Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs claimed law enforcement officers violated the Constitution when they responded to a detainee’s epileptic seizure in a jail cell by restraining and tasing him several times. The district court either dismissed or granted summary judgment on all claims in favor of the Defendants.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the grant of qualified immunity for the individual Defendant Officers as to the Section 1983 claims and the grant of summary judgment on the claims for bystander liability. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on municipal liability and on the claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act. The court explained that the record is insufficient to support a jury question that the use-of-force and ECW policies were so vague that they amounted to no policy at all. These policies “may have been inadequate,” and while a jury might conclude that the City was negligent in not requiring Plaintiffs’ specified actions, “that, of course, is not enough under Section 1983.” The court explained that without evidence showing that the higher level of care was obviously necessary, we cannot see how the jury could conclude that the use-of-force and ECW policies were deliberately indifferent. Accordingly, there was no substantial evidence that such a policy would obviously lead to the violation of pre-trial detainees’ constitutional rights. Further, the court found that Plaintiffs cite no binding caselaw in which liability under the ADA and RA has been extended to a context similar to this one. View "Austin v. City of Pasadena" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a Section 1983 civil rights suit in Louisiana state court against Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections Secretary James LeBlanc. Among other claims, Plaintiff argued that LeBlanc violated his constitutional rights by misclassifying him as a sex offender and thereby illegally extending his detention in prison for 337 days past his release date. LeBlanc sought dismissal based on qualified immunity, but the district court denied the motion. LeBlanc argued that this complaint did not adequately allege the requisite “pattern” of constitutional violations by untrained employees “ordinarily necessary” under Connick to establish deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court agreed with Plaintiff that his complaint sufficiently alleges the requisite “pattern” of constitutional violations by untrained employees to establish deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train. Further, the court held that there is sufficient clearly established law regarding the constitutional right to a timely release from prison and that Plaintiff has sufficiently argued a violation of the right. Accordingly, construing the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the court agreed they are sufficient to support the argument that LeBlanc had fair warning’ that his failure to address this delay would deny prisoners like Plaintiff their immediate or near-immediate release upon conviction. View "Parker v. LeBlanc" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked as a longshoreman as early as 1998 and worked regularly for Cooper from 2008 through the date of his injury on June 22, 2018, never going more than a week and a half without working. He performed various jobs including operating a front-end loader and track hoe, flagging cranes, and loading barges. Employer classified Plaintiff as a non-assigned employee, meaning he was not assigned to a specific vessel. Employer has other employees who are assigned to vessels.Plaintiff was hurt when he fell to the deck of a ship he was working on. He filed suit against Employer in federal district court in November 2020, alleging that he was a seaman and a member of the crew, and bringing claims of Jones Act negligence, failure to pay maintenance and cure, and unseaworthiness. In the alternative, Plaintiff alleged that if he was not a seaman and was covered by the LHWCA.The District Court found Plaintiff failed to cite evidence that showed a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he was a seaman and, alternatively, as to vessel negligence.The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that Plaintiff did not have a connection to the ship he was working on at the time he was injured, and that he could not establish vessel negligence. View "Johnson v. Cooper T. Smith Stevedoring" on Justia Law

Defendants Cpl. John Lee and Cpl. Derek Barker appealed the district court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment seeking qualified immunity from Plaintiffs’ unlawful entry and excessive force claims. The Fifth Circuit unanimously concluded that Lee and Barker are not entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiffs' unlawful entry claims. However, the court held that Lee is entitled to qualified immunity for any force employed from the moment he entered Plaintiffs' house. The court explained that, including the significant fact that the dog was deployed as a wholly duplicative means of detention, no precedent establishes under analogous circumstances how long a bite is too long. Thus, a jury could not find that every reasonable officer would have known that a K9-trained dog had to be released more quickly. Even if Officer Lee mistakenly permitted Dice to bite Plaintiff for a minute, qualified immunity shields him from suit as well as liability. View "Smith v. Lee" on Justia Law

Appellee won a multi-million-dollar arbitration award (the “Award”) against his former attorney and son-in-law, Appellant. Appellant soon filed for bankruptcy and sought to discharge the amounts awarded against him. Appellee objected under 11 U.S.C. Section 523(a) (“Exceptions to Discharge”) and sought summary judgment, arguing that (i) the Award is entitled to preclusive effect based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel and (ii) the Award found that all the elements of Section 523(a) were met. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment with respect to the bulk of the Award. The district court affirmed, and Appellant appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Appellant argued that the court should recognize a fourth requirement that has no basis in our precedent, to the effect that collateral estoppel is inappropriate where an arbitration award contains a “disclaimer” like the one in the Award. The court reasoned that it need not decide whether a “disclaimer” could ever render collateral estoppel inappropriate. The court held merely that this “disclaimer” does not do so. Further, the court wrote that at no place in his 53-page, single-spaced award does the arbitrator provide an “express instruction” to future tribunals not to grant the Award preclusive effect. View "Amberson v. McAllen" on Justia Law

Petitioner is a native of El Salvador. He first entered the United States around 2003 and was ordered removed in 2007. He then returned three more times—in 2010, 2018, and 2019. This appeal concerns his 2019 visit. In September 2019, the federal government reinstated Petitioner’s 2007 removal order. Petitioner sought withholding of removal and CAT relief. An immigration judge denied his application and, on April 27, 2022, the BIA dismissed his appeal. Petitioner petitioned for review on May 26, 2022.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that Congress has limited the court’s jurisdiction to final orders “concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation.  And it imposed another condition: the petition must be filed within 30 days of that order. The BIA’s denial of Petitioner’s application for withholding of removal and CAT relief is not a final order of removal. And his petition is untimely because it was filed over 30 days after his reinstatement order became final. View "Argueta-Hernandez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff attended a Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) air traffic controller training program at the FAA Academy. Because he failed the final performance assessment, Plaintiff was not retained as a permanent air traffic controller. Several months later, Plaintiff submitted ten requests under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) to the FAA seeking various categories of records. Dissatisfied with the FAA’s responses to his requests, Plaintiff brought two suits against the FAA and its parent agency, the Department of Transportation (“DOT”; collectively with the FAA, “Appellees”), seeking injunctive relief compelling the release and disclosure of the requested agency records. The district court later consolidated the two lawsuits. Appellees moved to dismiss most of Plaintiff’s claims, and the district court dismissed seven of Plaintiff’s requests for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff appealed the district court’s judgment with respect to three of his requests.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it is undisputed that the FAA does not maintain screenshots of individuals’ Active Directory Account profiles, NextGen Toolbox profiles, or Windows Explorer directories and folder structures. Therefore, for the FAA to produce the requested records, it would have to open the relevant software, display the requested data, and take a screenshot of the displayed information. The court explained that his inquiry would not merely require Appellees to produce information they retain and use, albeit in a slightly altered format; it would instead require Appellees to produce a new record— a screenshot—of information it does not store. FOIA imposes no such obligations on agencies. View "Harold Rutila, IV v. TRAN" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed IFP and dismissed his appeal failure to pay filing fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections 1911–14. The court barred Plaintiff from proceeding IFP in any civil action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility unless he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury as defined by Section 1915(g).   The Fifth Circuit denied Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP and dismissed his appeal for failure to pay the required filing fees. The court held that that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP. He has accumulated more than three strikes and has failed to demonstrate imminent danger in this case. The court barred him from proceeding IFP in any civil action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility unless he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury as defined by Section 1915(g). Alternatively, he may pay the appropriate fees. He may resume any claims dismissed under Section 1915(g), if he decides to pursue them, under the fee provisions of 28 U.S.C. Sections 1911–14. View "Prescott v. UTMB" on Justia Law

Under Texas law, parties to municipal contracts must certify that they do not and will not boycott Israel for the duration of their contracts. The City of Houston offered A&R Engineering and Testing, Inc. a contract with an anti-boycott clause. A&R refused to sign and brought a Section 1983 suit against the City and the Texas Attorney General. The district court entered a preliminary injunction against the City and the Attorney General. The Attorney General appealed, arguing that A&R lacks standing.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to vacate the injunction and dismiss the suit against the Attorney General. The court explained that t, A&R has not shown that the Attorney General could interfere with the City’s contracts. Chapter Section 2271 merely provides a list of definitions and then a list of requirements. It doesn’t expressly provide a way for the Attorney General to enforce those requirements. The statute’s “textually unenforceable language” poses a traceability problem. Second, the Attorney General hasn’t taken any action to suggest he might enforce the provision even if he has such power. Plaintiffs must assert “an injury that is the result of a statute’s actual or threatened enforcement.” Finally, the City’s conduct severs any link between A&R’s economic injury and the Attorney General. View "A & R Engineering v. Scott" on Justia Law

In 2019, Appellant filed a Form I-140 petition for a work visa under 8 USC Sec. 1153(b)(2) and Form I-485 applications for himself and his spouse to adjust their immigration statuses. Appellant's I-140 petition asserted that he satisfied the requirements to obtain a national-interest waiver under Sec. 1153(b)(2)(B)(i). USCIS declined to grant Appellant's request and denied his request for reconsideration.Appellant sued the US government, challenging the denials of his I-140 petition, his motion for reopening or reconsideration, and his I-485 applications. The Government moved to dismiss Appellant's complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), arguing that the jurisdictional bar in 8 USC § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies to national-interest waiver denials. The district court dismissed Appellant's case, citing a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Appellant claimed the district court erred in concluding that Sec. 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars jurisdiction over the denial of an I140 petition. Joining the Ninth, Eleventh, Third and D.C. Circuits, the court affirmed, finding Sec. 1153(b)(2)(B)(i) “expressly and specifically vest discretion in the Attorney General” to deny national-interest waivers. Thus, the jurisdiction bar in Sec. 1252(a)(2)(B) applies. View "Flores v. Garland" on Justia Law