Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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Appellee attempted to use an “inversion table” located at an Anytime Fitness franchise. The equipment allegedly failed, and Appellee suffered neuromuscular injuries. Appellee filed a personal injury suit in Louisiana court against the franchise owner, Thornhill Brothers Fitness, LLC (“Thornhill”). An amended complaint named an additional defendant, franchisor Anytime Fitness, LLC (“Anytime”). Thornhill agreed to assign all rights it had “against Anytime Fitness LLC” to the Appellees, including any rights arising from “the indemnity agreement contained in the Franchise Agreement” between Thornhill and its franchise parent, Anytime. Anytime then protested in the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court vacated its prior order and allowed Anytime a hearing. But in July 2022, the bankruptcy court entered a new order ratifying the actions it took originally. Anytime appealed that July 2022 order and the district court affirmed.  At issue on appeal is whether 11 U.S.C. Section 365(f) or any other portion of Title 11, authorizes a bankruptcy court’s approval of a debtor’s partial assignment of an executory contract.   The Fifth Circuit wrote that it does not and reversed the bankruptcy court’s contrary order and remanded. The court explained that it does not construe any other provision of the Code to permit circumvention of the court’s interpretation of Section 365(f). It’s true that the Code contains various catch-all provisions. But those catch-alls do not create substantive powers not committed to the bankruptcy court by some other section. The court wrote that since the bankruptcy court order at issue here does not satisfy Section 365, it does not matter whether it satisfied Jackson Brewing. View "Anytime Fitness v. Thornhill Brothers" on Justia Law

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Defendant was charged with conspiracy to obstruct commerce by robbery, obstruction of commerce by robbery, and using, carrying, brandishing, and discharging firearms during and in relation to a crime of violence, causing death. Defendant was charged alongside several others. The district court severed the trial of the then-capital defendants. Defendant’s first trial, in July 2021, ended in a mistrial after the jury could not reach a verdict. At his retrial in March 2022, a jury convicted Defendant of each of the three counts charged. Defendant appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it rejected Defendant’s assertion that his substantial rights were affected “because the government’s case was almost entirely premised on DNA evidence.” The court explained that the government also presented eyewitness testimony that, on the morning of the robbery, Defendant helped load a bag of firearms into the vehicle used in the robbery, and the government properly introduced a statement from a non-testifying co-defendant that Defendant was one of the shooters who emerged from the vehicle. Further, the court wrote that Defendant’s vague assertion does not establish that “there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different but for the error.” View "USA v. Johnson" on Justia Law

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Defendant State of Louisiana, ex rel. Jeff Landry (“the State”) sought to dissolve a consent decree that pertains to the method of selecting justices for the Louisiana Supreme Court. The State attempted to dissolve the consent judgment under the first and third clauses of Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The State contended that the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged because the State has substantially complied with the decree for more than thirty years and the decree was intended to terminate at a defined milestone. The State further contended that it is no longer equitable to enforce the consent judgment prospectively because of widespread malapportionment in Louisiana’s supreme court election districts. The district court denied the State’s motion to dissolve.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the dissolution motion, as the State has failed to meet its evidentiary burdens under both the first and third clauses of Rule 60(b)(5). The court explained that the State did not meet the evidentiary burden associated with Rufo’s first prong, which requires a showing of changed factual or legal circumstances that warrant reexamination of a consent decree. The State only makes very general claims about malapportionment and asserts that “new policy concerns” have arisen which satisfy Rufo. But the State offers almost no evidentiary support for this argument. Further, the court wrote that the State’s argument that continued enforcement of the Consent Judgment is detrimental to the public interest is unavailing. View "Chisom v. State of Louisiana" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, a Louisiana prisoner, sued the Louisiana Board of Pardons and Parole (“Parole Board”), seeking to have his parole reinstated on the grounds that its rescission just prior to its effective date violated his due process rights. The district court agreed with Plaintiff and ordered his release on parole within 30 days. On appeal, the Parole Board’s arguments include that there is no constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained the State bases its argument on the premise that the Parole Board has unfettered discretion in all aspects of parole and release decisions. In support of its position, the State relied on an unpublished opinion, Burton v. Bd. of Parole. The court wrote that the opinion relies on Sinclair for its analysis, which the court has already rejected as inapplicable in this case. The court concluded the same now with regard to Burton because, there, the Louisiana First Circuit was considering an appeal from a prisoner’s denial of parole. The opinion discusses “expectancy of release,” while the question here is whether there are limits on the Parole Board to rescind parole after its formal grant but before the effective date of release. The court agreed and explained that Plaintiff’s parole was ostensibly rescinded because of an alleged problem with notice to a victim. He was notified of this reason on May 1, 2017, 10 days after his parole was rescinded. At the time, that was not a permissible reason to rescind his grant of parole. Therefore, Plaintiff’s parole was improperly rescinded. View "Galbraith v. Hooper" on Justia Law

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Chapter 423 of the Texas Government Code governs the operation of unmanned aerial vehicles—drones—in Texas airspace. In this case, Plaintiffs claimed a sweeping First Amendment right to use unmanned aerial drones to film private individuals and property without their consent. They also assert a constitutional right to fly drones at low altitudes over critical infrastructure facilities like prisons and large sports venues.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in Defendants’ favor on the constitutional claims. The court explained that it disagreed with Plaintiffs claim that a sweeping First Amendment right to use unmanned aerial drones to film private individuals and property without their consent. The court explained that though it does not foreclose any as-applied constitutional defenses to any hypothetical future prosecutions under the drone laws, we hold that these facial challenges fail. The court also rejected Plaintiffs’ cross-appeal claiming that federal regulations occupy the entire field of drone regulation. On this issue, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the field-preemption claim. The court explained that federal law expressly contemplates concurrent non-federal regulation of drones, especially where privacy and critical infrastructure are concerned. View "National Press v. McCraw" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Armadillo Hotel Group, LLC (“Armadillo”) is a buyer and operator of modular and mobile structures throughout North America. According to Armadillo, Defendants Todd Harris and Jason McDaniel were hired in May 2019 to oversee Armadillo’s construction operations and its hotel, food, and beverage operations, respectively. McDaniel resigned in January 2021, Harris in July 2021. Harris and McDaniel asserted that they entered employment agreements with AHG Management as part of the joint venture, but AHG Management breached these agreements by failing to pay the agreed-upon salary, bonuses, and profit-sharing interests. They asserted claims of fraudulent inducement, negligent misrepresentation, tortious interference, and unjust enrichment. Harris, McDaniel, SDRS, and BMC moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the non-GML defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice.   The Fifth Circuit reversed. The court explained that it could not find sufficient information in the record to decide if Armadillo and AHG Management were in privity with each other. The fact that the same attorneys filed AHG Management’s amended state counterclaim and Armadillo’s federal complaint is insufficient to show privity. Accordingly, the court found that the district court did not have sufficient information or even assertions about the relationship of Armadillo and AHG Management to perform such an assessment. View "Armadillo Hotel v. Harris" on Justia Law

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Before Plaintiffs’ cases were distributed to the district court, these cases were part of MDL 2179, the multi-district litigation proceeding before United States District Court Judge Carl J. Barbier in the Eastern District of Louisiana. Judge Barbier established what is known as the “B3 Bundle” within the overall litigation. The B3 Bundle included claims for personal injury and wrongful death due to exposure to oil and/or other chemicals used during the response to the disaster. 85 B3 cases were assigned to District Judge Barry Ashe. Before his confirmation, Judge Ashe he was a longtime partner at the Stone Pigman law firm. A little more than two weeks after Judge Ashe began granting summary judgments following the exclusion of Dr. Cook, Street’s counsel moved to disqualify Judge Ashe in the five cases in which he had excluded Dr. Cook and in other cases where Daubert and summary judgment motions were still pending. Plaintiffs argued that Judge Ashe should have disqualified himself and, in the alternative, that he should have extended the case-management deadlines.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. If Judge Ashe erred when he failed to recuse in these cases, that error was harmless. Nonetheless, as the arguments on this appeal support, potential conflicts of interest must be taken seriously by every member of the judiciary. The litigants and the public need to be confident in the impartiality of those who will decide legal disputes. View "Lundy v. BP Expl & Prod" on Justia Law

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N&W Marine Towing (N&W) filed in federal district court a verified complaint in limitation (the Limitation Action), pursuant to the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 (Limitation Act) and Rule F of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims. The complaint filed in N&W’s Limitation Action alleged that on February 29, 2020, the M/V Nicholas, which is owned by N&W, was towing six barges up the Mississippi River when the wake of a cruise ship, the Majesty of the Seas, caused one of the Nicholas’s face wires to break. After dismissing N&W from the case, no claims remained in the State Court Petition because Wooley had settled his claims against the other defendants. Therefore, the district court severed Wooley’s State Court Petition from the Limitation Action and dismissed it. The district court retained jurisdiction over the Limitation Action but stayed and administratively closed it to allow Wooley to pursue any claims available to him against N&W in Louisiana state court pursuant to the saving to suitors clause. N&W and Wooley cross-appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court determines that a nondiverse defendant was improperly joined, the improperly joined defendant’s citizenship may not be considered for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, and that defendant must be dismissed without prejudice. After determining that N&W had been improperly joined, the district court correctly considered only the citizenship of the properly joined State Court Petition defendants. As they were diverse from Wooley, removal based on diversity jurisdiction was permitted. View "Wooley v. N&W Marine Towing" on Justia Law

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These consolidated cases continue the Fifth Circuit’s saga of Deepwater Horizon. Plaintiffs argue the district court judge abused his discretion by failing to disqualify himself at their request. The Street Plaintiffs do not challenge Judge Ashe’s decision to exclude the expert’s testimony under Daubert, nor do they raise any argument on the merits as to why his granting of summary judgment to BP was erroneous. In the briefing before the Fifth Circuit, the two arguments raised were that Judge Ashe should have disqualified himself and, in the alternative, that he should have extended the case-management deadlines. The Street plaintiffs argued that Judge Ashe abused his discretion for not disqualifying himself under 28 U.S.C. Section 455(b)(2) because he was a partner at Stone Pigman when it represented Cameron in the Phase One liability trial.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Street Plaintiffs do not challenge the judge’s actual impartiality on appeal. Instead, they rely solely on the “matter in controversy” language found in Section 455(b)(2) and argue that recusal was mandatory. The court explained that even mandatory recusal under Section 455(b)(2) can be harmless. The court wrote that if Judge Ashe erred when he failed to recuse in these cases, that error was harmless. Nonetheless, as the arguments on this appeal support, potential conflicts of interest must be taken seriously by every member of the judiciary. The litigants and the public need to be confident in the impartiality of those who will decide legal disputes. View "Street v. BP Expl & Prod" on Justia Law

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The Nasdaq Stock Market, LLC (Nasdaq) proposed a rule that would require companies listed on its stock exchange to disclose information about their board members, as well as a rule that would give certain companies access to a board recruiting service. After the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) approved these rules, the Alliance for Fair Board Recruitment (AFBR) and the National Center for Public Policy Research (NCPPR) petitioned for review.   The Fifth Circuit denied the petitions because the SEC’s Approval Order complies with the Exchange Act and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The court wrote that the SEC’s point is that because the meaning of diversity varies globally, it is fair and desirable to let foreign issuers report diversity information according to nationally appropriate standards. Further, the court explained that AFBR does not explain how the SEC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in weighing burdens on competition against the purposes of the Exchange Act. Instead, AFBR argues that the SEC ignored “tremendous costs for firms that dare to defy the quotas. The court explained that the SEC did account for the costs that AFBR asserted in its comment letter. The SEC made a rational decision that those burdens on competition were “necessary or appropriate” to further the purposes of the Exchange Act. Therefore, AFBR has failed to meet its burden to show that the SEC’s Approval Order is arbitrary and capricious on this basis. View "Alliance for Fair Board Recruitment v. SEC" on Justia Law