Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A Border Patrol Agent was conducting inspections and noticed two people in a truck. At trial, the Agent testified that he first asked the driver, Defendant, whether he was a United States citizen. Defendant responded that he was a lawful permanent resident of the United States. Defendant answered that the passenger was his wife and a United States citizen, and he gave the Agent a marriage certificate. After looking at the marriage certificate, the Agent asked the passenger if she was legally present in the United States, and she said that she was not. A jury found Defendant guilty of transporting within the United States an alien who “has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law.” On appeal, Defendant challenged his conviction as based on insufficient evidence. Defendant argued that the Government failed to prove the first element of this offense.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a rational jury could infer that Defendant illegally entered or remained in the United States from the testimony confirming that she was illegally present in the country. When the Agent asked the passenger if she was illegally present, she answered yes. During Defendant’s post-arrest interview, Defendant said that he heard from the passenger that she was “illegal.” And the passenger corroborated at trial that Defendant knew that she was in the United States illegally when he went to pick her up. View "USA v. Irias-Romero" on Justia Law

Appellant worked as a barge cleaner for T.T. Barge Services, which provides barge cleaning services to Ingram Barge Company. Appellant asserted negligence claims against Ingram after Appellant was injured by caustic soda that he was cleaning up on Ingram Barge 976, which was moored to one of T.T.’s work barges at the time of his injury. After Ingram filed a district court complaint to limit liability, Appellant counterclaimed and asserted claims of negligence against Ingram. T.T. also filed a claim for contribution and indemnity against Ingram. The district court granted summary judgment (1) as to Appellant’s lack of seaman status under the Jones Act and (2) as to all of Appellant’s negligence claims against Ingram. The district court then dismissed the case with prejudice. Appellant challenged the district court’s orders.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that T.T.’s Cleaning Barge is semi-permanently and indefinitely attached to land by steel cables, except for rare moves during repairs or to accommodate nearby dredging operations. Therefore, the district court did not err in finding that T.T.’s Cleaning Barge lacked vessel status at summary judgment.   Further, the court explained that to qualify as a Jones Act seaman, a plaintiff must satisfy two requirements. First, an employee’s duties must ‘contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission. Second, that employee must have a connection to a vessel in navigation that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature. Here, Ratcliff lacks a substantial connection to Ingram’s barges. View "Ingram Barge v. Ratcliff" on Justia Law

In this case, the parties consented to have their commercial dispute tried before a United States magistrate judge. But, allegedly unbeknownst to Defendant, the judge was longtime family friends with the lead trial lawyer for the plaintiff. Specifically, the lawyer had been a groomsman in the judge’s own wedding, and the judge officiated the wedding of the lawyer’s daughter three months before this lawsuit was filed. None of this information was disclosed to Defendant. After a twenty-day bench trial, the magistrate judge rendered judgment for the Plaintiff, awarding $124.5 million, including over $100 million in trebled damages. After the issuance of the judgment and award, Defendant learned about the undisclosed longstanding friendship and sought to have the magistrate-judge referral vacated. The district judge denied the request and denied discovery on the issue. Defendant appealed.   The Fifth Circuit vacated. The court concluded that the facts asserted here, if true, raise serious doubts about the validity of Defendant’s constitutionally essential consent to have its case tried by this magistrate judge. Further, the court explained remand was necessary because the facts were not sufficiently developed for the court to decide whether Defendant’s consent was validly given or whether vacatur of the referral was otherwise warranted. Accordingly, the court remanded for an evidentiary inquiry. View "I F G Port Hold v. Lake Charles Harbor" on Justia Law

Defendant a citizen of Mexico, has been deported from the United States repeatedly over the past three decades. The list of crimes he has committed in the United States is extensive. Most recently, Defendant pleaded guilty to illegally reentering the United States after a prior deportation. At the time of this offense, Defendant was 51 years old, but had only spent one year of his adult life in Mexico, his country of citizenship. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, Defendant’s recommended range spanned from 3 years and 10 months (46 months) to 4 years and 9 months (57 months). The district court sentenced Defendant to 6 years (72 months). Defendant challenged his sentence as procedurally and substantively unreasonable.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Government concedes that the district court mistakenly counted six prior theft convictions when there were only four and mistakenly suggested that Defendant had served 7 years for a 1991 vehicle burglary conviction when he actually served 10 months of the 7-year sentence. These, the Government admits, were obvious errors. Yet the Government argues, and we agree, that these misstatements did not affect Defendant’s substantial rights. Nor did they impugn the fairness, integrity, or reputation of the proceedings. Further, the court wrote it has previously affirmed the substantive reasonableness of a 72-month sentence for illegal re-entry. Thus, the court concluded that this sentence was substantively reasonable, as well. View "USA v. Recio-Rosas" on Justia Law

The United States commenced an investigation of Mississippi’s mental health system. This investigation was not prompted any individual instance of discrimination against a person with serious mental illness. The United States filed suit against the state of Mississippi, alleging that its entire mental health care system violated the “integration mandate” prescribed by 28 C.F.R. Section 35.130(d) and reified in the Supreme Court’s decision, Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring. The district court conducted a trial, upheld the federal government’s theory of liability, and ordered not only sweeping modifications to the state’s system but also the indefinite appointment of a monitor who would oversee the system. Mississippi contends that (1) the federal government has not proved a cause of action for discrimination in violation of the ADA (2) the court erred in rejecting its defense that remediation would require an impermissible “fundamental alteration” of its existing programs and (3) the court’s remedial order vastly exceeds the scope of claimed liability   The Fifth Circuit reversed. The court explained that the possibility that some un-named individual with serious mental illness or all such people in Mississippi could be unjustifiably institutionalized in the future does not give rise to a cognizable claim under Title II. The court further wrote that nor does such a vague and standardless theory license courts under the ADA to rework an entire state’s mental health system. Accordingly, the court held that the government did not prove that the state of Mississippi violated Title II pursuant to the statute, regulations, or Olmstead as properly construed. View "USA v. State of Mississippi" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded in part and affirmed in part the district court’s ruling in Plaintiff’s suit against the truck driver, trucking company, and insurance company.  The court found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Defendants acted in bad faith in destroying the tire. Plaintiff was driving on an interstate highway in Louisiana when his car was struck by part of a tire that came from the tractor-trailer being driven directly in front of him. The resulting crash caused serious injuries to Plaintiff and damage to his vehicle. The tractor-trailer was owned by Defendant New Prime, Inc. d/b/a Prime, Inc. and operated by its employee, Defendant James Arthur Rogers. The tread of the failed tire — a refurbished, retread tire manufactured by Prime’s own EcoTire facility — separated from the casing or tire core before it hit Plaintiff’s vehicle. Plaintiff filed suit against a truck driver, trucking company, and insurance company. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. On appeal, Plaintiff contends the district court erred in ruling on several motions. The central question is whether the district court was correct to hold that there were no genuine issues of material fact.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded in part and affirmed in part. The court explained that Plaintiff should be permitted a jury instruction that if jurors find bad faith, they may infer that the destroyed evidence would have been adverse to Prime’s defense in this suit. The court wrote that Prime destroyed the most crucial piece of evidence just weeks after learning that its tire may have caused a car accident, and Prime cannot explain why it transported the tire to its Salt Lake facility or what happened to the tire following the accident. These circumstances create a fact question on bad faith, necessitating a jury determination. View "Van Winkle v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a music theory professor at UNT, a leading expert on the Austrian music theorist Heinrich Schenker, the director of the Center for Schenkerian Studies, and the founder of the Journal of Schenkerian Studies. Plaintiff published an article defending Schenker against charges of racism. The Dean of the College of Music announced that the College of Music would be launching a “formal investigation into the conception and production of” the Journal’s symposium issue. After interviewing eleven individuals, the panel produced a report. The provost sent Jackson a letter instructing him to “develop of a plan to address the recommendations.” After Plaintiff submitted his plan, Board members charged the department with launching a national search for a new editor-in-chief for the Journal, who is a full-time tenured faculty member. Plaintiff sued the Board defendants, among others, alleging a First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The district court denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court found that sovereign immunity does not bar Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim. Further, the court found that Plaintiff has standing to bring his First Amendment claim against the Board defendants. Accordingly, the court found that Plaintiff has “alleged an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.” Thus, at the motion to dismiss stage, sovereign immunity does not bar Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim against the Board defendants. The court also found that Plaintiff also has standing to bring his First Amendment claim. For Article III standing. View "Jackson v. Wright" on Justia Law

The Texas Department of Criminal Justice fired Plaintiff after he refused to cut his hair and beard in violation of his religious vow. Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies. He then filed a pro se lawsuit against TDCJ and various officers, which alleged claims of religious discrimination and failure to accommodate under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants.   The Fifth Circuit, in accordance with the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Groff v. DeJoy, 143 S. Ct. 2279 (2023), reversed. The court explained that Title VII forbids religious discrimination in employment. The statute defines “religion” broadly to include “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief.” Further, the court explained that Title VII also requires employers to accommodate the religious observances or practices of applicants and employees. The court held that TDCJ breached both duties. TDCJ (A) failed to accommodate Hebrew’s religious practice and (B) discriminated against him on the basis of his religious practice   The court reasoned that the only issue is whether TDCJ has met its burden to show that granting Hebrew’s requested accommodation—to keep his hair and beard—would place an undue hardship on TDCJ. The court held that (1) TDCJ cannot meet the undue hardship standard and (2) the Department’s counterarguments are unavailing. The court noted that, in this case, TDCJ cannot hide behind its “otherwise-neutral policy.” This policy must “give way” to Plaintiff’s requested accommodation. View "Hebrew v. TDCJ" on Justia Law

Louisiana Fair Housing Action Center (LaFHAC) sued Azalea Garden Properties, LLC (Azalea Garden), alleging that Azalea Garden discriminated on the basis of race and disability at its apartment complex in Jefferson, Louisiana, in violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA). The district court dismissed LaFHAC’s disability claim but allowed its disparate impact race claim to proceed, subject to one caveat: The district court certified a permissive interlocutory appeal on the issue of whether the “predictably will cause” standard for FHA disparate-impact claims remains viable after Inclusive Communities Project Inc. v. Lincoln Property Co., 920 F.3d 890 (5th Cir. 2019).   The Fifth Circuit remanded the case with instructions to dismiss LaFHAC’s claims without prejudice. The court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction over this case. Along the same lines, the court wrote that it cannot consider the district court’s certified question. The court explained that LaFHAC has plausibly alleged a diversion of resources, as it shifted efforts away from planned projects like its annual conference toward counteracting Azalea Garden’s alleged discrimination. But “an organization does not automatically suffer a cognizable injury in fact by diverting resources in response to a defendant’s conduct.” The court wrote that LaFHAC failed to plead an injury because it failed to allege how its diversion of resources impaired its ability to achieve its mission. Thus, the court held that because LaFHAC has not alleged a cognizable injury, it lacks standing to bring the claims it alleges in this action. View "LA Fair Housing Action v. Azalea Garden" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of illegally reentering the country after a previous deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. Section 1326(a) & (b)(2). He claimed that the district court wrongly denied his request for a jury instruction about duress and inappropriately applied an enhancement to his sentence for obstruction of justice. Mora argues that the district court’s finding did not address all the elements of perjury. The district court stated that “this Defendant lied under oath to that jury” and that “he obstructed justice.” Defendant posits that this does not address whether the lie was willful or material.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the defendant must present proof of each element to receive a jury instruction on duress. The court wrote that even taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Defendant, he has not presented proof that he was in danger at the moment of his offense. The court reasoned that there is no reason to believe that he was detained, followed, or surveilled in the interim between his abduction and the commission of the offense.   Further, the court explained that the obstruction of justice enhancement applies if “the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction, and . . . the obstructive conduct related to . . . the defendant’s offense of conviction and any relevant conduct.” The court wrote that it found that the district court’s finding “encompasses all of the factual predicates for a finding of perjury.” View "USA v. Mora-Carrillo" on Justia Law