Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant challenged the district court’s 1) denial of his motion to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act, 2) imposition of a sentencing enhancement for reckless endangerment, and 3) adoption of the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) that treated two of his prior convictions as crimes of violence.   The Fifth Circuit rejected the first two grounds but vacated and remanded for resentencing in light of Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021), and United States v. Bates, 24 F.4th 1017 (5th Cir. 2022). The court explained that the district court correctly interpreted the Speedy Trial Act. However, the court was plainly wrong in its application of U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(a)(3). It is plain, post-Borden, that applying Section 2K2.1(a)(3) to the convictions at issue was in error.   Further, applying Section 2K2.1(a)(3) affected Appellant’s substantial rights and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings. Without the two qualifying prior convictions for crimes of violence, Appellant maintains that his base offense level would drop from 22 to 20 under Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(B), and that he would receive at least one less criminal history point, which would result in a criminal history category of IV. 22 USSG Section 4A1.1(e), 4A1.2(a)(2). View "USA v. Kelley" on Justia Law

After a man was found incompetent to stand trial, and his civil commitment proceeding was dismissed, he stayed in jail for six more years. Plaintiff, the man’s guardian, filed suit against the District Attorney, Sheriffs, and Clay County under Section 1983, challenging the man’s years-long detention.   The district court first dismissed the District Attorney from the case. However, the court determined that the Sheriffs were not entitled to qualified immunity on the detention claim because their constitutional violations were obvious. It denied summary judgment to Clay County too, finding that there was strong evidence that the Sheriffs were final policymakers for the county.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed Clay County’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment as to the Sheriffs.  The court first held that it lacked jurisdiction over the ruling keeping Clay County in the case. The Court explained that, unlike the Sheriffs, municipalities do not enjoy immunity. Further, the court wrote it did not have pendent party jurisdiction over Clay County. Defendants assume that if Clay County’s liability is “inextricably intertwined” with that of the individual officers, that provides “support [for] pendent appellate jurisdiction.” But the court has never permitted pendent party (as opposed to pendent claim) interlocutory jurisdiction.   Further, taking the evidence in Plaintiff’s favor, the Sheriffs violated the man’s due process right by detaining him for six years in violation of the commit-or-release rule and the circuit court’s order enforcing that rule. The court explained that it was clearly established that the Sheriffs could be liable for a violation of the man’s clearly established due process right. View "Harris v. Clay County, MS" on Justia Law

Defendant, seeking habeas relief, alleged that prosecutors unconstitutionally suppressed a document that would have aided his case and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during his trial and his direct appeal.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed holding that Defendant failed to demonstrate that any of his habeas claims merit relief. Defendant first asserted that the prosecution violated his Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by suppressing FD-302 evidence favorable to his case. The court wrote that the impeachment value of the 302 is insufficient to undermine confidence in the trial and the jury’s verdict, such that the 302 is not material, and Defendant’s Brady claim therefore fails.   Next, because none of the prosecutor’s statements, taken in context, constitute improper vouching, Defendant cannot argue that his trial counsel should have objected to them and was ineffective for not doing so. And even if the prosecution acted improperly as to some of its closing remarks, Defendant fails to show how any strategic decision on his counsel’s part not to object rises to ineffective assistance. View "USA v. Valas" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1). The jury instructions did not specify that the jury must find that Defendant knew he was a felon when he possessed a firearm. After Defendant’s conviction and sentencing, the Supreme Court decided in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), that knowledge of felony status is an essential element of that offense. The following year, Defendant filed a motion with the district court under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255, arguing that because of Rehaif the court should vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Rehaif did not establish a new right that applies retroactively as required for such collateral actions.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded. The court considered whether in Rehaif the Supreme Court newly recognized a right and whether that right has been made retroactive to cases on collateral review. The court concluded that the Supreme Court did indeed recognize a new right—the defendant’s right to have the Government prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew of his felony status when he possessed a firearm.Next, the court wrote, that rule applies retroactively. The Supreme Court has explained that “[n]ew substantive rules generally apply retroactively” to finalized convictions. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004). The court explained that remand is appropriate because the district court has not addressed procedural default or the merits of Defendant’s claim. View "USA v. Kelley" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a guilty plea to conspiracy to interfere with commerce by robbery under 18 U.S.C. Section 1951(a) and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c). The conspiracy conviction served as the predicate crime of violence for the firearm offense.Under the terms of the plea agreement, Defendant waived the right to challenge his conviction and sentence on direct appeal or through a collateral attack. However, following United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), Defendant brought a collateral attack on his firearm conviction under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255, claiming that notwithstanding his waiver, his conviction must be vacated because it was predicated on the residual clause held unconstitutional in Davis.The Fifth Circuit held that Defendant's plea waiver was valid, and precluded collateral attack, citing Grzegorczyk v. United States, _ U.S. _ (2022) (Kavanaugh, J., respecting the denial of certiorari). View "USA v. Caldwell" on Justia Law

Defendant and several others were indicted on various healthcare fraud offenses stemming from a scheme in which Defendant and others would pay TRICARE beneficiaries to order certain creams and vitamins. At a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit health care fraud, one count of receiving an illegal kickback payment, and six counts of making illegal kickback payments. The District Court sentenced Defendant to 240 months imprisonment.On appeal, Defendant challenged, among other things, the sufficiency of the evidence pertaining to his convictions for paying illegal kickbacks. The Fifth Circuit agreed with Defendant's reasoning that he did not "induce" TRICARE beneficiaries to order the substances by paying them because the substances were for their own use. Thus, the court reversed Defendant's convictions for paying illegal kickback payments. The court affirmed Defendant's other convictions and remanded for resentencing. View "USA v. Cooper" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, conspiracy to solicit and receive healthcare kickbacks, and two counts of false statements relating to healthcare matters. On appeal, Defendant challenged the sufficiency of evidence and her sentence.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction and sentence. The court explained that the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt “(1) an agreement between two or more persons to pursue an unlawful objective; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the unlawful objective and voluntary agreement to join the conspiracy; and (3) an overt act by one or more of the members of the conspiracy in furtherance of the objective of the conspiracy.” The evidence was sufficient to prove that Defendant made an agreement to and did receive $60 kickbacks in exchange for home healthcare certifications. Thus, it was not unreasonable for the jury to conclude that the $60 payments were kickbacks, rather than legitimate co-pays, based on the evidence that patients rarely paid the fee, and that Defendant charged a uniform $60 fee regardless of the services rendered.   In Defendant’s challenge to the PSR’s calculation of the loss amount and its effect on her Sentencing Guidelines range, the court held that the district court did not err by overruling Defendant’s objection to the inclusion of Medicare Part A claims in the loss amount. However, the district court did err by overruling Defendant’s objection to the inclusion of the non-certification Medicare Part B claims in the loss amount because absent the fraud Medicare would have paid for these claims. Nonetheless, this error was harmless. View "USA v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to transporting an alien within the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (a)(1)(B)(i). At sentencing, the district court enhanced his total offense level for reckless endangerment pursuant to Section 2L1.1(b)(6) and for reckless endangerment while fleeing pursuant to Section 3C1.2. Defendant did not object and was sentenced at the bottom of the guideline range to 37 months of imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court plainly erred by enhancing his total offense level pursuant to Section 2L1.1(b)(6).The Fifth Circuit held that the district court plainly erred by enhancing Defendant’s total offense level pursuant to Section 2L1.1(b)(6). Here, in support of the Section2L1.1(b)(6) enhancement, the presentence report cited the CBP agents’ findings that Defendant was transporting five undocumented aliens, four of whom were unrestrained, plus himself in a vehicle with a seating capacity of five. In support of the Section 3C1.2 enhancement, the PSR cited the 14-mile chase where Defendant reached speeds of up to 105 miles per hour at night. Because the district court enhanced Defendant’s sentence under both provisions, the Section 2L1.1(b)(6) enhancement cannot be based on his conduct while fleeing from the CBP agents. Thus, any support for the Section 2L1.1(b)(6) enhancement must come from his pre-flight activity. Defendant’s pre-flight activity does not support a Section 2L1.1(b)(6) enhancement, even under plain error review. View "USA v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to 36 months in prison to be followed by five years of supervised release after pleading guilty to illegal reentry. As a special condition of release, the district court required that Defendant be turned over to immigration authorities upon his release and that he be deported to Mexico. If immigration authorities were unwilling to take Defendant, the court required he self-deport.Defendant challenged the special condition of release requiring he self-deport. The government conceded that the district court committed plain error. The Fifth Circuit remanded for entry of a new written judgment without the special condition requiring Defendant to depart the United States. View "USA v. Badillo" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested and indicted on federal drug charges following the seizure of 400 grams of heroin 26 minutes into a traffic stop. At trial, Defendant unsuccessfully litigated a motion to suppress and then entered a conditional guilty plea. Defendant then appealed the denial of his motion to suppress.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress. The traffic stop leading to the discovery of the narcotics was justified at its inception because Defendant was speeding, driving on the shoulder of the road, and littered a cigarette out his window. The court also held that the length of the traffic stop was justified. While a traffic stop must be temporary and last no longer than necessary, upon the development of reasonable suspicion, officers can extend the stop. Here, three minutes into the stop the officer determined Defendant's license was suspended. The officer could have arrested Defendant at this point for driving on a suspended license. However, as the stop progressed, the officer developed reasonable suspicion that Defendant was involved in the sale of heroin, leading to the permissible extension of the stop. View "USA v. Henry" on Justia Law