Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Nicholas Queen, a former federal prisoner, filed a lawsuit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging that prison officials physically assaulted him in January 2019. The incident occurred when four correctional officers woke Queen up in his cell due to a supposed medical emergency. The parties dispute the events that followed, with the government claiming that Queen assaulted the officers, while Queen alleges that the officers physically attacked him without provocation. Following the incident, Queen complained of various physical pains, which he associated with the assault. However, prison medical officials dismissed his complaints, suggesting over-the-counter pain medication would suffice. After his release from prison, Queen was diagnosed with chronic back and right hip pain, which a medical doctor confirmed was severe enough to prevent him from working.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. The United States moved for the case to be dismissed at the summary judgment stage, arguing that Queen's injuries were de minimis and therefore insufficient to support an FTCA assault claim against a prison officer. The magistrate judge agreed with this argument and recommended dismissal. The district judge adopted this recommendation and dismissed Queen's case.Upon appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the court found that the district court had erred in its decision. The appellate court noted that the de minimis injury test applied to constitutional claims does not apply to an injury alleged under Louisiana tort law, which does not impose a de minimis injury bar to tort claims. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Queen v. United States" on Justia Law

In September 2020, George Fluitt was indicted on three counts of fraud and offering kickbacks related to genetic testing services that his company, Specialty Drug Testing LLC, provided to Medicare beneficiaries. As part of a nationwide investigation into genetic testing fraud, the Government executed search warrants at laboratories referred to as the Hurricane Shoals Entities (“HSE”), allegedly operated by Khalid Satary. The Government copied several terabytes of data from HSE, some of which were later determined to be material to Fluitt’s defense.In the lower courts, the Government established a “Filter Team” to review materials seized in its investigation and identify any that might be privileged. The Filter Team’s review was governed in part by a Protocol Order, which established a multi-step process for notifying a third party that it might have a claim of privilege and then adjudicating that claim. HSE and Satary provided privilege logs to the Filter Team, asserting thousands of claims of privilege. Both Fluitt and the Filter Team found these privilege logs to be facially deficient as they made only threadbare assertions of privilege, without any accompanying explanation.In the United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit, the court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the appellants failed to establish their claims of privilege. The court also found that the appellants' argument that they are not bound by the Protocol Order was a red herring, as the magistrate judge evaluated the appellants’ privilege logs under the standards established by federal caselaw. The court also rejected the appellants' argument that Fluitt “has not shown a need for the documents” and has not “demonstrated any kind of relevancy.” The court found that the record suggests that Fluitt “has a need” for the potentially privileged documents, as the Government determined that the potentially privileged materials were material to preparing Fluitt’s defense. View "United States v. Fluitt" on Justia Law

This case revolves around a series of maritime accidents caused by the breakaway of a drillship, the DPDS1, owned by Paragon Asset Company, during Hurricane Harvey in Port Aransas, Texas. Paragon had hired two tugboats owned by Signet Maritime Corporation to keep the vessel moored to the dock during the storm. However, the DPDS1 broke from its moorings, collided with both Signet tugs, and ran aground in the Corpus Christi ship channel. It later refloated and collided with a research pier owned by the University of Texas.The district court found Paragon solely liable for the breakaway, applying maritime negligence law. It concluded that Paragon had unreasonably relied on inaccurate reports about the strength of its mooring system and failed to call for an evacuation when it was the prudent course of action. The court also found that Signet and Paragon were equally liable for the damages suffered by the University of Texas due to the failure of a third tug, supplied by Signet, to prevent the vessel's collision with the pier.Paragon appealed, arguing that the court should have applied a "towage law" standard of duty to Signet's services and contested the district court's rejection of a force majeure defense. Paragon also disputed the court's determination regarding which contract between the parties governed Signet's services.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. It found no error in the application of maritime negligence law, rejected Paragon's force majeure defense, and agreed with the lower court's determination that Signet's Tariff governed the services provided during Hurricane Harvey. View "Paragon Asset v. American Steamship" on Justia Law

The case involves Maria E. Garcia and Liang Guo Yu, who were convicted for money laundering. The charges stemmed from their involvement with the Villalobos drug trafficking organization (DTO) in Houston, Texas. The DTO was known for moving hundreds of kilograms of cocaine and making yearly profits in the millions. Garcia and Yu were implicated in the seizure of large sums of cash during two separate searches. They were charged with conspiring to launder monetary instruments and aiding and abetting money laundering. Both defendants appealed their convictions, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they committed the offenses.Prior to their trial, the defendants had their motions for a new trial and to suppress denied by the district court. At trial, the government presented testimony from ten witnesses and introduced dozens of exhibits. The jury found Garcia and Yu guilty of both charges. Post-trial, the district court denied all three motions for a new trial and for a judgment of acquittal. Garcia was sentenced to two concurrent 78-month terms of imprisonment and two concurrent 3-year terms of supervised release. Yu was sentenced to two concurrent 151-month terms of imprisonment and two concurrent 3-year terms of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgments of the district court. The court found that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove the defendants' guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also held that the district court did not err in assessing a sentencing enhancement for Garcia and in denying Yu's motion to suppress without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The court further held that the district court did not err in denying Yu's motion for a new trial as untimely. View "USA v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Sandra Beatriz Bustamante-Leiva and her three children, natives and citizens of Honduras, entered the United States illegally near Hildalgo, Texas. They were charged with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) for not possessing valid documentation at the time of entry. Bustamante-Leiva applied for asylum, withholding of removal, protection under the Convention Against Torture, and humanitarian asylum, with her children as riders to her application. The claims were based on alleged persecution due to religion, political opinion, and membership in a particular social group. Bustamante-Leiva and her children had fled Honduras due to threats from gang members, who had used an empty lot adjacent to their home for violent activities.The immigration judge denied all requested relief and ordered that the petitioners be removed to Honduras. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the immigration judge’s findings that the petitioners did not show harm rising to the level of persecution, did not show a nexus between the harm and a protected ground, and did not establish a cognizable particular social group. The BIA also rejected due process arguments made by the petitioners and denied their request for a three-member panel as moot.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the BIA did not err in its determinations. The court found that the petitioners failed to show membership in a cognizable particular social group and failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution based on religion. The court also rejected the petitioners' claims that the BIA violated their due process rights by allowing a single BIA member to render its decision, and that the BIA violated its regulatory obligation to be impartial. The court denied the petition for review. View "Bustamante-Leiva v. Garland" on Justia Law

GFS Industries, a Texas limited liability corporation, entered into an agreement with Avion Funding to receive $190,000 in exchange for $299,800 of GFS’s future receivables. GFS stated it had not filed, nor did it anticipate filing, any Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. However, two weeks after signing the agreement, GFS petitioned for voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the Western District of Texas and elected to proceed under Subchapter V, a 2019 addition to the Bankruptcy Code designed to streamline the Chapter 11 reorganization process for certain small business debtors. Avion filed an adversary complaint in GFS’s bankruptcy, claiming GFS obtained Avion’s financing by misrepresenting whether it anticipated filing for bankruptcy. Avion sought a declaration that GFS’s debt to Avion was therefore nondischargeable.The bankruptcy court agreed with GFS, ruling that in the Subchapter V context, only individuals, not corporations, can be subject to § 523(a) dischargeability actions. The court followed the reasoning of four bankruptcy courts and declined to follow the Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in Cantwell-Cleary Co. v. Cleary Packaging, LLC (In re Cleary Packaging, LLC), which held that the Subchapter V discharge exceptions apply to both individual and corporate debtors. The bankruptcy court ruled GFS’s debt to Avion was dischargeable and dismissed Avion’s complaint. Avion timely appealed to the district court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the bankruptcy court's interpretation of the interplay between § 523(a) and § 1192(2). The court found that § 1192 governs discharging debts of a “debtor,” which the Code defines as encompassing both individual and corporate debtors. The court also noted that other Code provisions explicitly limit discharges to “individual” debtors, whereas § 1192 provides dischargeability simply for “the debtor.” The court concluded that 11 U.S.C. § 1192(2) subjects both corporate and individual Subchapter V debtors to the categories of debt discharge exceptions listed in § 523(a). Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the bankruptcy court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Avion Funding v. GFS Industries" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over the eligibility of a dredging barge, the DB AVALON, to operate in U.S. waters. Federal law stipulates that only vessels "built in the United States" can dredge in U.S. waters, a determination made by the U.S. Coast Guard. Curtin Maritime Corporation sought the Coast Guard's ruling that the AVALON, which incorporated foreign-made spuds and a crane, could operate in U.S. waters. The Coast Guard ruled that the AVALON would be considered U.S.-built. Diamond Services Corporation, a competitor of Curtin, challenged this ruling as arbitrary and capricious.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The district court deferred to the Coast Guard's interpretation of its own regulations and granted the Coast Guard summary judgment. Diamond Services Corporation appealed this decision.The case was then reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing that the Coast Guard's interpretation of its own regulations was reasonable. The court found that the regulations were genuinely ambiguous as to whether the crane was part of the AVALON’s superstructure. The court also found that the Coast Guard's interpretation fell within the regulatory zone of ambiguity and was reasonable. The court concluded that the Coast Guard's ruling was made by the agency, implicated the agency’s substantive expertise, and reflected fair and considered judgment. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment for the Federal Defendants. View "Diamond Services v. Maritime" on Justia Law

The case involves Marcus Anderson and Reed Clark, current and former employees of Harris County, who allege that Constable Christopher Diaz violated their First Amendment rights. They claim that Diaz instituted reforms to ensure his re-election, which included requiring employees to work on his campaign and retaliating against those who impeded campaign functions. The plaintiffs assert that Diaz had final authority over employment decisions and that his actions resulted in various adverse employment actions, ranging from transfer to termination.The plaintiffs initiated a suit against Diaz and Harris County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming Diaz violated their First Amendment rights. Harris County filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court granted, finding that Diaz was not a policymaker for Harris County. The district court dismissed all claims against the county with prejudice. Two years later, the district court issued a final judgment regarding the claims against Harris County, allowing the plaintiffs to appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court agreed with the lower court's finding that Diaz, as a constable of a single precinct, was not a final policymaker for Harris County. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' alternative argument that Harris County was liable for Diaz's employment decisions under a delegation or rubber-stamp theory. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to show that the alleged First Amendment violations were the result of an official county policy, and therefore, their claims against Harris County were dismissed. View "Anderson v. Harris County" on Justia Law

Danny Richard Rivers, an inmate in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, filed a second habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 while his first petition was still pending on appeal. The second petition challenged the same convictions as the first but added new claims. Rivers argued that these new claims arose after he was able to review his attorney-client file, which he had long requested and only received after a successful state bar grievance adjudication against his counsel. The district court deemed the second petition "successive" under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which requires an applicant to first get authorization from the appropriate court of appeals for such a petition. The district court held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petition without such authorization and transferred the matter to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.Rivers appealed the district court's transfer order, arguing that his second petition should have been construed as a motion to amend his first petition since it was still pending on appeal. He also contended that his claims should not have been considered successive because his counsel withheld his client file that would have allegedly exposed his ineffective assistance, and this information was not available to him when he filed his first petition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed with Rivers' arguments. The court found that Rivers' second petition attacked the same conviction as his first petition and added several new claims that stemmed from the proceedings already at issue in his first petition. The court held that the fact that Rivers' later-obtained client file allegedly contained information that was not available to him when he filed his first petition did not excuse him from meeting the standards for seeking authorization under § 2244. The court also held that the timing of Rivers' second petition did not permit him to circumvent the requirements for filing successive petitions under § 2244. The court affirmed the district court's order transferring the matter to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for lack of jurisdiction. View "Rivers v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

Elden Don Brannan was living with his sister and her three children in Corpus Christi, Texas. In 2022, Brannan's sister called 911 to report that Brannan had assaulted her boyfriend and was threatening suicide. She informed the police that Brannan had a "pipe bomb" in his bedroom closet. The bomb squad removed the device and Brannan was arrested. He was later indicted by a grand jury for possessing an unregistered "destructive device" in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). His sister testified that Brannan had built the device from disassembled fireworks. Brannan's defense was that the device was not an explosive but a "makeshift roman-candle or fountain firework" designed to emit a pyrotechnic display.Brannan was found guilty by a federal jury. He moved for acquittal, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to show he had designed the device as a weapon. These motions were denied. Brannan also requested the court to instruct the jury that to convict him under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), it had to find he had intentionally designed the device for use as a weapon. The court rejected this proposed instruction, reasoning that Brannan's intent to design the device as a weapon was not an element of the offense but an affirmative defense. The jury found Brannan guilty and he was sentenced to 24 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Brannan argued that the evidence was insufficient to convict him and that the jury instruction omitted an element of the offense. The court disagreed, affirming Brannan's conviction. The court held that under its binding precedent, the exception to § 5861(d) is an affirmative defense, not an element of the crime. Therefore, the government did not need to prove that the device was "designed for use as a weapon." The court also concluded that the district court did not err by following the circuit’s pattern instructions and declining to add "designed as a weapon" as an element of § 5861(d). View "United States v. Brannan" on Justia Law