Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of identity theft and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The district court found the calculated guidelines range of 15 to 21 months to be “woefully unreasonable” and varied upwards to a total of 72 months of imprisonment, which consisted of a sentence of 36 months for the identity theft offense and a concurrent sentence of 72 months for the firearm offense. On appeal, Defendant challenged only the substantive reasonableness of the 72-month sentence for the firearm offense.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Defendant has not shown that the district court abused its discretion. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by giving significant weight to Defendant’s prior marijuana importation offense, which is the predicate offense for his firearm conviction, and to the statements of the victim of the identity theft. Finally, Defendant has not shown that the district court made a clear error of judgment in balancing the sentencing factors of Section 3553(a), and the court declined to reweigh those factors. View "USA v. Cortez-Balderas" on Justia Law

Bouchard Transportation Company and its affiliates (collectively “Bouchard”)—debtors in bankruptcy—prepared to sell some of their assets at an auction. Fearing the auction would go poorly, Bouchard solicited a “stalking horse bidder” to start the auction and set a floor price. In exchange, Bouchard agreed to pay the stalking horse bidder a $3.3 million break-up fee and to reimburse expenses up to $1.5 million. The question is whether those payments were a permissible use of estate funds. As the bankruptcy and district courts found, the stalking horse payments were lawful under both applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code—they provided an actual benefit to the estate and were issued in the reasonable exercise of business judgment.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment affirming the bankruptcy court’s order that Bouchard pay Hartree a break-up fee and a capped expense reimbursement. The court explained that Bouchard’s payment to the stalking horse bidder is justified under either the stringent administrative-expense standard or the more relaxed business judgment rule. The court further wrote that there is “no basis to conclude that the board did not thoroughly review the presentation and make a well-reasoned, careful decision to designate Hartree as the stalking-horse bidder.” In signing the Hartree purchase agreement, Bouchard acted well within the bounds of reasonable business judgment. Section 363(b) does not require more. View "Official Committee v. Hartree" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted a doctor and two pharmacists (collectively, “Appellants” or “Defendants”) for roles in a “pill-mill” operation. Prosecutors charged Appellants with three drug-distribution conspiracies that each spanned from 2011 to 2020. The pharmacists, who both owned pharmacies, were also charged with possession with intent to distribute controlled substances. At trial, the Government offered extensive evidence, including text messages, wiretaps, surveillance, cooperator testimony, and records from Defendants’ businesses and homes. The jury found Defendants guilty on all counts. The district court sentenced the doctor and one of the pharmacists to 240 months imprisonment and the other pharmacist to 151 months. Defendants timely appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that there is sufficient evidence for a jury to draw reasonable inferences to support Appellants’ convictions. The pharmacist and doctor failed to make the showings necessary to warrant plain error reversal. The pharmacist’s refusal to be represented by her retained attorney amounted to a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel. The pharmacist failed to show the necessary prejudice for her challenges to the denial of a continuance, as well as permitting a DEA agent to authenticate her signature as a lay witness. The Government’s closing argument was consistent with the evidence. The record is not sufficiently developed to evaluate the doctor’s IAC claim. View "USA v. Capistrano" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. He moved to suppress the evidence of the weapon, claiming that the gun was the fruit of an unlawful seizure because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate a “Terry stop.” The district court orally denied the motion to suppress after a live hearing based on testimony from the officer and the tipster. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial. After the court entered a judgment of conviction, Defendant timely appealed.The Fifth Circuit concluded that the police had reasonable suspicion to seize Defendant and thus lawfully obtained the incriminating evidence from his car. The court further affirmed the judgment of conviction. The court explained that the contemporaneous tip, the visual details that the officer confirmed, the high-crime area, and Defendant’s evasive response to police presence was enough to give an officer articulable suspicion that crime was occurring (or was about to occur). To conclude otherwise would raise the bar of reasonable suspicion and hamper law enforcement from engaging in essential investigatory actions. View "USA v. Wright" on Justia Law

The Jefferson Parish School Board (JPSB) separately suspended two students for individually having a BB gun visible during virtual school. Each student’s family sued the school board, in part seeking a declaration that the school board’s virtual learning disciplinary policy is unconstitutional. Louisiana intervened, agreeing with the families on the constitutionality of JPSB’s policy and separately challenging JPSB’s disciplinary actions as ultra vires. JPSB settled with the families, ending the private suits. Louisiana wants to continue the case, citing its broad interest in compliance with its laws. The question before us is whether Louisiana has standing to do so.   The Fifth Circuit concluded that Louisiana does not have Article III standing and remanded the case to the district court to send back to the capable Louisiana state courts. The court explained that this case lies outside the limits of Article III standing. States undoubtedly have an interest in enforcing their laws. But when it comes to federal courts, Louisiana must claim an injury to a traditional, sovereign interest to invoke Article III jurisdiction. The two are distinctly dissimilar. Louisiana fails to point to “any precedent, history, or tradition,” establishing that its interest in compliance with its laws is the equivalent of an Article III sovereign interest in maintaining its right to govern in the face of competing authority. The state similarly fails to establish an injury to an established quasi-sovereign interest sufficient to show parens patriae standing. Louisiana’s claim of injury to a proprietary interest also falls short. View "LA State v. Jefferson Parish Sch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was repeatedly tased while he was a pretrial detainee at the McLennan County jail in Waco, Texas. Plaintiff insists that he did nothing to warrant the use of force—that he was neither threatening nor resisting the officer who tased him. The principal question on appeal is whether Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment on his ensuing civil rights claims.   The Fifth Circuit reversed summary judgment on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against Defendant and remanded that claim to the district court for trial. The court reversed and remanded the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Plaintiff’s policy and practice claims to afford Plaintiff the opportunity to discover evidence relevant to those claims. But the court affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim. The court denied the motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that a rational jury could find that Defendant’s decision to tase Plaintiff was not justified by any exigency, in which case Defendant’s qualified immunity defense would not shield him from liability because the court’s precedents clearly establish that resort to force in such circumstances is unconstitutional.   Further, the court wrote that it was inappropriate for the court to then dismiss Plaintiff’s policy and practice claims on the ground that Plaintiff failed to present “adequate summary judgment evidence of any official or unofficial policy,” depriving him of his rights. If a jury finds, as it could, that Defendant tased a non-threatening, compliant inmate, then he is not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Boyd v. McNamara" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to conspiring to possess cocaine with intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(B). Defendant had two prior drug convictions for possessing amphetamine with intent to distribute it and conspiring to possess methamphetamine with intent to manufacture and distribute it. Because these and the instant offense were classified as controlled substance offenses, Defendant was deemed a career offender under § 4B1.1. Defendant appealed his career-offender designation.On appeal, Defendant argued that conspiracies cannot qualify as controlled substance offenses because the guideline definition excludes inchoate crimes. A panel rejected his argument and then the Fifth Circuit granted en banc review.The en banc court affirmed, finding that under Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993), a guideline comment is "authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline," neither of which applied here. In so holding, the Fifth Circuit joined the First, Second, Fourth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits. View "USA v. Vargas" on Justia Law

Almost a decade ago, Huntsville, Plaintiff, a Texas firefighter, had gallbladder surgery. It did not go well, and ever since, Plaintiff has needed medication and treatment for complications. And for years, both the City and its fire department accommodated him. But in 2016, not long after his surgery, the City caught Plaintiff asking a fellow employee for his leftover prescription painkillers. Because such a request violated city policy, Huntsville placed Plaintiff on probation and warned that future violations could lead to his termination. The City placed Plaintiff on administrative leave and investigated. Two weeks later, it fired him. Plaintiff sued, claiming retaliation under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the ADEA, and discrimination under the ADA. Eventually, and over Plaintiff’s request for a Rule 56(d) continuance, the district court granted summary judgment to the City on all claims. January appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that beyond temporal proximity, Plaintiff produced no evidence that Lunsford’s reasoning concerning his intoxication was false (such that he was not actually intoxicated at the time) or pretextual (such that Plaintiff’s protected activities were the real reason for his firing). The court explained that it has said temporal proximity isn’t enough. Nothing Plaintiff provides “makes the inferential leap to [retaliation] a rational one.” Because he failed to rebut this proffered justification for his termination, summary judgment was proper. View "January v. City of Huntsville" on Justia Law

Plaintiff received his third citation for Driving While Intoxicated (“DWI”). As a term of his probation, Plaintiff, an alcoholic, was required to attend weekly substance abuse classes. Some of these classes conflicted with shifts that Plaintiff was scheduled to work as an operator at a plant owned by Defendant-Appellee La Grange Acquisitions, L.P. Plaintiff informed his supervisors that he was an alcoholic and that several of the court-ordered substance abuse classes would conflict with his scheduled shifts. When Plaintiff was unable to find coverage for these shifts, La Grange, citing this scheduling conflict, terminated Plaintiff. After exhausting his administrative remedies, Plaintiff sued La Grange under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), for intentional discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of La Grange on all three claims. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the evidence does not create a triable issue of fact as to whether the given reason for his termination was pretextual, that is, “false or unworthy of credence.” Nothing in the record supports such a finding. There is no dispute that, while La Grange may have been able to do more to find coverage for the shifts Plaintiff needed to miss, La Grange did attempt to coordinate coverage for him and, while partially successful, eventually, these efforts failed. It was only at this point when some of Plaintiff’s shifts were left uncovered, that La Grange dismissed Plaintiff. Given this context, no reasonable jury could find that La Grange’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason—the shift conflict—for Plaintiff’s suspension and termination was pretext for discrimination. View "Mueck v. La Grange Acquisitions" on Justia Law

The PredictIt Market is an online marketplace that lets people trade on the predicted outcomes of political events. Essentially, it is a futures market for politics. In 2014, a division within the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) issued PredictIt a “no-action letter,” effectively allowing it to operate without registering under federal law. But, in 2022, the division rescinded the no-action letter, accusing PredictIt of violating the letter’s terms but without explaining how. It also ordered all outstanding PredictIt contracts to be closed in fewer than six months. Various parties who participate in PredictIt (collectively, “Appellants”) challenged the no-action letter’s rescission in federal district court and moved for a preliminary injunction. The district court has not ruled on that motion, though, despite PredictIt’s looming shutdown. Appellants sought review, treating the district court’s inaction as effectively denying a preliminary injunction.   The Fifth Circuit concluded that a preliminary injunction was warranted because the CFTC’s rescission of the no-action letter was likely arbitrary and capricious. So, the court remanded for the district court to enter a preliminary injunction while it considers Appellants’ challenge to the CFTC’s actions. The court explained that the DMO’s withdrawal of no-action relief constitutes final agency action. Further, the decision to rescind a no-action letter is not “committed to agency discretion by law.” The court concluded that the revocation of the no-action letter was likely arbitrary and capricious because the agency gave no reasons for it. And the agency’s attempts to retroactively justify the revocation after oral argument—and in the face of our injunction—only underscore why Appellants are likely to prevail. View "Clarke v. CFTR" on Justia Law