Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this long-running contract dispute, at issue is whether the parties are entitled to fee awards. The Fifth Circuit concluded that IWS is entitled to some fees under the Texas Theft Liability Act (TTLA) and remanded for a determination of the proper amount. The court clarified that the mandate of Transverse II did not depart from Texas law governing fee segregation, and fees incurred defending the TTLA claim do not become unrecoverable simply because they may have furthered another nonrecoverable claim as well.The court also concluded that, because the Supply Contract itself does not authorize attorneys' fees, under Iowa law, the district court lacked a basis on which to award Transverse attorney's fees for IWS's breach of this agreement. In this case, IWS has made the showing necessary to prevail under plain-error review, and thus the court reversed the fee award to Transverse on the Supply-Contract claim. Finally, the court rejected Transverse's contention that the district court erred by failing to recognize it as the prevailing party on the Non-Disclosure Agreement claim and refusing to award Transverse the related fees. The court explained that Transverse did not prevail, substantially or otherwise, on this claim and thus there was no error on the district court's part. View "Transverse, LLC v. Iowa Wireless Services, LLC" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants in an action brought by plaintiff, a former police officer, alleging claims of sex discrimination, retaliation, and constructive discharge under Title VII and Texas law, as well as a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim and a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In this case, plaintiff worked as an officer for the Windcrest Police Department but resigned during her first, probationary year.In this same-sex sexual harassment case, the court conducted a two-step inquiry pursuant to E.E.O.C. v. Boh Brothers Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 453 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc). The court concluded that plaintiff's claim failed at the first prong of the inquiry where the alleged conduct was not sex discrimination. The court explained that plaintiff did not allege that another officer's conduct was motivated by sexual desire nor does plaintiff otherwise contend that the conduct was sexual in nature or a display of explicit sexual animus. As for plaintiff's contention that the other officer treated women worse than men, these allegations are highly speculative. Therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment on the sex discrimination claim. The court also concluded that plaintiff's constructive discharge, retaliation, and sex discrimination claims also failed. In regard to the section 1983 claim, the court rejected plaintiff's contention that the city violated her privacy by surreptitiously activating her police body camera when she was off duty and filming her inside her apartment. The court explained that plaintiff failed to present any evidence showing that the city has a policy or practice of furtively recording employees off duty, even if she was recorded remotely. View "Newbury v. City of Windcrest" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, five former employees of CB&I who worked as laborers on a construction project in Louisiana, quit before the project ended and thus made them ineligible to receive the Project Completion Incentive under the term of that plan. Plaintiffs filed suit in state court seeking the bonus for the period they did work, arguing that making such employees ineligible for bonuses amounts to an illegal wage forfeiture agreement under the Louisiana Wage Payment Act. LA. STAT.ANN. 23:631, 23:632, 23:634. After removal to federal court, the district court concluded that the incentive program was an Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) plan because it required ongoing discretion and administration in determining whether a qualifying termination took place.The Fifth Circuit concluded that the employee benefit at issue—a bonus for completing the project—is not an employee benefit plan under ERISA. The court explained that the plan involves a single and simple payment; determining eligibility might require the exercise of some discretion, but not much; and the plan lacks the complexity and longevity that result in the type of "ongoing administrative scheme" ERISA covers. Therefore, there is no federal jurisdiction over this action. The court vacated and remanded for the case to be returned to state court. View "Atkins v. CB&I, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with conspiracy to violate 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(l) and (b)(l)(C), namely to possess with intent to distribute a mixture and substance containing more than 50 grams of methamphetamine. However, the information cited the wrong part of section 841(b)(1): Subparagraph B—not C—criminalizes possession of a substance containing more than 50 grams of meth. In this case, the parties agree that subparagraph C is a lesser-included offense of subparagraph B. Despite that initial error and without any plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to subparagraph B, referencing it nine times.The Fifth Circuit concluded that jeopardy does not always attach upon acceptance of a guilty plea; explained the framework for analyzing attachment under Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (1984); and concluded that there was no double jeopardy violation in this case. The court explained that Johnson abrogated United States v. Sanchez's, 609 F.2d 761, 762 (5th Cir. 1980), statement about attachment; defendant's counterarguments are not persuasive; and the rule of orderliness does not preclude that conclusion. Furthermore, defendant's finality interest is low and there is no evidence of prosecutorial overreach. Therefore, jeopardy did not attach upon the district court's acceptance of defendant's guilty plea and there is no violation. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in applying a sentencing enhancement under USSG 2D1.1(b)(5) for an offense involving the importation of methamphetamine. View "United States v. Brune" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision upholding the IJ's conclusion that one of petitioner's three convictions rendered petitioner removeable. At issue is petitioner's 2018 conviction for knowingly possessing a controlled substance listed in Penalty Group 2-A, in violation of Texas Health & Safety Code 481.1161(a). In this case petitioner possessed MMB-Fubinaca, which, he agrees, is a federally controlled substance. However, Penalty Group 2-A also includes at least one substance that is not federally controlled.The court concluded that petitioner's 2018 conviction did not render him removeable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). The court explained that the government failed to show that Penalty Group 2-A is divisible. Applying the categorical approach, the court concluded that Penalty Group 2-A is broader than the federal statute, and "there is no categorical match" between Penalty Group 2-A and its federal counterpart. Here, the parties agree that Penalty Group 2-A criminalizes possession of at least one substance—naphthoylindane—that the federal statute does not mention. The panel declined to terminate petitioner's removal proceedings. Instead, the court remanded for consideration of whether petitioner has shown a realistic probability that Texas would prosecute conduct that falls outside the relevant federal statute. The panel also remanded for consideration of whether petitioner's 2009 and 2013 convictions render him removable, in the event that petitioner succeeds on the realistic-probability inquiry. View "Alejos-Perez v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendants' convictions for offenses related to their involvement in two armored truck robberies. The court concluded that a third co-defendant's testimony alone was sufficient to support defendants' convictions; sufficient evidence supported Defendant Armstead's conviction for making a false material statement and for being a felon-in-possession of a firearm; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants' motions for a new trial where defendants failed to identify any inappropriate questions asked to the jury and the court saw no indication that any juror abandoned his or her role as a neutral fact-finder; and Defendant Jerome's conviction under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) was predicated solely on armed bank robbery and thus United States v. Reece, 938 F.3d 630 (5th Cir. 2019), was inapplicable in this case. View "United States v. Kieffer" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit in Texas district court against Mabe after plaintiff was involved in a car accident with a truck owned by Mabe and operated by a Mabe employee. The accident occurred in Louisiana, a few miles from its border with Texas. Although the Texas district court concluded that Mabe lacked sufficient contacts with Texas to subject the company to personal jurisdiction in the state, the Texas district court found that it was in the interests of justice not to dismiss the case and instead transferred it to the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, which was the federal district court sitting in the district in which the accident occurred. The Louisiana federal district court concluded that plaintiff's claims were time-barred and granted summary judgment for Mabe.The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that 28 U.S.C. 1631 permitted the Texas district court to transfer this case to the Louisiana district court for lack of personal jurisdiction; the provisions of section 1631 apply irrespective of the Texas district court's invocation of 28 U.S.C. 1406(a); section 1631, which was specifically designed to protect federal litigants from the forfeiture that could result from a statute of limitations running after a plaintiff's mistakenly filing an action in a court that lacks jurisdiction if the interests of justice so demand, neither runs afoul of the Erie doctrine and the Rules of Decision Act it effectuates nor transgresses constitutional bounds; and section 1631 is therefore the standard against which the Louisiana district court should have measured whether the action had been timely filed in that court, and its application must necessarily precede that of the Louisiana Civil Code articles.Applying section 1631, the court accepted that plaintiff is deemed to have filed his suit in the Louisiana district court on November 22, 2016, the date he actually filed suit in the Texas district court. Therefore, plaintiff must be deemed to have filed his claim "in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue" on that date and thereby interrupted the one-year prescriptive period under Louisiana law. Accordingly, the Louisiana district court erred by granting Mabe summary judgment on the basis that plaintiff's claim was time-barred. View "Franco v. Mabe Trucking Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of defendant's motion to suppress evidence that was critical to establish the Government's charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The district court determined that police officers did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct the investigatory stop of defendant, and thus the gun and statements to police were suppressed as fruits of the poisonous tree.The court concluded that the district court did not err in finding that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. In this case, the district court found that the informant's tip lacked credibility and reliability because the caller did not provide her name or phone number and had no history of reliable reports of criminal activity, and the police officers did not attempt to contact the management at the Millsaps Apartments to determine who made the phone call. View "United States v. Norbert" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissal of plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from his arrest for aggravated sexual assault where the district attorney's officer subsequently dismissed the case based on lack of probable cause to believe that plaintiff committed the offense.The court concluded that the district court did not err by dismissing plaintiff's constitutional claims for false arrest where the arrest was reasonable and established no constitutional violation; for malicious prosecution because he abandoned this claim on appeal and, to the extent that he does not concede the issue, there is no freestanding right under the Constitution to be free from malicious prosecution; and for equal protection where plaintiff failed to allege that he was treated differently than persons similarly situated to him and that the treatment stemmed from discriminatory intent. Furthermore, the district court did not err by dismissing the claim for failure to train where plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that the City's training practices were inadequate or that the City was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's rights. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's fourth request for leave to amend, and did not err by sua sponte dismissing plaintiff's constitutional claims against the officer. View "Anokwuru v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

After plaintiff agreed to arbitrate employment disputes with her former employer, Michaels, the arbitrator ruled against her. Plaintiff then tried to sue Michaels in federal court, challenging the same termination on a different theory: that it amounted to discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII. A new arbitrator ruled that res judicata barred the Title VII claims because they arose from the same transaction at issue in her first arbitration.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's confirmation of the arbitration order. The court explained that the district court correctly recognized some murkiness in the circuit's manifest-disregard caselaw. The court emphasized that manifest disregard of the law as an independent, nonstatutory ground for setting aside an award must be abandoned and rejected. See Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 358 (5th Cir. 2009). The court concluded that Citigroup Global is still binding precedent and resolves this case. In this case, plaintiff relies on manifest disregard as a freestanding ground for vacatur, untethered to any of the Federal Arbitration Act's (FAA) four grounds for vacatur. Because plaintiff does not invoke any statutory ground for vacatur, her appeal cannot overcome the court's instruction that "arbitration awards under the FAA may be vacated only for reasons provided in 9 U.S.C. 10." View "Jones v. Michaels Stores, Inc." on Justia Law