Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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Cornelius Burgess, the former CEO of Herring Bank, was the subject of a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) enforcement action that began with an investigation in 2010 and formal proceedings in 2014. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) recommended in 2017 that Burgess be removed from his position, barred from the banking industry, and fined $200,000. The FDIC Board adopted this recommendation, but the enforcement order was stayed pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucia v. SEC, which addressed the constitutionality of ALJ appointments. After Lucia, the case was remanded for a new hearing before a properly appointed ALJ, who again recommended the same sanctions in 2022. Before the FDIC Board could issue its final order, Burgess filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, seeking to enjoin the Board from issuing its decision on constitutional grounds.The district court found it had jurisdiction to hear Burgess’s claims despite 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1), which generally precludes such jurisdiction. The court denied injunctive relief on Burgess’s claims regarding unconstitutional removal protections for the Board and ALJs, finding he had not shown harm from those provisions. However, it granted an injunction based on his Seventh Amendment claim, concluding he was likely to succeed on the merits and that the other factors for injunctive relief were met. The FDIC appealed the injunction, and Burgess cross-appealed the denial of relief on his removal claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1) explicitly strips district courts of subject matter jurisdiction to enjoin or otherwise affect the issuance or enforcement of FDIC orders, including on constitutional grounds. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of injunctive relief and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, declining to reach the merits of Burgess’s constitutional claims. View "Burgess v. Whang" on Justia Law

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Ernest Clark, while on probation for a Louisiana felony conviction of aggravated assault with a firearm, was found in possession of a firearm. He was indicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits felons from possessing firearms. Clark moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to him under the Second Amendment, violated the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee, and exceeded Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause. The district court denied his motion. Clark then pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, which included a waiver of most appellate rights except for a direct appeal of the district court’s order denying his motion to dismiss under the Second Amendment, as interpreted in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi sentenced Clark to 64 months in prison and three years of supervised release. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Clark raised several claims, but acknowledged that most were foreclosed or waived by his plea agreement, except for his as-applied Second Amendment challenge and his Fifth Amendment equal protection claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that disarming individuals convicted of violent felonies, such as aggravated assault with a firearm, and those found in possession of a firearm while on probation, is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court relied on its own recent precedents to conclude that Clark’s as-applied Second Amendment challenge failed. The court also found that Clark’s equal protection claim was waived by his plea agreement. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "USA v. Clark" on Justia Law

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Fire Protection Service, Inc. (FPS), a Texas business, served as a non-exclusive dealer for Survitec Survival Products, Inc., which manufactures and distributes marine safety products, including life rafts. These life rafts, each valued at over $15,000 and capable of accommodating up to 30 people, are required by federal law and international treaties to be installed on various types of navigable vessels used in industries such as offshore oil and gas, commercial fishing, and maritime shipping. In August 2017, Survitec terminated its dealership agreement with FPS without citing cause and did not repurchase FPS’s unsold inventory.FPS filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, alleging that Survitec’s actions violated the Texas Fair Practices of Equipment Manufacturers, Distributors, Wholesalers, and Dealers Act (“Dealer Act”). After a bench trial, the district court granted Survitec’s Rule 52(c) motion, ruling that the life rafts did not qualify as “Equipment” under the Act, and therefore the Act did not apply to the parties’ agreement.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s legal conclusions de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that Survitec’s life rafts are “Equipment” under the Dealer Act because they are used “in connection with” commercial activities covered by the Act, including construction, maintenance, mining (which encompasses oil and gas extraction), and industrial activities. The court found that the Act’s language and legislative intent support a broad interpretation, and that the life rafts meet the statutory definition. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Fire Protection v. Survitec Survival" on Justia Law

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Three employers—SpaceX, Energy Transfer, and Findhelp—each faced unfair labor practice complaints before the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Before administrative proceedings began, each employer filed suit in a different federal district court in Texas, challenging the constitutionality of the NLRB’s structure. Specifically, they argued that the dual for-cause removal protections for both NLRB Board Members and Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) unconstitutionally insulated these officials from presidential removal, violating Article II and the separation of powers.Each district court granted a preliminary injunction, halting the NLRB’s proceedings against the respective employer. The courts found that the removal protections for ALJs (and, in one case, for Board Members) were unconstitutional, that the employers would suffer irreparable harm if forced to proceed before an unconstitutionally structured agency, and that the balance of equities and public interest favored injunctive relief. The NLRB appealed, arguing that the district courts lacked jurisdiction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act and that the employers had not shown a likelihood of success or irreparable harm.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the consolidated appeals. The court held that the district courts had jurisdiction to enjoin the NLRB’s proceedings, as the employers’ constitutional challenges to the agency’s structure did not “grow out of a labor dispute” within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. On the merits, the Fifth Circuit held that the dual for-cause removal protections for NLRB ALJs are unconstitutional, following its own precedent in Jarkesy v. Securities & Exchange Commission. The court further held that the removal protections for Board Members likely violate Article II, as the NLRB’s structure does not fit within the narrow exception recognized in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States. The court also found that being subjected to proceedings before an unconstitutionally structured agency constitutes irreparable harm. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunctions granted by the district courts. View "Space Exploration v. NLRB" on Justia Law

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A predecessor of BP America Production Company obtained an offshore oil and gas lease from the United States in 1983. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. later acquired the lease and assigned it to Linder Oil Company, retaining certain deep operating rights. Linder Oil assumed all decommissioning obligations and indemnified Chevron. Linder Oil then assigned its interest to Reserves Management and Destin Resources, who later conveyed interests to Sojitz Energy Venture. Sojitz eventually transferred its interests back, and Linder Oil released Sojitz from decommissioning obligations. The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management required Linder Oil to provide performance bonds, which Lexon Insurance Company issued. After Linder Oil and related entities filed for bankruptcy and failed to complete decommissioning, the government called the bonds, and Lexon paid over $11 million. Chevron and Sojitz completed the decommissioning work, and Lexon sought reimbursement from them and BP America.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment based on stipulated facts. The magistrate judge recommended summary judgment for the defendants, finding Lexon was not entitled to reimbursement under theories of subrogation, contribution, or unjust enrichment, primarily because Louisiana law did not support Lexon’s claims. The district judge adopted this recommendation and dismissed Lexon’s claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Fifth Circuit held that federal law, including 31 U.S.C. § 9309, did not provide Lexon with a right to subrogation against the defendants, and that any gap in federal law was properly filled by Louisiana law, which did not entitle Lexon to subrogation, contribution, or unjust enrichment recovery under the circumstances. The court concluded that Lexon had no recourse against the defendants as required by Louisiana law and that any enrichment of the defendants was contractually justified. View "Lexon Insurance v. Chevron U.S.A." on Justia Law

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Robert Miller was arrested on July 31, 2019, and died the next day while in custody at the Tarrant County Jail. His wife, Shanelle Jenkins, was not notified by authorities of his death but learned about it several days later through a newspaper article. Jenkins alleges that, despite making several direct requests, she was unable to obtain information from Tarrant County or the Texas Rangers about the circumstances of her husband’s death. Nearly two years after Miller’s death, Jenkins filed a lawsuit against the Tarrant County Sheriff’s Office and Sheriff, alleging wrongful death and excessive force, but her complaint lacked specific factual allegations about how Miller died.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed Jenkins’s federal claims with prejudice due to insufficient factual allegations and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims. After the dismissal, Jenkins received documents from Tarrant County and the Texas Department of Public Safety that provided more details about Miller’s death. She sought relief from the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), but the district court denied her motion, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that Jenkins had not exercised due diligence in investigating her claims and that the evidence was not intentionally withheld.Jenkins then filed a new lawsuit on November 30, 2023, against ten individual defendants, asserting similar claims but with more detailed factual allegations. The district court again dismissed her claims, holding they were barred by Texas’s two-year statute of limitations and that equitable tolling did not apply because Jenkins failed to allege fraudulent concealment by the named defendants and did not exercise due diligence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that Jenkins’s claims accrued in August 2019 and were time-barred, and that equitable tolling was not warranted. View "Jenkins v. Tahmahkera" on Justia Law

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A student organization at West Texas A&M University, focused on supporting LGBT+ students, planned a charity drag show to raise funds for a suicide prevention initiative. The event was to be held in a university venue that had previously hosted a wide range of student and community events, including a prior drag show. The organizers took steps to ensure the show would be appropriate for a general audience, restricting lewd content and requiring minors to be accompanied by adults. Shortly before the event, the university president canceled the show, citing concerns that drag performances were discriminatory against women and did not align with the university’s values.Following the cancellation, the student group and two of its officers filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, seeking a preliminary injunction to allow future drag shows on campus. The district court denied the injunction, holding that drag shows were not inherently expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment and that the university president was entitled to qualified immunity. The court also found that the plaintiffs had standing against certain university officials but not others, and rejected the claim of irreparable harm.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the denial of the preliminary injunction de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the planned drag show was expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment, as it conveyed a clear message of support for the LGBT+ community in its context. The court determined that the university venue was a designated public forum, making the content-based restriction on the drag show subject to strict scrutiny, which the university did not attempt to justify. The court found the plaintiffs faced irreparable harm from the ongoing ban and that the balance of equities and public interest favored an injunction. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction against the university president and a vice president, affirmed the denial as to the chancellor for lack of standing, and remanded for entry of the injunction. View "Spectrum WT v. Wendler" on Justia Law

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The case concerns the parents of a pre-kindergarten student who alleged that their daughter was sexually abused by a substitute teacher at Lorena Primary School during the 2020-2021 academic year. Multiple school employees reported the teacher’s inappropriate behavior—such as allowing the child to sit on his lap, wear his clothes, and lie under a blanket with him—to the school principal, April Jewell. Despite these reports, Jewell did not investigate, warn the teacher, inform the child’s parents, or report the conduct to law enforcement. Instead, she reprimanded staff who raised concerns and reassigned a vigilant aide, which may have increased the child’s exposure to the abuser. The abuse continued throughout the school year, culminating in the teacher’s arrest, conviction, and lengthy prison sentence.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas reviewed the parents’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the child’s Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily integrity. The district court denied Jewell’s motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity, finding that the complaint sufficiently alleged that Jewell was deliberately indifferent to a known risk of sexual abuse and that her inaction caused the child’s injuries. Jewell appealed the denial of qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the denial de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ allegations, if proven, would establish that Jewell violated clearly established constitutional rights by acting with deliberate indifference to repeated reports of sexual misconduct, thereby causing the child’s injuries. The court also found that Jewell’s conduct could be considered conscience-shocking under substantive due process standards. Accordingly, the denial of qualified immunity was affirmed. View "Doe v. Jewell" on Justia Law

Posted in: Civil Rights
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During the COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S. House of Representatives adopted a rule permitting remote voting and proxy participation, allowing Members to be counted as present for quorum purposes even if not physically on the House floor. Using this procedure, the House passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023, with a majority of votes cast by proxy. The Act was subsequently passed by the Senate and signed into law by the President. The State of Texas challenged the validity of certain provisions of the Act, arguing that the Constitution’s Quorum Clause required a physical majority of Members to be present in the House chamber for business to be conducted.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas held a bench trial and found that Texas had standing to challenge the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, a provision of the omnibus legislation. The district court concluded that the enrolled-bill rule, which generally bars courts from questioning the validity of a law based on legislative procedure, did not apply to this constitutional challenge. On the merits, the district court determined that the Quorum Clause required physical presence and enjoined enforcement of the challenged provision against Texas.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of a permanent injunction. The Fifth Circuit held that the enrolled-bill rule did not bar judicial review of Texas’s constitutional claim because the facts were undisputed and the challenge was purely legal. The court then concluded that the Quorum Clause does not require physical presence, relying on the constitutional text, Supreme Court precedent, and historical congressional practice. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and vacated the permanent injunction, holding that the House’s proxy-voting rule did not violate the Quorum Clause. View "State of Texas v. Bondi" on Justia Law

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A white male lieutenant who had worked for the Louisiana State Police since 1995 applied for promotion to captain 31 times between 2008 and 2021 but was never selected. He alleged that, on at least two occasions, he was the most qualified candidate but was passed over in favor of non-white applicants. The two specific promotions at issue involved positions in specialized divisions where the selected candidates, both non-white, had prior experience in those divisions, while the plaintiff did not. The plaintiff claimed he had higher test scores, more time in grade, and more commendations than the selected candidates. Instead of promotion, he was offered opportunities to gain broader experience and interview advice, but he chose to retire and then filed suit alleging racial discrimination under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as well as constructive discharge and retaliation.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana dismissed the § 1981, constructive discharge, and retaliation claims, finding the § 1981 claim time-barred by Louisiana’s one-year statute of limitations for such actions. After discovery, the district court granted summary judgment to the employer on the Title VII claim, holding that the plaintiff failed to rebut the employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its promotion decisions—namely, the selected candidates’ relevant experience in the specific divisions. The court found no evidence that race was a motivating factor in the decisions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the summary judgment de novo and affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to present evidence sufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding pretext or mixed-motive discrimination under Title VII. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the § 1981 claim, agreeing that the one-year limitations period applied because the promotion would have created a new and distinct employment relationship. View "Stelly v. Dept of Public Safety" on Justia Law