Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Before Plaintiffs’ cases were distributed to the district court, these cases were part of MDL 2179, the multi-district litigation proceeding before United States District Court Judge Carl J. Barbier in the Eastern District of Louisiana. Judge Barbier established what is known as the “B3 Bundle” within the overall litigation. The B3 Bundle included claims for personal injury and wrongful death due to exposure to oil and/or other chemicals used during the response to the disaster. 85 B3 cases were assigned to District Judge Barry Ashe. Before his confirmation, Judge Ashe he was a longtime partner at the Stone Pigman law firm. A little more than two weeks after Judge Ashe began granting summary judgments following the exclusion of Dr. Cook, Street’s counsel moved to disqualify Judge Ashe in the five cases in which he had excluded Dr. Cook and in other cases where Daubert and summary judgment motions were still pending. Plaintiffs argued that Judge Ashe should have disqualified himself and, in the alternative, that he should have extended the case-management deadlines.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. If Judge Ashe erred when he failed to recuse in these cases, that error was harmless. Nonetheless, as the arguments on this appeal support, potential conflicts of interest must be taken seriously by every member of the judiciary. The litigants and the public need to be confident in the impartiality of those who will decide legal disputes. View "Lundy v. BP Expl & Prod" on Justia Law

N&W Marine Towing (N&W) filed in federal district court a verified complaint in limitation (the Limitation Action), pursuant to the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 (Limitation Act) and Rule F of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims. The complaint filed in N&W’s Limitation Action alleged that on February 29, 2020, the M/V Nicholas, which is owned by N&W, was towing six barges up the Mississippi River when the wake of a cruise ship, the Majesty of the Seas, caused one of the Nicholas’s face wires to break. After dismissing N&W from the case, no claims remained in the State Court Petition because Wooley had settled his claims against the other defendants. Therefore, the district court severed Wooley’s State Court Petition from the Limitation Action and dismissed it. The district court retained jurisdiction over the Limitation Action but stayed and administratively closed it to allow Wooley to pursue any claims available to him against N&W in Louisiana state court pursuant to the saving to suitors clause. N&W and Wooley cross-appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court determines that a nondiverse defendant was improperly joined, the improperly joined defendant’s citizenship may not be considered for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, and that defendant must be dismissed without prejudice. After determining that N&W had been improperly joined, the district court correctly considered only the citizenship of the properly joined State Court Petition defendants. As they were diverse from Wooley, removal based on diversity jurisdiction was permitted. View "Wooley v. N&W Marine Towing" on Justia Law

These consolidated cases continue the Fifth Circuit’s saga of Deepwater Horizon. Plaintiffs argue the district court judge abused his discretion by failing to disqualify himself at their request. The Street Plaintiffs do not challenge Judge Ashe’s decision to exclude the expert’s testimony under Daubert, nor do they raise any argument on the merits as to why his granting of summary judgment to BP was erroneous. In the briefing before the Fifth Circuit, the two arguments raised were that Judge Ashe should have disqualified himself and, in the alternative, that he should have extended the case-management deadlines. The Street plaintiffs argued that Judge Ashe abused his discretion for not disqualifying himself under 28 U.S.C. Section 455(b)(2) because he was a partner at Stone Pigman when it represented Cameron in the Phase One liability trial.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Street Plaintiffs do not challenge the judge’s actual impartiality on appeal. Instead, they rely solely on the “matter in controversy” language found in Section 455(b)(2) and argue that recusal was mandatory. The court explained that even mandatory recusal under Section 455(b)(2) can be harmless. The court wrote that if Judge Ashe erred when he failed to recuse in these cases, that error was harmless. Nonetheless, as the arguments on this appeal support, potential conflicts of interest must be taken seriously by every member of the judiciary. The litigants and the public need to be confident in the impartiality of those who will decide legal disputes. View "Street v. BP Expl & Prod" on Justia Law

The Nasdaq Stock Market, LLC (Nasdaq) proposed a rule that would require companies listed on its stock exchange to disclose information about their board members, as well as a rule that would give certain companies access to a board recruiting service. After the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) approved these rules, the Alliance for Fair Board Recruitment (AFBR) and the National Center for Public Policy Research (NCPPR) petitioned for review.   The Fifth Circuit denied the petitions because the SEC’s Approval Order complies with the Exchange Act and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The court wrote that the SEC’s point is that because the meaning of diversity varies globally, it is fair and desirable to let foreign issuers report diversity information according to nationally appropriate standards. Further, the court explained that AFBR does not explain how the SEC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in weighing burdens on competition against the purposes of the Exchange Act. Instead, AFBR argues that the SEC ignored “tremendous costs for firms that dare to defy the quotas. The court explained that the SEC did account for the costs that AFBR asserted in its comment letter. The SEC made a rational decision that those burdens on competition were “necessary or appropriate” to further the purposes of the Exchange Act. Therefore, AFBR has failed to meet its burden to show that the SEC’s Approval Order is arbitrary and capricious on this basis. View "Alliance for Fair Board Recruitment v. SEC" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of transporting illegal aliens and conspiracy to transport illegal aliens. But the government used inadmissible evidence to prove that the person being transported was in the United States unlawfully. Defendant challenged the district court’s ruling admitting the G-166F into evidence based on the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Sixth Amendment.   The Fifth Circuit vacated Defendant's conviction for transporting illegal aliens but affirmed Defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to transport illegal aliens and remanded for resentencing. The court explained that an alien-smuggling investigation report is not “essentially ministerial” as this court found the I-213 to be in Noria. 945 F.3d at 860. Instead, it is a criminal investigation report—the sort of document the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court therefore found that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the G-166F into evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Moreover, the court explained that it is the government’s burden to establish that using the challenged investigative report was constitutional. The government has not met that burden here. Therefore, admitting the G-166F into evidence violated Defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. However, the court explained that whether the men in Defendant’s car were actually illegal aliens is not relevant to any element in the conspiracy to transport illegal aliens charge. Accordingly, the court affirmed Defendant’s conviction for conspiracy. View "USA v. Foreman" on Justia Law

Defendant asserts that he is required by his religious faith to abstain from psychiatric medication. Defendant raised a religious objection to being involuntarily medicated without identifying a particular source of law. The district court denied the objection, concluding that: (1) the Government had a compelling interest in prosecuting Defendant’s crime, which was not outweighed by Defendant’s religious liberty interests; and (2) the Government satisfied the four Sell factors. Defendant appealed.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded. The court explained that Defendant faces a pending civil-confinement hearing in North Carolina. Moreover, he asserts that his religious belief as a Jehovah’s Witness prevents him from taking medication. He further asserts that forcible medication would violate his “constitutionally protected liberty.” The Government does not dispute that Defendant’s religious faith can qualify as a “special factor” under Sell. See Red Br. at 13–15; cf. Ramirez v. Collier, 595 U.S. 411, 426 (2022). Defendant’s religious beliefs, combined with his lengthy detention and his potential civil confinement, thus lessen the Government’s interests under the first Sell factor. The court emphasized that it holds only that religious liberty can constitute a “special circumstance” under Sell and that Defendant properly raised a religious objection to forcible medication here. That well-taken special circumstance, combined with other factors identified above, necessitates the district court’s reevaluation of the Government’s efforts to forcibly medicate him. View "USA v. Harris" on Justia Law

Kenai Ironclad Corporation (“Kenai” or “Plaintiff”) alleged that CP Marine Services, LLC, breached its contract to repair and convert Kenai’s offshore supply vessel to a salmon fishing tender for use in Alaska. After Kenai expressed dissatisfaction with the work, the relationship deteriorated. Kenai alleged that, after paying its final invoice, it attempted to remove its vessel from CP Marine’s shipyard, but as it did so, CP Marine and codefendant Ten Mile Exchange, LLC (“TME”) (collectively, “Defendants”) rammed, wrongfully seized, detained, and converted Kenai’s vessel for five days before finally releasing it the district court found that CP Marine did not breach its contract with Kenai but did wrongfully seize, detain, and convert the vessel. The district court awarded punitive damages and attorney’s fees for Defendants’ bad faith and reckless behavior in ramming, seizing, and converting the vessel for five days. Defendants appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that Defendants wrongfully seized and converted Kenai’s vessel in bad faith and in a manner egregious enough to warrant an award of punitive damages. The court vacated the district court’s award of damages and remanded on the limited basis of clarifying the court’s award. The court found that Kenai presented sufficient evidence and testimony to support the district court’s finding that Defendants’ conduct was in bad faith, in callous disregard for the safety of the people aboard the vessels, and in reckless disregard of Kenai’s rights. Hence, the district court did not clearly err in finding facts sufficient to support an award of punitive damages. View "Kenai Ironclad v. CP Marine Services" on Justia Law

Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London (“Lloyds”) brought an intervenor complaint against Cox Operating LLC (“Cox”) seeking to recover maintenance and cure benefits Lloyds paid to an injured seaman. Cox filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Lloyds bears responsibility for the payments under a protection and indemnity (“P & I”) policy under which Cox is an assured. The district court agreed and granted the motion. Lloyds timely appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that even if there were ambiguity as to the term “intended operations,” as included in the limitation on the waiver of subrogation, any such ambiguity is to be resolved “in favor of coverage.” Because the M/V SELECT 102 was engaged in its “intended operations” at the time of the seaman’s injury and the limitation on the waiver of subrogation does not apply, Lloyds waived its subrogation rights as to Cox. Thus, the court affirmed the he district court’s dismissal of Lloyds’s intervenor complaint. View "Certain Underwriters v. Cox Operating" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of sex trafficking of a child in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1591(a)(1) and (b)(2). On appeal, he challenged the introduction of evidence pulled from his cellphone using Cellebrite technology. He claimed that the district court erred by permitting a police investigator to introduce the Cellebrite extract without first being qualified as an expert under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that when law enforcement uses Cellebrite to pull information from a phone, and a lay juror would require no additional interpretation to understand that information, the party does not need to introduce the evidence through an expert. The court explained that all the investigator testified to was how he downloaded the information from the phones using Cellebrite technology. At no point did he speak to the reliability of the software, except that he double-checked some of the reports by looking directly at the source material in the phones themselves. To that end, he did not state any information on how Cellebrite operated in a technical sense, nor information that was beyond the knowledge of an average cell phone user. Without a showing of specialized knowledge, the mere use and understanding of a Cellebrite extract at trial is insufficient to require an expert. Operating a Cellebrite device and understanding its report require knowledge in the realm of a reasonably tech-savvy layperson, regardless of the investigator’s testimony that he was a “certified” operator and analyzer. View "USA v. Williams" on Justia Law

On a Mesa Airlines flight, a flight attendant grew concerned about two passengers. She alerted the pilot, who, despite the reassurance of security officers, delayed takeoff until the flight was canceled. The passengers were told the delay was for maintenance issues, and all passengers, including the two in question, were rebooked onto a new flight. After learning the real reason behind the cancellation, Passenger Plaintiffs sued Mesa under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. The airline countered that it had immunity under 49 U.S.C. Section 44902(b). The district court granted Mesa’s motion for summary judgment. At issue is whether such conduct constitutes disparate treatment under Section 1981, whether a Section 1981 claim can exist without a “breach” of contract, and whether Section 44902(b) grants immunity to airlines for allegedly discriminatory decisions.   The Fifth Circuit reversed. The court explained that the right to be free from discrimination in “the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms and conditions” means that one has the right to be free from discrimination in the discretionary “benefits, privileges, terms and conditions” of a contract, too. Defendants cannot claim that flying at the originally scheduled time is not a “benefit” of the contract at all. Further, the court explained that a hand wave, refusing to leave one’s assigned seat, boarding late, sleeping, and using the restroom are far from occurrences so obviously suspicious that no one could conclude that race was not a but-for factor for the airline’s actions. The court wrote that because “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for” Plaintiffs, the dispute is genuine. View "Abdallah v. Mesa Air Group" on Justia Law