Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs are people who claim to suffer from chronic Lyme disease. A person contracts Lyme disease from ticks carrying the bacterium Borrelia burgdorferi. In 2006, IDSA published The Clinical Assessment, Treatment, and Prevention of Lyme Disease, Human Granulocytic Anaplasmosis, and Babesiosis: Clinical Practice Guidelines by the Infectious Diseases Society of America (“the Guidelines”). The Guidelines extensively discuss how to diagnose and treat Lyme disease. Throughout, they express doubt about the causes, frequency, and even the existence of chronic Lyme disease. Moreover, the Guidelines do not recommend long-term antibiotic therapy for persons with persistent Lyme symptoms who have already received recommended treatments.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs took issue with IDSA’s positions that (1) “there is no convincing biological evidence for the existence of symptomatic chronic B. burgdorferi infection among patients after receipt of recommended treatment regimens for Lyme disease,” and (2) “antibiotic therapy has not proven to be useful and is not recommended for patients with chronic (>6 months) subjective symptoms after recommended treatment regimens for Lyme disease.” On their face, however, these statements are medical opinions. In this context (a scientific debate over treatment options for persistent Lyme symptoms), to say that evidence is not “convincing” or that some treatment is “not recommended” is plainly to express a medical opinion. Just because Plaintiffs disagree with those opinions does not mean that IDSA is somehow liable because their doctors or insurance providers found the opinions persuasive. View "Torrey v. Infectious Diseases Socty" on Justia Law

The original leaseholder transferred its interest to Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. (“Martin Marietta”), in 2014, and Elmen Holdings, L.L.C. (“Elmen”), acquired title to the underlying land in 2018. Elmen contends that Martin Marietta did not make required royalty payments to it or prior lessors; Elmen sought a declaration that the lease had terminated. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and a magistrate judge recommended that the district court grant Elmen’s motion and deny Martin Marietta’s. The district court adopted that recommendation.   The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the magistrate judge’s and district court’s reasoning, but affirmed the summary judgment for Elmen and affirmed the denial of summary judgment for Martin Marietta. The court explained that a payment or tender—such as Martin Marietta’s April 12 check— made to someone other than the lessor is not made “in the manner provided” by the Gravel Lease. The sentence in paragraph six that Martin Marietta relies on does not apply. Further, the court wrote that the undisputed facts show that Martin Marietta failed to pay royalties in 2017, received adequate notice of this failure, and did not cure within ten days of that notice. Therefore, the Gravel Lease terminated ten days after Martin Marietta received the relevant email, and summary judgment in favor of Elmen is warranted. View "Elmen Holdings v. Martin Marietta" on Justia Law

Defendant contested her convictions for transferring a firearm to a prohibited person and for making false statements while purchasing a firearm, as well as the sentence imposed on her resulting from these convictions. She argued that these convictions run afoul of In New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen,(“Bruen”), and that her upwardly varying sentence was substantively unreasonable.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant’s arguments concerning her convictions failed plain error review because there was no clear or obvious error, and the District Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing an upwardly varying sentence. The court explained that the district court gave a fulsome explanation of the reasons underpinning its decision to vary on Defendant’s sentence. The court explained that it made clear that it was prepared to upwardly vary even more but for the very factors to which Defendant says it did not give sufficient weight. According to the district court, the “sentence would be much higher” had it not considered these factors. Moreover, the court explained that the sentence imposed was well within a reasonable variance from the guidelines. It was only 36 months above the top of the guidelines range and 15 years below the statutory maximum sentence. View "USA v. Sanches" on Justia Law

The Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (“TCEQ”) declined to impose certain emissions limits on a new natural gas facility that it had recently imposed on another such facility. In doing so, it contravened its policy of adhering to previously imposed emissions limits, but it did not adequately explain why.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the Commission’s order granting the emissions permit at issue and remanded. The court explained that in this case, the Commission rejected the ALJs’ proposed CO and NOX emissions limits because they were “not demonstrated to be achievable or proven to be operational, obtainable, and capable.” Even though those limits had been approved for Rio Grande LNG, there was no “operational data to prove” they were achievable. Here, the record is clear—the limits imposed on Port Arthur LNG are not “at least equivalent” to those imposed on Rio Grande LNG. Therefore, the Commission’s own policy directed it to consider Rio Grande LNG’s limits, even if Rio Grande LNG was not currently in operation. It therefore acted arbitrarily and capriciously under Texas law. View "Port Arthur Cmty Actn Netwk v. TCEQ" on Justia Law

The Inflation Reduction Act (“IRA”) requires the federal government to hold a specific oil-and-gas lease sale (“Lease Sale 261”), covering territory in the northwest and north-central Gulf of Mexico, by September 30, 2023, in accordance with a particular administrative record of decision. A month before that deadline, however, the bureau in the Department of the Interior charged with conducting the sale—the Bureau of Ocean Energy and Management (“BOEM”)—abruptly changed the sale terms, removing six million acres from the lease and imposing new limits on vessels that pass through the to-be-leased area. Plaintiffs—the State of Louisiana, the American Petroleum Institute, Chevron USA, Inc., and Shell Offshore, Inc.—sued BOEM and other federal entities and officials, arguing that BOEM’s implementation of the new terms was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The merits panel stayed the preliminary injunction pending its decision on the merits. On appeal, BOEM does not challenge the injunction, instead asking only for enough time to comply with it. Only the four environmental organizations that intervened below (“Intervenors”) challenge the preliminary injunction on appeal.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed the intervenors’ appeal and amended the preliminary injunction to require that the lease sale at issue be conducted within thirty-seven days. The court explained that here, the causal chain of events necessary to support Intervenors’ theory of standing is so attenuated that the alleged harm is not “certainly impending.” Namely, for the complained-of conduct to result in the alleged injury, the following chain of events needs to occur. View "State of Louisiana v. Haaland" on Justia Law

Tesla requires its employees to wear uniforms to minimize damage to vehicles throughout the production process. When employees wore union t-shirts instead, Tesla informed them they were violating the uniform policy and threatened to send them home. The International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, AFL CIO (“Union” or “UAW”), filed an unfair labor practice charge, and a divided National Labor Relations Board (“Board” or “NLRB”) ruled that Tesla was infringing on its employees’ rights to unionize under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or “Act”). Tesla petitioned for review, claiming that the Board’s decision irrationally made all company uniforms presumptively unlawful. The NLRB cross-applied for enforcement.   The Fifth Circuit granted Tesla’s petition for review, denied the NLRB’s application for enforcement, and vacated the Board’s decision. The court agreed with Tesla that the NLRA does not give the NLRB the authority to make all company uniforms presumptively unlawful. The court explained that the Team Wear policy—or any hypothetical company’s uniform policy—advances a legitimate interest of the employer and neither discriminates against union communication nor affects nonworking time. And a prohibition is a greater infringement than is a restriction. Therefore, by treating any restriction as per se equivalent to a prohibition, the NLRB has failed to balance—or even strike a reasonable accommodation of—the employer’s and employees’ rights. View "Tesla v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Cajun Industries LLC (“Cajun”) claimed tax credits for the 2013 tax year pursuant to § 41 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. Section 41. First, the Code provision at issue in this case, Section 41 offers a tax credit for “qualified research expenses” including wages and expenditures incurred in pursuit of qualified research.1 The Internal Revenue Code provides a tax credit for qualified research activities, as defined by the Code. Appellants appealed the district court’s judgment which ejected research and development tax credits claimed by Cajun Industries LLC and upheld the resulting tax deficiency.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Appellants’ argument that all contracts “for the product or result” are not funded improperly conflates “amounts payable under any agreement that are contingent on the success of the research” with contracts for products or services. This argument ignores the operative portion of the sentence: “amounts payable under any agreement that are contingent on the success of the research.” Structurally, the phrase “and thus considered to be paid for the product or result of the research” merely describes or modifies “amounts payable . . . contingent on the success of the research.” It does not, as Appellants urge, stand on its own to establish an additional type of contract “not treated as funding.” Further, the court explained that Appellants are not entitled to the research credit merely because SWBNO could not claim the credit. The Regulations do not require that a tax credit be allocated in every contract. View "USA v. Grigsby" on Justia Law

The LSBA is a mandatory bar association. Attorneys are required to join and pay fees to the organization as a condition of practicing law in the state. Plaintiff has been a member in good standing of the LSBA since 1996. Upset that he was forced to associate with and contribute to certain causes, Plaintiff sued the LSBA, the Louisiana Supreme Court, and its justices (collectively, “the LSBA”) in 2019. He claimed that compulsory membership in the LSBA violated his rights to free speech and association. Defendants moved to dismiss, and the district court granted the motion. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment in part and reversed it in part. The court remanded to the district court for a determination of the proper remedy. The court explained that although it takes no position on the proper injunctive or declaratory relief. The court also rendered a preliminary injunction preventing the LSBA from requiring Plaintiff to join or pay dues to the LSBA pending completion of the remedies phase. The court wrote that because the LSBA engages in non-germane speech, its mandatory membership policy violates Plaintiff’s rights to free speech and free association. Additionally, Plaintiff is entitled to a limited preliminary injunction for the same reasons as the plaintiffs in McDonald. View "Boudreaux v. LA State Bar Assoc" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenge the Louisiana Legislature’s 2022 redistricting map for electing the state’s six members of the United States House of Representatives. The district court preliminarily enjoined use of that map for the 2022 congressional elections. The United States Supreme Court stayed that injunction, pending resolution of a case involving Alabama’s congressional redistricting plan. About a year later, the Supreme Court resolved the Alabama case.In review of the Louisiana Legislature's 2022 redistricting plan, the Fifth Circuit held that district court did not clearly err in its necessary fact-findings nor commit legal error in its conclusions that the Plaintiffs were likely to succeed in proving a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. However, the court found the injunction is no longer necessary. View "Robinson v. Ardoin" on Justia Law

The Galveston County Commissioners Court is composed of four county commissioners, elected from single-member precincts, and one county judge, elected by the entire county. From 1991 to 2021, one of the four commissioner precincts had a majority-minority population, with blacks and Hispanics together accounting for 58 percent of the precinct’s total population as of 2020. In 2021, the Galveston County Commissioners Court enacted a new districting plan for county commissioner elections. The enacted plan does not contain a majority-minority precinct. Following a bench trial, the district court found that the enacted plan dilutes the voting power of the county’s black and Hispanic voters in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.Galveston County appealed. The panel held that, under existing precedent, distinct minority groups like blacks and Hispanics may be aggregated for purposes of vote dilution claims under Section 2. However, disagreeing with the underlying legal analysis, the panel believed that such precedent should be overturned. Thus, the panel requested a poll for en banc hearing. View "Petteway v. Galveston County" on Justia Law