Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Tesla requires its employees to wear uniforms to minimize damage to vehicles throughout the production process. When employees wore union t-shirts instead, Tesla informed them they were violating the uniform policy and threatened to send them home. The International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, AFL CIO (“Union” or “UAW”), filed an unfair labor practice charge, and a divided National Labor Relations Board (“Board” or “NLRB”) ruled that Tesla was infringing on its employees’ rights to unionize under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or “Act”). Tesla petitioned for review, claiming that the Board’s decision irrationally made all company uniforms presumptively unlawful. The NLRB cross-applied for enforcement.   The Fifth Circuit granted Tesla’s petition for review, denied the NLRB’s application for enforcement, and vacated the Board’s decision. The court agreed with Tesla that the NLRA does not give the NLRB the authority to make all company uniforms presumptively unlawful. The court explained that the Team Wear policy—or any hypothetical company’s uniform policy—advances a legitimate interest of the employer and neither discriminates against union communication nor affects nonworking time. And a prohibition is a greater infringement than is a restriction. Therefore, by treating any restriction as per se equivalent to a prohibition, the NLRB has failed to balance—or even strike a reasonable accommodation of—the employer’s and employees’ rights. View "Tesla v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Cajun Industries LLC (“Cajun”) claimed tax credits for the 2013 tax year pursuant to § 41 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. Section 41. First, the Code provision at issue in this case, Section 41 offers a tax credit for “qualified research expenses” including wages and expenditures incurred in pursuit of qualified research.1 The Internal Revenue Code provides a tax credit for qualified research activities, as defined by the Code. Appellants appealed the district court’s judgment which ejected research and development tax credits claimed by Cajun Industries LLC and upheld the resulting tax deficiency.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Appellants’ argument that all contracts “for the product or result” are not funded improperly conflates “amounts payable under any agreement that are contingent on the success of the research” with contracts for products or services. This argument ignores the operative portion of the sentence: “amounts payable under any agreement that are contingent on the success of the research.” Structurally, the phrase “and thus considered to be paid for the product or result of the research” merely describes or modifies “amounts payable . . . contingent on the success of the research.” It does not, as Appellants urge, stand on its own to establish an additional type of contract “not treated as funding.” Further, the court explained that Appellants are not entitled to the research credit merely because SWBNO could not claim the credit. The Regulations do not require that a tax credit be allocated in every contract. View "USA v. Grigsby" on Justia Law

The LSBA is a mandatory bar association. Attorneys are required to join and pay fees to the organization as a condition of practicing law in the state. Plaintiff has been a member in good standing of the LSBA since 1996. Upset that he was forced to associate with and contribute to certain causes, Plaintiff sued the LSBA, the Louisiana Supreme Court, and its justices (collectively, “the LSBA”) in 2019. He claimed that compulsory membership in the LSBA violated his rights to free speech and association. Defendants moved to dismiss, and the district court granted the motion. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment in part and reversed it in part. The court remanded to the district court for a determination of the proper remedy. The court explained that although it takes no position on the proper injunctive or declaratory relief. The court also rendered a preliminary injunction preventing the LSBA from requiring Plaintiff to join or pay dues to the LSBA pending completion of the remedies phase. The court wrote that because the LSBA engages in non-germane speech, its mandatory membership policy violates Plaintiff’s rights to free speech and free association. Additionally, Plaintiff is entitled to a limited preliminary injunction for the same reasons as the plaintiffs in McDonald. View "Boudreaux v. LA State Bar Assoc" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenge the Louisiana Legislature’s 2022 redistricting map for electing the state’s six members of the United States House of Representatives. The district court preliminarily enjoined use of that map for the 2022 congressional elections. The United States Supreme Court stayed that injunction, pending resolution of a case involving Alabama’s congressional redistricting plan. About a year later, the Supreme Court resolved the Alabama case.In review of the Louisiana Legislature's 2022 redistricting plan, the Fifth Circuit held that district court did not clearly err in its necessary fact-findings nor commit legal error in its conclusions that the Plaintiffs were likely to succeed in proving a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. However, the court found the injunction is no longer necessary. View "Robinson v. Ardoin" on Justia Law

The Galveston County Commissioners Court is composed of four county commissioners, elected from single-member precincts, and one county judge, elected by the entire county. From 1991 to 2021, one of the four commissioner precincts had a majority-minority population, with blacks and Hispanics together accounting for 58 percent of the precinct’s total population as of 2020. In 2021, the Galveston County Commissioners Court enacted a new districting plan for county commissioner elections. The enacted plan does not contain a majority-minority precinct. Following a bench trial, the district court found that the enacted plan dilutes the voting power of the county’s black and Hispanic voters in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.Galveston County appealed. The panel held that, under existing precedent, distinct minority groups like blacks and Hispanics may be aggregated for purposes of vote dilution claims under Section 2. However, disagreeing with the underlying legal analysis, the panel believed that such precedent should be overturned. Thus, the panel requested a poll for en banc hearing. View "Petteway v. Galveston County" on Justia Law

In April of 2022,the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,and Explosives (“ATF”)issued a Final Rule in which the terms “firearm” and “frame or receiver,” among others, were given “an updated, more comprehensive definition. The Final Rule was almost immediately the subject of litigation claiming that ATF had exceeded its statutory authority, including this case.The Plaintiffs claimed that portions of the Final Rule, which redefine “frame or receiver” and “firearm,” exceeded ATF’s congressionally mandated authority. The plaintiffs requested that the court hold unlawful and set aside the Final Rule, and that the court preliminarily and permanently enjoin the Government from enforcing or implementing the Final Rule. The district issued, and then expanded upon, a preliminary injunction before granting Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, vacating the Final Rule.The Fifth Circuit held that the two challenged portions of the Final Rule exceeded ATF's authority.At this point, all that remained before the court was whether the appeal of the district court’s final judgment vacating the Final Rule in its entirety. In reviewing the district court's vacatur of the entire Final Rule, the court vacated the vactur order, remanding for further consideration of the remedy, considering the court’s holding on the merits. View "VanDerStok v. Garland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jane Doe AW, a former criminal clerk in the Burleson County Attorney’s Office, alleged that Burleson County Judge Mike Sutherland used his power and authority as a county judge to sexually assault her on several occasions. Doe claimed that Sutherland sexually assaulted her once in his restaurant, Funky Junky, LLC (“Funky Junky”), and twice in his office. According to Doe, when she complained to Sutherland about the abuse, she was terminated from her job. The district court entered final judgment, ordering that Doe take nothing against Burleson County. Doe timely appealed the judgment. Doe raised three issues on appeal: (1) whether Sutherland, as the Burleson County Judge, was a policymaker with final decision-making authority for Burleson County with respect to Doe’s claim; (2) whether the Magistrate Judge abused her discretion when she reversed and vacated a prior order on a dispositive motion; and (3) whether the Magistrate Judge erred in indicating that she would deny a party’s challenge for cause unless the parties agreed on the challenge.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that despite his position as County Judge, Sutherland lacked the requisite policymaking authority to hold Burleson County liable for his alleged sexual misconduct. Monell requires that “the municipal official . . . possess final policymaking authority for the action in question.” The court wrote that even if the Texas constitutional provision gave Sutherland, as County Judge, broad ability to oversee operations in the county, this authority is immaterial because Doe fails to establish that Sutherland possessed the requisite authority as it relates specifically to the alleged sexual abuse. View "Doe AW v. Burleson County, TX" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were injured in an auto accident and brought product liability claims against the vehicle’s manufacturer. In the course of litigation, the manufacturer moved to exclude Plaintiffs’ two liability experts, moved for a new trial and a judgment as a matter of law, and objected to the denial of a jury instruction regarding the presumption of nonliability (“the presumption”). Ultimately, the manufacturer was found liable and ordered to pay nearly $5 million in damages.On appeal, the manufacturer argued the district court erred in denying the motions and rejecting the requested instruction. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that Plaintiffs’ experts based their opinions on reliable methodologies and provided relevant, helpful testimony. View "Kim v. American Honda Motor" on Justia Law

Using a blocked number, an anonymous individual twice called 9-1-1 in Abilene, Texas, relaying a serious threat of gun violence against officers and an alleged hostage while providing his location. Abilene Police responded, only to find the apartment occupied by Plaintiff and his dog, with no hostage or lethal firearm in sight. Plaintiff was detained, taken to the police station, and ultimately released when an investigation proved inconclusive. Weeks later, Plaintiff was charged with making a false report, though the charges were eventually dropped. Plaintiff subsequently sued three individuals involved in his arrest and prosecution as well as Taylor County, Texas. Each defendant moved for summary judgment, with the individuals asserting qualified immunity. The district court granted the Defendants’ motions.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court affirmed the district court’s order regarding the exclusion of the affidavits, the dismissal of Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims against the officer and detective, and the dismissal of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims against all Defendants. The court reversed the district court’s order regarding Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim against the officer. The court explained that the investigator is the only Taylor County employee involved in this suit, serving in the Taylor County District Attorney’s Office. Plaintiff’s suit against Taylor County is, therefore, wholly premised on the investigator’s alleged wrongdoing. Affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim against the investigator vitiates Plaintiff’s Monell claim. View "Reitz v. Woods" on Justia Law

The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) adopted a rule requiring issuers to report day-to-day share repurchase data once a quarter and to disclose the reason why the issuer repurchased shares of its own stock. Despite Petitioners’ comments, however, the SEC maintained that many of the effects of the daily disclosure requirement could not be quantified. Petitioners filed a petition for review of the final rule.   The Fifth Circuit granted the petition for review and remanded with direction to the SEC to correct the defects in the rule within 30 days of this opinion. The court found that the e SEC’s notice and comment period satisfies the APA’s requirements. However, the court held that the SEC acted arbitrarily and capriciously, in violation of the APA, when it failed to respond to Petitioners’ comments and failed to conduct a proper cost-benefit analysis. The court explained that almost every part of the SEC’s justification and explanation of the rule reflects the agency’s concern about opportunistic or improperly motivated buybacks. That error permeates—and therefore infects—the entire rule. The court explained that short of vacating the rule, it affords the agency limited time to remedy the deficiencies in the rule. View "Chamber of Com of the USA v. SEC" on Justia Law