Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A Mississippi statute empowers boards of supervisors to contract “by the year” for legal counsel. The Hinds County Board of Supervisors hired Plaintiff and his law firm to perform legal work for the County. Plaintiff’s contracts with the County were each for a one-year term. But before the year was up, an election flipped the board’s composition, and the new board terminated both contracts. Plaintiff sued, arguing that the contracts required the County to pay him a fixed sum for the full year—even if the County no longer wanted his legal services. The district court granted the County’s motion to dismiss, reasoning that no statute expressly authorized the old board to bind the new one. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the statutory phrase “by the year” gave the old board “express authority” to bind the new board.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s final judgment and remanded. The court held that Section 19-3-47 expressly authorized the board to bind successors. The court explained that the court’s research has revealed no statutes that would satisfy the standard that the district court relied on for express authorization. The court wrote that the Mississippi statute books are rife with laws that apparently would allow individual officers to bind their successors under Cleveland’s test but apparently would not allow officers to bind successors under the district court’s test. The court found that the phrase “by the year” is the kind of express authorization that Cleveland calls for. Any other reading leaves the phrase “by the year” as surplusage. View "Teeuwissen v. Hinds County, MS" on Justia Law

After several instances of inappropriate behavior and twice failing to show up for a client’s sentencing hearing, mostly due to a problem with substance abuse, attorney Plaintiff was referred by a presiding judge to a three-judge disciplinary panel of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Following an investigation and hearing, the panel sanctioned Plaintiff by suspending him from practicing before that court for 12 months, with the option to reapply upon proof of sobriety during the period of suspension. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that a three-judge panel could not sanction him because the rules say only that “[a] presiding judge” may take disciplinary action. He also says the 12-month suspension is excessive.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion. The court explained that the district court did try a less severe option. An informal panel of judges privately reprimanded him in June 2020. That lesser sanction did not work. The court was thus justified in imposing a harsher sanction like the suspension. Moreover, the sanction here is appropriately tailored to Plaintiff’s unique situation: his inability to practice law stemmed from his alcohol abuse, so the court ordered him not to practice until he is able to demonstrate sustained sobriety for one year. Further, the court wrote that the district court here considered that a lesser, non-suspension sanction had not deterred Plaintiff from reverting to his old ways. The panel also considered that Plaintiff’s conduct had persisted for some time and that he was not remorseful for his conduct. View "In re Sealed Appellant" on Justia Law

Defendant asserts that he is required by his religious faith to abstain from psychiatric medication. Because he is not competent to stand trial, though, the government requested to involuntarily medicate him, and the district court granted the motion.   The Fifth Circuit held that the district court did not err in concluding that the government had satisfied the conditions for involuntary medication set out in Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180–81 (2003). However, the court wrote that the district court should also have analyzed whether any statutory religious-freedom protections apply to Defendant. The court vacated and remanded for the district court to consider that issue. The court held that the government psychiatrist’s medical opinion is sufficient evidence that involuntary medication will “significantly further” the government’s interest. And “whatever the strength of that evidence,” Defendant “provides no reason to question its accuracy.” Thus, the court agreed with the district court that the government has provided enough evidence to satisfy the second prong. View "USA v. Harris" on Justia Law

Heriberto Chavez, Evangelina Escarcega (representing her son, Jose Escarcega), and Jorge Moreno (collectively “Plaintiffs”) sought to represent a class in a lawsuit against Plan Benefit Services, Fringe Insurance Benefits, and Fringe Benefit Group (collectively “FBG”) for the alleged mismanagement t of funds that Plaintiffs contributed to benefit plans through their employers.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that the litigation may proceed as a class-action lawsuit. The court held that Plaintiffs have standing and certification is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) or (b)(3). The court explained that here, Plaintiffs have established their standing to sue FBG. First, they have demonstrated injury in fact by alleging that FBG abused its authority under the Master Trust Agreement by hiring itself to perform services paid with funds from the CERT and CPT trusts, effectively devaluing the trusts and retirement benefits that Plaintiffs otherwise would have accrued with their employer. Second, they have established that their injury is traceable to FBG’s conduct by providing evidence of FBG’s direct control over the CERT and CPT trusts and the underlying contractual agreement with their employer. Finally, their injury is redressable in this court by awarding monetary damages or other relief. View "Chavez v. Plan Benefit Services" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s entry of an order of forfeiture as part of his criminal sentence for his drug and money laundering conspiracy offenses.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that there are two paths available to defendants who plead guilty pursuant to a plea agreement but who later seek to allege that ineffective lawyering caused a mistaken, involuntary, or unknowing guilty plea. Defendants can either file a collateral attack on the guilty plea under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255,3 or, before the imposition of sentence, move to withdraw the guilty plea under Rule 11. However, the court explained that but what a defendant “may not do is pick and choose which portions he wishes to abide by and which he wishes to appeal.” Thus, the court explained that if Defendant wishes to pursue relief from his sworn stipulation that his Florida condo and credit union money was forfeitable, he must do so through a Section 2255 motion challenging the entire guilty plea. The result, if successful, would be for all parties to start over. View "USA v. Brooks" on Justia Law

Appellant Matthew Johnson filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and separately moved to recuse the district judge to whom that petition was assigned. On appeal, The Fifth Circuit denied Petitioner’s motion for a certificate of appealability, explaining that each of his arguments had already been considered and rejected by binding precedent. The court also affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to recuse.   The Fifth Circuit denied the petition. The court explained that Defendant petitioned for rehearing en banc, arguing that the panel opinion stands for the proposition that a district court has the power to shorten the one-year statute of limitations. The court explained that the opinion stands for no such thing. It holds only that the district court’s case-management order is not a ground for disqualification under 28 U.S.C. Section 455(a). Especially probative for that holding is the fact that the district court ultimately granted Johnson the extension he sought. The court explained that its conclusion that the district court was not required to recuse says nothing about the hypothetical issue of whether a district court would commit legal error if it did order a post-conviction habeas petitioner to file his petition before the deadline provided by the statute of limitations. View "Johnson v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to possessing child pornography. The district court sentenced him to 168 months in prison and ordered him to pay his victims $46,000 in restitution. On appeal, Defendant argued that he was not competent to enter the plea and challenged the court's restitution order.The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Regarding competency, the court relied on Defendant's admission that he only began to exhibit competency concerns during the PSR interview. There is no authority to find that erratic statements made in a PSR interview can somehow retroactively undermine Defendant's competency to plead guilty. Further, the district court did not commit reversible error in failing to hold a competency hearing sua sponte.In terms of Defendant's restitution argument, the court held that he failed "to show that there is a reasonable probability that such error resulted in his accountability for damages he did not cause or that the district court would have imposed a lower restitution amount but for any error." View "USA v. Teijeiro" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a 1983 claim, arguing that he was held in administrative segregation for 300 days over his 30-day disciplinary sentence without additional due process, such as new disciplinary hearings or periodic review of his custody status. The magistrate judge reviewed Petitioner's suit under 28 USC 1915(e) and 1915A and issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that Petitioner's federal claims be dismissed with prejudice as legally frivolous and for failure to state a claim. The district court reviewed and adopted the magistrate judge’s report, dismissing Petitioner's 1983 suit with prejudice as frivolous and for failure to state a claim.The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that the district court failed to apply the appropriate, multi-faceted legal test considering the conditions and length of confinement, and thus, dismissing the Petition was an abuse of discretion. View "Carmouche v. Hooper" on Justia Law

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(3) bars an individual from possessing a firearm if he is an “unlawful user” of a controlled substance. Patrick Daniels is one such “unlawful user”—he admitted to smoking marihuana multiple days per month. But the government presented no evidence that he was intoxicated at the time of arrest, nor did it identify when he last had used marihuana. Still, based on his confession to regular usage, a jury convicted Defendant of violating Section 922(g)(3). The question is whether Defendant’s conviction violates his right to bear arms. The answer depends on whether Section 922(g)(3) is consistent with the nation’s “historical tradition of firearm regulation.”   The Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment of conviction and render a dismissal of the indictment. The court explained that the nation’s history and tradition may support some limits on an intoxicated person’s right to carry a weapon, but it does not justify disarming a sober citizen based exclusively on his past drug usage. Nor do more generalized traditions of disarming dangerous persons support this restriction on nonviolent drug users. Thus, the court held that as applied to Defendant, then, Section 922(g)(3) violates the Second Amendment. View "USA v. Daniels" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to the production of child pornography. On appeal, he challenged the district court’s application of a sentence enhancement pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(e) based on his prior conviction for fondling a child, also referred to as lustful touching of a child.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s sentence. The court concluded that the Mississippi statute relates to “abusive sexual contact involving a minor or ward,” as defined under section 2251(e) because the statute proscribes conduct that: (1) involves a child; (2) is sexual in nature; (3) is abusive; and (4) involves physical contact. The Mississippi statute only criminalizes conduct involving a child under the age of 18, so the first element is met. Moreover, because the statute also proscribes conduct involving “handling, touching or rubbing,” it meets the generic definitions of “abuse” and “contact” as well. Accordingly, the court held that there is no ambiguity as to the enhancements’ application; the rule of lenity is inapplicable. View "USA v. Northington" on Justia Law