Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and received a sentencing enhancement for possessing a gun “in connection with” drug trafficking. Defendant raised two challenges to his sentence.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court applied the Sentencing Guidelines and did not clearly err in its factfinding. The court explained that Defendant correctly received a four-level sentencing enhancement if he possessed a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking offense. The court reasoned that a firearm is “automatically” connected to drug trafficking if it is found in close proximity to drugs or drug paraphernalia, and there is no serious dispute that Defendant’s firearm was in close proximity to his drugs, grinder and scale.   Further, Defendant argued that the automatic enhancement prescribed by Application Note 14(B) is an unreasonable expansion of the Guidelines’ text under Kisor v. Wilkie. The court noted that first, the district court was entitled to find that Defendant committed a drug trafficking offense. Mere possession of a controlled substance with an intent to distribute qualifies as a “drug trafficking offense.” Moreover, Defendant alleged that he expressly told the officers at the traffic stop that the drugs were just for personal use. But there is nothing in the record to support that. Finally, Defendant reasoned that because he was homeless, he was less capable of trafficking. But the United States cites Defendant’s lack of gainful employment as evidence for trafficking—he had an obvious motive to turn drugs for profit. View "USA v. Choulat" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of identity theft and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The district court found the calculated guidelines range of 15 to 21 months to be “woefully unreasonable” and varied upwards to a total of 72 months of imprisonment, which consisted of a sentence of 36 months for the identity theft offense and a concurrent sentence of 72 months for the firearm offense. On appeal, Defendant challenged only the substantive reasonableness of the 72-month sentence for the firearm offense.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Defendant has not shown that the district court abused its discretion. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by giving significant weight to Defendant’s prior marijuana importation offense, which is the predicate offense for his firearm conviction, and to the statements of the victim of the identity theft. Finally, Defendant has not shown that the district court made a clear error of judgment in balancing the sentencing factors of Section 3553(a), and the court declined to reweigh those factors. View "USA v. Cortez-Balderas" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted a doctor and two pharmacists (collectively, “Appellants” or “Defendants”) for roles in a “pill-mill” operation. Prosecutors charged Appellants with three drug-distribution conspiracies that each spanned from 2011 to 2020. The pharmacists, who both owned pharmacies, were also charged with possession with intent to distribute controlled substances. At trial, the Government offered extensive evidence, including text messages, wiretaps, surveillance, cooperator testimony, and records from Defendants’ businesses and homes. The jury found Defendants guilty on all counts. The district court sentenced the doctor and one of the pharmacists to 240 months imprisonment and the other pharmacist to 151 months. Defendants timely appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that there is sufficient evidence for a jury to draw reasonable inferences to support Appellants’ convictions. The pharmacist and doctor failed to make the showings necessary to warrant plain error reversal. The pharmacist’s refusal to be represented by her retained attorney amounted to a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel. The pharmacist failed to show the necessary prejudice for her challenges to the denial of a continuance, as well as permitting a DEA agent to authenticate her signature as a lay witness. The Government’s closing argument was consistent with the evidence. The record is not sufficiently developed to evaluate the doctor’s IAC claim. View "USA v. Capistrano" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. He moved to suppress the evidence of the weapon, claiming that the gun was the fruit of an unlawful seizure because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate a “Terry stop.” The district court orally denied the motion to suppress after a live hearing based on testimony from the officer and the tipster. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial. After the court entered a judgment of conviction, Defendant timely appealed.The Fifth Circuit concluded that the police had reasonable suspicion to seize Defendant and thus lawfully obtained the incriminating evidence from his car. The court further affirmed the judgment of conviction. The court explained that the contemporaneous tip, the visual details that the officer confirmed, the high-crime area, and Defendant’s evasive response to police presence was enough to give an officer articulable suspicion that crime was occurring (or was about to occur). To conclude otherwise would raise the bar of reasonable suspicion and hamper law enforcement from engaging in essential investigatory actions. View "USA v. Wright" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to conspiring to possess cocaine with intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(B). Defendant had two prior drug convictions for possessing amphetamine with intent to distribute it and conspiring to possess methamphetamine with intent to manufacture and distribute it. Because these and the instant offense were classified as controlled substance offenses, Defendant was deemed a career offender under § 4B1.1. Defendant appealed his career-offender designation.On appeal, Defendant argued that conspiracies cannot qualify as controlled substance offenses because the guideline definition excludes inchoate crimes. A panel rejected his argument and then the Fifth Circuit granted en banc review.The en banc court affirmed, finding that under Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993), a guideline comment is "authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline," neither of which applied here. In so holding, the Fifth Circuit joined the First, Second, Fourth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits. View "USA v. Vargas" on Justia Law

Appellant was indicted for intentionally causing the death of another by setting her on fire during a robbery. The jury found him guilty of capital murder, as alleged in the indictment. Appellant challenged the validity of his conviction and sentence in a state habeas proceeding, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied relief. Appellant filed an application for a certificate of appealability and appealed the district court's denial of his motion to recuse.   The Fifth Circuit denied the application for a certificate of appealability and affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to recuse. The court explained that Appellant cited no governing legal authority recognizing the right to delay his briefing until the final day of AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. On the contrary, it is firmly established that a district court has “the inherent authority to manage their dockets and courtrooms with a view toward the efficient and expedient resolution of cases.” The district court noted that Appellant’s counsel might be acting contrary to Rule 11(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires counsel to certify that “the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.” Given the district court’s explanation, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion to recuse. Accordingly, the court held that these do not debatably give rise to a claim for relief. View "Johnson v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to drug offenses and assaulting or impeding U.S. Border Patrol agents. The district court sentenced him within the guidelines range to a total of 46 months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and a $225 special assessment. Although Defendant’s presentence report (“PSR”) listed no conditions of supervised release, the district court, at sentencing, specifically imposed “the standard and mandatory conditions of supervision … including the conditions that the defendant shall not commit another federal, state, or local crime during the term of supervision.”   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the well-grounded and legally-sound procedure for imposing “standard” and “mandatory” conditions of supervised release listed in a court’s standing order is: 1. The probation officer should either include the court’s standing order in or append it to the PSR, or preferably both. 2. Defense counsel must review and explain the conditions in the court’s standing order with the defendant before sentencing. 3. The district court must (a) confirm with the defendant that he or she saw the standing order and had the opportunity to review it with defense counsel; (b) ask the defendant whether he or she has any questions about the conditions listed in the standing order; (c) orally pronounce that it is imposing the conditions detailed in a specific standing order, and (d) provide the defendant with an opportunity to object. Nonetheless, in this case, the district court did not plainly err in imposing the standard and mandatory conditions detailed in the court-wide standing order and two special conditions. View "USA v. Baez-Adriano" on Justia Law

Defendant, a rap artist as well as a convicted felon, owned a company that hired a videographer to film Defendant throughout his life for eventual use in a music video. One day, an anonymous 911 caller reported several men with “Uzis” and other guns walking down a residential street in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Police arrived, detained Defendant, the videographer, and others. Police seized a memory card from the videographer, as well as several firearms from the nearby area. There was a video on the memory card of Defendant holding a firearm.The district court reasoned that Gaulden had a protectable Fourth Amendment interest in the videos on the memory card, although he lacked a Fourth Amendment interest in the memory card itself. The court also found the warrant fatally defective. Accordingly, the court suppressed the footage of Defendant in possession of the firearms.The Fifth Circuit reversed. Defendant's right to Fourth Amendment protection turns on whether he has a constitutionally protected property interest or a judicially conferred reasonable expectation of privacy in the place or thing searched or seized. To the extent Defendant can have a distinct property interest in the video footage, he never proved that he acquired such a right. Defendant himself did not testify and there was no written contract giving Defendant ownership of the video footage. And Defendant's company, not Defendant himself, hired the videographer. Thus, Defendant did not have an established property interest in the footage.The court also held that Defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the footage. View "USA v. Gaulden" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to conspiring to transport and transporting undocumented immigrants resulting in serious bodily injury and death. He appealed a two-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. Section 2L1.1(b)(8)(A) for involuntarily detaining a migrant through threat or coercion.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here Defendant did not continue to drive in order to prevent L.G.G.G. from escaping—he continued to drive in order to avoid apprehension. That Defendant’s continued driving was not for the purpose of detaining L.G.G.G. is buttressed by his prior instruction to L.G.G.G. and A.M.A. to exit the vehicle and run should they be pulled over by law enforcement. L.G.G.G. was involuntarily detained, but he was not involuntarily detained through threat or coercion. The district court erred by applying this enhancement to Defendant’s conduct. However, the court wrote that Defendant failed to show that the error was plain. Because Defendant’s claim of plain error failed the second prong of the relevant text, the court declined to examine the remaining prongs. View "USA v. Buendia" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of distribution of child pornography and one count of possession of child pornography involving the sexual exploitation of minors. He was sentenced to 60 months in prison on each count, to run concurrently. The district court also imposed a life term of supervised release. Defendant was released from prison in August 2010. And he successfully completed his sex offender treatment. Since his release, he has maintained a clean record and complied with his registration requirement. The government appeals the district court’s order granting Defendant’s request to terminate his obligation to register as a sex offender.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting Defendant’s request. The court held that the unambiguous language of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act deems Defendant a tier II sex offender and that status demands that his registration continues. The court explained that because he was convicted of distribution of child pornography, Defendant’s crime falls under Section 20911(3)(B)(iii), and so he is a tier II sex offender. Consequently, he “shall” register for 25 years from the date of his release from prison. Furthermore, he is not entitled to any reduction of the required registration period under SORNA. 34 U.S.C. Section2 0915(b) (providing reduction for tier I and tier III sex offenders, but not tier II). View "USA v. Nazerzadeh" on Justia Law