Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Securities Law
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Two whistleblowers, John M. Barr and John McPherson, challenged the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) calculation of their award amounts under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The case involves Life Partners Holdings, Inc., which was found guilty of extensive securities fraud from 1999 to 2013. In 2012, the SEC filed a civil action against Life Partners, resulting in a $38.7 million judgment. Life Partners subsequently filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy to avoid the appointment of a receiver. The bankruptcy court appointed a Chapter 11 trustee, and a reorganization plan was confirmed in 2016.The SEC posted a Notice of Covered Action in 2015, inviting whistleblowers to apply for awards. Barr and McPherson submitted applications. The SEC’s Claims Review Staff initially recommended denying Barr an award and granting McPherson 23% of the collected sanctions. After objections, the SEC revised its decision, granting Barr 5% and McPherson 20% of the collected amounts. The SEC argued that the bankruptcy proceedings did not qualify as a “covered judicial or administrative action” or a “related action” under the Dodd-Frank Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the SEC’s motion to appoint a Chapter 11 trustee did not constitute “bringing an action” under the Dodd-Frank Act. The court found that the ordinary meaning of “action brought” refers to initiating a lawsuit or legal proceedings, which did not apply to the SEC’s involvement in the bankruptcy case. The court also rejected the argument that the SEC’s actions in the bankruptcy case were a continuation of its enforcement strategy. Consequently, the court denied the petitions for review, upholding the SEC’s award calculations. View "Barr v. SEC" on Justia Law

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Mark Nordlicht, founder and chief investment officer of Platinum Partners, defrauded Black Elk Energy Offshore Operations' creditors of nearly $80 million, transferring the funds to his hedge fund’s investors, including Shlomo and Tamar Rechnitz, who received about $10.3 million. Nordlicht was later convicted of securities fraud. Black Elk declared bankruptcy, and the Trustee initiated an adversary proceeding against the Rechnitzes to recover the transferred funds.The bankruptcy court ruled that the Trustee could recover the money from the Rechnitzes under 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 548(a)(1), and 550(a), rejecting their defense under 11 U.S.C. § 550(b)(1) that they were good faith transferees. The court imputed Nordlicht’s knowledge of the fraudulent scheme to the Rechnitzes, as he acted as their agent. The court also found that the funds transferred to the Rechnitzes were traceable to the fraudulent scheme. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' rulings. The court held that the knowledge of an agent (Nordlicht) is imputed to the principal (the Rechnitzes) under 11 U.S.C. § 550(b)(1), and thus, the Rechnitzes could not claim to be good faith transferees. The court also found that Nordlicht’s actions were within the scope of his authority as the Rechnitzes’ agent. Additionally, the court upheld the bankruptcy court’s tracing methodology, which assumed that tainted funds were used first, finding it appropriate under the circumstances. The court concluded that the Trustee could recover the $10.3 million from the Rechnitzes. View "Rechnitz v. Schmidt" on Justia Law

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Robert Allen Stanford operated a billion-dollar Ponzi scheme through various entities in Texas and Antigua. In 2009, a federal district court appointed an equity receiver (the "Receiver") to manage the assets of the Stanford entities, handle claims from defrauded investors, and pursue claims against third parties. This appeal concerns a settlement with Societe Generale Private Banking (Suisse) S.A. ("SGPB"), which included a bar order preventing future Stanford-related claims against the Swiss bank. Two individuals appointed by an Antiguan court to liquidate one of the Stanford entities argued that the bar order should not apply to their claims against SGPB.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas approved the settlement and issued the bar order. The Joint Liquidators objected, arguing that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over them. They filed their objection in a related Chapter 15 proceeding rather than the main SEC action, leading to a jurisdictional dispute. The district court held a hearing, during which it indicated that any participation by the Joint Liquidators' counsel would be considered a waiver of their jurisdictional objection. The court approved the settlement and entered the bar order, prompting the Joint Liquidators to appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not have the necessary personal jurisdiction to bind the Joint Liquidators with its bar order. The court emphasized that injunctions require in personam jurisdiction, which the district court lacked over the Joint Liquidators. The court vacated the district court's scheduling order and the bar order as it applied to the Joint Liquidators, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Dickson v. Janvey" on Justia Law

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The case involves the National Association of Manufacturers and Natural Gas Services Group, Incorporated (plaintiffs-appellants) against the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Gary Gensler, in his official capacity as Chair of the SEC (defendants-appellees). The dispute arose after the SEC, in 2020, adopted a rule regulating businesses that provide proxy voting advice to institutional shareholders of public corporations. Two years later, the SEC rescinded this rule. The appellants challenged the rescission in district court, arguing that the SEC arbitrarily and capriciously failed to provide an adequate explanation for its abrupt change in policy. The district court rejected the appellants’ contentions and granted summary judgment in favor of the SEC.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The court found that the SEC's explanation for rescinding the 2020 rule was arbitrary and capricious, and therefore unlawful. The court held that the SEC failed to provide an adequate justification for contradicting its prior factual finding that the 2020 Rule did not threaten the timeliness and independence of proxy voting advice. The court also found that the SEC failed to provide a reasonable explanation why these risks were so significant under the 2020 Rule as to justify its rescission. The court vacated the 2022 rescission in part and remanded the case back to the SEC. View "National Association of Manufacturers and Natural Gas Services Group, Inc. v. Securities and Exchange Commission" on Justia Law

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The case involves a challenge to a rule adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) aimed at enhancing the regulation of private fund advisers. The rule was designed to protect investors who invest in private funds and to prevent fraud, deception, or manipulation by the investment advisers to those funds. The petitioners, a group of associations representing private fund managers, challenged the rule, arguing that the SEC exceeded its statutory authority in adopting it.The case was heard in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The petitioners argued that the SEC had overstepped its authority under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and the Dodd-Frank Act. They contended that the rule imposed requirements that were not authorized by these statutes and that the SEC had failed to adequately consider the rule's impact on efficiency, competition, and capital formation.The SEC, on the other hand, argued that it had the authority to adopt the rule under sections 206(4) and 211(h) of the Advisers Act. It contended that these provisions authorized it to define and prescribe means to prevent fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts by investment advisers.The Fifth Circuit sided with the petitioners, holding that the SEC had exceeded its statutory authority in adopting the rule. The court found that the rule was not authorized by the relevant provisions of the Advisers Act and that the SEC had failed to establish a close nexus between the rule and the prevention of fraud or deception. As a result, the court vacated the rule. View "NA of Private Fund Managers v. SEC" on Justia Law

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The case involves Tammy O’Connor and Michael Stewart (the Sellers) who sold their company, Red River Solutions, LLC, to Atherio, Inc., a company led by Jason Cory, Greg Furst, and Thomas Farb (the Executives). The agreement stipulated that the Sellers would receive nearly half of their compensation upfront, with the rest—around $3.5 million—coming in the form of ownership units and future payments. However, Atherio went bankrupt and the Sellers received none of the promised $3.5 million. The Sellers sued the Executives, alleging fraud under federal securities law, Delaware common law, and the Texas Securities Act.The district court granted summary judgment to the Executives on all claims. The Sellers appealed the decision, arguing that the district court erred in applying the summary-judgment standard to the federal securities law and Delaware common law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision on the extracontractual and Texas Securities Act fraud claims, but reversed the summary judgment grants on the federal securities law and Delaware common law claims. The court found that there was a genuine dispute as to whether the Executives' misrepresentation of Farb's role as CFO was a substantial factor in the Sellers' loss. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Cory v. Stewart" on Justia Law

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During the 2008 financial crisis, Highland Capital Management, L.P., an investment manager, faced numerous redemption requests from investors of the Highland Crusader Fund. The Fund was placed in wind-down, and a dispute arose over the distribution of assets. This led to the adoption of a Joint Plan of Distribution and the appointment of a Redeemer Committee to oversee the wind-down. The Committee accused Highland Capital of breaching its fiduciary duty by purchasing redemption claims of former investors. An arbitration panel ruled in favor of the Committee, ordering Highland Capital to pay approximately $3 million and either transfer or cancel the redemption claims.Before the Committee could obtain a judgment for the award, Highland Capital filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. CLO HoldCo, a creditor, filed a claim for approximately $11 million, asserting it had purchased interests in the redemption claims. However, after a settlement agreement between Highland Capital and the Committee led to the cancellation of the redemption claims, CLO HoldCo amended its claim to zero dollars.After the bankruptcy court confirmed Highland Capital's reorganization plan, CLO HoldCo filed a second amended proof of claim, asserting a new theory of recovery. It argued that the cancellation of the redemption claims resulted in a credit for Highland Capital, which it owed to CLO HoldCo. The bankruptcy court denied the motion to ratify the second amended proof of claim, a decision affirmed by the district court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower courts' decisions. It held that post-confirmation amendments require a heightened showing of "compelling circumstances," which CLO HoldCo failed to provide. The court found that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying CLO HoldCo's motion to ratify the second amended proof of claim. View "CLO Holdco v. Kirschner" on Justia Law

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A class of stock purchasers alleged that Anadarko Petroleum Corporation fraudulently misrepresented the potential value of its Shenandoah oil field project in the Gulf of Mexico, violating federal securities law. The plaintiffs claimed that a decline in Anadarko’s stock price resulted from the company's disclosure that the Shenandoah project was dry and that Anadarko was taking a significant write-off for the project. The plaintiffs invoked the Basic presumption, a legal principle that allows courts to presume an investor's reliance on any public material misrepresentations if certain requirements are met.The District Court for the Southern District of Texas certified the class, relying on new evidence presented by the plaintiffs in their reply brief. Anadarko argued that it was not given a fair opportunity to respond to this new evidence and appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with Anadarko, stating that the district court should have allowed a sur-reply when the plaintiffs presented new evidence in their reply brief. The court held that when a party raises new arguments or evidence for the first time in a reply, the district court must either give the other party an opportunity to respond or decline to rely on the new arguments and evidence. The court also agreed that the district court failed to perform a full Daubert analysis, a standard for admitting expert scientific testimony. The court vacated the class certification order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Georgia Firefighters' Pension Fund v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp." on Justia Law

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In 2015, Christopher Novinger and ICAN Investment Group, L.L.C. were sued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for fraudulently offering and selling life settlement interests in violation of the Securities and Exchange Acts. As part of the settlement, Novinger and ICAN were prohibited from casting doubt on the validity of the SEC’s investigation or enforcement against them or proclaiming their innocence unless they also indicated their lack of innocence.Later, Novinger sought judicial review of the decree, claiming it violated his First Amendment rights. His motion for relief was denied by the district court, and this decision was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Novinger then moved for a declaratory judgment under the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 57, essentially raising the same claims as in his initial motion. The district court again denied his motion, ruling that it was procedurally improper and that there was no change in the law or facts that called for a modification of the decrees.Novinger appealed this decision, but the Fifth Circuit ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to review a procedurally improper motion that was denied as such. The court stated that the district court's order did not change the status quo or resolve any substantive issues, and thus, it was not a final decision that could be appealed. The court also rejected the assertion that the motion for declaratory judgment could be construed as an appropriate pleading under the DJA, maintaining the distinction between a pleading as an initial filing in a case and a motion as a subsequent filing. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "SEC v. Novinger" on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and vacated parts of a judgment against EOX Holdings, L.L.C., and Andrew Gizienski ("Defendants") in a case initiated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC"). The CFTC had accused the defendants of violating a rule that prevents commodities traders from "taking the other side of orders" without clients' consent. The court ruled that the defendants lacked fair notice of the CFTC's interpretation of this rule. The case revolved around Gizienski's actions while working as a broker for EOX, where he had discretion to make specific trades on behalf of one of his clients, Jason Vaccaro. The CFTC argued that Gizienski's actions violated the rule because he was making decisions to trade opposite the orders of other clients without their knowledge or consent. The court, however, ruled that the CFTC's interpretation of the rule was overly broad, as it did not provide sufficient notice that such conduct would be considered taking the other side of an order. The court reversed the penalty judgment against the defendants, vacated part of the injunction against them, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Commodity Futures v. EOX Holdings" on Justia Law