Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims against the University as barred by sovereign immunity. Plaintiff's action involved employment discrimination and retaliation claims, and he sought compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees. The court held that Texas A&M is an agency of the State of Texas, so a suit against the former is a suit against the latter. Furthermore, neither of the two exceptions to sovereign immunity apply in these circumstances. In this case, Congress did not abrogate the State's sovereign immunity, and the State did not knowingly and plainly waive its sovereign immunity and consent to suit. View "Sullivan v. Texas A&M University System" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit dismissed, based on lack of jurisdiction, plaintiffs' appeal of the district court's grant of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) motion in a dispute over attorney's fees stemming from an underlying action regarding the promotion and sale of a medical procedure. The court explained that this case does not yet involve a final determination of the status of the interpleaded funds. Rather, it involves Rule 60(b)(5) relief from a prior order to disburse funds. View "Reed Migraine Centers of Texas, PLLC v. Ticer" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Tanzania, petitions for review of an order issued by the BIA dismissing his appeal from the IJ's decision denying his application for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner separately seeks review of the BIA's order denying his motion to reopen and denying his request for review of that motion by a three-member panel.The Fifth Circuit denied in part the petitions for review and concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to review factual challenges to the removal order; substantial evidence supports the conclusion of the IJ and BIA that petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof for CAT relief; and the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that petitioner did not present newly discovered evidence to corroborate his claim for CAT relief. The court dismissed the petition for review of the unexhausted claims, and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the petition for review of the BIA's non-referral of petitioner's motion to a three-member panel. View "Tibakweitira v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against seven district judges of Tarrant County's family law courts in their official capacities, District Judge Patricia Baca-Bennett in her personal capacity, and the County under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that she was fired for refusing to support a political candidate and for her husband's political activity.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the suit, holding that plaintiff was in a policymaking and confidential role and thus, under the Elrod/Branti exception, could constitutionally be discharged for the exercise of rights that would otherwise by protected by the First Amendment. The court also held that the district court correctly dismissed plaintiff's claims against the County because plaintiff failed to plead a constitutional violation. Furthermore, because Baca-Bennett did not violate plaintiff's constitutional rights, this is enough for Baca-Bennett to be entitled to qualified immunity. Even if plaintiff's rights had been violated, Baca-Bennett certainly did not have "fair warning that [her] conduct violate[d] a constitutional right." View "Haddock v. Tarrant County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against SHSU and TSUS under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Pay Act, alleging sex discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment. Plaintiff then filed a separate action against UHD and UHS under Title VII, alleging that UHD's denial of employment constituted retaliation.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of all of plaintiff's claims and remanded, directing that plaintiff's cases be reassigned to a new district judge for further proceedings. The court noted that a litigant has the fundamental right to fairness in every proceeding; fairness is upheld by avoiding even the appearance of partiality; and when a judge's actions stand at odds with these basic notions, the court must act or suffer the loss of public confidence in our judicial system. In this case, the court concluded that the district court erred in its sua sponte dismissal of TSUS and UHS where the district court failed to give plaintiff an adequate opportunity to respond before it dismissed her claims against TSUS and UHS with prejudice. Furthermore, it follows that the district court likewise erred when it denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. The court also concluded that the district court abused its discretion by repeatedly denying plaintiff's requests for discovery, including her requests to depose witnesses with knowledge material to her claims. View "Miller v. Sam Houston State University" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for violating the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). Defendant's arguments center on challenges to his conviction for violating two separate protection orders by transporting his girlfriend across state lines in violation of both.The court held that the district court did not err by denying defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment where the definition of protection order in VAWA encompasses the two orders at issue. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion for acquittal as a matter of law where a rational jury could have found the elements of each offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, the court held that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to elect a single count of conviction. In regard to defendant's sentence, the court held that the district court did not err by applying a two-level, vulnerable victim sentencing enhancement under USSG 3A.1.1. In this case, defendant knew that the victim was pregnant with his child and knew or should have known that she was susceptible to his efforts to contact her. View "United States v. Cline" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a prolific inventor in the field of lighting technology, licensed his intellectual property exclusively to High End Systems in 2007. High End became a wholly owned subsidiary of Barco several years later. After Barco decided to sell High End to a third party in 2017, plaintiff filed suit alleging claims against Barco including breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud by nondisclosure arising out of the events leading up to the sale of High End.The Fifth Circuit held that the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's claim to pierce the corporate veil. In this case, to hold Barco liable for High End's alleged breach of contract, plaintiff must show that Barco (the then-shareholder) used High End (the corporation) to (1) "perpetrate an actual fraud" (2) primarily for Barco's "direct personal benefit." The court concluded that the evidence, when viewed as a whole, does not raise a fact issue regarding Barco's dishonest purpose or intent to deceive plaintiff in entering into the Barco Sublicense. The court explained that piercing the corporate veil is not a cumulative remedy for creditors of corporate or other legal entities in Texas; that theory does not make owners of such entities codefendants for every breach of contract case. Rather, it is a remedy to be used when the actions of the entity's owner amounting to "actual fraud" have rendered the entity unable to pay its debts. The court held that the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's claim for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud by nondisclosure. The court agreed with the district court that there was no evidence of a fiduciary relationship between plaintiff and Barco. View "Belliveau v. Barco, Inc." on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit dismissed the petition for review, holding that the use of an unauthorized social security number, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 408(a)(7)(B), constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) such that petitioner is ineligible for cancellation of his removal to Mexico.Reviewing de novo, the court explained that, under Fifth Circuit precedent, a section 408(a)(7)(B) offense categorically constitutes a CIMT because it necessarily involves intentional deception. The court concluded that the offender's deceptive intent is dispositive. Even assuming arguendo that the conviction requires a further aggravating element beyond deceptive intent, the court was satisfied that such an element is present where a conviction under section 408(a)(7)(B) necessarily involves conduct that obstructs the function of government. Therefore, petitioner's application for cancellation of removal is pretermitted. View "Munoz-Rivera v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's 37-month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after deportation. The court held that defendant failed to show the district court committed significant procedural error in declining to explicitly address his arguments for a shorter sentence. In this case, the district court gave defendant a sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range after adopting the presentence report's factual findings and the probation officer's conclusions; read the sentencing memorandum submitted by defendant's counsel and heard both counsel's argument and personal request for a more lenient sentence; and explained how it considered the advisory guidelines and the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. View "United States v. Coto-Mendoza" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action against Arkema, a chemicals facility that combusted during Hurricane Harvey, seeking redress for the physical and financial effects of the incident, which released toxic ash and smoke into the surrounding communities and caused the evacuation of nearby residents.The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's class certification order and remanded for further proceedings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The court explained that, when the cementing of relationships among proffered class members of liability or damages or both turns on scientific evidence, the court must insist that the metric of admissibility be the same for certification and trial. Therefore, the Daubert hurdle must be cleared when scientific evidence is relevant to the decision to certify. In its certification order, the court concluded that the district court was not as searching in its assessment of the expert reports' reliability as it would have been outside the certification setting. Furthermore, the district court's certification order did not discuss the considerations affecting the administration of trial, and it concluded that common questions would predominate without adequately addressing Arkema's arguments that causation, injury, and damages would be highly individualized. The court also concluded that the relative balance of concededly common claim elements to contested elements of causation and injury warrants closer attention. Finally, the court concluded that the current record does not compel the conclusion that plaintiffs' medical and property injuries are incapable of being addressed by classwide injunctions. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Prantil v. Arkema Inc." on Justia Law