Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant is a medical doctor. He contracted with two hospitals, one in Mississippi and one in Alabama. He usually made $30,000 to $40,000 per month. Because he was a contractor, the hospitals did not withhold any wages for tax purposes— Defendant was solely responsible for satisfying his federal tax obligations. From 2006 through 2012, Defendant did not pay any income taxes or file any timely tax returns. A jury found him guilty of tax evasion in violation of 26 U.S.C. Section 7201. Defendant raised two claims on appeal: first, that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support a conviction for tax evasion under Section 7201; and second, that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a mistrial.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that even if it was legitimate for Defendant to deduct IRS garnishments from his income, that does not explain why Defendant neglected to mention key assets on the form—such as the $50,000 gun collection and the corporate bank accounts that he used to pay personal expenses. Moreover, the prosecution presented evidence suggesting that he manipulated his wages to artificially depress his income at the time he submitted Form 433-A.   Further, even assuming that the district court was right to sustain the defense’s objection, Defendant offered no reason to believe that the questions incurably prejudiced the jury. Given the weight of evidence presented to the jury in this case, there is no “significant possibility” that these two questions had a substantial impact on the verdict. View "USA v. Crandell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was arrested and released on a surety bond provided by Big Bubba’s. Plaintiff was formally charged with the same offense in April 2016, but due to an epileptic seizure, he was hospitalized before receiving notice of the indictment. As a result, he was incapacitated for several months, but according to Plaintiff, his wife stayed in touch with Big Bubba’s on his behalf. Big Bubba’s filed a petition with the trial court, requesting an arrest warrant for Plaintiff on the grounds that he had failed to fulfill his contractual obligations by neglecting to check in and provide contact information. The trial court granted the request, and Plaintiff was arrested pursuant. Plaintiff sued Big Bubba’s, alleging that it violated their agreement and caused him to be wrongfully arrested by presenting misleading information to the court. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s Memorandum and Recommendation and granted Big Bubba’s motion to dismiss. On appeal, Plaintiff contends that his false imprisonment and contract claims were wrongly dismissed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court as to Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim, and the court reversed and remanded his contract claim. The court explained that while Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim was properly dismissed, his contract claim was not. The district court held that principals, such as Plaintiff, who seek to contest a surrender, are “limited to the remedy” set out in Tex. Occ. Code Section 1704.207(b)–(c). Thus the court concluded that Plaintiff is not limited to this remedy and therefore reverse the dismissal of his claim. View "Jeanty v. Big Bubba's" on Justia Law

The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) sued Defendant as well as other individual Defendants and corporate entities for securities violations. Defendant appealed the district court’s order appointing a receiver over all corporations and entities controlled by him.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the order appointing the receiver effective 90 days after the issuance of the court’s mandate and remanded for further proceedings. The court also granted in part Defendant’s motion for a partial stay pending appeal. The court explained that Faulkner does not support the district court’s actions here. Under Faulkner, the SEC could have sought an injunction freezing asset transfers while it traced the funds and determined which entities should be placed in the receivership. But it did not. Since a receivership’s jurisdiction extends only over property subject to the underlying claims, the district court abused its discretion by including all Defendant-controlled entities in the receivership without first finding that they had received or benefited from the ill-gotten funds. Should the district court decide that a new receivership is justified on remand, it can only extend over entities that received or benefitted from assets traceable to Defendant’s alleged fraudulent activities that are the subject of this litigation. View "SEC v. Barton" on Justia Law

At issue in this case are three such Texas laws: Texas Election Code sections 61.003, 61.010, and 85.036 (collectively, the “electioneering laws”). Plaintiff filed this action, alleging that she was unconstitutionally censored under the electioneering laws when she voted in 2018 and that the statutes unconstitutionally “chilled” her right to free speech by criminalizing political expression within polling places. The district court, adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, upheld section 61.010 as constitutional, but concluded that sections 61.003 and 85.036 are facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Both sides appealed, contesting jurisdictional issues as well as the merits.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s holding denying Texas’s Secretary of State and Attorney General sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and dismissed those defendants for lack of jurisdiction. The court affirmed that Plaintiff has standing to bring her claims against the remaining two Defendants. The court also affirmed the district court’s holding that section 61.010 is constitutional. However, the court reversed and rendered the district court’s holding that sections 61.003 and 85.036 are unconstitutional and instead uphold all three electioneering laws. Finally, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of nominal damages. View "Ostrewich v. Nelson" on Justia Law

In 2019, Appellant filed a Form I-140 petition for a work visa under 8 USC Sec. 1153(b)(2) and Form I-485 applications for himself and his spouse to adjust their immigration statuses. Appellant's I-140 petition asserted that he satisfied the requirements to obtain a national-interest waiver under Sec. 1153(b)(2)(B)(i). USCIS declined to grant Appellant's request and denied his request for reconsideration.Appellant sued the US government, challenging the denials of his I-140 petition, his motion for reopening or reconsideration, and his I-485 applications. The Government moved to dismiss Appellant's complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), arguing that the jurisdictional bar in 8 USC § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies to national-interest waiver denials. The district court dismissed Appellant's case, citing a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Appellant claimed the district court erred in concluding that Sec. 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars jurisdiction over the denial of an I140 petition. Joining the Ninth, Eleventh, Third and D.C. Circuits, the court affirmed, finding Sec. 1153(b)(2)(B)(i) “expressly and specifically vest discretion in the Attorney General” to deny national-interest waivers. Thus, the jurisdiction bar in Sec. 1252(a)(2)(B) applies. View "Flores v. Garland" on Justia Law

Defendant has two state convictions for indecent exposure to children. The government contends that those convictions “clearly” relate United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit “to the sexual exploitation of children,” so Defendant should be subject to the enhancement. Defendant countered that “sexual exploitation of children,” in this context, applies only to offenses relating to child pornography, so his sentence is not subject to the enhancement.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(e)’s use of the phrase “relating to the sexual exploitation of children” refers to any criminal sexual conduct involving children. Defendant’s convictions for indecent exposure to a child neatly fall within that broad category. View "USA v. Moore" on Justia Law

This is an appeal from the denial of a preliminary injunction. While this appeal was pending, the district court subsequently dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot. The court explained that there is no need for a preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo during the pendency of trial court proceedings that are now over. View "Koppula v. Jaddou" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Nueces County and Wellpath for “County/Municipal Liability” under Section 1983. Specifically, he alleged that the county was liable because it “sanctioned the custom, practice, and/or policy or procedure of failing to protect and/or ignoring the serious medical needs of those entrusted to [its] care.” The original claim was not specific about how Wellpath was supposedly liable. The county and Wellpath moved to dismiss. The district court granted both motions but permitted Martinez to file a “Motion for Leave to Amend his Complaint.” Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his claim against Nueces County and the denial of leave to amend as to Wellpath.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that because Plaintiff had not properly alleged a custom or policy that was the moving force of his injuries, the district court was correct to dismiss his claims against Nueces County. Further, the court found that from the face of Plaintiff’s pleadings, there is no reason to conclude that Wellpath, at an organization-wide level, had a policy of deliberate indifference that was the moving force of Plaintiff’s alleged constitutional violation at the Nueces County Jail. This is doubly so because of Plaintiff’s failure to allege, with sufficient detail, what happened to him at the jail. View "Martinez v. Nueces County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the Austin Independent School District (“AISD”) on behalf of her minor son, A.H., alleging that AISD violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983by employing an individual assigned to help A.H. accommodate his disabilities, but who instead verbally harassed him and threw a trash can at him, hitting him and causing injury. After the incident, the parties settled all of A.H.’s Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) claims outside of court but agreed that Plaintiff still had the right to file a separate action containing A.H.’s claims arising under Section 504, the ADA, and Section 1983. Heston then brought these claims in a suit filed in 2018. The district court dismissed the suit without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s (“IDEA”) administrative remedies.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded it to the district court for further consideration in light of Luna Perez v. Sturgis Pub. Schs., 143 S. Ct. 859 (2023). Since Plaintiff appealed and the Parties’ briefed the case, the Supreme Court decided Luna Perez, concluding that the IDEA does not require administrative exhaustion “where a plaintiff brings a suit under another federal law for compensatory damages.” This constitutes a “modification in controlling legal principles . . . rendering a previous determination inconsistent with the prevailing doctrine.” View "Heston v. Austin Indep" on Justia Law

Defendants were among 24 individuals indicted on various charges in connection with their involvement in the Sinaloa Cartel. Defendants were jointly tried during a 10-day jury trial. One defendant was convicted on five counts, while another was convicted on 12 counts. Each received concurrent life sentences for all counts on which they were convicted. Defendants raised various challenges to their respective convictions and sentences on appeal.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the convictions, vacated the sentences that exceed their respective statutory maxima and remanded the case for resentencing on those counts only. The court explained that the maximum term of imprisonment that may be imposed for either Count IV—Conspiracy to Launder Monetary Instruments or Count V— Conspiracy to Possess Firearms in Furtherance of any Crime of Violence or Drug Trafficking Crime is 20 years. 18 U.S.C. Sections1956(a)(2), 924o. The maximum term of imprisonment that may be imposed for Counts VI, VIII, or X—all VICAR convictions—is 10 years. Nevertheless, both Defendants were sentenced to concurrent life terms of imprisonment on Counts IV and V, and one defendant also received concurrent life sentences for Counts VI, VIII, and X. These sentences all exceed their respective statutory maxima. Therefore, the life sentences imposed for Counts IV, V, VI, VIII, and X are vacated, and the case is remanded for resentencing on those counts only. View "USA v. Urquidi" on Justia Law