Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Vicente David Cuenca-Arroyo, a native and citizen of Mexico, was brought to the United States as a child without being admitted or paroled. He has a minor son, B.A., who is a U.S. citizen and primarily resides with his mother but spends weekends with Cuenca-Arroyo. In 2017, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Cuenca-Arroyo, charging him as inadmissible. Cuenca-Arroyo conceded the charge and was found removable by an immigration judge. He applied for cancellation of removal and voluntary departure but was denied both. He also sought a continuance to include his parents as qualifying relatives for his cancellation application, which was also denied.Cuenca-Arroyo appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed the immigration judge's decisions. The BIA agreed that there was no good cause for a continuance, that the hardships to Cuenca-Arroyo's son were not "exceptional and extremely unusual," and that Cuenca-Arroyo did not merit voluntary departure based on the equities.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the BIA's determination that Cuenca-Arroyo did not demonstrate the required hardship for cancellation of removal, noting that the hardships presented were common consequences of removal. The court also concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's discretionary decision regarding voluntary departure. Lastly, the court found that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in affirming the denial of Cuenca-Arroyo's motion for a continuance.The Fifth Circuit denied Cuenca-Arroyo's petition for review regarding the cancellation of removal and dismissed the petition regarding the voluntary departure decision. The court also upheld the BIA's decision on the continuance denial. View "Cuenca-Arroyo v. Garland" on Justia Law

Dagoberto Luna, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States in 1997 without valid entry documents. In 2003, the Government mailed Luna a Notice to Appear (NTA) for a removal hearing, which did not specify the date and time. Subsequently, a notice of hearing (NOH) was sent to the same address, informing Luna of a hearing scheduled for November 13, 2003. Luna did not attend the hearing, and an immigration judge ordered his removal in absentia. In 2018, Luna moved to rescind the removal order, claiming he did not receive the NTA or NOH and argued the NTA was defective under Pereira v. Sessions.The immigration judge denied Luna’s motion, finding that he had not rebutted the presumption of delivery and that the notice provided in the NOH was sufficient. The judge also declined to reopen the proceedings sua sponte. Luna appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed his appeal, holding that Luna had not rebutted the presumption of receipt, his motion to reopen was untimely, and he had not demonstrated exceptional hardship to his relatives.Luna petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for review. Initially, the court granted his petition based on the defective NTA. However, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Campos-Chaves v. Garland, the Fifth Circuit reconsidered. The court held that the defective NTA did not deprive the immigration judge of jurisdiction and that the NOH provided sufficient notice. The court also found that Luna had not rebutted the presumption of delivery of the NOH and lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to reopen proceedings sua sponte.The Fifth Circuit dismissed Luna’s petition in part for lack of jurisdiction and denied it in part, concluding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion. The petition for rehearing was granted. View "Luna v. Garland" on Justia Law

Charles Ray Lerma escaped from Dismas Charities, a residential reentry center, by jumping the facility’s exterior fence. He voluntarily returned the same day. Lerma was charged with one count of escape from custody under 18 U.S.C. § 751 and pleaded guilty. His presentence investigation report (PSR) classified his escape as from non-secure custody and applied a four-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 2P1.1(b)(3) for not returning within ninety-six hours, resulting in a base offense level of seven.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas reviewed the PSR and, considering Lerma’s extensive criminal history and the nature of the offense, decided to depart upward from the Sentencing Guidelines’ recommendation. The court sentenced Lerma to the statutory maximum, citing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) such as the need to promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, deter future criminal conduct, and protect the public. Lerma’s counsel objected, arguing that the sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. Lerma argued that the district court erred by not applying a seven-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 2P1.1(b)(2) since he returned within ninety-six hours. The Fifth Circuit disagreed, holding that jumping a fence constitutes escape from secure custody, making Lerma ineligible for any reduction under § 2P1.1(b). The court also found that the district court adequately explained its reasoning for the upward variance and that the sentence was not substantively unreasonable. The Fifth Circuit affirmed Lerma’s sentence. View "USA v. Lerma" on Justia Law

A truck driver, Jarrod Newsome, was delivering chemicals to International Paper Company’s factory when he was overcome by a "rotten smell" and lost consciousness. He sued International Paper for negligence and gross negligence, claiming various injuries. The district court granted summary judgment to International Paper, finding that Newsome failed to establish general causation under Texas law and denied Newsome’s motion for additional time to designate another expert.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas reviewed the case and found that Newsome did not provide admissible expert testimony to establish that International Paper’s conduct caused his injuries. The court also denied Newsome’s motion for additional time to designate a new expert, citing a lack of good cause for the delay.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that Newsome failed to establish general causation as required by Texas law, which necessitates reliable expert testimony based on scientifically accepted methodologies. The court found that the experts relied upon by Newsome did not meet the necessary standards of reliability. Additionally, the court upheld the district court’s denial of Newsome’s motion for additional time to designate another expert, noting that Newsome’s explanation for the delay was insufficient and that allowing the late designation would prejudice International Paper.The Fifth Circuit concluded that without reliable evidence of general causation, Newsome’s claims could not proceed. The court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of International Paper and the denial of Newsome’s motion for additional time to designate another expert. View "Newsome v. International Paper" on Justia Law

Dr. Susan Neese and Dr. James Hurly, both doctors in Amarillo, Texas, filed a pre-enforcement challenge against the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) regarding the Notification of Interpretation and Enforcement of Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. The Notification, issued in May 2021, interprets the prohibition on sex discrimination to include discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. The plaintiffs, who are unwilling to provide certain gender-affirming care, feared that their medical practices might be viewed as discriminatory under the Notification, potentially leading to enforcement actions and loss of federal funding.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The district court found that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the Notification and ruled in their favor.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. The court found that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated how their conduct constituted gender-identity discrimination under any plausible interpretation of the Notification. The plaintiffs did not view their own practices as discriminatory, nor did they provide evidence that HHS would view them as such. Additionally, there was no indication that an enforcement proceeding was imminent. As a result, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for lack of jurisdiction. View "Neese v. Becerra" on Justia Law

Johnathan Avery pleaded guilty to coercing or enticing an individual to travel to engage in prostitution, violating 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a). Avery signed an acceptance of responsibility statement as part of his plea. His initial presentence report (PSR) incorrectly determined his base offense level to be 30, relying on a cross-reference that applies when the offense involves sexual abuse conduct. The PSR also assessed a four-level enhancement for conduct described in 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a). Avery objected, arguing that his plea did not involve such conduct.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas held two sentencing hearings. Initially, the judge agreed with the PSR’s recommendations, but after Avery’s counsel requested a hearing and threatened to withdraw the plea, the court sustained Avery’s objections. The court decided not to apply the enhancement or cross-reference for coercion and physical force. Instead, the court applied a different enhancement under § 2G1.1(b)(1) without informing Avery or his counsel beforehand. The court determined Avery’s offense level to be 15, resulting in a guideline range of 41 to 51 months, and sentenced him to 72 months imprisonment, a $100 mandatory special assessment, and a ten-year term of supervised release. Avery did not object at the time.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. Avery argued that the district court erred by not informing him of the new enhancement and failing to make the requisite findings of fraud or coercion. The Fifth Circuit found no plain error, noting that Avery had agreed with the enhanced guideline range and that the district court could rely on the PSR’s factual findings. The court affirmed Avery’s sentence. View "United States v. Avery" on Justia Law

Sarah Lindsley filed a discrimination lawsuit against her employer, Omni Hotels Management Corporation, alleging sex-based pay discrimination under the Equal Pay Act (EPA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Lindsley claimed that her initial salary was set too low due to her sex, causing her to earn less than her male colleagues despite subsequent raises. She also alleged that she faced harassment and that her complaints about pay discrepancies were ignored.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas initially granted summary judgment in favor of Omni on all claims. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for trial on the pay-discrimination claims under Title VII and the EPA. At trial, the jury found Omni not liable under the EPA but awarded Lindsley over $25 million in Title VII damages despite finding no liability under Title VII. The district court deemed the jury's answers inconsistent, amended the verdict form, and ordered further deliberation. The jury then found for Lindsley on her Title VII claim, again awarding over $25 million in damages, which the district court reduced under the statutory cap.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court did not err in handling the first verdict form but did err in handling the second verdict form. The appellate court found that the jury's answers in the second verdict form were inconsistent, as they found that any pay disparity resulted from a factor other than sex (an affirmative defense to both the EPA and Title VII claims) but still awarded Title VII damages. The court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Lindsley v. Omni Hotels" on Justia Law

Enriqueta Diaz, a former county judge and resident of Maverick County, opposed the issuance of certificates of obligation for water and sewer improvements by the Maverick County Commissioners Court. She collected signatures on a petition to force an election on the issue. Despite her petition, the commissioners decided to issue the certificates without holding an election. During the meeting, Diaz heckled the commissioners, leading County Judge English Cantu to hold her in contempt and order her removal. Diaz was detained outside in the rain for several hours and later sentenced to 24 hours in jail, though she was released without being confined.Diaz filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, seeking damages for false imprisonment and bystander liability against County Judge English Cantu and three county commissioners. The district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, rejecting their claims of state sovereign immunity, judicial immunity, and qualified immunity. The defendants appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that constitutional county judges in Texas are not entitled to state sovereign immunity as they are considered local rather than state officers. The court also determined that English Cantu was not entitled to judicial immunity because he was acting in an administrative capacity, not a judicial one, during the commissioners court meeting. Additionally, the court found that English Cantu was not entitled to qualified immunity because he acted without discretionary authority in holding Diaz in contempt. However, the court reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity for the commissioners on the bystander liability claims, as the law was not clearly established that they had a duty to intervene. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Diaz v. Cantu" on Justia Law

Adrian Dantrell Wesley was convicted of possession with intent to distribute controlled substances. At sentencing, he received a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) for maintaining premises for the purpose of distributing a controlled substance. Wesley appealed the enhancement, arguing that there was no evidence he possessed or controlled the premises.The case originated when Fort Worth police received a tip about drug distribution at a residence on Griggs Avenue. A confidential informant purchased methamphetamine from Wesley at the residence. Subsequent police surveillance and searches revealed drugs, firearms, and other evidence linking Wesley to the premises. Wesley was indicted on multiple counts of possession with intent to distribute and firearm possession. He proceeded with a bench trial on stipulated facts for one count and was found guilty. The pre-sentence report included the premises enhancement, which Wesley contested, arguing lack of evidence of his control over the premises.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas overruled Wesley’s objection and applied the enhancement, finding that Wesley used the residence for drug distribution, had a key, and controlled access to the premises. Wesley appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.The Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the evidence supported the finding that Wesley maintained the premises for drug distribution. The court noted that Wesley’s repeated use of the residence for drug transactions, possession of a key, and control over access to the premises justified the enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(12). The court found no clear error in the district court’s determination and affirmed the application of the sentencing enhancement. View "United States v. Wesley" on Justia Law

The United States Army Corps of Engineers partnered with the City of Dallas on the Dallas Floodway Extension (DFE) project, which began in 1999. Plaintiffs Timpy Ondrusek and Barbara Ann Ondrusek Wolfe own property that Dallas attempted to condemn for the DFE. They sued the Corps and the City in federal district court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), claiming the Corps failed to prepare a supplemental environmental impact statement (SEIS) to account for new information, violating the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Clean Water Act (CWA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed the claims, determining the case was not justiciable. The court found the plaintiffs had not shown Article III standing and dismissed the complaint without prejudice. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, but the district court again concluded the case was not justiciable, noting the levee design phase was only 35 percent complete, and dismissed the case as unripe without prejudice, denying leave to amend.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found the claims against the Army Corps of Engineers were ripe for decision, as the Corps' failure to comply with NEPA presented a present controversy. The court determined the plaintiffs had standing, as they alleged a concrete and particularized risk of environmental harm to their property due to the Corps' failure to prepare an SEIS. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of the suit with respect to the Army Corps of Engineers, affirmed the dismissal with respect to the City of Dallas, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ondrusek v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law