Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves two nonprofit organizations, the National Federation of the Blind of Texas and Arms of Hope, which use donation boxes to collect items for fundraising. The City of Arlington, Texas, enacted an ordinance regulating the placement and maintenance of these donation boxes, including zoning restrictions and setback requirements. The nonprofits challenged the ordinance, claiming it violated the First Amendment by restricting their ability to place donation boxes in certain areas of the city.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas reviewed the case. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Arlington on several counts, including the constitutionality of the setback requirement and the ordinance not being overbroad or a prior restraint. However, the court ruled in favor of the nonprofits on the zoning provision, finding it was not narrowly tailored and thus violated the First Amendment. The court enjoined Arlington from enforcing the zoning provision against the nonprofits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the ordinance was content-neutral and subject to intermediate scrutiny. It found that the zoning provision, which limited donation boxes to three of the city's 28 zoning districts, was narrowly tailored to serve Arlington's significant interests in public health, safety, welfare, and community aesthetics. The court also upheld the setback requirement, finding it did not burden more speech than necessary and left ample alternative channels of communication. The court concluded that the ordinance's permitting provisions did not constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint.The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment regarding the zoning provision and rendered judgment in favor of Arlington on that part. The rest of the district court's judgment was affirmed. View "National Federation of the Blind of Texas, Incorporated v. City of Arlington" on Justia Law

The case involves the estate of Bud Conyers seeking a relator’s share of the proceeds from a settlement between the United States and military contractor Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR) under the False Claims Act (FCA). Conyers, a former KBR truck driver, had filed a qui tam suit alleging various fraudulent activities by KBR, including the use of mortuary trailers for supplies, kickbacks for defective trucks, and billing for prostitutes. The government later intervened in Conyers’s suit but pursued different claims involving KBR employees Mazon, Seamans, and Martin, who were involved in separate kickback schemes.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas awarded Conyers’s estate approximately $1.1 million, finding a “factual overlap” between Conyers’s allegations and the settled claims, particularly with Martin’s kickback scheme involving trucks. The court reasoned that Conyers’s allegations had put the government on notice of fraud in trucking contracts, which arguably led to the investigation of Martin. The district court also ordered the government to pay Conyers’s attorney’s fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that under the FCA, a relator is entitled to a share only of the settlement of the claim he brought, not additional claims added by the government. The court found no relevant factual overlap between Conyers’s claims and the settled claims involving Mazon, Seamans, and Martin. The court also rejected the district court’s reasoning that Conyers’s allegations spurred the investigation into Martin’s misconduct, noting that the FCA does not entitle a relator to recover from new claims discovered by the government. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Conyers’s estate was not entitled to any share of the settlement proceeds and reversed the award of attorney’s fees. View "USA v. Conyers" on Justia Law

Dean Dabbasi was terminated by his employer, Motiva Enterprises, in 2019. Dabbasi filed a lawsuit alleging age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA), as well as disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the TCHRA. He claimed that his termination was due to his age and a cardiac incident he experienced during a performance improvement plan (PIP) meeting. Motiva argued that Dabbasi was terminated for poor performance and attitude.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of Motiva. The court found that Dabbasi's claims related to his transition to a different role and the failure to place him in a promised position were time-barred or not actionable. The court also held that Dabbasi failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination because he was not replaced by someone younger in his final position. Additionally, the court concluded that Dabbasi was not disabled at the time of his termination, as he returned to work without restrictions after his medical leave.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court erred in evaluating Dabbasi's age-discrimination claim in isolation rather than considering the totality of the evidence. The appellate court determined that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Dabbasi was terminated because of his age. However, the court agreed with the district court that Dabbasi failed to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, as he was not disabled at the time of his termination.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Dabbasi's disability-discrimination claim but reversed the summary judgment on his age-discrimination claim, remanding it for further proceedings. View "Dabbasi v. Motiva Enterprises" on Justia Law

Caris MPI, Inc. (Caris) provided cancer diagnostic services to UnitedHealthcare, Inc. (United) for over ten years without a written contract. United audited Caris’s past claims and determined that Caris had used incorrect billing codes, resulting in overpayments. United began recouping these overpayments by offsetting them against new payment claims from Caris. Caris challenged United’s recoupment through United’s internal process, but after United rejected Caris’s appeals, Caris filed suit in Texas state court alleging various state law claims.United removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, asserting federal officer jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). The district court denied Caris’s motion to remand and dismissed Caris’s claims without prejudice, finding that Caris failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the Medicare Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and agreed that federal officer jurisdiction existed. However, the court found that the district court erred in dismissing Caris’s claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Fifth Circuit held that the administrative review process under Medicare Part C does not extend to claims where an enrollee has no interest, and there were no administrative remedies for Caris to exhaust. The court distinguished this case from others by noting that no enrollee had requested an organization determination or appeal, and all enrollees had already received the services for which United sought recoupment. Consequently, the court affirmed the denial of the remand motion, reversed the dismissal of Caris’s claims, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Caris MPI v. UnitedHealthcare, Incorporated" on Justia Law

Dobbin Plantersville Water Supply Corporation (Dobbin) held a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity (CCN) to provide water service in certain areas of Texas. Dobbin, a recipient of federal loans under 7 U.S.C. § 1926, which grants monopoly protection to loan recipients, faced decertification petitions from developers SIG Magnolia L.P. and Redbird Development L.L.C. The Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUC) granted these petitions, finding that Dobbin was not providing actual water service to the developers' properties. Dobbin then filed a lawsuit in federal court, arguing that the Texas Water Code section allowing decertification was preempted by federal law.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed Dobbin's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the PUC officials, concluding they were not appropriate defendants under § 1983. At the summary judgment stage, the district court dismissed Dobbin's remaining claims with prejudice, primarily on jurisdictional grounds. The court found that Dobbin lacked a cause of action against the developers and that an injunction against the PUC would not redress Dobbin's injuries.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Dobbin lacked standing to seek an injunction against the PUC officials because such relief would not redress its injuries. The court also upheld the dismissal of Dobbin's § 1983 claim against the PUC officials, reiterating that state officials in their official capacities are not "persons" under § 1983. Lastly, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to dismiss Dobbin's claims against the developers with prejudice, as Dobbin lacked a viable cause of action against them. View "Dobbin Plantersville Water Supply Corporation v. Lake" on Justia Law

The case involves the Canadian Standards Association (CSA), a Canadian not-for-profit corporation that holds Canadian copyrights for various model codes. CSA alleged that P.S. Knight Company, Limited, PS Knight Americas, Incorporated, and Gordon Knight (collectively, Knight) infringed its copyrights by selling competing versions of CSA’s codes. These codes had been incorporated by reference into Canadian statutes and regulations. Knight argued that his actions were permissible under U.S. copyright law, as the codes had become "the law" of Canada.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas found in favor of CSA, granting its motion for summary judgment and issuing a permanent injunction against Knight. The district court held that Knight's copying of CSA’s codes constituted copyright infringement and declared Knight’s U.S. copyright registration invalid. Knight appealed the decision, arguing that the district court improperly applied the law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court found that the district court had improperly applied the holding of Veeck v. Southern Building Code Congress International, Inc., which states that once model codes are enacted into law, they become "the law" and may be reproduced or distributed as such. The Fifth Circuit held that because CSA’s model codes had been incorporated into Canadian law, Knight’s copying of those codes did not constitute copyright infringement under U.S. law.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment decisions, vacated the grant of injunctive relief, and remanded the case with instructions to grant summary judgment in favor of Knight and to dismiss CSA’s copyright infringement claim. View "Canadian Standards Association v. P.S. Knight Company Limited" on Justia Law

During Winter Storm Uri in 2021, Pioneer Natural Resources invoked a force majeure clause to excuse its failure to deliver natural gas to MIECO, L.L.C., as per their contract. MIECO sued for damages, arguing that Pioneer improperly invoked the clause. The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of Pioneer, ruling that the force majeure clause was correctly invoked and did not require Pioneer to show that the storm made performance literally impossible. The court also held that Pioneer’s “gas supply” referred only to gas it regularly produced from the Permian Basin, not substitute gas available on the spot market.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas initially reviewed the case. The court found that the force majeure clause was unambiguous and did not require Pioneer to purchase available spot market gas. It rejected MIECO’s argument that a force majeure event must render performance literally impossible and that “Seller’s gas supply” included spot market gas. The court granted summary judgment for Pioneer, dismissing MIECO’s breach of contract claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case on appeal. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s interpretation of the force majeure clause, agreeing that it did not require performance to be literally impossible and that “Seller’s gas supply” referred only to gas produced from the Permian Basin. However, the appellate court found that the district court erred by not addressing whether Pioneer exercised due diligence to overcome the storm’s impact. The appellate court held that genuine disputes of material fact remained regarding whether Pioneer made reasonable efforts to avoid the adverse impacts of the storm. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings to resolve these factual disputes. View "Mieco, L.L.C. v. Pioneer Natural Resources USA, Incorporated" on Justia Law

Joel Francois Jean was incarcerated in Texas since 2009 after pleading guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense. At sentencing, he was classified as a career offender due to three prior Texas controlled-substance convictions, resulting in a Guidelines range of 352 to 425 months, but he received a 292-month sentence. Subsequent legal decisions (Mathis v. United States, United States v. Hinkle, and United States v. Tanksley) redefined what constitutes a controlled-substance offense, meaning Jean would not be classified as a career offender if sentenced today.Jean filed a motion for compassionate release in 2023, arguing that changes in the law, sentence disparities, and his rehabilitation warranted release. The district court found that the non-retroactive changes in the law, combined with Jean's extraordinary rehabilitation, constituted extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release. The court noted Jean's significant efforts towards self-improvement and the support he received from Bureau of Prisons officials. Consequently, Jean was resentenced to time served, followed by eight years of supervised release.The United States appealed the district court's decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's grant of compassionate release. The appellate court held that district courts have the discretion to consider non-retroactive changes in the law, along with other factors such as extraordinary rehabilitation, when determining whether extraordinary and compelling reasons exist for compassionate release. The court emphasized that this discretion is consistent with Supreme Court precedent and Congressional intent, and noted that the Sentencing Commission's November 1, 2023 Amendments support this interpretation. View "USA v. Jean" on Justia Law

Joshua Jones applied for disability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI) on October 1, 2019, citing various medical conditions including disc herniation, diabetes, and high blood pressure. His applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. Jones then requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ), which took place on August 5, 2021. The ALJ denied his claims on October 6, 2021. Jones appealed to the Appeals Council, which denied review. Subsequently, he sought judicial review in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, which upheld the Commissioner’s decision.The district court reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment and adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation to deny Jones’ motion and grant the Commissioner’s motion. The court found that the ALJ had applied the correct legal standards and that substantial evidence supported the decision. Jones then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the ALJ correctly applied Listing 1.15, which became effective on April 2, 2021, rather than the older Listing 1.04, to evaluate Jones’ claims. The court found that applying the new listing to pending claims did not constitute impermissible retroactivity. Additionally, the court determined that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, including the finding that Jones did not meet the criteria for medical equivalency under Listing 1.15. The court also concluded that the ALJ properly considered the impact of Jones’ medical treatments on his ability to maintain employment, finding no evidence that his treatment regimen significantly interrupted his ability to work. View "Jones v. O'Malley" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants, a group of produce suppliers, sold produce to Lonestar Produce Express, LLC, a produce broker started by Leonidez Fernandez III and Eric Fernandez. Their father, Leonidez Fernandez Jr., frequently assisted them. By mid-2019, Lonestar owed approximately $221,000 to Plaintiffs-Appellants for unpaid produce invoices. Plaintiffs-Appellants sought relief under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA), which requires produce buyers to hold produce or proceeds from its sale in trust for unpaid suppliers until full payment is made. If the merchant's assets are insufficient, others who had a role in causing the breach of trust may be held secondarily liable.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas held a bench trial to determine whether Leonidez Fernandez Jr. could be held individually liable under PACA. The court found that Leonidez Jr. was not a member, manager, or employee of Lonestar and did not have control over its financial operations. Consequently, the district court concluded that Leonidez Jr. did not owe a fiduciary duty under PACA and was not liable for Lonestar's debts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that individuals who are not members of an LLC can still be held secondarily liable under PACA if they have control over the trust assets. However, the court found that Leonidez Jr. did not have the requisite control over Lonestar's PACA trust assets. He was not authorized to direct payments, was not a signatory on the bank account, and did not contribute financially to Lonestar. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that Leonidez Jr. was not liable under PACA. View "A & A Concepts v. Fernandez" on Justia Law