Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioners in this immigration case are a husband and wife who applied for asylum and withholding of removal based on their membership in the proposed particular social group of “Salvadoran business owners.” The immigration judge (IJ) denied the family asylum and withheld removal, concluding that “extorted business owners” do not constitute a particular social group (PSG), that no showing of nexus is possible without a PSG, and that extortion is not persecution. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the IJ’s ruling that the family had not asserted a cognizable PSG.   The Fifth Circuit denied Petitioners’ petition for review. The court held that regardless of geography, “business owners” are not a protected social group. The court explained that to be eligible for asylum, an applicant must show, among other things, that “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.” The court wrote that “business owner” is not an immutable trait. The court reasoned that because a PSG is an essential element of claims for asylum and withholding of removal, Petitioners cannot succeed on either claim. View "Munoz-De Zalaya v. Garland" on Justia Law

A Texas citizen brought state-law claims in federal court against “Dining Alliance Inc.” Prior to the suit, however, Dining Alliance Inc. had converted into Dining Alliance LLC (“Dining Alliance”), whose citizenship may include both Texas and Delaware. This potential jurisdictional defect was not recognized because Dining Alliance originally answered under the name Dining Alliance Inc. and represented itself as a Massachusetts citizen. Dining Alliance unacceptably hid the ball with respect to the elementary jurisdictional facts during the entire course of litigation, including on appeal. The district court dismissed its third-party claims with prejudice as a sanction for that willful abuse of the judicial process.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a district court may invoke its inherent power to dismiss claims with prejudice in order to protect “the integrity of the judicial process.” It must find that the litigant acted in bad faith or willfully abused the judicial process. It must also find that “lesser sanctions would not serve the best interests of justice.” The court wrote that contrary to Dining Alliance’s assertion, the district court found that Dining Alliance itself willfully abused the judicial process based on the totality of its litigation misconduct, which culminated in its refusal to obey the court’s order. That misstatement was reckless because the company’s transformation into Dining Alliance LLC should have been and apparently was known at the time. Accordingly, the court held that the district court neither lacked jurisdiction nor abused its discretion in dismissing Dining Alliance LLC’s third-party claims with prejudice as a sanction for its willful abuse of the judicial process. View "Dining Alliance v. Foodbuy" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs—three doctors, a news website, a healthcare activist, and two states—had posts and stories removed or downgraded by the platforms. Their content touched on a host of divisive topics. Plaintiffs maintain that although the platforms stifled their speech, the government officials were the ones pulling the strings. They sued the officials for First Amendment violations and asked the district court to enjoin the officials’ conduct. In response, the officials argued that they only “sought to mitigate the hazards of online misinformation” by “calling attention to content” that violated the “platforms’ policies,” a form of permissible government speech. The district court agreed with Plaintiffs and granted preliminary injunctive relief. In reaching that decision, it reviewed the conduct of several federal offices but only enjoined the White House, the Surgeon General, the CDC, the FBI, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Department of State.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated the injunction in part, and modified the injunction in part. The court explained that the White House officials, in conjunction with the Surgeon General’s office, coerced and significantly encouraged the platforms to moderate content. As a result, the platforms’ actions “must in law be deemed to be that of the State.” Further, the court held that the CDC officials likely significantly encouraged the platforms’ moderation decisions. However, the court found that for the NIAID officials, it is not apparent that they ever communicated with the social media platforms. View "State of Missouri v. Biden" on Justia Law

Petitioner E a native and citizen of El Salvador, attempted to enter the United States near Hidalgo, Texas, with her daughter Katherine. An asylum officer interviewed Petitioner and determined that she had a credible fear of persecution based on her membership in a particular social group. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) then personally served Petitioner and Katherine each with a Notice to Appear (“NTA”), charging them with removability under 8 U.S.C. Section 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), as aliens who sought admission without a valid entry document. In December 2018, Petitioner appeared before the IJ again and set forth her claims for immigration relief. She asserted that her claim for asylum and withholding of removal was based on her membership in several particular social groups. The IJ issued an oral decision denying Petitioner’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection and ordered her and her daughters removed to El Salvador. The BIA also rejected Petitioner’s argument.   The Fifth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review. The court held that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Petitioner is ineligible for immigration relief in the form of asylum because has failed to show the requisite nexus between the harm she claims she suffered and feared in El Salvador and a protected statutory ground. Further, the court held that the BIA did not err in rejecting Petitioner’s argument on this issue, given its reasoning that the IJ considered “the entirety of the evidence of record,” which included the relevant testimony. View "Martinez-De Umana v. Garland" on Justia Law

Louisiana oil and gas law authorizes the state Commissioner of Conservation to combine separate tracts of land and appoint a unit operator to extract the minerals. Plaintiffs own unleased mineral interests in Louisiana that are part of a forced drilling unit. BPX is the operator. Plaintiffs alleged on behalf of themselves and a named class that BPX has been improperly deducting post-production costs from their pro rata share of production and that this practice is improper per se. The district court granted BPX’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ per se claims, holding that the quasi-contractual doctrine of negotiorum gestio provides a mechanism for BPX to properly deduct postproduction costs. Plaintiffs filed this action as purported representatives of a named class of unleased mineral owners whose interests are situated within forced drilling units formed by the Louisiana Office of Conservation and operated by BPX. BPX removed this action to the district court based on both diversity and federal question jurisdiction. BPX sought dismissal of the Plaintiffs’ primary claim. The district court granted BPX’s motion to dismiss. The district court certified its ruling for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b).The Fifth Circuit wrote that no controlling Louisiana case resolves the parties’ issue. Accordingly, the court certified the following determinative question of law to the Louisiana Supreme Court: 1) Does La. Civ. Code art. 2292 applies to unit operators selling production in accordance with La. R.S. 30:10(A)(3)? View "Self v. B P X Operating" on Justia Law

Plaintiff contracted with Dicom Transportation Group to work as a delivery driver. In this position, he would handle deliveries for Defendant L Brands Service Company, LLC. In 2017, after experiencing significant shrinkage at locations serviced by Plaintiff, Defendant Shawn Tolbert, a logistics asset protection manager at L Brands, and Defendant Aidan Duffy, the regional asset protection manager at L Brands, conducted a driver observation of Plaintiff. After discovering several indicators of fraud and interviewing Plaintiff, Tolbert and Duffy concluded that Plaintiff had been attempting to steal the product. The two reported their findings to both Dicom, who terminated Plaintiff’s contract, and local law enforcement, who later obtained a warrant and arrested Plaintiff on a charge of felony theft. No formal charge was filed against Plaintiff. Plaintiff subsequently filed suit against L Brands, Tolbert, and Duffy (collectively, “Defendants”) for claims of defamation, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants and dismissed the case with prejudice. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the statements at issue were limited communications that were made in good faith and only to interested parties. Accordingly, the conditional privilege applies such that Plaintiff cannot prevail on his defamation claim. Further, the court explained that Defendants provided evidence supporting their position that they reported their findings with the honest and reasonable belief that Plaintiff had attempted to steal cartons of L Brands merchandise. As with his defamation claim, Plaintiff provides no evidence to dispute this contention. View "Phillips v. L. Brands Service" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to conspiracy to participate in a racketeering enterprise. Defendant waived the preparation of a presentence report (PSR), and the district court determined that a PSR was not necessary. The district court proceeded to sentencing directly after taking Defendant’s guilty plea. Pursuant to the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, Defendant was sentenced to 360 months of imprisonment and 5 years of supervised release. As part of his supervised release term, the district court stated that Defendant was “subject to the standard conditions.” Defendant’s written judgment included a list of the fifteen “standard” conditions of supervision listed in the Southern District of Texas’s standing order. Defendant appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it discerned no error in the district court’s oral imposition of the standard conditions of supervised release contained in the district’s standing order, which mirror the conditions then listed in the written judgment. Furthermore, the court explained that even if it assumes the first three prongs of the plain-error test, Defendant has not met his burden in demonstrating that any claimed error affected “the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” View "USA v. Reyna" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, formerly a patrol sergeant in the Alamo, Texas police department, brought a Section 1983 action against the City of Alamo (the “City”), former chief of police, and several other officers in connection with an alleged scheme to have Plaintiff fired and arrested on bogus charges. The district court dismissed the City and the other officers under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), then dismissed the chief of police under 12(c). Plaintiff appealed the dismissals of the chief of police and the City.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Plaintiff's false arrest complaint against the chief of police and affirmed the dismissal of the City. The court explained that Plaintiff’s complaint presents Defendant as the sole moving force behind a deliberate, long-term conspiracy to create and file affidavits Defendant knew to be false, with the purpose of exploiting the criminal justice system to arrest, detain, and torment Plaintiff for crimes Defendant knew he did not commit. Defendant, moreover, ordered the sham investigations that served as the basis for the false affidavits and pushed the investigations forward despite knowing Plaintiff was innocent. The court wrote that Terwilliger v. Reyna controls here. As such, the court held that Defendant’s alleged actions are relevant, like Reyna’s, for purposes of evaluating his potential Franks liability at the Rule 12 stage. Defendant was the “driving force” behind the conspiracy, and he was “continuously updated” as to the status of the investigations he had ordered, including the fact the investigations revealed no criminality or impropriety. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s false arrest claim against Defendant. View "Guerra v. Castillo" on Justia Law

Driftwood LNG and Driftwood Pipeline (jointly “Driftwood”) want to convert natural gas produced in the United States into liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) for export to international markets. That undertaking involves building an LNG production and export terminal and a pipeline that will connect to existing interstate pipeline systems; the terminal would be located on the Calcasieu River in Louisiana. Numerous federal and state agencies are involved in the approval and permitting process for projects such as Driftwood’s. One of those agencies— the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“the Corps”)—granted Driftwood one of the requisite permits. Petitioners Healthy Gulf and Sierra Club petition for review of that permit, alleging that the Corps’s decision violated the governing statute and was arbitrary and capricious.   The Fifth Circuit denied the petition. The court explained that the record reveals thorough analysis and cooperation by the Corps and other agencies and a lucid explanation of why the Corps was permitting a departure from the default hierarchy. The court wrote that the approval process spanned several years and involved detailed analysis by (and often the cooperation of) FERC, the Corps, the EPA, the National Marine Fisheries Services, the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, and LDEQ, among others. The administrative record is over 24,000 pages and provides more than enough insight into the agencies’ deliberations. Moreover, the court explained that both the Corps and the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources (which issued Driftwood a Coastal Use permit) imposed conditions on Driftwood to ensure that it did not dredge and use contaminated material. View "Healthy Gulf v. US Army Corps of Eng" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Rex Real Estate I, L.P. sued Defendant Rex Real Estate Exchange for trademark infringement. The district court granted Defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law after Plaintiff rested its case. Plaintiff appealed the judgment against its federal infringement claims under the Lanham Act.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that a reasonable jury could not find in favor of Plaintiff’s Section 32(1) claim, but it could find in favor of Plaintiff’s Section 43(a) claim. The court explained that while there was strong evidence that the marks are perceived by the public as primarily a personal name, the record does not compel that conclusion. Thus, the district court erred by deciding as a matter of law that Plaintiff’s marks are not inherently distinctive.     Moreover, the court explained that Plaintiff also asserts that the numerous calls it received from confused consumers who heard Defendant’s advertisements show that the marks have strong standing in the marketplace because it could mean that the callers assumed that Plaintiff was the sole source of the advertising. This is a plausible inference for a jury to make. The court held that taken together and in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find that this factor weighs in favor of Plaintiff. View "Rex Real Est I v. Rex Real Est" on Justia Law