacturers, and impose an excise tax on manufacturers who refuse to negotiate. The tax is calculated as a high percentage of sales reimbursed by Medicare. Manufacturers may avoid the program by withdrawing from Medicare and Medicaid participation. The statutory scheme also limits administrative and judicial review of key program decisions and allows HHS to implement early cycles of the program through guidance rather than notice-and-comment rulemaking.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and improper venue. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that at least one plaintiff had standing and venue was proper. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the government, holding that the program did not violate the nondelegation doctrine, that the Anti-Injunction Act barred the plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claim, and that the plaintiffs lacked a protected property interest to support their due process claim.Upon further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the statute provided an “intelligible principle” sufficient to withstand a nondelegation challenge, that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the Eighth Amendment claim but the excise tax did not constitute a punitive fine, and that neither manufacturers, providers, nor patients possessed a protected property or liberty interest implicated by the program. The government’s summary judgment was affirmed in full. View "Natl Infusion Center v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Several tobacco companies and retailers challenged a rule issued by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) that required cigarette packaging and advertisements to display eleven rotating health warnings, each paired with a graphic image illustrating the harms of smoking. Congress had previously enacted the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA), which enumerated nine specific warning statements to appear on cigarette packaging and gave the FDA limited, conditional authority to adjust the format or text of these warnings to promote public understanding of smoking risks. The FDA’s new rule went beyond these statutory warnings by mandating two additional warnings, raising industry concerns that the agency had exceeded its statutory authority.The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. That court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs and enjoined enforcement of the rule on First Amendment grounds, without addressing their claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The FDA appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, ruling that the rule did not violate the First Amendment and remanding the case for consideration of the APA claims. Upon remand, the district court granted the plaintiffs’ request for interim relief under the APA, finding a substantial likelihood of success on their claim that the FDA lacked statutory authority to increase the number of required warnings and that enforcement would inflict irreparable harm through unrecoverable compliance costs. The court postponed the rule’s effective date.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The Fifth Circuit held that the TCA’s nine statutory warning statements form a closed set and that the FDA exceeded its authority by requiring eleven warnings. The court also found that the equities favored interim relief and that universal postponement of the rule’s effective date was appropriate under the APA. View "R J Reynolds Tobacco Company v. FDA" on Justia Law

A conservation district in Montgomery County, Texas, required large water users to reduce groundwater usage by 30%. To facilitate compliance, the San Jacinto River Authority (the “River Authority”), a political subdivision of Texas, created a joint groundwater reduction plan and entered into contracts with about 80 utilities, including Quadvest, L.P. (“Quadvest”). These contracts required participants to pay certain fees and, at the River Authority’s discretion, to connect to surface water provided by the River Authority. The fees aimed to equalize costs between groundwater and surface water users and to finance new infrastructure. Quadvest, a family-owned utility, initially operated only in the retail market and later expanded into wholesale water supply.After the relevant groundwater regulations were rescinded due to political changes and litigation, Quadvest challenged the lawfulness of its contract with the River Authority in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. It alleged that the contract constituted an unlawful restraint of trade under the Sherman Act, specifically as per se illegal horizontal price-fixing and market allocation. After a bench trial, the district court found in favor of the River Authority, concluding that Quadvest failed to prove its claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the challenged contract did not constitute a per se illegal horizontal restraint because the parties were not competitors at the time of contracting, and the agreement was vertical in nature. The court further determined that the contract did not fix prices or allocate markets in a manner prohibited by the Sherman Act. Under the rule of reason, Quadvest also failed to define the relevant market and thus could not demonstrate anticompetitive effects. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Quadvest v. San Jacinto River Auth" on Justia Law

A company applied to construct a deepwater port off the coast of Texas, including a pipeline that would cross the pipeline of another recently approved deepwater port. The relevant federal statute, the Deepwater Port Act of 1974 (DWPA), requires that only one deepwater port be licensed per “application area.” An environmental group, comprised of local residents near the proposed pipeline and tank farm, objected to the approval, claiming that the pipeline should have been included in the application area. Their concerns included increased risks of flooding, pollution, and negative impacts on property value and quality of life.The United States Maritime Administration (MARAD), acting under authority delegated by the Secretary of Transportation, processed the application. Unlike with previous applications for similar projects, MARAD excluded the proposed pipeline from Texas GulfLink’s application area, reasoning that the DWPA gave it discretion to do so. MARAD then approved Texas GulfLink’s application. The environmental group filed a timely petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, challenging MARAD’s decision on the basis that it violated the DWPA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the DWPA requires the application area to encompass the entire deepwater port site, including pipelines located seaward of the high water mark. The court found MARAD’s designation of the application area to be unlawful because, if the pipeline had been properly included, the application area would overlap with that of another approved port, contrary to the DWPA’s requirement. The court granted the petition for review, vacated MARAD’s approval of the application, and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Citizens for Clean Air v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Several organizations and individuals challenged provisions of a 2021 Texas law known as Senate Bill 1, which imposed new requirements on mail-in voting, regulated voter assistance, and restricted compensation for certain election-related activities. The plaintiffs, including advocacy groups and individuals with disabilities, argued that these provisions discriminated against voters with disabilities in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Key facts included reports of rejected mail-in ballots due to missing identification numbers and claims that the law’s requirements created barriers for disabled voters.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas held a bench trial and found that nine provisions of Senate Bill 1 were inconsistent with the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court permanently enjoined the Texas Secretary of State and various local officials from enforcing these provisions. The defendants, including the Governor of Texas and other state and county officials, appealed the injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision in its entirety. The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the identification provisions, as they could not show a substantial risk of future injury to any specific member or demonstrate organizational standing under Supreme Court precedent. The court also found that the plaintiffs’ challenges to voter assistance and compensation provisions were foreclosed by prior Fifth Circuit decisions and failed for lack of standing or on the merits. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court’s grant of permanent injunctive relief was improper and reversed the injunction, declining to interfere with the Texas Legislature’s election regulations. View "La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Abbott" on Justia Law

Several states challenged a federal agency’s attempt to set new energy efficiency standards for consumer cooking appliances, including gas stoves. The Department of Energy (DOE) had initially tried to implement these standards through the standard notice-and-comment rulemaking process, but after facing substantial opposition, including critical comments from industry groups and states, it abandoned that effort. Subsequently, the DOE used a “Direct Final Rule” (DFR) process to impose similar standards, bypassing the usual public comment period by relying on a joint statement from selected stakeholders. The new rule included a ban on certain power supplies and set limits on annual energy consumption for appliances.After the DFR was published, the DOE solicited public comments as required by statute. Several states, led by Nebraska, Utah, and Montana, submitted timely adverse comments on the last day of the comment period, arguing that the joint statement did not fairly represent all stakeholders, particularly states opposed to the rule. They also asserted that the DOE failed to properly consider the impact on product reliability and lifespan. The DOE later issued a notice confirming it would not withdraw the DFR, despite these objections.The case was then reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The court first held that it had authority to review the petition, determining that the rule became “prescribed” for purposes of judicial review only when the DOE confirmed its adherence to the DFR after considering comments. On the merits, the Fifth Circuit found that the DOE failed to meet statutory requirements for using the DFR process, especially by excluding key stakeholders and not adequately addressing concerns about reliability and economic justification. The court granted the states’ petition for review, set aside the rule, and remanded the matter to the DOE for further proceedings. View "State of Mississippi v. DOE" on Justia Law