Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A Venezuelan citizen entered the United States in 2019 on a B-2 visitor visa and applied for asylum before his visa expired. He remained in the country after his visa lapsed, leading to removal proceedings. The petitioner claimed he feared persecution in Venezuela due to his political activities as an opponent of the ruling party, his membership in the Primero Justicia Party, and his activism against the Maduro regime. He recounted being shot by a paramilitary group known as the “colectivos” in 2015, receiving threats, and participating in numerous protests. He also described incidents involving tear gas at demonstrations and threats relayed through neighbors, but acknowledged periods of living unharmed in Venezuela and traveling freely between Venezuela and the United States.An Immigration Judge found the petitioner’s testimony credible but denied relief, concluding that the harms he experienced, individually and collectively, did not rise to the level of persecution required for asylum. The judge also found no well-founded fear of future persecution, noting the petitioner’s ability to travel and live in Venezuela without incident for extended periods. The judge further determined that the petitioner did not meet the higher standard for withholding of removal and failed to show a likelihood of torture necessary for protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision, agreeing that the petitioner had not suffered past persecution or established a well-founded fear of future persecution, and that he did not face a particularized risk of torture. The petitioner then sought review from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.The Fifth Circuit denied the petition for review, holding that substantial evidence supported the agency’s findings. The court concluded that the petitioner did not demonstrate past persecution, a well-founded fear of future persecution, or eligibility for withholding of removal or CAT protection. View "Rubio v. Bondi" on Justia Law

After Hurricane Harvey caused significant flooding at the Arbor Court apartment complex in Houston in 2017, the property’s owner, DM Arbor Court, Limited (DMAC), sought permits from the City of Houston to repair the damage. The City denied these permits, invoking a provision of its flood control ordinance that had not previously been used for such denials. The City determined that a majority of the complex’s buildings had sustained “substantial damage,” requiring costly elevation before repairs could proceed. As a result, DMAC was unable to repair or redevelop the property, which led to the loss of tenants and the property sitting idle.DMAC filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, alleging that the City’s denial of repair permits constituted an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment. The district court dismissed the case as unripe, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding the case ripe once the City’s Director of Public Works formally denied the permit application. On remand, after a bench trial, the district court rejected DMAC’s takings claim, concluding that the property retained some economic value and that DMAC was not deprived of all economically beneficial use. The court also found that the City’s actions were justified under the Penn Central framework, emphasizing the public interest in flood management.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the City’s denial of the repair permit deprived DMAC of all economically viable use of Arbor Court, constituting a categorical taking under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the City’s regulatory action amounted to a per se taking requiring just compensation. View "DM Arbor Court v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

Ronald Donell Brown led a drug trafficking organization that transported large quantities of cocaine and marijuana from Houston, Texas, to Atlanta, Georgia. In 2014, after a shipment of cocaine was stolen, Brown believed two associates were responsible and sought to retaliate. He and others kidnapped one associate, Eric Williams, who escaped, but was later shot and wounded by Brown. Brown then orchestrated the murder of the second associate, Marcus Celestine, by providing information and a weapon to intermediaries, resulting in Celestine’s death outside a parole office. Brown was arrested in 2017 on unrelated charges and later indicted federally on multiple counts, including conspiracy to commit murder for hire, intentional killing during drug trafficking, and firearm offenses related to crimes of violence.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied Brown’s motion to suppress evidence, finding that communications involving a confidential informant and Brown’s attorneys were not protected by attorney-client privilege, and that Brown’s Sixth Amendment rights had not been violated because the government’s alleged intrusion occurred before adversarial proceedings began. At trial, Brown was convicted on several counts. The government later moved to dismiss two firearm-related counts (Counts Three and Four) after trial, citing double jeopardy concerns. The district court granted this motion, denied Brown’s request for a continuance to respond, and sentenced him to life imprisonment on the remaining counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Brown’s motion to suppress, holding that the attorney-client privilege did not apply and that no Sixth Amendment violation occurred. However, the appellate court vacated the district court’s dismissal of Counts Three and Four and the sentences for Counts One and Two, holding that the district court, not the government, must exercise its discretion to determine which multiplicitous convictions to dismiss and then resentence accordingly. The case was remanded for that purpose. View "USA v. Brown" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on a commercial property in Jackson, Mississippi, owned by Retro Metro, LLC. In 2011, the Jackson City Council authorized the mayor to negotiate and execute a lease with Retro Metro for office space in the former Metro Center Mall, with specific limitations on square footage, annual rent, and lease term. The City and Retro Metro executed a written lease in April 2011, and the City occupied the property. Over the years, the lease was the subject of multiple lawsuits between the parties, with the City previously admitting in court filings that it had entered into the lease. In 2023, after the City Council authorized the mayor to terminate the lease and vacate the premises, Retro Metro and its partners filed suit in federal court, alleging breach of contract and other claims.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi granted summary judgment for the City, finding that the lease was unenforceable under Mississippi’s “minutes rule,” which requires that public board contracts be sufficiently detailed in the board’s official meeting minutes. The court also dismissed all claims against the individual defendants. Retro Metro appealed, challenging only the summary judgment on its breach of contract claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fifth Circuit held that the lease did not satisfy the minutes rule because the City Council’s minutes did not contain enough detail to establish the parties’ obligations and liabilities without resorting to other evidence. The court further held that judicial estoppel could not override the minutes rule under Mississippi law, and that the City’s failure to raise the minutes rule earlier did not constitute waiver, as the burden to show a valid contract rested with Retro Metro. The district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Retro Metro v. City of Jackson" on Justia Law

A manufacturer of open-system electronic nicotine delivery systems (ENDS) and a retailer sought premarket authorization from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to market six vaping devices and related components. The devices allow users to customize their vaping experience by adjusting voltage and selecting e-liquids. The manufacturer submitted extensive scientific data and studies, concluding that its products posed lower health risks than combustible cigarettes and were targeted at adult smokers. After reviewing the applications, the FDA issued a deficiency letter identifying several concerns, including insufficient information about the products’ abuse liability—the potential for addiction and misuse. The manufacturer responded with additional information and proposed warning labels but did not provide consumer comprehension studies for the labels.The FDA ultimately denied the applications, finding that the manufacturer failed to demonstrate that marketing the products would be appropriate for the protection of public health, as required by statute. The denial specifically cited the lack of data on abuse liability under actual-use conditions and the absence of evidence that consumers would understand and comply with the proposed warnings. The manufacturer and retailer then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for review, arguing that the FDA’s denial was arbitrary and capricious, failed to conduct a holistic risk-benefit analysis, and unfairly changed its review process by limiting applicants to a single deficiency letter.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the FDA’s denial was not arbitrary or capricious. The court found that the FDA adequately explained the importance of abuse liability data and the need for consumer comprehension studies. The court also determined that the FDA’s change to a single-deficiency-letter policy was properly acknowledged and justified. Because the abuse liability deficiency alone was sufficient to support the denial, the court denied the petition for review. View "Shenzhen IVPS Tech v. FDA" on Justia Law

A Chinese manufacturer of electronic nicotine delivery systems (ENDS) sought authorization from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to market its refillable e-cigarette device in the United States. The device, sold without e-liquid, allows consumers to use a wide range of nicotine concentrations. The manufacturer submitted a premarket tobacco product application (PMTA) in August 2020, asserting that its product was appropriate for the protection of public health. After a preliminary assessment, the FDA identified deficiencies in the application and issued a deficiency letter in March 2023, requesting additional information. The manufacturer responded to some, but not all, of the deficiencies and requested an extension, which the FDA later denied. In January 2024, the FDA issued a final order denying the application, citing insufficient data to evaluate the product’s risks and benefits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case after the manufacturer and a retailer based in Texas, who was also affected by the denial, petitioned for review. The court determined that venue was proper because the retailer had its principal place of business in the circuit. The petitioners argued that the FDA’s denial was arbitrary and capricious, claiming the agency failed to weigh the public health benefits of the product and improperly limited applicants to a single deficiency letter.The Fifth Circuit held that the FDA’s decision was reasonable and reasonably explained. The court found that the FDA had considered the potential benefits and risks of the product, explained the deficiencies in the application, and did not impose new evidentiary requirements without notice. The court also concluded that the FDA’s policy of issuing only one deficiency letter was adequately justified and not arbitrary. The petition for review was denied. View "Shenzhen Youme v. FDA" on Justia Law

A company specializing in supply chain services, CAM, entered into negotiations with Rockwall, a corrugated packaging manufacturer, to provide warehousing services in Louisiana. The parties discussed terms, exchanged draft contracts, and CAM ultimately leased warehouse space for three years in anticipation of a long-term arrangement. However, neither party ever executed a written contract, and CAM began providing services and invoicing Rockwall monthly. Rockwall paid these invoices for over two years, but later terminated the relationship, citing changes in its business needs.CAM filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, alleging breach of contract and detrimental reliance. The district court found that while the parties had an oral agreement for warehousing services, there was no binding contract for a fixed three-year term because both parties intended to be bound only by a written, executed agreement. The court also held that CAM’s detrimental reliance claim failed, as it was unreasonable for CAM to rely on the existence of a three-year contract term when no such term was ever agreed upon, either orally or in writing. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Rockwall and dismissed CAM’s claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Fifth Circuit held that under Louisiana Civil Code article 1947, when parties contemplate a written contract, there is a presumption that they do not intend to be bound until the contract is executed in that form. The court found that this presumption was not rebutted by the parties’ conduct, including Rockwall’s payment of monthly invoices. The court also concluded that CAM failed to establish the elements of detrimental reliance, as there was no promise or representation by Rockwall of a fixed contract term. The summary judgment in favor of Rockwall was affirmed. View "CAM Logistics v. Pratt Industries" on Justia Law

A woman was stopped by a county deputy in Texas around 2:00 AM after the officer claimed to observe multiple traffic violations, including speeding and failing to maintain a single lane. The woman, who had just left a family event with her husband, denied any wrongdoing and began recording the encounter on her phone. The officer reported smelling alcohol and observing signs of intoxication, such as slurred speech and glossy eyes. The woman refused to answer certain questions or perform field sobriety tests, leading to her arrest. Body camera footage later showed her being uncooperative and verbally abusive during the arrest and subsequent blood draw at the jail. A blood test revealed a low blood alcohol content, and the criminal charge was later dismissed for insufficient evidence.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of the county and the arresting officer on all claims. The court found that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity and that there was probable cause for the arrest based on the totality of the circumstances, including the officer’s observations and the woman’s refusal to cooperate. The court also rejected claims of First Amendment retaliation, malicious prosecution, and excessive force, as well as Monell claims against the county for alleged unconstitutional policies.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s evidentiary rulings and summary judgment de novo. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the officer had probable cause to arrest for driving while intoxicated, that the woman failed to show a constitutional violation necessary for her claims, and that the county could not be held liable under Monell without an underlying constitutional violation. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s evidentiary decisions. View "Wood v. Bexar County" on Justia Law

The defendant, who had a prior Louisiana felony conviction for illegal use of a weapon stemming from a drive-by shooting in 2021, was released on parole in March 2023. One month later, he was found as a passenger in a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation, where police discovered four loaded firearms, including one reported stolen. He was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and with possessing unregistered firearms under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d).In the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, the defendant moved to dismiss both counts, arguing that the statutes were unconstitutional both facially and as applied to him. The district court denied the motion, holding that convicted felons are not protected by the Second Amendment and that the statutes align with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The defendant then pleaded guilty to the felon-in-possession charge in exchange for dismissal of the other count, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the preserved as-applied constitutional challenge de novo. The court held that, under current precedent, the statute’s facial constitutionality was foreclosed. Addressing the as-applied challenge, the court found that the defendant’s prior conviction qualified as a predicate felony and that the government had identified relevant historical analogues—specifically, founding-era “going armed” laws that imposed similar burdens and justifications. The court concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), as applied to the defendant, is consistent with the Second Amendment and the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. Morgan" on Justia Law

The defendant, a Mexican citizen, was first brought to the United States as a child. He was discovered by federal officials in Texas in 2015 and deported later that year. In 2020, he was again found in the United States and arrested on outstanding warrants. He was convicted in state court for drug-related offenses and sentenced to five years in prison. While serving this sentence, he was screened by immigration authorities and subsequently indicted for illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). In 2024, he pleaded guilty to the federal charge without a plea agreement. The district court sentenced him to 24 months in prison and one year of supervised release, adopting special conditions recommended in the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR), including requirements to report to immigration authorities and seek work authorization.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas confirmed at sentencing that the defendant and his counsel had reviewed the PSR, which contained the special conditions. The court orally adopted the PSR and its appendix, imposed the recommended conditions, and provided the defendant an opportunity to object. The defendant’s counsel objected only to the relationship between the federal and state offenses, not to the special conditions. The written judgment included all the conditions from the PSR. The defendant appealed, arguing that the written judgment conflicted with the oral pronouncement regarding the special conditions of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case for plain error, as the defendant had notice and an opportunity to object at sentencing but did not do so. The court held that the district court satisfied the oral-pronouncement requirement by adopting the PSR and providing notice and opportunity to object. Therefore, there was no conflict between the written judgment and the oral pronouncement, and the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA v. Quezada-Atayde" on Justia Law