Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Seven years ago, A.D. was hired to create a PVT (“pressure volume temperature”) simulation software program. Sah was hired by A.D. to develop a PVT software program in exchange for a stake in one of A.D.’s companies, IPSS. Eight months later, a product called InPVT hit the market. Plaintiff Calsep started looking into InPVT. In Calsep’s assessment, A.D. didn’t have the technical skills or resources to develop a PVT product. Calsep filed another motion to compel, alleging that A.D. still hadn’t adequately disclosed his source code control system. Although A.D. had “produced [a] purported source code system” in April and July, Calsep claimed that these productions were “undoubtedly incomplete” and “had been manipulated.” Believing the deletions to be intentional, Calsep filed a motion for sanctions. Afterward, A.D. filed a motion for reconsideration based on newly discovered forensic images that “vindicated” him. The magistrate judge recommended denying the motion, and the district court agreed, denying the motion for reconsideration of the sanctions order. A.D. appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision on A.D.'s motion for reconsideration. The court explained that A.D. cannot offer any reason—other than mere forgetfulness—why he couldn’t acquire the images sooner. Further, A.D. hasn’t shown that he acted with diligence during the case to locate these images. Moreover, the court explained that although A.D. argues that the images change the game, Calsep’s expert insists that too much data is still missing from the source code control system, rendering a proper review impossible. The court noted that there was no reason to question the district court’s judgment crediting Calsep’s expert testimony. View "Calsep v. Dabral" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was convicted of the 2000 murder of an 80-year-old woman. After the jury found him to be guilty of the offense, evidence of his future dangerousness was offered at sentencing. Among the evidence was testimony from the victim of another vicious crime who identified Plaintiff as her attacker. Plaintiff was not tried for that offense. Plaintiff is now seeking DNA testing of evidence from that other crime that he argues could exonerate him. A different district court agreed with a similar argument and declared that Texas must provide testing if a sufficient basis is shown that it would have affected sentencing and not just the finding of guilt. The district court relied on the pendency of a decision in Gutierrez as a reason to grant Plaintiff a stay of execution. The State of Texas sought to vacate the stay of execution.   The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that a stay is appropriate at least until a decision in that case. The court explained that at that time it will order additional briefing. Accordingly, the court entered no ruling on the motion to vacate the stay at this time. The related appeal has similar issues that could affect the proper resolution in this case. Waiting for that decision is not required by any general procedural rule or by rules of the court. Nonetheless, the court explained that it should wait for that decision unless there is some basis to distinguish the present appeal. View "Murphy v. Nasser" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was convicted of the 2000 murder of an 80-year-old woman. After the jury found him to be guilty of the offense, evidence of his future dangerousness was offered at sentencing. Among the evidence was testimony from the victim of another vicious crime who identified Plaintiff as her attacker. Plaintiff was not tried for that offense . Plaintiff is now seeking DNA testing of evidence from that other crime that he argues could exonerate him. The State of Texas filed an emergency appeal seeking to vacate a stay of execution entered by the district court. The issue on which the district court decided to enter a stay is whether the inmate is entitled to have DNA testing performed on certain evidence. The district court granted a stay because similar issues were pending before the Fifth Circuit in a case brought by a different Texas prisoner. That related case is fully briefed and has been orally argued, and a decision in the case is pending.   The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that a stay is appropriate, at least until a decision in that related pending case. The court explained that here the district court order bars Texas officials from carrying out “lawful and important conduct” because it prevents them from performing Plaintiff’s execution. Moreover, the district court’s order does not operate on the judicial proceeding but restricts the actions of specific defendants. That is the function of an injunction.  The court entered no ruling on the motion to vacate the stay at this time. Therefore, the stay of execution will remain in effect. View "Murphy v. Nasser" on Justia Law

Defendants United Services Automobile Association and USAA General Indemnity Company (“USAA”) contract with insureds to pay “Actual Cash Value” (“ACV”) for totaled vehicles. USAA calculates ACV using the CCC One Market Valuation Report (“CCC”) rather than, e.g., the National Automobile Dealers Association guidebook (“NADA”) or Kelley Blue Book (“KBB”). Plaintiffs are USAA-insureds whose vehicles were totaled and who received ACV as determined by CCC. Plaintiffs alleged that CCC violates Louisiana statutory law, that they would have been paid more if USAA used NADA, and that they are owed the difference. Plaintiffs sought certification for a class of USAA-insureds who were paid less under CCC, and the district court granted it. USAA appealed class certification. On appeal, the parties dispute, among other things, whether common questions across the class involving damages and liability predominate over individual differences between class members, as required for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3).   The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded. The court held that Plaintiffs failed to show injury and therefore failed to establish USAA’s liability on a class-wide basis because they failed to demonstrate entitlement to the NADA values for their totaled vehicles. The court held that with respect to Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim, the district court’s choice of NADA is not simply an arbitrary choice among imperfect damages models. It is an arbitrary choice of a liability model, and a district court’s wide discretion to choose an imperfect estimative-damages model at the certification stage does not carry over from the context of damages to the context of liability. View "United Svcs Automobile v. Sampson" on Justia Law

Two people were killed while unclogging a machine at Darling Ingredients, Inc., a chicken rendering plant. When the Occupational Safety and Health Agency (OSHA) investigated, it found that the plant’s “lockout/tagout” procedures did not “clearly and specifically outline” how to safely work on the machine, so it cited the plant’s owner. Darling challenged the citations before the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission.  After the trial, the ALJ ruled in favor of OSHA, finding that (1) Darling did violate Section 147; (2) the violation was a repeat; (3) it was serious; and (4) Darling waived any “independent employee misconduct” defense. Darling appealed all of these decisions, save for the serious classification.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that Darling’s argument is flawed for a couple of reasons. First, there are steps that a worker can take besides waiting around. Second, doing nothing is doing something; if waiting was the right thing to do, there is no reason that Darling’s procedure could not say that. The court concluded that there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding of noncompliance, namely that Darling failed to “clearly and specifically outline the . . . rules and technique to be utilized for the control of hazardous energy. The court concluded that the ALJ’s determination that Darling had knowledge of its Section 147 violations is supported by the law and substantial evidence. View "Darling Ingredients v. OSHC" on Justia Law

This ERISA case concerns the National Football League’s retirement plan, which provides disability pay to hobbled NFL veterans whose playing days are over but who are still living with debilitating, often degenerative injuries to brains and bodies, including neurotrauma. The claimant, former NFL running back Michael Cloud, suffered multiple concussions during his eight-year career, leaving him physically, neurologically, and psychologically debilitated. After the Social Security Administration found him entitled to disability benefits, Cloud went back to the NFL Plan and sought reclassification to a higher tier of benefits. Cloud was awarded a higher tier but not the highest tier. Cloud again filed a claim to be reclassified at the most generous level of disability pay. The NFL Plan denied reclassification on several grounds. Cloud sued the NFL Plan. The district court ordered a near doubling of Cloud’s annual disability benefits. The district court awarded top-level benefits under the Plan instead of remanding for another round at the administrative.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court wrote that it is compelled to hold that the district court erred in awarding top-level benefits to Cloud. Although the NFL Plan’s review board may well have denied Cloud a full and fair review, and although Cloud is probably entitled to the highest level of disability pay, he is not entitled to reclassification to that top tier because he cannot show changed circumstances between his 2014 claim for reclassification and his 2016 claim for reclassification—which was denied and which he did not appeal. View "Cloud v. NFL Player Retirement Plan" on Justia Law

This litigation stems from the bankruptcy of Imperial Petroleum Recovery Corporation (“IPRC”). IPRC once marketed microwave separation technology (“MST”) machines, which purported to recover usable oil from various emulsions. The Carmichael parties held security interests in IPRC’s assets—including its MST units. The Carmichaels filed an involuntary Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding against IPRC. After various proceedings, the amended judgment cut the actual damages owed to the Carmichaels to $4,000, cut the fee and cost award to around $92,000, and made no provision for post-judgment interest. All told, the sum due to the Carmichael parties declined roughly 96%, from over $2.3 million to approximately $96,000. The Carmichaels appealed to the district court. The district court affirmed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court wrote that the bankruptcy court’s factual findings related to the assigned assets were not clearly erroneous. The court wrote that the district court’s damages award nevertheless rested on clearly erroneous factual findings. The court explained that the Carmichaels are entitled to post-judgment interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1961. Finally, the court disposed of the Carmichaels’ contention that the bankruptcy court’s judgment did not provide adequate declaratory relief. The court wrote that applying a preponderance standard and viewing the record holistically, it is persuaded that the Carmichaels’ damages for reassembly exceed $4,000. But the court wrote that it does not attempt to specify the Carmichaels’ reassembly damages here. Instead, the court remanded so that the bankruptcy court may consider the Carmichaels’ asserted damages under the correct standard of proof. View "Carmichael v. Balke" on Justia Law

Sixteen professional models (the Models) sued three Texas strip clubs (the Clubs) following the Clubs’ use of the Models’ likeness for advertising campaigns without the Models’ consent. Relevant to those claims, Princeton Excess and Surplus Lines Insurance Company (PESLIC) filed this declaratory judgment action. PESLIC issued two commercial liability insurance policies to the Clubs covering the time period relevant to the Models’ claims. PESLIC named both the Models and the Clubs as Defendants. The parties disputed whether that policy’s Exhibitions and Related Marketing Exclusion rendered illusory the Personal and Advertising Injury coverage. The district court agreed with the Models and the Clubs that it did. The district court also held that PESLIC had a duty to indemnify the Clubs under the 02 Policy. PESLIC appealed.   The Fifth Circuit reversed, rendered in part, and remanded. The court explained that PESLIC does not have a duty to defend the Clubs under the 01 Policy. Its duty to indemnify under the 01 Policy depends on the final resolution of the state case. As for the 02 Policy, PESLIC does not have a duty to defend or indemnify under it because the 02 Policy does not provide coverage for the claims alleged by the Models. The court held that the district court erred by concluding otherwise. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s summary judgment, rendered in part, and remanded the remaining issue of indemnity under the 01 Policy with instructions for the district court to stay disposition of that issue pending final resolution of the underlying state court lawsuit. View "Princeton Excess v. AHD Houston" on Justia Law

After a fatal truck accident claimed the lives of members of two families, the victims' families filed a personal injury action against the trucking company. The trucking company's insurer ultimately transferred $1 million to the law firm representing one of the families. The insurer then notified the other family that the policy limits had been exhausted. That same day, the insurer submitted two checks: one to the victim's family and one to the law firm.The family that was not party to the settlement filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition against the trucking company. The trustee brought an adversary proceeding against the other victim's family and their law firm, seeking to avoid and recover the transfer of the policy proceeds pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Secs. 547 and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court denied the law firm's motion to dismiss.On appeal, the family that settled and the law firm argued that the district court erred in determining that the trucking company held an equitable property interest in the policy proceeds. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that these facts fit the "limited circumstances" under which the policy proceed are considered the property of the estate. View "Law Office of Rogelio Solis v. Curtis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff planned on hosting a music festival in Austin, Texas. However, Austin canceled the event due to concerns related to COVID-19. In turn, ticket holders who were refused a refund sued, resulting in a judgment against PLaintiff of over $1 million. Plaintiff sued its insurer for failure to defend against the class action. The district court denied Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed.On appeal. the parties agreed that the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332(a)(1) and Plaintiff claimed the Fifth Circuit had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291.Exercising its independent judgment, the Fifth Circuit could not find proper allegations or evidence of Plaintiff's citizenship, giving the parties an opportunity to respond. However, the Fifth Circuit found the proffered evidence of Plaintiff's citizenship insufficient, remanding the case for the limited purpose of determining whether jurisdiction exists. View "SXSW v. Federal Insurance" on Justia Law