Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After pleading guilty to one count of receiving child pornography, Defendant was sentenced to a 168–month term of imprisonment followed by a 15–year term of supervised release. During Defendant’s term of supervised release, the district court modified a number of the special conditions imposed. Defendant appealed, challenging the district court’s jurisdiction to modify his supervised release conditions and contesting the substantive reasonableness of the conditions imposed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court has jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. Section 3583(e)(2) to modify conditions of supervised release and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning these conditions. The court explained that a district court cannot modify an unlawful condition under Section 3583(e)(2) if the illegality of that condition is the basis for modification, regardless of whether it was the defendant or government who brought the motion challenging the conditions. In the case at hand, however, Defendant’s appeal fails because the government did not move for modification solely on the basis of illegality, and the district court did not premise its ruling on the illegality of the special condition.   Next, Defendant contended that even if the district court’s ruling was not based on the illegality of a condition, the district court still lacked authority to modify his conditions of supervised release because there was not a “change in circumstance” that precipitated the modification nor was there a “compelling cause” for the modification. The court explained that it has found no cases requiring a “change in circumstance” or “compelling cause” to modify a condition of supervised release. View "USA v. Caillier" on Justia Law

The issue before the court is whether Plaintiff, an inmate incarcerated in Gatesville, Texas, has a right to be heard before the prison decides whether to approve or deny her request to transfer money from her inmate trust account to an outside bank account. The district court answered no and granted summary judgment to the Appellees.   The Fifth Circuit vacated and reversed. The court wrote that Plaintiff provided evidence that her procedural due process rights were violated, which precludes summary judgment. The court explained that Plaintiff’s property interests were undoubtedly at stake, and, considering the evidence that was before the district court, it cannot be said as a matter of law that the procedures were adequate, there were alternative safeguards, or that the administrative burden would be too great. It is up to a factfinder to determine whether Plaintiff can prove her case. Accordingly, the court held that the district court erred in not vacating the judgment and granting Plaintiff leave to amend her pleadings. View "Calhoun v. Collier" on Justia Law

Defendant, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was charged with importation of a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section 952(a). Her lawyer told her that if she pleaded guilty, it was “very likely” that she would be deported. She nonetheless entered the plea. Defendant then learned that her offense did not just possibly make her deportable, it automatically did so. She then moved to withdraw her plea, alleging that if she had known the full scope of the immigration consequences of her plea, she would not have entered it. The district court denied Defendant’s motion and sentenced her. Defendant appealed. At issue is whether a lawyer’s warning of “very likely” deportation satisfies the right to effective assistance of counsel.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that when defense counsel tells an alien client that a conviction will have serious immigration consequences, including “very likely” deportation, that defendant has received sufficient advice to make an informed plea decision, as required by the Sixth Amendment. The court explained that there is some ambiguity about what specific words Defendant’s lawyer used when explaining to her the immigration consequences of the plea. But the district court’s factual finding—which is reviewed only for clear error—suggests the following bottom line: Defendant’s lawyer put her on notice of the risk of serious immigration consequences, including deportation. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to withdraw her plea. View "USA v. Armendariz" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought an action against Defendants-Appellees Holy Cross College, Inc. and Congregation of Holy Cross Moreau Province, Inc. (collectively, “Holy Cross”) in the district court. Plaintiff alleged that he suffered from sexual abuse carried out by Holy Cross teacher on two separate occasions while attending summer camp at Holy Cross as a 10- or 11-year-old boy in either 1968 or 1969. Plaintiff asserted that Holy Cross is liable for the teacher’s conduct under the doctrine of respondeat superior. At the time of the alleged abuse, such an offense was subject to a one-year liberative prescriptive period. Plaintiff invoked the Revival Provision as his basis to bring a suit. The district court granted Holy Cross’s motion and dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint.   The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded. The court explained that while the appeal was pending, the Louisiana Supreme Court issued its decision in T.S v. Congregation of Holy Cross Southern Province, Inc., 2023 WL 4195778. The court wrote that with the benefit of the T.S. decision, the court is now certain as to how this case should be resolved under Louisiana law. As previously noted, the facts of both cases are nearly identical. Therefore, it is apparent that the district court should not have ruled on the Revival Provision’s constitutionality. Instead, it is now clear that the Revival Provision’s wording makes it inapplicable to Plaintiff’s claims. Accordingly, his complaint should be dismissed for that sole reason. The court directed that on remand, the district court may consider whether Plaintiff should be provided with leave to amend his complaint. View "Lousteau v. Holy Cross College" on Justia Law

A school resource officer tased a special-needs student who physically struggled with school staff while attempting to leave school following a violent episode. The student’s mother sued the officer and the school district, bringing constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and disability discrimination claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act.  The district court granted summary judgment to the officer and school district.   The Fifth Circuit concluded, based on recent Supreme Court precedent, that the district court incorrectly subjected the disability discrimination claims to administrative exhaustion. On the merits, however, the district court correctly granted summary judgment to the officer and school district. The court explained that the officer’s use of his taser in this situation was poor judgment, especially after Plaintiff’s son had ceased struggling. However, the court explained that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA are not the proper vehicles for remedying “all unreasonable, inappropriate, unprofessional, and/or unduly harsh conduct by public agents. View "W. v. Paley" on Justia Law

Whirlpool filed a complaint against Shenzhen Sanlida Electrical Technology Co., Ltd. and Shenzhen Avoga Technology Co., Ltd. (collectively, “Shenzhen”) asserting federal and state law claims for trademark and trade dress infringement along with a motion for a preliminary injunction to stop the sale of the allegedly infringing mixers. The district court granted the injunction. In addition to its appeal, Shenzhen sought an emergency stay pending appeal. After granting an initial administrative stay, the Fifth Circuit denied that motion. Then, after the Federal Circuit heard the merits of the case, it affirmed the district court.The Fifth Circuit found the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the harms weighed in favor of Whirlpool. View "Whirlpool v. Shenzhen Sanlida" on Justia Law

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has asserted that it has authority under the Atomic Energy Act to license temporary, away from reactor storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel. Based on that claim of authority, the Commission issued a license for Interim Storage Partners, LLC, to operate a temporary storage facility on the Permian Basin.Fasken Land and Minerals, Ltd., and Permian Basin Land and Royalty Owners (“PBLRO”) petitioned for review of the license. As did the State of Texas, arguing that the Atomic Energy Act doesn’t confer authority on the Commission to license such a facility.The Fifth Circuit granted Texas’ petition for review and vacated the license, finding that the Atomic Energy Act does not confer on the Commission the broad authority it claims to issue licenses for private parties to store spent nuclear fuel away from the reactor. And the Nuclear Waste Policy Act establishes a comprehensive statutory scheme for dealing with nuclear waste generated from commercial nuclear power generation, thereby foreclosing the Commission’s claim of authority. View "State of Texas v. NRC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are two women, Elwood Staffing Services, Inc., placed at a job site working for Schlumberger, Ltd. A senior coworker at their site was a lesbian who sexually assaulted one of the women and harassed the other. Plaintiff submitted a complaint about sexual harassment, and Schlumberger terminated her. The other Plaintiff later resigned. Together, the women filed suit in federal court alleging violations of Title VII. The district court entered a mixed summary judgment order, finding the women had viable claims against Schlumberger but releasing Elwood from the suit. Schlumberger subsequently settled with Plaintiffs at mediation. The women challenged the order to the extent it granted summary judgment in Elwood’s favor on appeal.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff does not provide evidence that Elwood knew what was happening to her in the gun shop. She did not report the discrimination and abuse she experienced to Elwood. And a report would not have been and was not a wasted action. Nor does she provide evidence that Elwood should have linked the other Plaintiff’s complaints to other employees. At best, she has shown that Elwood had good reason to ask Schlumberger some questions, which, of course, it did. But that does not meet the applicable knowledge element in her cause of action. The court concluded that Elwood did not have actual or constructive knowledge of the hostile work environment experienced by Plaintiff. The court concluded that Plaintiffs sought to hold the wrong party liable for their injuries. They cannot establish why Elwood should be held responsible for the misconduct of Schlumberger’s employees. View "Arredondo v. Elwood Staffing Svc" on Justia Law

Plaintiff y filed suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights when he was arrested as a terrorist for a post on Facebook. The district court granted Detective Randall Iles and Sheriff Mark Wood’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds and dismissed Bailey’s claims with prejudice.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment. The court held that Plaintiff’s post was constitutionally protected speech and that the grant of summary judgment was improper. The court explained that regardless of the unnamed deputy’s comment, Iles admitted that he arrested Plaintiff at least in part because of the content of his Facebook post, rather than for some other conduct, i.e. Iles admitted that the arrest was at least “substantially motivated” by Plaintiff’s speech. Further, there is t no dispute as to the second element, as Plaintiff’s speech was chilled when he deleted his Facebook post in response to the arrest. Thus, when Iles arrested Plaintiff, he violated Plaintiff’s clearly established First Amendment right to engage in speech even when some listeners consider the speech offensive, upsetting, immature, in poor taste, or even dangerous. View "Bailey v. Iles" on Justia Law

Princeton Excess and Surplus Lines Insurance Company (PESLIC) filed this declaratory judgment action. PESLIC issued two commercial liability insurance policies to the Clubs covering the time period relevant to the Models’ claims: Number 1RA3GL0000179–01, with a policy period of November 9, 2015, to November 9, 2016 (the 01 Policy); and Number 1RA3GL0000179–02, with a policy period of November 9, 2016, to November 9, 2017 (the 02 Policy). The policies have identical coverage provisions but contain slightly different exclusions. The parties dispute whether this exclusion renders illusory the Personal and Advertising Injury coverage provided in the 02 Policy. If it does not, then the Clubs have no coverage applicable to the Models’ claims; if it does, then they have coverage, as the district court held.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment ruling. The court held PESLIC does not have a duty to defend or indemnify the Clubs in the underlying lawsuit because neither the 01 Policy nor the 02 Policy provides coverage for the claims alleged by the Models. The court explained that the text of the 02 Policy is not ambiguous, and Texas law “presumes that the party knows and accepts the contract terms.” Those terms disclose that the policy’s Personal and Advertising Injury coverage comprises a single category of coverage and further that the Exhibition and Related Marketing Exclusion removes much but by no means all, of that coverage. The 02 Policy is, therefore, not illusory, and the exclusion must be enforced, constraining the court to conclude there is no coverage for the Models’ underlying claims under the 02 Policy. View "Princeton Excess v. AHD Houston" on Justia Law