Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a rap artist as well as a convicted felon, owned a company that hired a videographer to film Defendant throughout his life for eventual use in a music video. One day, an anonymous 911 caller reported several men with “Uzis” and other guns walking down a residential street in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Police arrived, detained Defendant, the videographer, and others. Police seized a memory card from the videographer, as well as several firearms from the nearby area. There was a video on the memory card of Defendant holding a firearm.The district court reasoned that Gaulden had a protectable Fourth Amendment interest in the videos on the memory card, although he lacked a Fourth Amendment interest in the memory card itself. The court also found the warrant fatally defective. Accordingly, the court suppressed the footage of Defendant in possession of the firearms.The Fifth Circuit reversed. Defendant's right to Fourth Amendment protection turns on whether he has a constitutionally protected property interest or a judicially conferred reasonable expectation of privacy in the place or thing searched or seized. To the extent Defendant can have a distinct property interest in the video footage, he never proved that he acquired such a right. Defendant himself did not testify and there was no written contract giving Defendant ownership of the video footage. And Defendant's company, not Defendant himself, hired the videographer. Thus, Defendant did not have an established property interest in the footage.The court also held that Defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the footage. View "USA v. Gaulden" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked as a longshoreman as early as 1998 and worked regularly for Cooper from 2008 through the date of his injury on June 22, 2018, never going more than a week and a half without working. He performed various jobs including operating a front-end loader and track hoe, flagging cranes, and loading barges. Employer classified Plaintiff as a non-assigned employee, meaning he was not assigned to a specific vessel. Employer has other employees who are assigned to vessels.Plaintiff was hurt when he fell to the deck of a ship he was working on. He filed suit against Employer in federal district court in November 2020, alleging that he was a seaman and a member of the crew, and bringing claims of Jones Act negligence, failure to pay maintenance and cure, and unseaworthiness. In the alternative, Plaintiff alleged that if he was not a seaman and was covered by the LHWCA.The District Court found Plaintiff failed to cite evidence that showed a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he was a seaman and, alternatively, as to vessel negligence.The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that Plaintiff did not have a connection to the ship he was working on at the time he was injured, and that he could not establish vessel negligence. View "Johnson v. Cooper T. Smith Stevedoring" on Justia Law

Defendants Cpl. John Lee and Cpl. Derek Barker appealed the district court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment seeking qualified immunity from Plaintiffs’ unlawful entry and excessive force claims. The Fifth Circuit unanimously concluded that Lee and Barker are not entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiffs' unlawful entry claims. However, the court held that Lee is entitled to qualified immunity for any force employed from the moment he entered Plaintiffs' house. The court explained that, including the significant fact that the dog was deployed as a wholly duplicative means of detention, no precedent establishes under analogous circumstances how long a bite is too long. Thus, a jury could not find that every reasonable officer would have known that a K9-trained dog had to be released more quickly. Even if Officer Lee mistakenly permitted Dice to bite Plaintiff for a minute, qualified immunity shields him from suit as well as liability. View "Smith v. Lee" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Weyerhaeuser NR Company (“NR”) entered into a manufacturing agreement with Simsboro Coating Services, LLC (“Simsboro”). That agreement required Simsboro to acquire commercial general liability insurance, which it obtained from Defendants-Appellees Burlington Insurance Company (“BIC”) and Evanston Insurance Company (“EIC”). It further required that “Weyerhaeuser and its Subsidiaries” be named as additional insureds. However, NR’s parent company, Weyerhaeuser Company (“W. Co.”), was never added to the insurance policies that Simsboro obtained from EIC and BIC. This insurance coverage dispute arose after several personal injury lawsuits were filed against Simsboro and W. Co. in state court. After those lawsuits settled, W. Co. and NR sued BIC and EIC, demanding that they defend and indemnify W. Co. and NR. EIC and BIC then filed Rule 12(b)(6) motions, which were granted by the district court.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Weyerhaeuser’s breach of contract claims. The court concluded that Defendants had no duty to defend or indemnify W. Co. and NR as additional insureds or as third-party beneficiaries to the CGL Policies or Excess Policy. The court explained that it was satisfied that BIC and EIC had no duty to defend W. Co. and NR as thirdparty beneficiaries. The indemnification inquiry, however, is fact intensive and may incorporate extrinsic evidence. The district court explained that because NR is listed on the CGL Policies as an additional insured and the CGL Policies might cover Simsboro’s indemnification obligation arising from the Agreement, NR might be a third-party beneficiary of the policies with respect to indemnification. View "Weyerhaeuser v. Burlington Insurance" on Justia Law

A disabled public school student was sexually assaulted by another student with known violent tendencies. Despite knowing of this attack, the victim’s teachers let both her and her aggressor wander the school unsupervised, and she was again assaulted by the very same student. The victim’s mother sued the school district under Title IX and various school officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. In her Section 1983 claim against the school officials, she alleged liability under the so-called “state-created danger” doctrine. The district court denied that motion and stayed proceedings on the Title IX claim pending this interlocutory appeal of the Section 1983 ruling.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the Section 1983 claim. The court explained that the Circuit has never adopted a state-created danger exception to the sweeping “no duty to protect” rule. And a never-established right cannot be a clearly established one. As for whether to adopt the state-created danger theory of constitutional liability moving forward, the court was reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process for two reasons: (1) the Supreme Court’s recent forceful pronouncements signaling unease with implied rights not deeply rooted in our Nation’s history and tradition; and (2) the absence of rigorous panel briefing that grapples painstakingly with how such a cause of action would work in terms of its practical contours and application, vital details on which the court’s sister circuits disagree. Rather than break new ground, the court ruled instead on a narrower ground, one that follows the court’s unbroken precedent. View "Fisher v. Moore" on Justia Law

Appellee won a multi-million-dollar arbitration award (the “Award”) against his former attorney and son-in-law, Appellant. Appellant soon filed for bankruptcy and sought to discharge the amounts awarded against him. Appellee objected under 11 U.S.C. Section 523(a) (“Exceptions to Discharge”) and sought summary judgment, arguing that (i) the Award is entitled to preclusive effect based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel and (ii) the Award found that all the elements of Section 523(a) were met. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment with respect to the bulk of the Award. The district court affirmed, and Appellant appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Appellant argued that the court should recognize a fourth requirement that has no basis in our precedent, to the effect that collateral estoppel is inappropriate where an arbitration award contains a “disclaimer” like the one in the Award. The court reasoned that it need not decide whether a “disclaimer” could ever render collateral estoppel inappropriate. The court held merely that this “disclaimer” does not do so. Further, the court wrote that at no place in his 53-page, single-spaced award does the arbitrator provide an “express instruction” to future tribunals not to grant the Award preclusive effect. View "Amberson v. McAllen" on Justia Law

Three installers of window blinds sued FS Blinds, L.L.C., the company for which they worked. The district court granted summary judgment to FS Blinds, determining that Plaintiffs had not met their prima facie burden to show they worked overtime. The court dismissed the case, and Plaintiffs appealed.   The Fifth Circuit reversed. The court held that Plaintiffs have met the lenient standard under Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 686–88 (1946), and therefore survive summary judgment, at least as to whether, if employees, Plaintiffs worked overtime. The court declined to reach whether Plaintiffs were employees or independent contractors and instead remand for the district court to consider that question anew. The court explained that, based on the record, Plaintiffs have presented enough to satisfy their “lenient” prima facie burden under Mt. Clemens. This is so even though Plaintiffs’ testimony offers only an estimated average of hours worked. In addition to their testimony, though, Plaintiffs offered supporting work orders and some corroborating testimony from FS Blinds. The court wrote that all told, this record evidence hurdles Plaintiffs’ Mt. Clemens burden. View "Flores v. FS Blinds" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s summary judgment of his claims against Safeco Insurance Company of Indiana (“Safeco”) for violating Section 541 and Section 542 of the Texas Insurance Code.   The Fifth Circuit explained that in 2017, the Texas legislature amended Section 542, raising an important issue of Texas insurance law as to which there is no controlling Texas Supreme Court authority, and the authority from the intermediate state appellate courts provides insufficient guidance. Thus, the court certified the following question of state law to the Supreme Court of Texas: In an action under Chapter 542A of the Texas Prompt Payment of Claims Act, does an insurer’s payment of the full appraisal award plus any possible statutory interest preclude recovery of attorney’s fees? View "Rodriguez v. Safeco" on Justia Law

A Listeria outbreak led to a shutdown of Blue Bell factories and a nationwide recall of its products. Consequently, Blue Bell suffered a substantial financial loss. A shareholder of Blue Bell Creameries brought a derivative action against Blue Bell’s directors and officers, alleging a breach of fiduciary duties. The shareholder, on behalf of Blue Bell, alleged that Blue Bell’s officers and directors breached their fiduciary duties of care and loyalty by failing “to comply with regulations and establish controls.” The Blue Bell Defendants appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Discover Property & Casualty Insurance Company and the Travelers Indemnity Company of Connecticut.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Here, only the duty to defend is at issue because the parties have stipulated that “If the district court finds there is no duty to defend, it may also find there is no duty to indemnify, but otherwise the duty to indemnify will not be a subject of the Parties’ motions.” Accordingly, the court wrote that it is confined by Texas’s “eight-corners rule,” which directs courts to determine an insurer’s duty to defend based on: (1) the pleading against the insured in the underlying litigation and (2) the terms of the insurance policy. The court explained that while it disagrees with the district court’s determination as to whether the directors and officers are “insureds” in relation to the shareholder lawsuit, it agreed with its determination that the complaint in the shareholder lawsuit does not allege any “occurrence” or seek “damages because of bodily injury.” Each issue is independently sufficient for affirmance. View "Discover Property Cslty v. Blue Bell" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to conspiring to transport and transporting undocumented immigrants resulting in serious bodily injury and death. He appealed a two-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. Section 2L1.1(b)(8)(A) for involuntarily detaining a migrant through threat or coercion.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here Defendant did not continue to drive in order to prevent L.G.G.G. from escaping—he continued to drive in order to avoid apprehension. That Defendant’s continued driving was not for the purpose of detaining L.G.G.G. is buttressed by his prior instruction to L.G.G.G. and A.M.A. to exit the vehicle and run should they be pulled over by law enforcement. L.G.G.G. was involuntarily detained, but he was not involuntarily detained through threat or coercion. The district court erred by applying this enhancement to Defendant’s conduct. However, the court wrote that Defendant failed to show that the error was plain. Because Defendant’s claim of plain error failed the second prong of the relevant text, the court declined to examine the remaining prongs. View "USA v. Buendia" on Justia Law