Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

On August 31, 2020, N&W Marine Towing (N&W) filed in federal district court a verified complaint in limitation, Case No. 2:20-cv-2390 (the Limitation Action), pursuant to the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 (Limitation Act) and Rule F of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims. The Limitation Act provides that once a shipowner brings a limitation action “all claims and proceedings against the owner related to the matter in question shall cease.” The district court issued a Stay Order. Wooley, Turn Services (Wooley’s employer), and Royal Caribbean Cruises (RCC) (the owner of the Majesty of the Seas) all filed claims against N&W in the Limitation Action. N&W and Wooley cross-appeal. Seeking to remain in federal court. On cross-appeal, Wooley contends that the outcome of the case was correct, but if this court were to determine that N&W was properly joined, then Wooley contends the district court erred in denying his motion to remand. The main issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in dismissing an improperly joined, nondiverse defendant when the only independent jurisdictional basis for removal was admiralty jurisdiction.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that, like in Flagg, the Louisiana state court here would have had no choice but to dismiss Wooley’s claims against N&W because of the district court’s Stay Order. The district court could have retained jurisdiction over claims against RCC had RCC remained in the case. However the federal court could not retain jurisdiction over claims against a nondiverse defendant (N&W) without some other basis for federal jurisdiction over those claims. View "Trey Wooley v. N&W Marine Towing" on Justia Law

Seven codefendants appeal their various convictions stemming from a multi-million-dollar healthcare conspiracy involving surgery-referral kickbacks at Forest Park Medical Center in Dallas, Texas. They challenge convictions under the Anti-Kickback Statute (“AKS”), the Travel Act, and for money laundering. The defendants in this case are, with three exceptions, the surgeons whom Forest Park paid to direct surgeries to the hospital—Won, Rimlawi, Shah, and Henry. One exception is Forrest— she is a nurse. Another is Jacob—he ran Adelaide Business Solutions (Adelaide), a pass-through entity. The other is Burt—he was part of the hospital’s staff. Defendants raise many of the same issues on appeal, often adopting each other’s arguments.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that the state law at issue here is the Texas Commercial Bribery Statute (TCBS). Here, it does not matter if the physician was acquitted because there could still be sufficient evidence in the record that defendants “offer[ed]” a benefit in violation of the TCBS regardless of whether any physician accepted it.  Further, the court explained that even assuming no rational jury could have found a single conspiracy, the surgeons fail to show that this error “prejudiced their substantial rights.” Henry and Forrest do not raise this point at all. Won and Shah address it only briefly and fail to provide any record citations to support the proposition that “clear, specific, and compelling prejudice” resulted in an unfair trial. View "USA v. Shah" on Justia Law

Proof Research, Inc. and Carbon Six Barrels, LLC both manufacture carbon-fiber gun barrels. Proof entered the market first and obtained a trademark for the unique appearance of its barrels. When Proof found out that Carbon Six intended to begin manufacturing and selling similar-looking carbon-fiber gun barrels of its own, Proof responded with litigation. However, Proof did not file suit against Carbon Six but rather against McGowen Precision Barrels, LLC, Carbon Six’s sister company. McGowen then initiated separate proceedings to have Proof’s trademark canceled. McGowen was ultimately successful, and Proof’s trademark for its carbon-fiber gun barrels was canceled in 2021. On February 9, 2022, Carbon Six filed this lawsuit against Proof for defamation and violation of the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act stemming from Proof’s efforts to register, renew, enforce, and defend its previously valid trademark. However, Carbon Six brought its claims after the one-year prescriptive period imposed by Louisiana law had run. On Proof’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Carbon Six failed to convince the district court that any of its claims were timely. The district court also held that Carbon Six’s LUTPA claim was legally deficient.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that all actions Carbon Six alleged Proof took were discrete rather than ongoing, and each began and ended more than a year before this lawsuit was filed. Carbon Six’s LUTPA claim is therefore prescribed. The court explained even if Carbon Six could do so, Proof’s attempt to enforce a later-invalidated trademark does not violate LUTPA. View "Carbon Six Barrels v. Proof Research" on Justia Law

Defendant Officer arrested Plaintiff for telephone harassment after she witnessed Plaintiff call in false complaints about her neighbors’ supposedly loud music. The harassment charges were dropped, however. Plaintiff then sued Defendant for false arrest under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Her claim was dismissed based on qualified immunity. On appeal, Plaintiff argued the magistrate judge erred by (A) concluding Defendant reasonably believed she had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for telephone harassment and (B) determining no issue of material fact existed precluding summary judgment.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it is undisputed that, before arresting Plaintiff, Defendant called the district attorney’s office to ensure that a telephone harassment charge was proper. The court wrote that as the magistrate judge observed, nothing about the circumstances taints Defendant’s beliefs as unreasonable: (1) Plaintiff called multiple times to report loud music that day; (2) other officers found no loud music playing when they arrived; (3) the alleged noisemakers claimed they were not playing loud music; (4) no music was playing during the several hours Defendant was on the scene; and (5) while Defendant stood behind the neighbors’ fence hearing no noise, she received reports Plaintiff was still calling in complaints. Thus the court wrote that it sees no error in the magistrate judge’s conclusion that Defendant reasonably believed probable cause supported Plaintiff’s arrest. View "Perry v. Mendoza" on Justia Law

Louisiana’s Attorney General filed a request for mandamus relief seeking to vacate the district court’s hearing scheduled to begin on October 3 and require the district court to promptly convene trial on the merits of this congressional redistricting case.   The Fifth Circuit granted in part and ordered the district court to vacate the October Hearing. The court explained that redistricting based on section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. Section 10301, is complex, historically evolving, and sometimes undertaken with looming electoral deadlines. The court explained that the district court did not follow the law of the Supreme Court or the Fifth Circuit court. Its action in rushing redistricting via a court-ordered map is a clear abuse of discretion for which there is no alternative means of appeal. Issuance of the writ is justified “under the circumstances” in light of multiple precedents contradicting the district court’s procedure here. The court held that the state has no other means of relief and is not seeking to use mandamus as a substitute for appeal. Further, the court noted that if this were ordinary litigation, the court would be most unlikely to intervene in a remedial proceeding for a preliminary injunction. Redistricting litigation, however, is not ordinary litigation. The court held that the district court here forsook its duty and placed the state at an intolerable disadvantage legally and tactically. View "In Re: Jeff Landry" on Justia Law

BD LaPlace, LLC, doing business as Bayou Steel (Bayou Steel), operated a steel mill in LaPlace, Louisiana. Without giving The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN) notice, Bayou Steel terminated Plaintiffs’ employment and closed the LaPlace mill where they worked. Seeking to recover under the WARN Act, Plaintiffs initially filed a putative class action complaint against Bayou Steel in Delaware bankruptcy court. Plaintiffs dismissed that action and filed the instant class action in federal district court. Rather than suing their employer Bayou Steel, Plaintiffs sued Bayou Steel BD Holdings II, LLC and Black Diamond Capital Management, LLC(a private equity firm that advised the fund that owned BD Holdings II). Plaintiffs demanded a jury trial, which the district court denied. Defendants sought summary judgment, which the district court granted. Plaintiffs appealed, challenging both the denial of their jury demand and the summary judgment for Defendants.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that there is no right to a jury trial under the WARN Act. The court also affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to BD Holdings II. But the district court erred in granting summary judgment to BDCM because there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether BDCM exercised de facto control over Bayou Steel’s decision to close its LaPlace steel mill and order Plaintiffs’ layoffs. The court explained that if BDCM “specifically directed” the closing of the mill without proper notice, the company may be liable for Bayou Steel’s WARN Act violation even absent the other factors. View "Fleming v. Bayou Steel" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of numerous federal drug offenses related to his ownership and operation of a Texas pharmacy that was, in reality, an illegal pill mill. On appeal, Defendant’s arguments for overturning his convictions largely concern four audio recordings that, after being vetted by a government filter team, were turned over to the prosecution. Defendant contends that the recordings intruded into privileged conversations with his attorney and prejudiced his defense and that, as a result, his indictment should have been dismissed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that nothing in the government’s conduct here rises to the level of shocking or outrageous behavior that would justify dismissal under the Due Process Clause. The court wrote that before releasing the recordings, the filter team contacted Defendant’s lawyer to ask whether he intended to assert a privilege— while explaining they did not believe the recordings were privileged. When Defendant’s lawyer did not respond for over a week, the filter team did not take this silence as license to go forward. Because Defendant’s lawyer said that he would do so only after this second set of correspondence, the team moved the district court to authorize the release of the recordings. And even when the district court prematurely granted that authorization the next day, the team still did not release the recordings because they believed Defendant would take corrective action. The court found that this hardly constitutes conduct that is “outrageous” or fundamentally unfair. Accordingly, the court held that Defendant cannot demonstrate any error, much less “clear or obvious” error, in the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment. View "USA v. Carr" on Justia Law

Plaintiff pled guilty to two counts of first-degree murder in 2012 and received a life sentence at the Louisiana State Penitentiary (“LSP”). Plaintiff claims Defendants should be personally liable under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for his conditions of confinement from August 2012 to June 2017, which he alleges violated the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments. On remand, the district court directed the parties to file supplemental memoranda addressing qualified immunity and prescription and referred the matter to a magistrate judge. The magistrate judge recommended dismissal for failure to state a claim. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and dismissed Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that as to the Fourteenth Amendment, the magistrate judge correctly stated that restrictive confinement, like Plaintiff’s grounds for a due process claim, only if it “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Applying that standard, the judge properly considered the severity and duration of the confinement. Further, as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim, the magistrate judge correctly stated that such a claim requires showing both that a prisoner faces conditions so dire as to deprive him of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” and that the responsible prison officials were “deliberately indifferent” to the inmate’s health or safety. Finally, the court wrote that confinement to a cell for twenty-three hours per day did not violate the Eight Amendment, where the inmate nonetheless could converse with other inmates, receive visitors, and engage in some form of exercise or other recreation. View "LaVergne v. Stutes" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon. On appeal, he argued that a sentencing enhancement that requires certain prior convictions be for offenses committed on different occasions could not be applied unless the facts supporting it were charged in the indictment and admitted by the accused or proved to a jury. He also argued that his prior convictions did not qualify for the enhancement.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant’s argument that the indictment must allege, and evidence at trial must prove, the facts of the commission of qualifying offenses on different occasions has long been rejected by the Fifth Circuit. Moreover, the court wrote that two of Defendant’s prior convictions were for the Texas offense of burglary of a building. It has been settled that convictions for Texas burglary qualify as violent felonies under the ACCA. View "USA v. Kerstetter" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a black female educator and school administrator who works for the Brookhaven School District (the “School District”). Plaintiff sought to attend the Mississippi School Board Association Prospective Superintendent’s Leadership Academy, a training program for prospective superintendents. According to Plaintiff, the School District “established a precedent of paying for every employee’s fees after the employee was accepted to attend the program.” Plaintiff asked the Deputy Superintendent, if the School District would pay for her to attend the Leadership Academy. Once the program accepted Plaintiff, the School District’s Superintendent reneged and refused to pay for her to attend at that time. But Plaintiff’s spot was for the upcoming class, so she paid the fees herself. Plaintiff sued, alleging that the School District violated Title VII and 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 by refusing to pay for her to attend the Leadership Academy but agreeing to pay for similarly situated white males to attend. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).   The Fifth Circuit reversed. The court held that Plaintiff set forth a plausible Title VII claim under Rule 12 because plausibly alleged facts that satisfy both adverse employment action prongs and the adverse employment action element was the only element in dispute. The court explained, taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true—that the School District (1) agreed to pay for similarly situated white males’ fees to attend the Leadership Academy; (2) promised to pay her fees (a promise she relied on); and (3) reneged on that promise—Plaintiff plausibly stated a Title VII disparate treatment claim. View "Harrison v. Brookhaven Sch Dist" on Justia Law