Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and possession of a machinegun, both federal offenses. His sentence was calculated using a higher base offense level under the United States Sentencing Guidelines because of a prior Louisiana armed robbery conviction, which the district court classified as a “crime of violence.” The defendant did not object to this classification at sentencing but later argued on appeal that Louisiana armed robbery, as a general intent crime, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the Guidelines. He also contended that the district court’s written judgment conflicted with its oral pronouncement regarding special conditions of supervised release and the crediting of presentence detention time.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana accepted the presentence investigation report’s calculation, which set the base offense level at 22, resulting in a sentencing range of 57 to 71 months. The court sentenced the defendant to 71 months. The defendant did not object to the Guidelines calculation or the written judgment at the time of sentencing. On appeal, he raised these issues for the first time.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the sentencing calculation for plain error and found no clear or obvious error in classifying Louisiana armed robbery as a crime of violence under the Guidelines, given the current state of the law. The court affirmed the district court’s base offense level determination. However, the appellate court found that the written judgment conflicted with the oral pronouncement regarding special conditions of supervised release and the treatment of presentence detention credit. The court remanded the case to the district court to modify the written judgment to conform to the oral pronouncement and to clarify its intent regarding credit for time served before sentencing. View "United States v. King" on Justia Law

Evan Norman visited a bar where he consumed several alcoholic drinks and fell asleep. At the request of the establishment, Deputy Ingle removed Norman and instructed him to go home, warning that he could be arrested for public intoxication. Norman repeatedly asked for the deputies’ names and badge numbers and made comments to them. As the deputies returned to the bar, Norman followed and continued to engage with them. The situation escalated when Norman reached over Deputy Sutton’s arm and pointed at Deputy Ingle, leading to physical shoving. Norman then attempted to punch Deputy Ingle and placed him in a headlock. In response, the deputies used force to subdue Norman, including multiple punches to his head. Norman was arrested and left facedown for about ten minutes while awaiting medical assistance, during which he suffered significant facial injuries.Norman filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas against the deputies and others, alleging excessive force, denial of medical care, failure to intervene, wrongful arrest, malicious prosecution, and First Amendment violations. The district court dismissed claims against the county and sheriff but allowed claims against the deputies to proceed. The deputies moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied their motions, finding genuine disputes of material fact regarding the use of force, resistance, and medical care, and ruled that the deputies were not entitled to qualified immunity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the denial of qualified immunity de novo, considering video evidence of the incident. The court held that the video evidence resolved any material factual disputes and showed that the deputies’ actions did not violate clearly established constitutional rights. The court found the use of force reasonable under the circumstances, no denial of medical care, and no basis for failure to intervene or other claims. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment, holding the deputies were entitled to qualified immunity. View "Norman v. Ingle" on Justia Law

A sheriff’s deputy in Brewster County, Texas, observed a pickup truck towing a horse trailer near a border patrol checkpoint during a shift change—a time and place known for smuggling activity. The deputy recognized the driver, who had previously been identified as a possible smuggler. Without being signaled or ordered, the driver pulled over to the shoulder, and the deputy parked behind him. During a casual conversation, the deputy noticed an open alcohol container in the truck. The driver gave inconsistent and suspicious answers about the trailer’s contents and ownership, and after further questioning, eventually admitted that there were people hidden in the locked compartment of the trailer. The deputy then discovered three undocumented immigrants inside.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding that the defendant had been seized with reasonable suspicion and that his consent to search the trailer attenuated any taint from the deputy’s actions. The defendant pleaded guilty to one count of transporting illegal aliens but reserved the right to appeal the suppression ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The appellate court held that there was no Fourth Amendment violation. It found that the initial encounter was consensual, that the deputy’s actions did not constitute a seizure until reasonable suspicion had developed, and that the deputy’s incidental contact with the truck did not amount to a trespassory search. The court also determined that the discovery of the open alcohol container was lawful and that the subsequent evidence was not subject to suppression. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. Larremore" on Justia Law

A trading company and a base oil manufacturer entered into a sales agreement in 2016, under which the manufacturer would serve as the exclusive North American sales representative for a high-quality base oil product distributed by the trading company. The agreement included noncompete provisions and was set to expire at the end of 2021. In late 2020, suspicions arose between the parties regarding potential breaches of the agreement, leading to a series of letters in which the trading company accused the manufacturer of selling a competing product and threatened termination if the alleged breach was not cured. The manufacturer responded by denying any breach and, after further correspondence, declared the agreement terminated. The trading company agreed that the agreement was terminated, and both parties ceased their business relationship.The trading company then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, alleging antitrust violations, breach of contract, business disparagement, and misappropriation of trade secrets. The manufacturer counterclaimed for breach of contract and tortious interference. After a bench trial, the district court found in favor of the manufacturer on the breach of contract and trade secret claims, awarding over $1.3 million in damages. However, the court determined that the agreement was mutually terminated, not due to anticipatory repudiation by the trading company, and denied the manufacturer’s request for attorneys’ fees and prevailing party costs.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that the trading company did not commit anticipatory repudiation and that the agreement was mutually terminated. The Fifth Circuit also affirmed the denial of prevailing party costs under Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the appellate court vacated the denial of attorneys’ fees under the agreement’s fee-shifting provision and remanded for further proceedings on that issue. View "Penthol v. Vertex Energy" on Justia Law

Two insurance companies entered into a quota share reinsurance agreement in 2014, under which one company (the reinsurer) agreed to indemnify the other (the reinsured) for a portion of claims arising from short-term medical insurance policies. The agreement required the reinsured to provide prompt notice to the reinsurer of any claims that might result in a covered loss and developments that could materially affect the reinsurer’s position. In 2017, the reinsured was sued in Montana by policyholders alleging underpayment of claims, and the litigation later expanded into a class action. The reinsured did not notify the reinsurer of the lawsuit until after the district court had entered summary judgment for the plaintiffs, certified the class, and the Ninth Circuit denied interlocutory appeal. The reinsured eventually settled the case for $8 million and sought indemnification from the reinsurer, which was refused on grounds of late notice.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, with the parties’ consent, ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment for the reinsured, holding that the notice provision in the reinsurance treaty was triggered only by the reinsured’s subjective belief that a claim might arise, and that the reinsurer had not shown evidence of the reinsured’s subjective intent. Alternatively, the court found that even if there was a breach, the reinsurer was not prejudiced by the late notice and remained obligated to indemnify, including for attorneys’ fees.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the notice provision required an objective standard—what a reasonable reinsured would believe might result in a claim—rather than a purely subjective belief. The court found that the reinsured’s notice was unreasonably late as a matter of law and that this delay materially prejudiced the reinsurer by depriving it of its contractual right to participate in the defense. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment, holding that the reinsurer was absolved of its duty to indemnify due to the material breach. View "US Fire Ins v. Unified Life Ins" on Justia Law

A Venezuelan citizen entered the United States in 2019 on a B-2 visitor visa and applied for asylum before his visa expired. He remained in the country after his visa lapsed, leading to removal proceedings. The petitioner claimed he feared persecution in Venezuela due to his political activities as an opponent of the ruling party, his membership in the Primero Justicia Party, and his activism against the Maduro regime. He recounted being shot by a paramilitary group known as the “colectivos” in 2015, receiving threats, and participating in numerous protests. He also described incidents involving tear gas at demonstrations and threats relayed through neighbors, but acknowledged periods of living unharmed in Venezuela and traveling freely between Venezuela and the United States.An Immigration Judge found the petitioner’s testimony credible but denied relief, concluding that the harms he experienced, individually and collectively, did not rise to the level of persecution required for asylum. The judge also found no well-founded fear of future persecution, noting the petitioner’s ability to travel and live in Venezuela without incident for extended periods. The judge further determined that the petitioner did not meet the higher standard for withholding of removal and failed to show a likelihood of torture necessary for protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision, agreeing that the petitioner had not suffered past persecution or established a well-founded fear of future persecution, and that he did not face a particularized risk of torture. The petitioner then sought review from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.The Fifth Circuit denied the petition for review, holding that substantial evidence supported the agency’s findings. The court concluded that the petitioner did not demonstrate past persecution, a well-founded fear of future persecution, or eligibility for withholding of removal or CAT protection. View "Rubio v. Bondi" on Justia Law

After Hurricane Harvey caused significant flooding at the Arbor Court apartment complex in Houston in 2017, the property’s owner, DM Arbor Court, Limited (DMAC), sought permits from the City of Houston to repair the damage. The City denied these permits, invoking a provision of its flood control ordinance that had not previously been used for such denials. The City determined that a majority of the complex’s buildings had sustained “substantial damage,” requiring costly elevation before repairs could proceed. As a result, DMAC was unable to repair or redevelop the property, which led to the loss of tenants and the property sitting idle.DMAC filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, alleging that the City’s denial of repair permits constituted an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment. The district court dismissed the case as unripe, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding the case ripe once the City’s Director of Public Works formally denied the permit application. On remand, after a bench trial, the district court rejected DMAC’s takings claim, concluding that the property retained some economic value and that DMAC was not deprived of all economically beneficial use. The court also found that the City’s actions were justified under the Penn Central framework, emphasizing the public interest in flood management.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the City’s denial of the repair permit deprived DMAC of all economically viable use of Arbor Court, constituting a categorical taking under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the City’s regulatory action amounted to a per se taking requiring just compensation. View "DM Arbor Court v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

Ronald Donell Brown led a drug trafficking organization that transported large quantities of cocaine and marijuana from Houston, Texas, to Atlanta, Georgia. In 2014, after a shipment of cocaine was stolen, Brown believed two associates were responsible and sought to retaliate. He and others kidnapped one associate, Eric Williams, who escaped, but was later shot and wounded by Brown. Brown then orchestrated the murder of the second associate, Marcus Celestine, by providing information and a weapon to intermediaries, resulting in Celestine’s death outside a parole office. Brown was arrested in 2017 on unrelated charges and later indicted federally on multiple counts, including conspiracy to commit murder for hire, intentional killing during drug trafficking, and firearm offenses related to crimes of violence.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied Brown’s motion to suppress evidence, finding that communications involving a confidential informant and Brown’s attorneys were not protected by attorney-client privilege, and that Brown’s Sixth Amendment rights had not been violated because the government’s alleged intrusion occurred before adversarial proceedings began. At trial, Brown was convicted on several counts. The government later moved to dismiss two firearm-related counts (Counts Three and Four) after trial, citing double jeopardy concerns. The district court granted this motion, denied Brown’s request for a continuance to respond, and sentenced him to life imprisonment on the remaining counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Brown’s motion to suppress, holding that the attorney-client privilege did not apply and that no Sixth Amendment violation occurred. However, the appellate court vacated the district court’s dismissal of Counts Three and Four and the sentences for Counts One and Two, holding that the district court, not the government, must exercise its discretion to determine which multiplicitous convictions to dismiss and then resentence accordingly. The case was remanded for that purpose. View "USA v. Brown" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on a commercial property in Jackson, Mississippi, owned by Retro Metro, LLC. In 2011, the Jackson City Council authorized the mayor to negotiate and execute a lease with Retro Metro for office space in the former Metro Center Mall, with specific limitations on square footage, annual rent, and lease term. The City and Retro Metro executed a written lease in April 2011, and the City occupied the property. Over the years, the lease was the subject of multiple lawsuits between the parties, with the City previously admitting in court filings that it had entered into the lease. In 2023, after the City Council authorized the mayor to terminate the lease and vacate the premises, Retro Metro and its partners filed suit in federal court, alleging breach of contract and other claims.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi granted summary judgment for the City, finding that the lease was unenforceable under Mississippi’s “minutes rule,” which requires that public board contracts be sufficiently detailed in the board’s official meeting minutes. The court also dismissed all claims against the individual defendants. Retro Metro appealed, challenging only the summary judgment on its breach of contract claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fifth Circuit held that the lease did not satisfy the minutes rule because the City Council’s minutes did not contain enough detail to establish the parties’ obligations and liabilities without resorting to other evidence. The court further held that judicial estoppel could not override the minutes rule under Mississippi law, and that the City’s failure to raise the minutes rule earlier did not constitute waiver, as the burden to show a valid contract rested with Retro Metro. The district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Retro Metro v. City of Jackson" on Justia Law

A manufacturer of open-system electronic nicotine delivery systems (ENDS) and a retailer sought premarket authorization from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to market six vaping devices and related components. The devices allow users to customize their vaping experience by adjusting voltage and selecting e-liquids. The manufacturer submitted extensive scientific data and studies, concluding that its products posed lower health risks than combustible cigarettes and were targeted at adult smokers. After reviewing the applications, the FDA issued a deficiency letter identifying several concerns, including insufficient information about the products’ abuse liability—the potential for addiction and misuse. The manufacturer responded with additional information and proposed warning labels but did not provide consumer comprehension studies for the labels.The FDA ultimately denied the applications, finding that the manufacturer failed to demonstrate that marketing the products would be appropriate for the protection of public health, as required by statute. The denial specifically cited the lack of data on abuse liability under actual-use conditions and the absence of evidence that consumers would understand and comply with the proposed warnings. The manufacturer and retailer then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for review, arguing that the FDA’s denial was arbitrary and capricious, failed to conduct a holistic risk-benefit analysis, and unfairly changed its review process by limiting applicants to a single deficiency letter.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the FDA’s denial was not arbitrary or capricious. The court found that the FDA adequately explained the importance of abuse liability data and the need for consumer comprehension studies. The court also determined that the FDA’s change to a single-deficiency-letter policy was properly acknowledged and justified. Because the abuse liability deficiency alone was sufficient to support the denial, the court denied the petition for review. View "Shenzhen IVPS Tech v. FDA" on Justia Law