Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A group of Doctors sued the FDA and the Department of Health and Human Services (together, the “Agencies”), claiming an FDA ad intended to deter people from off-label use of ivermectin to treat COVID-19. Each Doctor says that FDA’s messaging interfered with their own individual medical practice.The Doctors argue that FDA’s ad and similar public statements violated FDA’s enabling act (“Act”) and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The district court held that sovereign immunity protects the Agencies and the Officials, and it dismissed the suit. The Fifth Circuit reversed.The Fifth Circuit held that the Doctors can use the APA to bypass sovereign immunity and assert their ultra vires claims against the Agencies and the Officials. The ad was plausibly agency action, because it publicly announced the general principle that consumers should not use ivermectin to treat the coronavirus, and the Doctors fall within the Act’s zone of interests.The Doctors’ pure APA claim cannot go forward because the ad does not determine legal rights and thus lacks the finality. However, the Fifth Circuit held that the Doctors’ first theory was enough to allow this suit to proceed. View "Apter v. Dept of Health & Human Svc" on Justia Law

This is a class action brought by Louisiana sheriffs and Louisiana law enforcement districts against purveyors of software. The sheriffs and law enforcement districts allege that the software purveyors sold them defective software and then failed to administer the software properly.Defendants include both in-state and out-of-state software purveyors. The Class Action Fairness Act excludes federal jurisdiction over class actions with “less than 100” plaintiff class members. However, from 2015 to late 2018, only in-state Defendants were responsible for the alleged wrongdoing. An out-of-state defendant bears responsibility for the alledged conduct after 2018.Plaintiffs sued in Louisiana state court. Defendants removed to federal district court. Plaintiffs then sought remand to Louisiana state court, arguing that the local controversy exception to the Class Action Fairness Act applied. The magistrate recommended remand under the local controversy exception. The district court adopted the magistrate’s report. Defendants appeal.To be heard in federal court, a class action must have at least a hundred plaintiff class members. Plaintiffs argued that this class action is not removable to federal court because it has fewer than a hundred class members. The Fifth Circuit held that the law enforcement districts are separate entities from the sheriffs under 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(5)(B).However, the Fifth Circuit remanded to state court on alternate grounds. The Class Action Fairness Act establishes a local controversy exception to federal jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(4). This exception requires at least one in-state defendant “whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims asserted” and “from whom significant relief is sought.” View "State of Louisiana v. i3 Verticals" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty by jury of conspiring with intent to distribute cocaine and distributing a detectable amount of a substance containing cocaine base. Defendant was sentenced under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), which requires the Government must show that a defendant knew that the conspiracy involved a minimum quantity of the controlled substance. Defendant was sentenced to 480 months imprisonment on the first count and 240 months on the second.Defendant appealed on several sentencing-related issues: (1) the district court imposed a “trial penalty” in sentencing him; (2) the district court erred in determining the quantity of drugs attributable to him, (3) the propriety of the jury charge and verdict form; and (4) the district court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence.The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The judge's comments referring to various codefendants' cooperative efforts did not indicate the court imposed a trial penalty. Further, a participant in a drug conspiracy is responsible for all drug quantities with which he was “directly involved,” as well as for quantities “involved in transactions carried out by other participants. Moreover, there was overwhelming evidence that Defendant “knew or should have known [the drug amount that] was involved in the conspiracy[.]” View "USA v. Hill" on Justia Law

Due to a settlement in a civil matter, Plaintiff, an inmate incarcerated in Gatesville, Texas had an inmate trust fund worth nearly $100,000.00. In December of 2019, Plaintiff made a suspicious withdrawal, and Appellee, a former senior warden, notified her that she was under investigation for trafficking. Shortly after, Plaintiff was found guilty of the lowest level of rule violation. Plaintiff now asserts that she has submitted approximately three or four separate withdrawal requests to TDCJ, which were all denied without notice or an opportunity to be heard in violation of her procedural due process rights. The district court granted summary judgment to all Appellees and entered a final judgment. Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 59(e) and a Rule 15(a) motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, which the district court denied.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and reversed the district court’s ruling denying Plaintiff’s Rule 59(e) motion. The court explained that the Ex Parte Young exception applies to this case. The court explained that any of Plaintiff’s claims seeking declaratory relief based on purported constitutional violations occurring in the past, as well as any requests for monetary damages, are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. However, her claims to enjoin a future action that might violate her constitutional rights may proceed. Further, the court held that Plaintiff provided evidence that her procedural due process rights were violated, which precludes summary judgment. Finally, the court found that the court erred in not vacating the judgment and granting Plaintiff leave to amend her pleadings. View "Calhoun v. Collier" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of capital murder by a Texas jury and sentenced to death. He later filed an application in district court for habeas relief. In an earlier appeal, because his initial counsel had a conflict of interest, the Fifth Circuit remanded for appointment of additional counsel and further development of potential claims of ineffective trial counsel. An amended application was filed, but the district court rejected all the new claims.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and denied Petitioner’s motion for a Rhines stay. The court explained that as to the four claims for which the district court granted a COA, Petitioner has not shown that trial counsel’s actions in investigating, compiling, and presenting mens rea and mitigating evidence fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. As to the remaining claims for which the court granted a COA, the court found that Petitioner has not shown that trial counsel was ineffective for presenting the expert witness’s testimony, and Petitioner’s request for a Rhines stay is plainly meritless in this context.   The court explained that the expert’s testimony was not so unreasonable, as the expert also testified that Petitioner was still an adolescent and that his brain would not be fully developed until his mid-twenties, helping to explain his psychological condition. Further, the expert opined that Petitioner “has the potential to develop a sense of self and the potential for rehabilitation and some type of spiritual conversion.” Viewed as a whole, it was not deficient of trial counsel to believe this testimony would help Petitioner. View "Mendoza v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

The underlying case against Defendants TeamHealth—a group of private equity-owned healthcare entities—was brought under the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act. Two former TeamHealth employees (together, the “Relators”) alleged that TeamHealth routinely billed for nonexistent doctor examinations and critical care services. The matter was unsealed in 2018 after federal and state governments declined to intervene. The Relators moved forward with their case, which survived dismissal and proceeded through extensive discovery. Movant sought to permissively intervene in this closed matter to challenge the sealing of records. The district court denied Movant’s intervention on three independent grounds.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained that although courts are afforded great discretion in deciding intervention pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b), the district court’s reasoning was premised on several significant errors. The court explained it has permitted intervention by nonparties who seek only to challenge record-related restrictions. The court concluded that Movant’s claim shares a common question of law with the district court’s decisions related to sealing records: Whether there are compelling reasons for sealing that outweigh the public’s right of access. Thus, the court reversed the district court’s determination that Movant has failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 24(b)(1).  The court explained that it firmly holds that Movant has satisfied standing and the requirements of Rule 24(b)(1), however, it reiterated the district court’s discretion in ultimately deciding Movant’s motion. View "USA v. Team Finance" on Justia Law

The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) sued Defendant as well as other individual Defendants and corporate entities for securities violations. Defendant appealed the district court’s order appointing a receiver over all corporations and entities controlled by him. A central dispute between the parties is what test the district court should have applied before imposing a receivership. Defendant argued the district court abused its discretion because it did not apply the standard or make the proper findings under the factors set forth in Netsphere (“Netsphere factors”). The SEC responded that Netsphere is inapplicable and the district court’s findings were sufficient under First Financial.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s order appointing a receiver. The court granted in part Defendant’s motion for a partial stay pending appeal. The court explained that, as Defendant points out, the district court’s order denying the stay discussed events and actions that took place after the receivership was already in place. Accordingly, the court vacated the appointment of the receiver and remanded so that the district court may consider whether to appoint a new receivership under the Netsphere factors. The court immediately suspended the receiver’s power to sell or dispose of property belonging to receivership entities, including the power to complete sales or disposals of property already approved by the district court. The court explained that the suspension does not apply to activities in furtherance of sales or dispositions of property that have already occurred or been approved by the district court. The court clarified that “activities in furtherance” do not include the completion of the sale of any property. View "SEC v. Barton" on Justia Law

PHH Mortgage Corporation (PHH) is the successor-in-interest to Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (Ocwen). PHH filed suit against Old Republic in district court, alleging a single cause of action for breach of contract. Old Republic filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that PHH’s breach of contract claim failed as a matter of law because there was no defect in title to the Entire Southern Tract. The district court denied the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment without reaching the merits of either motion. Rather, the district court construed the parties’ claims as a request for a declaration of title in the Entire Southern Tract. On this basis, the district court determined that any person claiming an interest in the Entire Southern Tract is a required party under Rule 19 and dismissed the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7).   The Fifth Circuit vacated and dismissed. The court explained that the district court’s Rule 19(a) analysis is rooted in a misunderstanding of Texas law. Contrary to the district court’s conclusion below, Texas law draws a sharp distinction between a breach of contract action against a title insurance company and a trespass-to-try-title action. Further, the court explained that by deciding to dismiss this case based solely on its conclusions under Rule 19(a), the district court failed to do what “Rule 19 clearly requires a court to do: undertake an examination of the practical and equitable Rule 19(b) factors actually raised by the absence of a particular party in the case before it.” View "PHH Mortgage v. Old Republic National" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the terms of his supervised release arguing that there is an impermissible conflict between the district court’s oral pronouncement and written judgment. In the presentence report, the probation officer recommended various mandatory and standard conditions of supervision. The probation officer also recommended a special condition, as Defendant was a legal alien permanent resident, but his arrest would have rendered him subject to deportation proceedings. The district court imposed a guidelines sentence of imprisonment for 95 months with three years of supervised release. The court orally adopted the special conditions recommended in the presentence report and orally informed Defendant that he must be legally authorized to reenter the country, as is reflected in the written judgment. Defendant appealed, arguing that the work-authorization condition in the written judgment conflicts with the oral pronouncement of his sentence and that the written judgment should be amended to conform to the oral pronouncement.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that there is no conflict between the district court’s oral pronouncement of Defendant’s sentence and its written judgment. The work-authorization condition does not broaden the restrictions in Defendant’s supervised release already in place under the oral pronouncement. The court wrote that the purported “conflict” is then best described as an ambiguity— one that can be resolved by looking to entire record to determine the sentencing court’s intent in imposing the condition. The court explained that the record makes sufficient reference to Defendant’s immigration history to discern the district court’s efforts to ensure that Defendant complied with the relevant immigration laws. View "USA v. Pelayo-Zamarripa" on Justia Law

After pleading guilty to one count of receiving child pornography, Defendant was sentenced to a 168–month term of imprisonment followed by a 15–year term of supervised release. During Defendant’s term of supervised release, the district court modified a number of the special conditions imposed. Defendant appealed, challenging the district court’s jurisdiction to modify his supervised release conditions and contesting the substantive reasonableness of the conditions imposed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court has jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. Section 3583(e)(2) to modify conditions of supervised release and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning these conditions. The court explained that a district court cannot modify an unlawful condition under Section 3583(e)(2) if the illegality of that condition is the basis for modification, regardless of whether it was the defendant or government who brought the motion challenging the conditions. In the case at hand, however, Defendant’s appeal fails because the government did not move for modification solely on the basis of illegality, and the district court did not premise its ruling on the illegality of the special condition.   Next, Defendant contended that even if the district court’s ruling was not based on the illegality of a condition, the district court still lacked authority to modify his conditions of supervised release because there was not a “change in circumstance” that precipitated the modification nor was there a “compelling cause” for the modification. The court explained that it has found no cases requiring a “change in circumstance” or “compelling cause” to modify a condition of supervised release. View "USA v. Caillier" on Justia Law