Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, Shanita Terrell, alleges that two deputies from the Harris County Sheriff’s Office forced her into a patrol car, and one of them sexually assaulted her. The deputies were off-duty but were in uniform and using patrol vehicles while working side jobs at a bar. Terrell woke up the next morning at home with pain in her vaginal area and no memory of having sex. A DNA test revealed that semen in her underwear matched one of the deputies, Michael Hines. Hines was later charged with sexually assaulting Terrell.Terrell sued Deputy Hines, Deputy Mark Cannon, Harris County Sheriff Ed Gonzalez, and Harris County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed her claims against Cannon, Gonzalez, and Harris County for failing to state a claim. Terrell appealed the dismissal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Terrell failed to establish that Deputy Cannon violated a clearly established constitutional right. She also failed to allege the type of pattern of deliberate indifference required to establish liability for the County or its Sheriff. The court also dismissed Terrell's supervisory and municipal liability claims against Sheriff Gonzalez and Harris County, respectively. The court concluded that Terrell's allegations were insufficient to show a failure-to-train policy or a widespread pattern of misconduct. View "Terrell v. Harris County" on Justia Law

The case involves Priscilla Yvette Cervantes, who was convicted of participating in a drug-trafficking conspiracy to possess and aid in the possession of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute. The conspiracy was orchestrated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as a reverse-sting operation targeting Cervantes's boyfriend and later husband, Alexsander Reyes, a former Harris County Precinct One Constable’s Deputy suspected of corruption and stealing drugs from law enforcement seizures. Cervantes accompanied Reyes on multiple occasions, including transporting money and escorting drugs for a fake cartel in exchange for cash payments.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, where Cervantes was found guilty on both counts of conspiring and aiding and abetting possession with the intent to distribute a controlled substance. Cervantes moved for acquittal on both counts, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to show that she or Reyes ever actually or constructively possessed the cocaine, or that she knew, or reasonably should have known, that the weight of the cocaine was at least five kilograms. The district court denied the motion.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Cervantes raised three issues. She argued that the district court erred in denying her motion for acquittal, in failing to give a jury instruction that she could not be in a conspiracy alone with a government agent, and in excluding a video clip of Reyes's post-arrest interview with an FBI agent. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, finding that there was substantial evidence for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Cervantes and Reyes engaged in an agreement to possess with the intent to distribute a controlled substance. The court also found no error in the district court's refusal to give a specific jury instruction or in its decision to exclude the video clip. View "United States v. Cervantes" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of self-described "lawful and peaceful protestors" who sued the City of Dallas, Dallas County, and the Dallas County Sheriff’s Office under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking damages for alleged constitutional violations stemming from their participation in the George Floyd demonstrations in Dallas. The plaintiffs claimed that they were wrongfully arrested and mistreated by the police during the protests. They also alleged that the City of Dallas had a policy of failing to adequately discipline its police officers, which led to their constitutional rights being violated.The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims against the City, the County, and the Sheriff’s Office. The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their municipal liability claims against the City, arguing that the district court erred in doing so.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to show that the City of Dallas had a persistent and widespread practice of failing to discipline its police officers that amounted to deliberate indifference. The court also found that the plaintiffs failed to establish a causal link between the City's alleged failure to discipline and the violation of their rights. Furthermore, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that General Order 609.00, an official policy relating to mass arrests, was unconstitutional on its face. The court concluded that the policy did not affirmatively allow or compel unconstitutional conduct. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims against the City of Dallas. View "Verastique v. City of Dallas" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between Gibson, Inc., a Delaware corporation, and Armadillo Distribution Enterprises, Inc., a Florida corporation, along with Concordia Investment Partners, L.L.C. Gibson, a well-known guitar manufacturer, brought trademark-infringement and counterfeiting claims against Armadillo and Concordia, alleging that they infringed on Gibson's trademarked guitar body shapes, headstock shape, and word marks. After a ten-day trial, the jury found in favor of Gibson on several counts of infringement and counterfeiting but also found that the doctrine of laches applied to limit Gibson’s recovery of damages.The district court had excluded decades of third-party-use evidence that Armadillo and Concordia submitted in support of their genericness defense and counterclaim. Armadillo and Concordia appealed this exclusion order, arguing that the evidence was relevant to their defense that Gibson's trademarks were generic and thus not entitled to protection.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court abused its discretion by excluding all pre-1992 third-party-use evidence without examining its possible relevance. The court noted that third-party-use evidence is often relevant to show the genericness of a mark, and a mark that is generic is not entitled to trademark protection. The court concluded that the district court's error affected Armadillo’s substantial rights to put on its primary defense to the infringement and counterfeiting claims against it. Therefore, the court remanded the case for a new trial. View "Gibson, Inc. v. Armadillo Distribution Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a constitutional challenge to the Horseracing Integrity and Safety Act of 2020 (“HISA”). The Act empowers a private corporation, the Horseracing Integrity and Safety Authority (“Authority”), to create and enforce nationwide rules for thoroughbred horseracing. The plaintiffs, a group of horsemen's associations and other stakeholders in the horseracing industry, argued that the Act violated the private nondelegation doctrine, the Due Process Clause, the Appointments Clause, and the Tenth Amendment.The district court had previously held that an amendment to the Act, which gave the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) the power to abrogate, add to, or modify the Authority’s rules, cured the Act’s constitutional deficiencies. The district court also rejected claims that the Act violated the Constitution’s Appointments Clause and the Tenth Amendment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that the FTC’s new rulemaking oversight meant the agency was no longer bound by the Authority’s policy choices, thereby resolving the nondelegation problem with the Authority’s rulemaking power. The court also agreed that the Act did not violate the Due Process Clause or the Appointments Clause.However, the court disagreed with the district court regarding the Act’s enforcement provisions. The court held that the Act’s enforcement provisions, which empowered the Authority to investigate, issue subpoenas, conduct searches, levy fines, and seek injunctions without the FTC’s approval, violated the private nondelegation doctrine. The court declared these enforcement provisions facially unconstitutional. The court also affirmed the district court’s finding that one of the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring a Tenth Amendment challenge. View "National Horsemen’s Benevolent and Protective Association v. Black" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Wapiti Energy, L.L.C. ("Wapiti"), the owner of a 155-foot tank barge, the SMI 315, which broke free of its moorings and ran aground in marshland owned by a third party during Hurricane Ida. The vessel was insured under a marine package policy issued by Clear Spring Property and Casualty Company ("Clear Spring"). The policy provided coverage for wreck removal expenses that are compulsory by law. After the incident, Wapiti incurred expenses in removing the stranded vessel from the marshland and sought reimbursement from Clear Spring. Clear Spring, however, moved for summary judgment, arguing that the removal of the SMI 315 was not compulsory by law, and thus, it was not obligated to reimburse the expenses.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas ruled in favor of Clear Spring, concluding that removal of the SMI 315 was not compulsory by law and dismissing Wapiti’s claims. Wapiti appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the lower court's decision. The court concluded that the removal of the SMI 315 was compelled by the Louisiana possessory action, which made removal compulsory by law. The court reasoned that at the time of the incident, a reasonable owner would know that the barge stranded on a third party's property would expose them to a high probability of having to comply with an injunction mandating the removal of the vessel. Therefore, Wapiti's proactive removal of the vessel from the third party's marshland was warranted, and Clear Spring was obligated to reimburse the expenses. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Wapiti Energy v. Clear Spring Property and Casualty Co." on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between SR Construction (SRC), a construction company, and RE Palm Springs II, L.L.C. (RPS), a company formed to take title to a hotel property. SRC was hired to build a hotel in California but was terminated before completion, leaving it with a demand for $14 million in unpaid work. After several failed attempts to recover its dues, SRC held onto certain personal property left over from the hotel project. The bankruptcy court ordered SRC to turn over the personal property, which SRC appealed.The lower courts had a series of interactions with this case. The bankruptcy court initially ordered SRC to turn over the personal property. SRC appealed this decision, challenging the bankruptcy court's power to order the turnover and the validity of the most recent hotel owner's claim to the personal property. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision, concluding that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to interpret and enforce the Sale Order. It also affirmed the bankruptcy court's conclusion that Hall had obtained title to the Personal Property and had not waived its right to the Personal Property by taking it "as is."The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court's order was part of its undisputed power to order the sale of a bankruptcy debtor's assets. It also rejected SRC's arguments about ownership of the assets in this case. The court found that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to enter the Turnover Order because that order interpreted and enforced the Sale Order. It also concluded that because the Turnover Order is integral to and inseparable from RPS's bankruptcy, it is a core matter. Therefore, issuing the Turnover Order was entirely within the bankruptcy court's authority. The court also affirmed the conclusion that title to the Personal Property passed from SRC to Palm Springs, then to RPS, and finally to Hall. View "SR Construction v. RE Palm Springs II" on Justia Law

The case revolves around James Dondero, co-founder and former CEO of Highland Capital Management, L.P., a global investment advisor that filed for bankruptcy in 2019. Highland filed an adversary proceeding against Dondero due to a dispute over the disposition of its assets in bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) against Dondero, which he was later found to have violated, leading to a contempt order and compensatory damages awarded to Highland.The bankruptcy court's decision was affirmed by the district court. The court found that Dondero had violated the TRO by communicating with Highland's employees outside of the Shared Services Exception and interfering with Highland's trading activities. The court imposed a $450,000 compensatory monetary sanction to be paid to Highland, as well as a $100,000 sanction for each level of rehearing, appeal, or petition for certiorari unsuccessfully pursued. The district court affirmed all aspects of the bankruptcy court’s contempt order except for the $100,000 sanction for unsuccessful appeals, which Highland did not contest.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court found that the bankruptcy court did not err in concluding that Dondero violated both Section 2(c) and Section 3 of the TRO. The court also found that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a $450,000 sanction. The court rejected Dondero's arguments that the TRO was vague and ambiguous, that there was not clear and convincing evidence of a TRO violation, and that the bankruptcy court erred in awarding the sanction. View "Dondero v. Highland Capital Management, L.P." on Justia Law

Ian Simpson purchased a life insurance policy from Transamerica Life Insurance Company and named his then-fiancée, Holly Moore, as the primary beneficiary and his father, Jeffrey Simpson, as the contingent beneficiary. After Ian and Holly married and subsequently divorced, Ian died without changing the policy beneficiaries. The divorce decree stipulated that Holly was divested of all rights to Ian's life insurance policies. After Ian's death, both Holly and Jeffrey claimed the policy proceeds, leading Transamerica to file an interpleader action in federal court.The district court ruled in favor of Holly, holding that Texas Family Code § 9.301, which generally strips an ex-spouse of beneficiary interests in insurance policies after a divorce, only applies if the insured and the beneficiary were married when the insurance policy was purchased. The court reasoned that since the policy was purchased before Ian and Holly's marriage, Holly was not considered "the insured's spouse" at the time of the policy's inception, and therefore, the divorce decree did not divest her of the insurance proceeds.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment. The appellate court interpreted § 9.301 to focus on the marital relationship at the time of the divorce decree's rendition, regardless of when the insurance policy was purchased. The court held that since Holly was Ian's spouse at the time of the divorce decree, § 9.301 divested her of her beneficiary interest in the policy. Therefore, the court ruled in favor of Jeffrey Simpson, the contingent beneficiary. View "Simpson v. Moore" on Justia Law

Baylor Scott & White Holdings (BSW), the largest nonprofit health system in Texas, purchased a specialized commercial property insurance policy from Factory Mutual Insurance Co. (FM) to cover its facilities. The policy covered two types of claims—“Property Damage” and “Time Element” claims, which are synonymous with “business interruption” loss. BSW submitted a claim under the policy for its business interruption losses as a result of COVID-19, totaling over $192 million. FM denied the claim, stating that the only coverage under the policy for losses arising from COVID-19 came from the Communicable Disease Response Extension and the Interruption by Communicable Disease Extension, which had already been exhausted.FM moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim. The district court granted FM’s motion to dismiss, finding that BSW had not plausibly alleged “physical loss or damage” under the policy, and that the Contamination Exclusion and Loss of Use Exclusion barred BSW’s recovery under the policy. BSW appealed the district court’s dismissal order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The court held that, in the context of COVID-19 commercial-insurance coverage disputes, COVID-19 does not physically harm property. The court found that the alleged uniqueness of the policy’s language did not change this determination. The court also rejected BSW's contention that its complaint was wrongly dismissed because it included specific factual allegations of demonstratable, measurable, and tangible alteration of property caused by COVID-19. The court concluded that, as a matter of law, COVID-19 does not affect property in a “physical” way. View "Baylor Scott & White v. Factory Mutual" on Justia Law