Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant Compass Minerals Louisiana, Inc. (“Compass”) is part of a mineral company that owns and operates multiple salt mines. Among Compass’s locations is its Cote Blanche salt mine. Compass contracted with Louisiana-based companies Fire & Safety Specialists, Inc. (“FSS”) and MC Electric, LLC (“MCE”). An electrician employed by MCE died in an accident at the Cote Blanche salt mine. Both FSS and MCE held a commercial general liability policy with QBE. QBE filed a declaratory action in federal court, asserting that the indemnification and additional-insured provisions in the FSS and MCE purchase orders are “null, void, and unenforceable” under the Louisiana Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act (“LOAIA”). The court rejected QBE’s argument that Compass “drills for” salt by using the drill-and-blast method for breaking a salt wall. It concluded, relatedly, that the term “drilling for minerals” in the LOAIA “should be construed as referring to the drilling of a well.” QBE appealed.   Finding no clear and controlling precedent on this issue of Louisiana law, the Fifth Circuit certified two questions to the Louisiana Supreme Court: 1.     Does the Louisiana Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act, La. Stat. Ann. Section 9:2780, apply to provisions in agreements that pertain to “drilling for minerals,” even where the agreement does not “pertain to a well”? 2.     If the Act applies to agreements that pertain to “drilling for minerals,” irrespective of the agreement’s nexus to a well, does the Act apply to invalidate these indemnification and additional-insured provisions contained in contracts for fire suppression and electrical work in a salt mine, by virtue of the salt mine’s use of a “drill-and-blast” method for mining salt? View "QBE Syndicate 1036 v. Compass Minerals" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with and convicted of (1) producing child pornography, (2) committing that offense while being required to register as a sex offender, (3) possessing child pornography, and (4) sex trafficking of a child. All four charges involved his conduct with “Minor Victim-1” or “the Minor.” Defendant appealed his conviction for Count 4, sex trafficking of a child. He maintains that in light of Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844 (2014), 18 U.S.C. Section 1591 should not be interpreted to reach his conduct, which he terms a “purely local sex offense.”   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that overturning Defendant’s conviction under Bond requires him to show three things: (1) that allowing his conviction would “significantly change the federal-state balance,” (2) that Congress has not included a clear indication that they meant to reach “purely local crimes,” and (3) that his is a purely local crime. The court explained without expressing any view on (1) or (3), it determines that Defendant failed to demonstrate (2). Congress included a clear indication that Section 1591 is meant to reach “purely local crimes.” The court explained that it is not alone in adopting a broader interpretation of Section 1591 despite Bond. Because Congress included a clear indication that Section 1591 is meant to reach “purely local crimes,” Defendant’s argument under Bond fails. View "USA v. Renteria" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, then an Assistant Athletic Director at Louisiana State University (“LSU”)— internally reported Head Football Coach Les Miles for sexually harassing students. LSU retained outside counsel—Taylor, Porter, Brooks & Phillips LLP (“Taylor Porter”)—to investigate the matter, culminating in a formal report dated May 15, 2013 (the “Taylor Porter Report”). Matters were privately settled, and Miles stayed on as head coach until 2016. Lewis alleges that Defendants, members of LSU’s Board of Supervisors (the “Board”), leadership, and athletics department, along with lawyers at Taylor Porter (“Taylor Porter Defendants” and, collectively, “Defendants”), engaged in a concerted effort to illegally conceal the Taylor Porter Report and Miles’s wrong-doings. Plaintiff also alleged workplace retaliation for having reported Miles. She brings both employment and civil RICO claims. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s RICO-related allegations as time-barred and inadequately pleaded as to causation.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court considered when Plaintiff was first made aware of her injuries. It matters not when she discovered Defendants’ “enterprise racketeering scheme”—she alleges that this happened in March 2021 with the release of the Husch Blackwell Report. Plaintiff’s allegations make clear that she was made aware of her injuries much earlier. She was subject to overt retaliation after “Miles was cleared of any wrongdoing” by the Taylor Porter Report in 2013. Plaintiff alleged numerous harmful workplace interactions from that point forward. Given that Plaintiff filed her original complaint on April 8, 2021, her claims for injuries that were discovered—or that should have been discovered—before April 8, 2017, are time-barred. View "Lewis v. Danos" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are private shareholders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—government-sponsored home mortgage companies. Defendants include the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”), the Treasury, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the FHFA in their official capacities. The district court concluded that Plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged that the removal restriction caused them harm and dismissed their claims. It also dismissed their claims—raised for the first time on remand—that the FHFA’s funding mechanism is inconsistent with the Appropriations Clause, concluding that the claims were outside the scope of the Collins remand order in violation of the mandate rule. Plaintiffs raise two issues on appeal. The first is whether the district court erred in dismissing their claims that the unconstitutional removal restriction caused them harm. The second is whether the court erred in dismissing their Appropriations Clause claims.   The Fifth Circuit rejected Plaintiffs’ contentions and affirmed the dismissal of the removal and Appropriations Clause claims. The court explained that the anti-injunction clause applies and prevents courts from taking “any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of the [FHFA] as a conservator or a receiver.” Because Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief that would require the FHFA to take specific actions as conservator to restore Plaintiffs to the position they would have been in if not for the unconstitutional removal restriction, they asked the district court to “affect” the “function of the [FHFA] as a conservator[.]” So, Plaintiffs’ APA claims are barred. View "Collins v. Treasury" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was arrested and charged with interfering with the duties of a public servant. Eight hundred fifty-six days later, she brought suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against Harris County and a number of law enforcement officials, asserting a series of alleged constitutional rights violations. The district court found the applicable statute of limitations barred all claims and granted all Defendants’ respective motions to dismiss. On appeal, Plaintiff challenged the dismissal of her claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and failure to train, supervise, and discipline. She also asserted the district court erred in denying leave to amend her complaint. Finally, Plaintiff requested reassignment to a different district judge.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a false arrest claim accrues when charges are filed. Similarly, because a Section 1983 claim for false imprisonment is “based upon ‘detention without legal process,’” limitations run once “legal process [is] initiated.” Limitations had long lapsed by the time Plaintiff sued. The false arrest and false imprisonment claims are time-barred, and she concedes that no basis for tolling applies. Further, the court explained that Plaintiff’s proposed amendment includes twenty-three examples of arrests conducted by Precinct Seven officers that resulted in criminal charges later dismissed for lack of probable cause. They are of no use. All twenty-three lack critical factual detail. That, in turn, precludes Plaintiff from showing that the pattern of examples is sufficiently similar to her incident. Consequently, Plaintiff’s complaint—even as amended—would not survive a motion to dismiss. View "Johnson v. Harris County" on Justia Law

Communities can therefore regulate the so-called “secondary effects” of sexually oriented businesses (or “SOBs”), like crime and blight, without running afoul of the First Amendment. The City of Dallas passed Ordinance No. 32125 in 2022. The Ordinance requires licensed SOBs, such as cabarets, escort agencies, and adult video stores, to close between 2:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m.. Plaintiffs, a group of SOBs and their trade association, challenged the Ordinance under the First Amendment. After a hearing, the district court found that the City lacked reliable evidence to justify the Ordinance and that the Ordinance overly restricted Plaintiffs’ speech. It therefore preliminarily enjoined the Ordinance.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded. The court explained that under longstanding Supreme Court precedent, the Ordinance is likely constitutional. The City’s evidence reasonably showed a link between SOBs’ late-night operations and an increase in “noxious side effects,” such as crime. The court explained that it cannot say that the Ordinance substantially or disproportionately restricts speech. It leaves SOBs free to open for twenty hours a day, seven days a week, while also, in the City’s reasonable view, curtailing the violent crime and 911 calls with which the City was concerned. View "Assoc of Club Exct v. City of Dallas" on Justia Law

The City of Austin, Texas, issued an ordinance (1) declaring that the shoreline properties are within the city’s full purpose jurisdiction; (2) repealing a 1986 ordinance that putatively declared the shoreline properties to be within the city’s limited purpose jurisdiction but promised not to tax those properties until the city made city services available to them; and (3) announcing that the shoreline properties are subject to taxation by the city, albeit without providing city services. The owners asserted claims under the due process, equal protection, takings and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution, together with state law claims, and sought various declarations, injunctions, and writs of mandamus. They alternatively sought just compensation for the taking of their properties’ jurisdictional status. The district court dismissed all claims without prejudice as barred by the Tax Injunction Act. 28 U.S.C. Section 1341 Plaintiffs appealed that judgment.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court explained that apart from two minor exceptions, Plaintiffs do not ask the district court to “enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law.” Their claims thus fall outside the TIA. The court explained that Plaintiffs here seek the invalidation of the 2019 ordinance and a declaration that their properties are within the city’s extraterritorial or limited purpose jurisdiction. Although the ordinance authorized the taxation of Plaintiffs’ properties, the county tax assessor had to add their properties to the Travis County Appraisal District’s rolls, appraise the properties, determine their tax liabilities, levy the taxes, collect the taxes, and remit those payments to the city. View "Harward v. City of Austin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant had two children together. After the couple separated, the children remained in Mexico with Galaviz. In July 2021, Defendant took the children to El Paso and refused to return them. Plaintiff filed an action in the district court requesting the return of the children to Mexico under the Hague Convention. Defendant raised two affirmative defenses claiming that returning the children would violate their fundamental right to an education and would expose them to a grave risk of harm or an intolerable situation. The district court concluded that Defendant had satisfied his burden and denied Plaintiff’s request for the return of the children. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained that in the present case, the district court’s findings regarding the children’s healthcare, including the children’s cognitive decline, the fact that they remained non-verbal, or their regression to using diapers, may be supported by evidence that would be sufficient in a custody dispute. However, this evidence falls short of meeting Defendant’s clear and convincing burden. Finally, Defendant presented no evidence that unsuitable childcare would expose the children to a grave risk of harm. He merely expressed concern that Plaintiff often left the children with her older daughters, and they did not take care of the children. This is not clear and convincing evidence of a grave risk of harm. View "Galaviz v. Reyes" on Justia Law

When an armed fugitive held a 15-year-old girl hostage inside Plaintiff, City of McKinney (the “City”), police officers employed armored vehicles, explosives, and toxic-gas grenades to resolve the situation. The parties agree the officers only did what was necessary in an active emergency. However, Plaintiff’s home suffered severe damage, much of her personal property was destroyed, and the City refused to provide compensation. Plaintiff brought suit in federal court alleging a violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states that private property shall not “be taken for public use, without just compensation.” The district court held that, as a matter of law, the City violated the Takings Clause when it refused to compensate Baker for the damage and destruction of her property. The City timely appealed.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained that as a matter of history and precedent, the Takings Clause does not require compensation for damaged or destroyed property when it was objectively necessary for officers to damage or destroy that property in an active emergency to prevent imminent harm to persons. Plaintiff has maintained that the officers’ actions were precisely that: necessary, in light of an active emergency, to prevent imminent harm to the hostage child, to the officers who responded on the scene, and to others in her residential community. View "Baker v. City of McKinney" on Justia Law

A jury convicted United Development Funding (“UDF”) executives (collectively “Appellants”) of conspiracy to commit wire fraud affecting a financial institution, conspiracy to commit securities fraud, and eight counts of aiding and abetting securities fraud. Jurors heard evidence that Appellants were involved in what the Government deemed “a classic Ponzi-like scheme,” in which Appellants transferred money out of one fund to pay distributions to another fund’s investors without disclosing this information to their investors or the Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”). Appellants each filed separate appeals, challenging their convictions on several grounds. Considered together, they argue that (1) the jury verdict should be vacated because the evidence at trial was insufficient to support their convictions or, alternatively, (2) they are entitled to a new trial because the jury instructions were improper. Appellants also argue that the district court erred in (3) limiting cross-examination regarding a non-testifying government informant; (4) allowing the Government to constructively amend the indictment and include certain improper statements in its closing argument; (5) imposing a time limit during.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the jury verdict in its entirety. The court explained that considering the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict, a reasonable juror could have determined that Appellants made material misrepresentations in UDF III and UDF V’s filings that were sufficient to uphold their convictions. The court explained that multiple witnesses testified that the industry had shifted away from affiliate transactions because they were disfavored and that a no-affiliate-transaction policy in UDF V would enable it to participate in a larger network of brokers, dealers, and investors. View "USA v. Greenlaw" on Justia Law