Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, Guillermo Gray, sued Killick Group, L.L.C. for wages and overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Gray, an experienced welding and coding inspector, performed inspection services for Killick on a project-by-project basis through his own company, Veritas Inspectors, Inc. He used his own equipment and submitted invoices under his business name. In a previous criminal court proceeding, Gray had sworn that he was self-employed to obtain an essential-need license after a DWI conviction.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment to Killick, holding that Gray was judicially estopped from claiming employee status under the FLSA due to his prior sworn statement of being self-employed. The court also dismissed Gray’s breach of contract and quantum meruit claims. Gray appealed, seeking reversal only on the FLSA claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court reviewed the use of judicial estoppel for abuse of discretion and found that Gray’s previous self-employed statement was inconsistent with his current claim of being an employee. However, the court chose to resolve the appeal by determining whether Gray was an employee under the FLSA. Applying the economic-realities test, the court concluded that Gray was an independent contractor. The court considered factors such as Gray’s control over his work, his investment in his business, his ability to profit, the skill required for his job, and the project-based nature of his work. All factors supported the conclusion that Gray was not economically dependent on Killick and was thus an independent contractor, not an employee under the FLSA. The court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Killick. View "Gray v. Killick Group" on Justia Law

Christopher Wooten was arrested in February 2016 for driving while intoxicated (DWI) with a blood alcohol level of .265. Due to his prior DWI convictions, he was charged with felony DWI under Texas law, which escalates penalties for repeat offenders. Wooten had a history of DWI and other felony convictions, including a 1983 DWI for which he received a probationary sentence. This 1983 DWI was used as an element of the 2016 felony DWI charge, and his other felonies were used to justify a habitual offender enhancement, leading to a potential sentence of twenty-five years to life in prison.Wooten initially agreed to plead guilty in exchange for an eight-year sentence, but the state trial judge rejected this agreement. He then agreed to a thirteen-year sentence and waived one of the felony enhancements. Despite this, Wooten attempted to appeal, but the state appellate court dismissed his appeal due to the waiver in his plea agreement. Wooten filed multiple state habeas applications, all of which were denied. He also filed a federal habeas petition, which the district court denied, finding that his claims could not overcome the relitigation bar under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of Wooten's habeas petition. The court held that any error by the state court in using the 1983 DWI as an element of the felony DWI charge was harmless because Wooten had other felony convictions that could have satisfied the requirements for the felony DWI and habitual offender enhancement. The court also found that Wooten's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, and that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim did not warrant relief because he failed to show that he would not have pleaded guilty if his counsel had advised him differently. View "Wooten v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

Jose Paz Medina-Cantu was charged with possession of a firearm and ammunition as an illegal alien, violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(5)(A) and 924(a)(2), and illegal reentry into the United States, violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b). He moved to dismiss the firearm possession charge, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen. The district court denied his motion, referencing the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Portillo-Munoz, which held that the Second Amendment does not extend to illegal aliens.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied Medina-Cantu’s motion to dismiss, holding that Bruen did not abrogate the precedent set by Portillo-Munoz. Medina-Cantu then pleaded guilty to both counts without a plea agreement but preserved his constitutional argument for appeal. He was sentenced to fifteen months of imprisonment followed by two years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. Medina-Cantu argued that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bruen and United States v. Rahimi abrogated Portillo-Munoz. However, the Fifth Circuit held that neither Bruen nor Rahimi unequivocally overruled Portillo-Munoz. The court emphasized that under its rule of orderliness, it could not overturn another panel’s decision unless there was an unequivocal change in the law by the Supreme Court or an en banc decision. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) under the Second Amendment. View "USA v. Medina-Cantu" on Justia Law

Curtis Terrell, after consuming a significant amount of alcohol, pain pills, and methamphetamine, began running erratically in a residential neighborhood. His wife, Angela Terrell, called 911, requesting an ambulance. Officer Jason Allgrunn arrived and arrested Mr. Terrell. When Mrs. Terrell began filming the incident, she was also arrested. The Terrells filed multiple federal and state claims against Allgrunn and other officers involved.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana denied summary judgment to the defendants on all claims, rejecting their qualified immunity defense. The defendants appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment for the defendants on the Terrells' false arrest claims, finding that Officer Allgrunn had probable cause to arrest both Mr. and Mrs. Terrell. The court also reversed the denial of summary judgment on Mrs. Terrell's excessive force claim, concluding that there was no clearly established law prohibiting the officer's conduct. However, the court dismissed the appeal regarding Mr. Terrell's excessive force claim for lack of jurisdiction, as there were genuine disputes of material fact about what occurred when Mr. Terrell was out of the video frame.Additionally, the court reversed the denial of summary judgment on the Terrells' malicious prosecution and First Amendment retaliation claims, citing the presence of probable cause. The court also reversed the denial of summary judgment for Officers Henderson and Banta on the failure-to-intervene claims, as there were no violations of clearly established constitutional law.Finally, the court vacated the district court's denial of summary judgment on the Louisiana state law claims and remanded for reconsideration in light of the appellate court's opinion. View "Terrell v. Allgrunn" on Justia Law

The case involves a long-standing litigation concerning the Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office and the conditions at Orleans Parish Prison. Plaintiffs, including detainees and the United States, argued that the jail provided constitutionally inadequate housing and medical care. In 2013, a district court approved a consent decree to address these issues, which included a plan to construct a mental health annex, known as Phase III. Despite years of delays, the district court ordered the construction to proceed. No party appealed these orders at the time.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana oversaw the case initially. In 2016, the parties entered a stipulated order to develop a plan for appropriate housing for prisoners with mental health issues. The Compliance Director later proposed the construction of Phase III, which was agreed upon by the former Sheriff and the City. However, the City later sought to explore alternatives, leading to further court orders in 2019 to proceed with Phase III. The City’s subsequent motion to halt the project was denied, and this decision was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Anderson v. City of New Orleans.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is currently reviewing the case. The new Sheriff, Susan Hutson, moved to terminate all orders concerning Phase III, arguing that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) prohibits the construction of a new jail facility. The district court denied this motion, and the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that it could review the denial of the motion but not the underlying orders, as the Sheriff’s motion was not a proper procedural mechanism under the PLRA to challenge the 2019 Orders and Stipulated Order. The appeal was dismissed, and the construction of Phase III continues. View "Anderson v. Hutson" on Justia Law

Susan Hardy, a resident of Louisiana, flew from Newark, New Jersey, to Oslo, Norway, on Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS). Upon disembarking in Oslo, she fell and fractured her leg. Hardy sued SAS in the Eastern District of Louisiana, claiming that Article 33 of the Montreal Convention provided both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over SAS. The district court dismissed her case, ruling that the Montreal Convention only granted subject matter jurisdiction and not personal jurisdiction. Additionally, the court found that SAS’s waiver of service did not establish personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana dismissed Hardy’s complaint without prejudice. The court concluded that Article 33 of the Montreal Convention did not create personal jurisdiction over SAS. It also rejected Hardy’s argument that SAS’s waiver of service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) established personal jurisdiction, reasoning that SAS did not have sufficient contacts with Louisiana to warrant such jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Article 33 of the Montreal Convention does not independently create personal jurisdiction over a defendant airline, as it only prescribes venue. However, the court found that the district court erred in its analysis under Rule 4(k)(2). The correct analysis should have considered SAS’s contacts with the United States as a whole, not just Louisiana. The Fifth Circuit concluded that SAS had sufficient minimum contacts with the United States to establish personal jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2). Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hardy v. Scandinavian Airline System" on Justia Law

Tesla, Inc. and its affiliates challenged a Louisiana law that prohibits automobile manufacturers from selling directly to consumers and performing warranty services for cars they do not own. Tesla alleged that the law violated federal antitrust law, due process rights, and equal protection rights. The defendants included the Louisiana Motor Vehicle Commission, its commissioners, the Louisiana Automobile Dealers Association (LADA), and various dealerships.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana dismissed Tesla's claims. The court found that the private defendants were immune from antitrust liability, Tesla had not plausibly pleaded a Sherman Act violation against the governmental defendants, there was insufficient probability of actual bias to support the due process claim, and the regulations passed rational-basis review for the equal protection claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the dismissal of Tesla's due process claim, finding that Tesla had plausibly alleged that the Commission's composition and actions created a possible bias against Tesla, violating due process. The court vacated and remanded the dismissal of the antitrust claim, noting that the due process ruling fundamentally altered the grounds for Tesla's alleged antitrust injury. The court affirmed the dismissal of the equal protection claim, holding that the regulations had a rational basis in preventing vertical integration and controlling the automobile retail market.In summary, the Fifth Circuit reversed the due process claim dismissal, vacated and remanded the antitrust claim dismissal, and affirmed the equal protection claim dismissal. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. View "Tesla v. Louisiana Automobile Dealers" on Justia Law

Fernando Yates, a math teacher in his late sixties, alleged that Spring Independent School District (Spring ISD) discriminated and retaliated against him based on age, race, national origin, color, and disability. Yates was placed on multiple support plans due to performance concerns, reassigned from his eighth-grade math teaching position to a "push-in" role, and later to a seventh-grade math position before being replaced by a younger teacher. He was also placed on administrative leave following complaints from students and parents. Yates filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC and later a lawsuit against Spring ISD.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of Spring ISD. The court concluded that the actions taken against Yates did not constitute adverse employment actions under the pre-Hamilton standard, which required an "ultimate employment decision." The court also found that Yates failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination and that Spring ISD provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, which Yates could not prove were pretextual.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court acknowledged that the district court had applied an outdated standard but still found that Spring ISD had provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. The court held that Yates failed to show that these reasons were pretextual. Consequently, the summary judgment in favor of Spring ISD was affirmed. View "Yates v. Spring Independent School District" on Justia Law

Commercial fishers challenged the constitutionality of the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council's actions, specifically targeting the approval and implementation of Amendment 54, which significantly reduced the greater amberjack catch limit. The plaintiffs argued that the Council members were improperly appointed under the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution and were unconstitutionally insulated from removal. They sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction to set aside the Final Rule implementing the catch limit and to prevent further development of annual catch limits for the greater amberjack fishery.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi consolidated the cases and granted summary judgment to the government. The court found that six of the Council’s seventeen members were improperly appointed as inferior officers. However, it concluded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief because the constitutional violation was not the proximate cause of their injuries. The decision to implement Amendment 54 was made by the NMFS Assistant Administrator, not the Council. Additionally, the court noted that the remaining eleven Council members were properly appointed and constituted a quorum.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and remanded it to the district court. The appellate court instructed the lower court to determine whether it had jurisdiction to consider the plaintiffs' request to declare Amendment 54 void and to enjoin the Council from developing further catch limits. The district court was also directed to address whether the NMFS Assistant Administrator’s review and approval of the Final Rule functioned as a ratification of the Council’s actions. The appellate court emphasized the need for a thorough district court analysis of the ratification issue before addressing the validity of the Council members' appointments and the plaintiffs' entitlement to relief. View "Arnesen v. Raimondo" on Justia Law

The case involves the Restaurant Law Center and the Texas Restaurant Association challenging a final rule by the Department of Labor (DOL) that restricts when employers can claim a "tip credit" for "tipped employees" under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The tip credit allows employers to pay tipped employees a lower hourly wage, assuming tips will make up the difference to meet the minimum wage. The DOL's final rule imposes limits on the amount of non-tip-producing work a tipped employee can perform while still allowing the employer to claim the tip credit.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, stating they would not suffer irreparable harm. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision, finding that the plaintiffs had shown irreparable harm and remanded the case for further consideration. On remand, the district court evaluated the merits and granted summary judgment in favor of the DOL, holding that the final rule was a permissible interpretation of the FLSA under Chevron deference and was neither arbitrary nor capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the final rule was contrary to the clear statutory text of the FLSA and was arbitrary and capricious. The court held that the FLSA's definition of a "tipped employee" does not support the DOL's restrictions on non-tip-producing work. The court concluded that the final rule improperly focused on the pursuit of tips rather than the duties of the occupation itself. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the DOL, rendered summary judgment for the plaintiffs, and vacated the final rule. View "Restaurant Law Center v. Department of Labor" on Justia Law