Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

An advanced practice registered nurse in Texas, who maintained an active nursing license and a Prescriptive Authority Number, did not have a current prescriptive-authority agreement with a physician, as required by Texas law to prescribe drugs. She was not accused of any misconduct but was attending an educational program to transition careers. Because she lacked a prescriptive-authority agreement, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) initiated proceedings to revoke her federal Certificate of Registration, which allows her to handle controlled substances.An administrative law judge within the DEA recommended revocation, finding that she was “without state authority to handle controlled substances.” The Administrator of the DEA adopted this recommendation and revoked her registration. The nurse then petitioned for review directly to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, as permitted by statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the DEA’s action and concluded that the agency exceeded its statutory authority under 21 U.S.C. § 824(a)(3). The court held that the statute requires both the loss of a state license or registration and the lack of state authorization to handle controlled substances before the DEA may revoke a registration. Because the nurse still held all relevant state licenses and registrations, the court determined that the DEA lacked authority to revoke her registration solely due to the absence of a prescriptive-authority agreement. The court granted the petition for review, vacated the DEA’s revocation order, and remanded the case to the agency for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "DeWitt v. Drug Enforcement Administration" on Justia Law

An attorney who represented a client in a high-profile employment discrimination case against Louisiana State University (LSU) officials later brought suit against two attorneys and their law firm who had served as outside counsel to LSU. The plaintiff alleged that these attorneys engaged in misconduct during a Title IX investigation and, during subsequent state court litigation, made defamatory statements about him, including accusations of fabricating evidence. The state court had previously imposed significant monetary sanctions against the plaintiff and his client, citing, among other things, the plaintiff’s alleged fabrication of evidence and abusive litigation tactics.After the state court proceedings, the plaintiff filed a new lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, asserting claims for defamation, negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy under Louisiana law. The district court dismissed all claims with prejudice. It found the defamation claim barred by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, which limits federal review of state court judgments, and determined that the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was inadequately pleaded. The court also dismissed the conspiracy claim for lack of an underlying tort and denied leave to amend the complaint.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine did not bar the defamation claim because the plaintiff’s alleged injury arose from the defendants’ conduct, not from the state court judgment itself. The court vacated the dismissal of the defamation and conspiracy claims and remanded for further proceedings. However, it affirmed the dismissal of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, finding the alleged conduct did not meet the required legal standard. The court also vacated the denial of leave to amend the complaint. View "English v. Crochet" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, who is civilly committed as a sexually violent predator at the Texas Civil Commitment Center, brought a pro se lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Commissioner of the Texas Department of Family Protective Services and the Executive Commissioner of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission. He alleged that these agencies failed to investigate his reports of misconduct and abuse at the facility, claiming violations of his Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process, as well as rights under the Bill of Rights for Mental Health Patients. The plaintiff asserted that he should be able to file complaints with these agencies rather than being required to use the internal grievance procedure of the Texas Civil Commitment Office.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because the plaintiff was proceeding in forma pauperis. The district court found that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for relief and that amendment would be futile, so it dismissed the complaint without prejudice. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that he had adequately stated equal protection and due process claims, that he should have been allowed to amend his complaint, and that the district court was biased.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the plaintiff failed to state an equal protection claim because he was not similarly situated to other Texas citizens and the different grievance procedures had a rational basis. The court also found no protected liberty or property interest to support a due process claim and concluded that the alleged conduct did not rise to the level of a substantive due process violation. The court further held that amendment would have been futile and found no evidence of judicial bias. The plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel was denied. View "Dunsmore v. Muth" on Justia Law

A black man was hired as the first black city manager of a Texas city and led several major development initiatives. His tenure became contentious, especially after two new city council members, who opposed his policies, were elected. The conflict allegedly took on a racial character, and the city manager reported race-based discrimination. Eventually, the city council voted to part ways with him “without cause,” entering into a separation agreement that included a severance payment and a non-disparagement clause. After his departure, some council members publicly criticized him and later persuaded the council to rescind the separation agreement, citing a legal opinion that it was invalid. The city demanded the return of the severance payment, prompting the former city manager to sue, alleging racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and breach of contract under Texas law.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas granted summary judgment to the plaintiff on the validity of the separation agreement and denied the city’s motions for judgment as a matter of law. The case proceeded to trial, where a jury found for the plaintiff on both claims, awarding substantial damages. The district court entered judgment accordingly, later suggesting remittitur due to statutory limits on damages for breach of contract, which the plaintiff accepted.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the plaintiff failed to establish municipal liability for racial discrimination under § 1981 and § 1983 because he could not show that a majority of the city council acted with discriminatory intent, nor could he use the “cat’s paw” theory to impute animus under Monell. However, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment that the separation agreement was valid and enforceable, and that the city breached the contract by attempting to rescind it. The court reversed the judgment on the civil rights claim, affirmed the breach of contract ruling, and remanded for consideration of attorney’s fees. View "Jones v. City of Hutto" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case are homeowners and rental-property supervisors in New Orleans who challenged the City’s regulations governing short-term rentals (STRs), defined as lodging offered for less than thirty days. The City’s regulatory scheme requires permits for both owners and operators of STRs, restricts eligibility to “natural persons,” mandates that operators reside at the property, and imposes specific advertising requirements. The regulations were enacted in response to concerns about neighborhood disruption and loss of affordable housing attributed to the proliferation of STRs. Plaintiffs argued that these regulations violated various constitutional provisions, including the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, the First Amendment, and the dormant Commerce Clause.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted summary judgment largely in favor of the City, upholding the constitutionality of most aspects of the STR regulations. The district court found that the City had authority under state law to regulate STRs and rejected the plaintiffs’ due process and equal protection claims, except for one provision not at issue on appeal. The court also upheld the advertising restrictions and the operator residency requirement, interpreting the latter as not requiring permanent residency.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The Fifth Circuit held that the City’s prohibition on business entities obtaining owner or operator permits violated the Equal Protection Clause, as the distinction was arbitrary and not rationally related to a legitimate government interest. The court also found that the requirement that each STR advertisement list only one dwelling unit violated the First Amendment. However, the court upheld the City’s authority to regulate STRs, the due process analysis, most advertising restrictions, and interpreted the operator residency requirement as not violating the dormant Commerce Clause. View "Hignell-Stark v. City of New Orleans" on Justia Law

Juan Alaniz was convicted of possessing a firearm and ammunition as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Alaniz had prior state felony convictions for illegally possessing a controlled substance and for burglary. He challenged his conviction on constitutional grounds, arguing that the statute exceeded Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause, violated the Second Amendment on its face, and violated the Second Amendment as applied to him.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas reviewed the case and entered a conviction against Alaniz. On appeal, Alaniz raised the same constitutional arguments before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. He specifically argued that only his controlled substance conviction should be considered as the predicate for his § 922(g)(1) conviction, and that his burglary conviction should not be relevant to the constitutional analysis.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected Alaniz’s Commerce Clause and facial Second Amendment challenges, citing circuit precedent. The court reviewed his as-applied Second Amendment challenge de novo and held that the government may consider Alaniz’s entire criminal record, including his burglary conviction, when evaluating the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) as applied to him. The court found that founding-era laws support the constitutionality of disarming individuals convicted of burglary. Therefore, Alaniz’s as-applied challenge was foreclosed by circuit precedent, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Alaniz" on Justia Law

Three individuals, two of whom were former insureds of an insurance company, financed their insurance premiums through a separate premium finance company. Under the financing agreements, the finance company paid the full premium to the insurer and the insureds made monthly payments to the finance company. Each agreement authorized the finance company to cancel the insurance policy if the insured defaulted on payments. After defaults occurred, the finance company initiated cancellation of the policies. The plaintiffs alleged that the insurer’s procedures for cancellation did not comply with Louisiana law, resulting in ineffective cancellation and breach of good faith.The plaintiffs initially filed a class action in Louisiana state court against the insurer and the finance company, claiming that the insurer had not properly cancelled their policies and had failed to act in good faith. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. Both sides moved for summary judgment on whether the insurer’s cancellation procedures satisfied Louisiana statutory requirements. The district court granted summary judgment for the insurer, finding that its procedures complied with state law, and dismissed all claims with prejudice.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether the insurer’s procedures strictly adhered to Louisiana law governing cancellation of financed insurance policies. The court held that Louisiana law does not require a signature on the notice of cancellation sent by the premium finance company to the insurer, and that the insurer’s receipt of notice via its computer system satisfied the statutory requirement of “receipt.” The court declined to certify questions of statutory interpretation to the Louisiana Supreme Court and affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Williams v. GoAuto Insurance" on Justia Law

A group of individuals with large social media followings was charged with securities fraud and conspiracy to commit securities fraud. The government alleged that these individuals engaged in a “pump and dump” scheme: they would purchase securities, then use their social media platforms to post false or misleading information about those securities to induce their followers to buy, thereby artificially inflating the price. After the price increased, the defendants would sell their holdings for a profit. The indictment claimed that the defendants collectively profited $114 million from this scheme.After indictment in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, one defendant pleaded guilty while the others moved to dismiss the indictment. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, reasoning that the indictment failed to allege a scheme to deprive victims of a traditional property interest, instead only alleging deprivation of valuable economic information. The district court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Ciminelli v. United States, which held that deprivation of economic information alone does not constitute fraud under federal law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the indictment de novo. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the indictment adequately alleged both a scheme to defraud and an intent to defraud, as required by the securities fraud statute. The court distinguished the case from Ciminelli, finding that the indictment alleged a fraudulent-inducement theory—whereby the defendants used misrepresentations to induce followers to part with money by purchasing securities—not merely a deprivation of information. The court also held that the fraud statutes do not require proof that the defendants intended to cause economic harm, only that they intended to obtain money or property by deceit. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the indictment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "USA v. Constantinescu" on Justia Law

An inmate at the Louisiana State Penitentiary participated in the Angola Prison Rodeo from 1996 to 2019, selling leather belts and earning approximately $80,000. He alleged that prison officials confiscated about $16,000 of his earnings, claiming the deductions were for taxes, commissions, and maintenance fees. The inmate filed a grievance through the prison’s administrative process, arguing that the deductions were unauthorized and that he was denied a due process hearing regarding the seizure of his property. The prison denied his grievance, explaining the deductions, and the inmate exhausted his administrative remedies. He then sought relief in Louisiana state court through a petition for writ of mandamus, which remained unresolved for over a year.Subsequently, the inmate filed a pro se complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that various prison officials conspired to deny him due process in connection with the confiscation of his property. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting qualified immunity and failure to state a claim. A magistrate judge recommended dismissing any standalone claims regarding the denial of the prison grievance but allowed the conspiracy and due process claims to proceed. The district court adopted this recommendation, and the defendants appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that the inmate’s complaint did not adequately allege a pre-deprivation due process claim and that, at the time of the alleged conduct, it was not clearly established that the inmate had a protected property interest in the proceeds from the sale of crafts made and sold under prison auspices. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Savage v. Westcott" on Justia Law

Several development groups entered into a public improvement contract with a Texas city, purchasing over 60 acres of land, much of it in a flood zone. The developers received a variance from the city, exempting them from obtaining a federal floodplain permit (CLOMR), and invested significant funds in developing the property, including constructing a bridge. In 2018, the parties executed updated agreements, including a Master Development Agreement (MDA), which required certain conditions to be met within five years or the contract would automatically terminate, ending the city’s reimbursement obligations. As the deadline approached, the city informed the developers that they would now need to obtain the previously waived CLOMR, citing a later-enacted ordinance. Unable to comply in time, the developers sought an extension, which the city council denied, resulting in termination of the MDA.The developers sued in Texas state court, alleging the city’s actions constituted an unconstitutional taking under federal and state law, and also brought claims for breach of contract and violations of the Texas Vested Rights Statute. The city removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas and moved to dismiss. The district court dismissed the federal takings and declaratory judgment claims, finding the developers had not sufficiently alleged that the city acted in its sovereign rather than commercial capacity, and remanded the remaining state-law claims to state court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the developers’ allegations arose from a contractual dispute, not a sovereign act by the city, and thus did not state a plausible takings claim under the Fifth Amendment. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to dismiss the declaratory judgment claim, as the core issues would be resolved in the remanded state court action. View "Mesquite Asset Recovery Grp v. City of Mesquite" on Justia Law