Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Nine female detention service officers sued Dallas County, alleging that this sex-based scheduling policy violates Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination. Constrained by our decades-old, atextual precedent, a panel upheld the dismissal of the officers’ complaint, ruling that the discriminatory scheduling policy did not amount to an “ultimate employment decision.”   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that a plaintiff plausibly alleges a disparate-treatment claim under Title VII if she pleads discrimination in hiring, firing, compensation, or the “terms, conditions, or privileges” of her employment. She need not also show an “ultimate employment decision,” a phrase that appears nowhere in the statute and that thwarts legitimate claims of workplace bias. Here, giving men full weekends off while denying the same to women—a scheduling policy that the County admits is sex-based—states a plausible claim of discrimination under Title VII. View "Hamilton v. Dallas County" on Justia Law

AKD Investments, LLC (AKD), filed for bankruptcy. At that time, Magazine Investments I, LLC (Magazine), held the notes on AKD’s main asset, a building on Magazine Street in New Orleans, Louisiana. After Magazine resumed foreclosure proceedings, AKD sought permission from the bankruptcy court to obtain financing to pay off Magazine’s notes and thereby avoid the looming foreclosure sale of the building. In a February 2015 order, the bankruptcy court authorized the transaction, and the parties performed under the order. The bankruptcy court confirmed AKD’s reorganization plan in April 2017. In August 2020, AKD brought this action against Magazine as a core proceeding within the still-open bankruptcy case. AKD alleged that it had overpaid Magazine in 2015 and sought to recoup the overpayment. But the bankruptcy court granted summary judgment to Magazine. AKD contends that the bankruptcy court erred in applying the law-of-the-case doctrine because the 2015 order did not actually decide the amount AKD owed Magazine.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the bankruptcy court’s 2015 Order is internally contradictory. Its meaning is, therefore, ambiguous as to the question at hand: Whether the Order actually decided the correct amount that AKD owed to Magazine. Accordingly, we defer to the bankruptcy court’s reasonable interpretation of its Order—that it did—and affirm its invocation of the law-of-the-case doctrine to grant Magazine summary judgment as to AKD’s claim here. View "AKD Invsts v. Magazine Invsts I" on Justia Law

The Satanic Temple and one of its members sued the Texas Health and Human Services Commission (“THHSC”), its Executive Commissioner, and the Planned Parenthood Center for Choice, Inc., seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against several Texas abortion laws.Plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and a preliminary injunction against the Commissioner; the district court denied the motion. The Satanic Temple appealed.While the appeal was pending, the litigation continued in district court. Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the suit without prejudice but without leave to replead.On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court had jurisdiction to proceed on the merits of the case. An appeal from a grant or denial of a preliminary injunction does not divest the district court of jurisdiction or restrain it from taking other steps in the litigation. The district court, therefore, had jurisdiction to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims despite the pending appeal. Thus, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Satanic Temple v. TX Hlth and Human" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress on two grounds: (1) that officers lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop of his vehicle, and (2) that Defendant did not voluntarily consent to the search of his home and truck during the stop. Defendant also appealed his sentencing, arguing that the district court erred in relying on the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) to sentence him under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) rather than any evidence required by Shepard v. United States 544 U.S. 13 (2005).The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress but reversed the district court’s application of the ACCA, vacated his sentence, and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that the Shepard-documents do not conclusively show that Defendant’s predicate offenses occurred on three separate occasions. Thus, the district court’s error affected a substantial right, and the court wrote that it must vacate the sentence. Further, given the fact that Wooden was decided after the notice of appeal was filed, the court remanded the case for a full resentencing, at which time the Government may introduce any additional Shepard evidence into the record. View "USA v. Alkheqani" on Justia Law

Defendant a federal prisoner, appeals the denial of this 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 motion alleging breach of his plea agreement based on serious allegations against Assistant U.S. Attorneys and ineffective assistance of counsel.   The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s application of the procedural bar to the breach-of-plea agreement claim and reversed and remanded but affirmed its disposition of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The court explained that further factfinding is necessary to decide whether Defendant was prejudiced. To show prejudice, “the petition must show ‘not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.’” Here, the court explained that the government argues that Defendant cannot establish prejudice because the Louisiana USAO did not breach the plea agreement and because Defendant would have pled guilty even if he knew of the second indictment. The court reasoned that the district court is in the best position to determine the veracity of these claims. But the district court grounded its ruling on the cause and never addressed the arguments regarding prejudice. Therefore, the court remanded to the district court with instructions to determine (1) whether Defendant or his counsel knew or should have known of the Texas indictment before Defendant’s sentencing and (2), if not, whether Defendant was prejudiced. View "USA v. Cuff" on Justia Law

Pro se Plaintiffs-Appellants Alejandro Hernandez and his wife, Edith Schneider-Hernandez, appeal the dismissal of their claims against Defendant-Appellees West Texas Treasures Estate Sales, L.L.C., Linda Maree Walker, and Aaron Anthony Enriquez (jointly, the “Defendants”) arising from an encounter they had at an estate sale.   The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that the district court abused its discretion. The court explained that construing all reasonable inferences in the Plaintiffs’ favor, they may be able to supply additional allegations to support a plausible claim. The district court’s opinion essentially concedes that it could have benefited from more detailed pleadings, specifically about the severity of Plaintiff’s asthma and the impact of PTSD on the Plaintiffs’ daily activities. However, the district court did not address the Plaintiffs’ request for an opportunity to amend their Complaint. Thus, the basis for its decision not to allow leave to amend is unknown. View "Hernandez v. West Texas Treasures" on Justia Law

Defendant, a corporal with the Shreveport Police Department, shot Plaintiff four times. Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 suit against Defendant. After a bench trial, the district court ruled that Defendant was protected by qualified immunity. Plaintiff’s estate filed a motion for reconsideration or, in the alternative, a new trial. The district court denied the motion without explanation. Plaintiff’s estate timely appealed. Plaintiff’s estate contests the district court’s factual finding that Defendant could not see Plaintiff’s left hand when he opened fire because “Defendant has no credibility.”   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that when considering qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage, the prior panel of the Fifth Circuit court affirmed that the video potentially supported a finding that Defendant could see that Plaintiff was unarmed, but that panel agreed that the video did not require such a finding. The court explained that given its deferential standard of review, it declines to disturb the district court’s factual determination on that point. The court wrote that based on the district court’s finding that Defendant reasonably believed that Plaintiff was reaching for a weapon, the district court properly held that Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity. View "Creech Poole v. City of Shreveport" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of thirteen financial crimes. Defendant filed a series of pro se motions for compassionate release. This appeal arises from Defendant's third such motion. Defendant asked to be released based on the dangers posed by the pandemic, his close confinement with other prisoners, his age, and his preexisting heart condition. He also states that his wire fraud conviction was wrongful because it was predicated on a purely intrastate wire transmission and that a wrongful conviction is an extraordinary and compelling reason justifying relief. The motion was denied in a brief order shortly after being filed.   The Fifth Circuit ordered a limited remand for the district court to explain its reasons. The court explained that the district court’s order does not tell us that the court based its decision on Section 3553(a) factors. It states only that the court “considered Defendant’s motion and the applicable law” and determined that the motion should be denied. The court explained that, therefore, it has no reliable indication of the reason for the court’s decision to deny relief. View "USA v. Stanford" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is the former Chief Financial Officer of the Cypress Bayou Casino. The Casino is owned by the Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana. The Chitimacha Tribe is one of four federally recognized Indian tribes in Louisiana. According to the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint, the Chitimacha tribal council authorized Spivey (as CFO of the Casino) to make a $3,900 bonus payment to the then-newly elected chairman of the tribal council. Plaintiff claimed that several members of the tribal council turned around and reported the bonus payment to federal and state law enforcement. Plaintiff initially sued the Tribe, the Casino, and four tribal council members in federal court under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983 and 1985 and Louisiana tort law. The district court, over Plaintiff’s objections, again adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations, denied Plaintiff’s remand motion, and dismissed all Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded to state court. The court first wrote that when a district court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a removed case, it must remand. The court held, in accordance with the statute’s plain text and the great weight of authority from across the country, that Section 1447(c) means what it says, admits of no exceptions, and requires remand even when the district court thinks it futile. Moreover, the court held that such a dismissal should be made without prejudice. View "Spivey v. Chitimacha Tribe" on Justia Law

After slipping on a puddle of water in a Wal-Mart store, Plaintiff sued Defendant Wal-Mart Inc. and Wal-Mart Louisiana, L.L.C. in federal district court. The district court granted summary judgment for the Defendants, and Plaintiff appealed.   The court reversed and remanded because Plaintiff has raised genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. The court explained that at least two Wal-Mart employees were in the area who reasonably could have seen the puddle. Another shopper notified one Walmart employee in the area, who was bringing a wet floor sign. After the shopper returned to the area of the puddle and before Plaintiff slipped, the video surveillance shows another Wal-Mart employee walk past the puddle, looking in its direction. The shopper testified the puddle was visible, glimmering and reflecting light. Moreover, it was raining, and this area—known as “action alley”—was high-traffic, which, like in Courville, reduced the amount of time necessary to put Wal-Mart on notice. The court explained that Plaintiff has provided direct evidence that the puddle existed for “some period of time.” Under these circumstances and on summary judgment, Plaintiff has presented enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that the period of time the puddle existed was sufficient to place the Defendants on notice of its existence. View "Flowers v. Wal-Mart" on Justia Law