Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, who is civilly committed as a sexually violent predator at the Texas Civil Commitment Center, brought a pro se lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Commissioner of the Texas Department of Family Protective Services and the Executive Commissioner of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission. He alleged that these agencies failed to investigate his reports of misconduct and abuse at the facility, claiming violations of his Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process, as well as rights under the Bill of Rights for Mental Health Patients. The plaintiff asserted that he should be able to file complaints with these agencies rather than being required to use the internal grievance procedure of the Texas Civil Commitment Office.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because the plaintiff was proceeding in forma pauperis. The district court found that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for relief and that amendment would be futile, so it dismissed the complaint without prejudice. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that he had adequately stated equal protection and due process claims, that he should have been allowed to amend his complaint, and that the district court was biased.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the plaintiff failed to state an equal protection claim because he was not similarly situated to other Texas citizens and the different grievance procedures had a rational basis. The court also found no protected liberty or property interest to support a due process claim and concluded that the alleged conduct did not rise to the level of a substantive due process violation. The court further held that amendment would have been futile and found no evidence of judicial bias. The plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel was denied. View "Dunsmore v. Muth" on Justia Law

A black man was hired as the first black city manager of a Texas city and led several major development initiatives. His tenure became contentious, especially after two new city council members, who opposed his policies, were elected. The conflict allegedly took on a racial character, and the city manager reported race-based discrimination. Eventually, the city council voted to part ways with him “without cause,” entering into a separation agreement that included a severance payment and a non-disparagement clause. After his departure, some council members publicly criticized him and later persuaded the council to rescind the separation agreement, citing a legal opinion that it was invalid. The city demanded the return of the severance payment, prompting the former city manager to sue, alleging racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and breach of contract under Texas law.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas granted summary judgment to the plaintiff on the validity of the separation agreement and denied the city’s motions for judgment as a matter of law. The case proceeded to trial, where a jury found for the plaintiff on both claims, awarding substantial damages. The district court entered judgment accordingly, later suggesting remittitur due to statutory limits on damages for breach of contract, which the plaintiff accepted.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the plaintiff failed to establish municipal liability for racial discrimination under § 1981 and § 1983 because he could not show that a majority of the city council acted with discriminatory intent, nor could he use the “cat’s paw” theory to impute animus under Monell. However, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment that the separation agreement was valid and enforceable, and that the city breached the contract by attempting to rescind it. The court reversed the judgment on the civil rights claim, affirmed the breach of contract ruling, and remanded for consideration of attorney’s fees. View "Jones v. City of Hutto" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case are homeowners and rental-property supervisors in New Orleans who challenged the City’s regulations governing short-term rentals (STRs), defined as lodging offered for less than thirty days. The City’s regulatory scheme requires permits for both owners and operators of STRs, restricts eligibility to “natural persons,” mandates that operators reside at the property, and imposes specific advertising requirements. The regulations were enacted in response to concerns about neighborhood disruption and loss of affordable housing attributed to the proliferation of STRs. Plaintiffs argued that these regulations violated various constitutional provisions, including the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, the First Amendment, and the dormant Commerce Clause.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted summary judgment largely in favor of the City, upholding the constitutionality of most aspects of the STR regulations. The district court found that the City had authority under state law to regulate STRs and rejected the plaintiffs’ due process and equal protection claims, except for one provision not at issue on appeal. The court also upheld the advertising restrictions and the operator residency requirement, interpreting the latter as not requiring permanent residency.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The Fifth Circuit held that the City’s prohibition on business entities obtaining owner or operator permits violated the Equal Protection Clause, as the distinction was arbitrary and not rationally related to a legitimate government interest. The court also found that the requirement that each STR advertisement list only one dwelling unit violated the First Amendment. However, the court upheld the City’s authority to regulate STRs, the due process analysis, most advertising restrictions, and interpreted the operator residency requirement as not violating the dormant Commerce Clause. View "Hignell-Stark v. City of New Orleans" on Justia Law

Juan Alaniz was convicted of possessing a firearm and ammunition as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Alaniz had prior state felony convictions for illegally possessing a controlled substance and for burglary. He challenged his conviction on constitutional grounds, arguing that the statute exceeded Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause, violated the Second Amendment on its face, and violated the Second Amendment as applied to him.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas reviewed the case and entered a conviction against Alaniz. On appeal, Alaniz raised the same constitutional arguments before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. He specifically argued that only his controlled substance conviction should be considered as the predicate for his § 922(g)(1) conviction, and that his burglary conviction should not be relevant to the constitutional analysis.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected Alaniz’s Commerce Clause and facial Second Amendment challenges, citing circuit precedent. The court reviewed his as-applied Second Amendment challenge de novo and held that the government may consider Alaniz’s entire criminal record, including his burglary conviction, when evaluating the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) as applied to him. The court found that founding-era laws support the constitutionality of disarming individuals convicted of burglary. Therefore, Alaniz’s as-applied challenge was foreclosed by circuit precedent, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Alaniz" on Justia Law

Three individuals, two of whom were former insureds of an insurance company, financed their insurance premiums through a separate premium finance company. Under the financing agreements, the finance company paid the full premium to the insurer and the insureds made monthly payments to the finance company. Each agreement authorized the finance company to cancel the insurance policy if the insured defaulted on payments. After defaults occurred, the finance company initiated cancellation of the policies. The plaintiffs alleged that the insurer’s procedures for cancellation did not comply with Louisiana law, resulting in ineffective cancellation and breach of good faith.The plaintiffs initially filed a class action in Louisiana state court against the insurer and the finance company, claiming that the insurer had not properly cancelled their policies and had failed to act in good faith. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. Both sides moved for summary judgment on whether the insurer’s cancellation procedures satisfied Louisiana statutory requirements. The district court granted summary judgment for the insurer, finding that its procedures complied with state law, and dismissed all claims with prejudice.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether the insurer’s procedures strictly adhered to Louisiana law governing cancellation of financed insurance policies. The court held that Louisiana law does not require a signature on the notice of cancellation sent by the premium finance company to the insurer, and that the insurer’s receipt of notice via its computer system satisfied the statutory requirement of “receipt.” The court declined to certify questions of statutory interpretation to the Louisiana Supreme Court and affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Williams v. GoAuto Insurance" on Justia Law

A group of individuals with large social media followings was charged with securities fraud and conspiracy to commit securities fraud. The government alleged that these individuals engaged in a “pump and dump” scheme: they would purchase securities, then use their social media platforms to post false or misleading information about those securities to induce their followers to buy, thereby artificially inflating the price. After the price increased, the defendants would sell their holdings for a profit. The indictment claimed that the defendants collectively profited $114 million from this scheme.After indictment in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, one defendant pleaded guilty while the others moved to dismiss the indictment. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, reasoning that the indictment failed to allege a scheme to deprive victims of a traditional property interest, instead only alleging deprivation of valuable economic information. The district court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Ciminelli v. United States, which held that deprivation of economic information alone does not constitute fraud under federal law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the indictment de novo. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the indictment adequately alleged both a scheme to defraud and an intent to defraud, as required by the securities fraud statute. The court distinguished the case from Ciminelli, finding that the indictment alleged a fraudulent-inducement theory—whereby the defendants used misrepresentations to induce followers to part with money by purchasing securities—not merely a deprivation of information. The court also held that the fraud statutes do not require proof that the defendants intended to cause economic harm, only that they intended to obtain money or property by deceit. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the indictment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "USA v. Constantinescu" on Justia Law

An inmate at the Louisiana State Penitentiary participated in the Angola Prison Rodeo from 1996 to 2019, selling leather belts and earning approximately $80,000. He alleged that prison officials confiscated about $16,000 of his earnings, claiming the deductions were for taxes, commissions, and maintenance fees. The inmate filed a grievance through the prison’s administrative process, arguing that the deductions were unauthorized and that he was denied a due process hearing regarding the seizure of his property. The prison denied his grievance, explaining the deductions, and the inmate exhausted his administrative remedies. He then sought relief in Louisiana state court through a petition for writ of mandamus, which remained unresolved for over a year.Subsequently, the inmate filed a pro se complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that various prison officials conspired to deny him due process in connection with the confiscation of his property. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting qualified immunity and failure to state a claim. A magistrate judge recommended dismissing any standalone claims regarding the denial of the prison grievance but allowed the conspiracy and due process claims to proceed. The district court adopted this recommendation, and the defendants appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that the inmate’s complaint did not adequately allege a pre-deprivation due process claim and that, at the time of the alleged conduct, it was not clearly established that the inmate had a protected property interest in the proceeds from the sale of crafts made and sold under prison auspices. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Savage v. Westcott" on Justia Law

Several development groups entered into a public improvement contract with a Texas city, purchasing over 60 acres of land, much of it in a flood zone. The developers received a variance from the city, exempting them from obtaining a federal floodplain permit (CLOMR), and invested significant funds in developing the property, including constructing a bridge. In 2018, the parties executed updated agreements, including a Master Development Agreement (MDA), which required certain conditions to be met within five years or the contract would automatically terminate, ending the city’s reimbursement obligations. As the deadline approached, the city informed the developers that they would now need to obtain the previously waived CLOMR, citing a later-enacted ordinance. Unable to comply in time, the developers sought an extension, which the city council denied, resulting in termination of the MDA.The developers sued in Texas state court, alleging the city’s actions constituted an unconstitutional taking under federal and state law, and also brought claims for breach of contract and violations of the Texas Vested Rights Statute. The city removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas and moved to dismiss. The district court dismissed the federal takings and declaratory judgment claims, finding the developers had not sufficiently alleged that the city acted in its sovereign rather than commercial capacity, and remanded the remaining state-law claims to state court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the developers’ allegations arose from a contractual dispute, not a sovereign act by the city, and thus did not state a plausible takings claim under the Fifth Amendment. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to dismiss the declaratory judgment claim, as the core issues would be resolved in the remanded state court action. View "Mesquite Asset Recovery Grp v. City of Mesquite" on Justia Law

Texas submitted a State Implementation Plan (SIP) to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2012, asserting that its emissions did not significantly contribute to ozone pollution in downwind states and therefore no additional mitigation was necessary. The SIP included charts of declining ozone levels in certain metropolitan areas, a brief discussion of wind patterns, a map of 2010 ozone levels, and some raw measurement data, but did not analyze or quantify Texas’s impact on other states’ air quality. Texas’s submission focused on areas geographically close to Texas and did not address whether its emissions might interfere with maintenance of air quality standards in other states.After determining the SIP was technically complete, the EPA delayed substantive review pending the Supreme Court’s decision in EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., which clarified the agency’s authority under the Clean Air Act’s Good Neighbor Provision. During the delay, EPA provided Texas with updated modeling data showing that Texas emissions contributed to downwind ozone problems, but Texas did not supplement its SIP. In 2016, EPA formally disapproved the SIP, finding it failed to address statutory requirements, particularly by not evaluating impacts on maintenance areas and by relying on outdated control measures. Texas and industry groups petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for review, arguing EPA’s process was procedurally and substantively flawed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied the petition. The court held that EPA’s review complied with statutory and procedural requirements, and that the agency acted within its authority in disapproving the SIP. The court found EPA’s reasoning was not arbitrary or capricious, and that the SIP’s failure to analyze Texas’s impact on all relevant downwind areas, including maintenance areas, justified disapproval. The court also rejected arguments that EPA was required to approve the SIP due to procedural delays or reliance on updated data. View "State of Texas v. EPA" on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in Texas in 2010 for the killing of his fiancée’s thirteen-month-old daughter. The prosecution’s case relied heavily on DNA evidence and forensic testimony. Over the years, the petitioner pursued multiple avenues of postconviction relief, including direct appeal, state habeas petitions, and federal habeas petitions, all of which were denied. In 2024, he sought access to additional electronic DNA data from the Southwestern Institute of Forensic Sciences, arguing that this information was necessary to evaluate the reliability of the forensic evidence used at trial. After being denied access by the district attorney and the convicting court, he filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Texas’ postconviction relief procedures violated his due process rights by giving prosecutors unreviewable discretion to withhold evidence.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas dismissed the § 1983 complaint for failure to state a claim, finding that the petitioner had not sufficiently alleged a due process violation and that his request for an injunction resembled an improper petition for a writ of mandamus. The district court also denied his motion for discovery. The petitioner appealed and, in the interim, sought a stay of execution and authorization to file a successive habeas petition based on new evidence and scientific developments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that Texas’ postconviction relief procedures do not violate due process, as they provide adequate opportunities for discovery and judicial review in habeas proceedings. The court also denied the motions for a stay of execution and for authorization to file a successive habeas petition, finding that the petitioner failed to meet the stringent requirements for such relief. The court granted leave to file a motion in excess of the word limit. View "In Re: Milam" on Justia Law