Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A Mississippi retail pharmacy, Rx Solutions, Inc., sought to join the pharmacy benefit management (PBM) network operated by Caremark, LLC, which is associated with CVS Pharmacy, Inc. Caremark denied Rx Solutions’ application, citing inconsistencies in ownership information and affiliations with Quest Pharmacy, owned by Harold Ted Cain, who Caremark claimed was previously found guilty of violating the False Claims Act. Rx Solutions disputed these reasons, noting acceptance by other PBM networks and asserting that Harold Ted Cain lacked operational control over Rx Solutions and had not been convicted of any relevant criminal offense.Rx Solutions filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, alleging two federal antitrust violations under the Sherman Act and three state law claims: violation of Mississippi’s “any willing provider” statute, violation of the state antitrust statute, and tortious interference with business relations. The district court dismissed the federal antitrust and state statutory claims, concluding that Rx Solutions failed to adequately define relevant product and geographic markets and did not allege antitrust injury. The court also determined there was no diversity jurisdiction to support the remaining state law claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the federal antitrust and Mississippi state antitrust claims, holding that Rx Solutions did not sufficiently plead a relevant market or antitrust injury. However, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s finding regarding diversity jurisdiction, based on admissions by Caremark and CVS establishing complete diversity between the parties. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the state antitrust claim and remanded the claims under Mississippi’s “any willing provider” statute and for tortious interference with business relations for further proceedings. View "Rx Solutions v. Caremark" on Justia Law

Texas LNG, a company seeking to construct a liquid natural gas terminal in Brownsville, Texas, received a permit from the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) to build its facility. The company faced delays due to litigation and the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in three successive extensions of its construction deadline granted by TCEQ’s executive director. The South Texas Environmental Justice Network (STEJN), an environmental advocacy group, moved to overturn the third extension, arguing that Texas LNG did not meet the requirements under Texas law to receive it and that the executive director lacked authority to grant the extension.Prior to the current appeal, both federal and state agencies reviewed Texas LNG’s permit. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and TCEQ initially granted the necessary permits, but subsequent legal challenges led to a remand by the D.C. Circuit to FERC (which ultimately reaffirmed the permit) and a dismissal by the Third Court of Appeals in Austin for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction regarding the TCEQ permit. TCEQ’s Office of Public Interest recommended granting the motion to overturn on the basis of updated air quality standards, but TCEQ did not issue a decision, resulting in a denial of STEJN’s motion by operation of law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed STEJN’s direct petition for review of TCEQ’s denial. Applying de novo review under the Texas Administrative Procedure Act, the Fifth Circuit held that STEJN had standing but found that TCEQ’s executive director had the authority under section 116.120 of the Texas Administrative Code to grant the third extension. The court determined that Texas LNG met the regulatory requirements for a third extension, and substantial evidence supported TCEQ’s decision. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit denied STEJN’s petition for review. View "S Texas Environmental Justice v. Commission on Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

Two Venezuelan sisters, both recipients of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) in the United States, submitted affirmative applications for asylum, alleging past persecution and fear of future persecution in Venezuela. After interviews with asylum officers, they were denied asylum by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), which concluded that they had not shown a reasonable possibility of persecution. The denial letters stated that, due to their TPS, there would be no referral to an immigration judge for removal proceedings, and that the determinations could not be appealed at that time.Following delays in adjudication, each sister filed suit against various federal officials in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, seeking to overturn the asylum denials under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) as arbitrary and capricious. The district court in one case dismissed the suit without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), finding no final agency action; the other district court dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), also citing lack of final agency action. The sisters appealed, and the cases were consolidated.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the USCIS denial letters were not final agency actions under the APA because the administrative process was not complete. The sisters could still seek asylum defensively in future removal proceedings once their TPS ended. The court concluded that, since the agency’s decision did not fix legal rights or obligations or trigger legal consequences, the district courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit affirmed both dismissals and modified the dismissal in the case that had been with prejudice to be without prejudice. View "Sayegh de Kewayfati v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Several entities affiliated with Allstate sued a group of individuals and entities that own, manage, and operate Memorial Heights Emergency Center in Houston, Texas. The plaintiffs alleged that, starting in 2018, defendants entered into agreements with personal injury attorneys to refer clients to the Center under letters of protection, guaranteeing future payment from insurance settlements. Defendants billed these patients—primarily car accident victims—using emergency billing codes at rates far above standard charges, often conducting expensive diagnostic tests without documented medical necessity and discharging patients without additional treatment. The bills were then sent to attorneys, who submitted them to Allstate for inclusion in settlement demands. Between August 2018 and November 2022, Allstate settled with 635 claimants and subsequently alleged it discovered a fraudulent scheme, seeking to recover $4.7 million plus treble damages and attorney fees.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed all claims with prejudice. The district court held that Allstate failed to sufficiently allege reliance on the fraudulent bills, undermining its RICO, common-law fraud, conspiracy, unjust enrichment, and money-had-and-received claims. The court also found Allstate had not adequately pleaded direct or proximate causation, concluded that Allstate was “complicit” in the alleged fraud due to its continued settlements after learning of the scheme, and determined that the complexity of the case made it unmanageable as a single lawsuit.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court applied the wrong legal standards to Allstate’s RICO claims by requiring reliance, which is not necessary for a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud. The appellate court further found that Allstate adequately pleaded proximate cause, damages, and the elements of its common-law and equitable claims. The judgment of the district court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Allstate Indemnity Co v. Bhagat" on Justia Law

Brent Dubois was convicted in 2011 of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, receiving a sentence of 188 months in prison and three years of supervised release. As part of his supervised release, a condition required him to participate in a substance abuse program, allowing the probation office to decide whether that would be inpatient or outpatient treatment. After a relevant amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines, Dubois’s sentence was reduced to 151 months. Upon completing his incarceration in 2023, Dubois began supervised release, but struggled to comply with outpatient treatment requirements. After repeated difficulties and four revocation hearings, his probation officer filed a petition for revocation, leading Dubois to admit to violations except one allegation, which the government withdrew.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas sentenced Dubois to ten months in prison and 32 months of supervised release, reimposing the original supervised release conditions. Notably, it again permitted the probation office to determine whether Dubois’s substance abuse treatment would be inpatient or outpatient. Dubois did not object to this condition at sentencing, but later appealed, arguing that the delegation of this decision to the probation office was improper.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case under the plain error standard, given Dubois’s lack of objection in district court. The Fifth Circuit held that permitting the probation office to decide between inpatient and outpatient treatment constituted an impermissible delegation of the district court’s core judicial sentencing function, particularly since the sentence following revocation was only ten months. The court found this error to be clear under existing precedent, affected Dubois’s substantial rights, and warranted discretionary correction. The Fifth Circuit vacated the supervised release condition at issue and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Dubois" on Justia Law

Endure Industries, Inc., a seller of disposable medical supplies, sought to participate as a supplier in Vizient’s group purchasing organization (GPO), which negotiates bulk purchasing contracts for healthcare providers. Vizient is the largest GPO in the United States, serving a majority of general acute care centers and academic medical centers. After Vizient rejected Endure’s bid to supply medical tape in favor of another supplier, Endure filed an antitrust suit against Vizient and related entities, alleging monopolization and anticompetitive conduct in two proposed markets for disposable medical supplies.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas granted summary judgment to Vizient, finding that Endure failed to define a legally sufficient relevant market under antitrust law. The district court reasoned that Endure’s expert’s market definitions—(1) the sale of disposable medical supplies through GPOs to acute care centers, and (2) sales to Vizient member hospitals—excluded significant alternative sources of supply. Specifically, evidence showed that many hospitals purchase substantial amounts of supplies outside GPO contracts, demonstrating that reasonable substitutes exist and undermining Endure’s theory of market foreclosure.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed only the issue of market definition. The Fifth Circuit held that Endure did not raise a genuine dispute of material fact regarding its proposed markets, as its definitions failed to account for all commodities reasonably interchangeable by consumers. The court found that significant hospital purchasing occurs outside GPOs and that Vizient members are not “locked in” to buying exclusively through Vizient. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Vizient, concluding that neither of Endure’s proposed antitrust markets was legally sufficient. View "Endure Industries v. Vizient" on Justia Law

Two individuals, Vetter and Smith, co-wrote the song “Double Shot (Of My Baby’s Love)” in 1962 and assigned all copyright interests to Windsong Music Publishers in 1963, including a contingent assignment of renewal rights. After Smith died in 1972, his heirs and Vetter renewed the copyright when the original term ended in 1994. Windsong’s ownership of renewal rights depended on the authors’ survival; thus, Windsong received Vetter’s renewal rights because he survived, while Smith’s heirs received his share. Vetter Communications Corporation later purchased Smith’s heirs’ renewal rights. In 2019, Vetter terminated his earlier assignment under 17 U.S.C. § 304(c), aiming to recapture his rights. The publisher’s ownership interests were subsequently sold to Resnik Music Group. When licensing negotiations arose for international use, conflicting ownership claims led Vetter and his corporation to seek a declaratory judgment establishing their sole copyright ownership worldwide.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana denied Resnik’s motion to dismiss and granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs. The court declared that Vetter was the sole owner of the recaptured copyright interest globally, and Vetter Communications Corporation was the sole owner of the renewal copyright interest globally, establishing their exclusive ownership.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment de novo. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that termination of copyright assignments under 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) and the renewal provisions of the Copyright Act of 1909 confer worldwide ownership rights to the terminating author or their heirs, not limited to domestic rights. The court found that statutory text, context, and purpose support this interpretation, and that the judgment does not conflict with international treaty obligations or relevant legal principles. View "Vetter v. Resnik" on Justia Law

Ayodeji Awe, a former chaplain at Harris Health System (HHS), alleged that he and other minority chaplains were underpaid during his tenure. After leaving HHS in 2020, Awe reapplied for a chaplain position in 2021 but was not rehired; HHS instead selected three other candidates. Awe believed the failure to rehire him was due to age discrimination and retaliation for his prior complaints about workplace issues, including underpayment of minority chaplains.Following receipt of a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in June 2022, Awe filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, asserting claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The district court granted summary judgment for HHS on all claims, finding that Awe did not rebut HHS’s nondiscriminatory reasons for its hiring decisions. Specifically, the district court ruled that Awe failed to make a prima facie case on his ADEA claims and did not present sufficient evidence of pretext for his Title VII retaliation claim.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the summary judgment de novo and affirmed. The Fifth Circuit held that Awe did not establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, as one of the hired candidates was older than Awe, and another only five years younger. For ADEA retaliation, the court found Awe did not show his complaints were age-related. Although Awe established a prima facie Title VII retaliation claim, he failed to show that HHS’s stated preference for internal candidates was pretextual, nor that he was clearly better qualified than those hired. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Awe v. Harris Health" on Justia Law

Margaret Woods, proceeding without an attorney, sued her former employer STS Services, L.L.C., after being terminated from her job. In her Third Amended Complaint, Woods alleged that she was fired because she is a black woman and replaced by white men. Earlier versions of her complaint included claims for breach of contract and race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which she abandoned, leaving only claims of race and sex discrimination under Title VII. Woods did not provide factual details about her qualifications for the position from which she was terminated.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas reviewed Woods’s successive complaints. Each time, the district court dismissed her complaints for failure to state a claim but allowed her opportunities to amend and refile. Woods submitted her Second Amended Complaint late, which was also dismissed. Her Third Amended Complaint was timely, but again found deficient for failing to plead facts regarding her qualifications. The court gave her another chance to amend, but Woods did not file a Fourth Amended Complaint within the deadline, or at all. The district court ultimately dismissed the case with prejudice and entered judgment in favor of STS Services, assessing costs against Woods.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that Woods failed to state a Title VII claim because her complaint did not include sufficient factual allegations to establish that she was qualified for her position, a necessary element of a prima facie case under Title VII. The Fifth Circuit also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Woods’s complaint with prejudice after repeated deficiencies and failures to amend. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Woods v. STS Services" on Justia Law

Wilson and two associates attempted to purchase a firearm from D.J. at a gas station, only to discover that the firearm was fake. In retaliation, Wilson retrieved a handgun modified with a machinegun conversion device and an extended magazine from his vehicle. He confronted D.J. and fired multiple rounds, fatally wounding him. Wilson and his companions then robbed D.J. and fled the scene. Police subsequently located Wilson, who confessed to the shooting and acknowledged the weapon was equipped with a machinegun conversion device.Wilson was charged in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas with unlawful possession of a machinegun under 18 U.S.C. § 922(o). He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(o) violated the Second Amendment, but the district court denied the motion. Wilson pleaded guilty without a written plea agreement. At sentencing, the Presentence Investigation Report applied the Sentencing Guidelines cross-reference to second-degree murder due to the death resulting from Wilson's conduct, resulting in a recommended sentence of 120 months, the statutory maximum. Wilson objected, claiming the cross-reference failed to account for his self-defense claim, but the district court overruled his objection, adopted the PSR, and imposed the recommended sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed Wilson’s appeal. He challenged his conviction on Second Amendment grounds and the application of the second-degree murder cross-reference during sentencing. The Fifth Circuit held that circuit precedent, specifically Hollis v. Lynch, forecloses any Second Amendment protection for machineguns, and that Supreme Court precedent in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen does not overrule this holding. The court also found no plain error in the district court’s application of the second-degree murder cross-reference. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Wilson" on Justia Law