Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the case involved Marco Antonio Abundiz, the defendant-appellant, who was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for sexually abusing his six-year-old niece, K.Z. Abundiz appealed his conviction arguing that the district court erred in several areas including: allowing the victim to testify via closed-circuit television (CCTV) which he claimed violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation; failing to make the necessary findings before permitting the victim to testify via CCTV; admitting evidence of a previous sexual assault; admitting evidence that he possessed child pornography; and the instructions given to the jury regarding evidence admitted under the Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414.After reviewing the case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court. The Court held that the district court did not err in allowing the victim to testify via CCTV. The Court determined that the district court made the necessary findings showing that the child would be unable to testify in open court due to fear and a substantial likelihood she would suffer emotional trauma.The Court also found no error in the district court's admission of evidence regarding prior sexual assaults and child pornography possession. The Court observed that the district court had appropriately exercised its discretion to admit this evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414, providing that such evidence can be considered in sexual assault and child molestation cases, respectively.Lastly, the Court concluded that the district court's jury instructions regarding the use of evidence admitted under Rules 413 and 414 were not erroneous. The Court noted that the instructions appropriately informed the jury that such evidence could be used for any relevant purpose only if it was proven by a preponderance of the evidence. The instructions did not allow the jury to convict using a lower standard of proof or confuse the preponderance and beyond a reasonable doubt standards. View "USA v. Abundiz" on Justia Law

In this case, Fieldwood Energy LLC, and its affiliates, who were previously among the largest oil and gas exploration and production companies operating in the Gulf of Mexico, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2020 due to declining oil prices, the COVID–19 pandemic, and billions of dollars in decommissioning obligations. In the ensuing reorganization plan, some companies, referred to as the "Sureties", who had issued surety bonds to the debtors, were stripped of their subrogation rights. The Sureties appealed this loss in district court, which held their appeal to be statutorily and equitably moot. The Sureties appealed again to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, contending that a recent Supreme Court decision altered the landscape around statutory mootness and that the district court treated Section 363(m) as jurisdictional. However, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision, concluding that the Supreme Court’s recent decision did not change the application of Section 363(m) in this case, the district court did not treat the statute as jurisdictional, and the Sureties’ failure to obtain a stay was fatal to their challenge of the bankruptcy sale. The court also determined that the provisions stripping the Sureties of their subrogation rights were integral to the sale of the Debtors’ assets, making the challenge on appeal statutorily moot. View "Swiss Re Corporate Solutions America Insurance Co. v. Fieldwood Energy III, L.L.C." on Justia Law

The case was brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The plaintiff, Jarius Brown, alleged that officers from the DeSoto Parish Sheriff's Office attacked him without provocation, leaving him to languish in a jail cell with a broken nose and eye socket. Almost two years later, Brown sued Javarrea Pouncy and two unidentified officers in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the alleged use of unreasonable force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as under Louisiana state law for battery. However, the district court dismissed Brown's Section 1983 claim as untimely under Louisiana's one-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. Brown appealed this decision, arguing that the one-year period should not apply to police brutality claims brought under Section 1983 as it discriminates against such claims and practically frustrates litigants' ability to bring them.The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, holding that precedent required them to do so. The Court reasoned that while Brown's arguments that a one-year limitations period is too restrictive to accommodate the federal interests at stake in a civil rights action, the Supreme Court has yet to clarify how lower courts should evaluate practical frustration without undermining the solution it has already provided for the absence of a federal limitations period for Section 1983 claims. This was based on the principle that the length of the limitations period and related questions of tolling and application are governed by state law. The Court also noted that states have the freedom to modify their statutes to avoid being outliers in this regard. View "Brown v. Pouncy" on Justia Law

Mario Alejos-Perez, a Mexican citizen and lawful permanent resident of the United States, sought a review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) final order of removal that found him removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) based on his Texas conviction for possessing a synthetic cannabinoid. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied his petition for review. The court agreed with the BIA's conclusion that Alejos-Perez failed to prove there was a "realistic probability" that Texas would use the state statute he was convicted under to prosecute the possession of drugs that are not criminalized under federal law, which would mean his conviction would not be a removable offense. Alejos-Perez argued that the "realistic probability" standard should not apply, but the court rejected his argument, citing the rule of orderliness and the law of the case doctrine. The court also found that Alejos-Perez failed to exhaust his administrative remedies regarding several authorities he cited for the first time during his appeal. View "Alejos-Perez v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case concerns an appeal by Carl Monroe Gordon against his conviction on the grounds of aggravated sexual abuse of a child, traveling to engage in illicit sexual conduct, and abusive sexual contact with a child. Gordon argued that his statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial were violated due to delays in bringing him to trial and the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment by the district court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The Court held that the delay in bringing Gordon to trial did not violate the Speedy Trial Act since the period of delay was attributed to other proceedings related to the defendant and ends-of-justice continuances due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, the Court determined that Gordon's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was not violated as he failed to demonstrate actual prejudice resulting from the delay. View "United States v. Gordon" on Justia Law

In October 2018, Warren G. Treme, a member of AJSJS Development, LLC, leased minerals on a tract of land in St. John the Baptist Parish, Louisiana, from Dr. Christy Montegut and his siblings. AJSJS intended to join a joint venture formed in 2010 between Treme, AIMS Group, Inc., and Fred Kinsley. The joint venture aimed to extract and process clay material from the tract for a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers project. However, to conduct mining and excavation activities, the plaintiffs needed to change the zoning classification of the tract. Despite multiple applications for rezoning, the Parish Council denied the applications after hearing complaints from affected residents. The plaintiffs then sued the Parish and the Council, alleging that the denial of the rezoning application constituted a regulatory taking without compensation in violation of the United States and Louisiana Constitutions. The plaintiffs also alleged violations of procedural and substantive due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring a takings claim because their mineral lease was not yet in effect, meaning they had no vested property interest in the tract. The court interpreted the lease to have a suspensive condition that required the plaintiffs to obtain governmental approvals for the lease to become effective. As the plaintiffs had not obtained these approvals, the lease had not yet come into effect. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s decision but modified the judgment to be a dismissal without prejudice. View "Treme v. St. John the Baptist" on Justia Law

A Texas law, Senate Bill 1 (S.B. 1), related to voter registration and election integrity, was challenged by a group of plaintiffs (collectively referred to as LUPE) on the grounds that it chilled voter registration and was enacted with intent to discriminate against racial minorities. During the discovery phase of the lawsuit, LUPE sought documents and communications from the Harris County Republican Party (HCRP), which had been sent to or exchanged with the Texas Legislature and various members of the Texas executive branch regarding S.B. 1. The state defendants and non-party appellants (legislators) argued that some of these materials were protected by legislative privilege. The district court ruled that the legislative privilege did not apply.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the legislative privilege was properly invoked and covered communications between the legislators and Alan Vera, the chair of the HCRP Ballot Security Committee, who had been involved in the legislative process relating to S.B. 1. The court further held that the legislative privilege did not yield under the circumstances of the case, as it did not meet the criteria for being an "extraordinary civil case" in which the privilege must yield. Therefore, the documents and communications sought by LUPE were protected by legislative privilege and not subject to discovery. View "La Union del Pueblo v. Bettencourt" on Justia Law

In a dispute between Tara Shaw and Tara Shaw Designs, Ltd. (collectively, "Shaw") and Restoration Hardware ("RH"), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's dismissal of Shaw's claims. Shaw, a furniture designer, had entered into a contract with RH for the sale and licensing of certain furniture designs. However, Shaw alleged that RH breached an oral agreement by using Shaw's artisans to produce items not part of their licensing agreement without seeking Shaw's permission and providing additional compensation.Shaw brought claims of breach of contract, detrimental reliance, and unjust enrichment against RH. However, the district court dismissed these claims and denied Shaw's motions to reconsider and amend the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed these decisions.Regarding the breach of contract claim, the court stated that the alleged oral agreement was unenforceable because it left key terms for future negotiation, making it an "agreement to agree" which is not enforceable under Louisiana law.The court dismissed Shaw's detrimental reliance claim since Shaw failed to provide any evidence of damages or detriment due to their reliance on RH's alleged promise. The only detriment Shaw suffered was an opportunity to negotiate compensation in the future, which the court deemed insufficient for a detrimental reliance claim.The court also dismissed Shaw's unjust enrichment claim. While Shaw argued that the dismissal of their other claims demonstrated a lack of alternative remedies, the court found that Shaw failed to provide evidence of detriment necessary to support an unjust enrichment claim.Lastly, Shaw's motion to further amend the complaint was denied. The court found that Shaw failed to show good cause for amendment and that proposed amendments were futile. View "Shaw v. Restoration Hardware" on Justia Law

In this case, Miguel Angel Ortega, who pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography, appealed the application of a two-level sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice. The enhancement was based on a conversation he had with his wife regarding a letter of support she was writing for his sentencing proceeding. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated Ortega's sentence and remanded for resentencing.The court reasoned that Ortega's conduct, i.e., advising his wife about what to say in her letter to the court and in her statement at the sentencing hearing, did not constitute obstruction of justice. The government had argued that Ortega was unlawfully influencing a witness's testimony and directing his wife to attribute his conduct to drug addiction, which she lacked personal knowledge of. However, the court found no evidence that Ortega urged his wife to provide false or misleading information. It also noted that the facts Ortega instructed his wife to include in her statement were all supported by the factual record.The court clarified that the obstruction-of-justice enhancement applies if: (1) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction, and (2) the obstructive conduct related to (A) the defendant’s offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; or (B) a closely related offense.In this case, the court concluded, the government failed to show that Ortega's conduct met these requirements. Therefore, the court vacated Ortega's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing without the obstruction-of-justice enhancement. View "USA v. Ortega" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, which dismissed a False Claims Act (FCA) retaliation lawsuit brought by former employee Dana Johnson against his former employer, Raytheon Co.Johnson alleged that Raytheon retaliated against him for reporting fraudulent misrepresentations that the company made to the US Navy. However, the Court of Appeals ruled that the District Court correctly held that it lacked jurisdiction to review Johnson’s claims implicating the merits of the decision to revoke his security clearance, based on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Department of the Navy v. Egan. The court also affirmed that Johnson failed to present a prima facie case of retaliation for the remaining claim, which involved Johnson being instructed not to report problems to the Navy. The court found that such instructions by Raytheon would not have dissuaded a reasonable worker from reporting to the Navy and therefore did not constitute retaliation.The case centered around Johnson's work for Raytheon, a government defense contractor, on a Navy project which required top-secret security clearance. Johnson claimed that after he reported concerns to managers and supervisors about Raytheon making fraudulent misrepresentation to the Navy, Raytheon began to monitor him, made false accusations about him to the Navy, and ultimately fired him. The Navy found that Johnson had committed security violations, and his security clearance was revoked. Raytheon subsequently terminated Johnson's employment. Johnson filed a lawsuit claiming retaliation, which the District Court dismissed and the Court of Appeals affirmed. View "Johnson v. Raytheon" on Justia Law