Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Fifth Circuit withdrew its prior opinion and substituted the following opinion.Plaintiff filed suit against T-Mobile and Broadspire, alleging transgender discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from his treatment while working as a retail employee at a T-Mobile store. The court concluded that, at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, its analysis of the Title VII claim is governed by Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002)—and not the evidentiary standard set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under Swierkiewicz, there are two ultimate elements a plaintiff must plead to support a disparate treatment claim under Title VII: (1) an adverse employment action, (2) taken against a plaintiff because of her protected status. The court explained that when a complaint purports to allege a case of circumstantial evidence of discrimination, it may be helpful to refer to McDonnell Douglas to understand whether a plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded an adverse employment action taken "because of" his protected status as required under Swierkiewicz.Applying these principles here, the court concluded that there is no dispute that plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action. However, the court concluded that plaintiff has failed to plead any facts indicating less favorable treatment than others "similarly situated" outside of the asserted protected class. In this case, the Second Amended Complaint does not contain any facts about any comparators at all, and there is no allegation that any non-transgender employee with a similar job and supervisor and who engaged in the same conduct as plaintiff received more favorable treatment. Therefore, the complaint does not plead any facts that would permit a reasonable inference that T-Mobile terminated plaintiff because of gender identity. Furthermore, plaintiff's Americans with Disabilities Act discrimination claim fails for similar reasons, and plaintiff's retaliation claim under Title VII is untimely.The court rejected plaintiff's contention that Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020), changed the law and created a lower standard for those alleging discrimination based on gender identity. Rather, the court concluded that Bostock did not constitute an intervening change of law that warrants reconsideration under Rule 59(e). The court explained that Bostock defined sex discrimination to encompass sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination, but did not alter the meaning of discrimination itself. Therefore, where an employer discharged a sales employee who happens to be transgender—but who took six months of leave, and then sought further leave for the indefinite future, that is an ordinary business practice rather than discrimination. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying further leave to amend. View "Olivarez v. T-Mobile USA, Inc." on Justia Law

This action stemmed from the collapse of Robert Stanford's Ponzi scheme. Plaintiffs, investors who purchased certificates of deposits (CDs) with Stanford International Bank, Ltd. (SIBL), filed suit against SEI Private Trust Company, businesses that had a longstanding relationship with SIBL.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion for a continuance for further discovery and award of summary judgment to SEI where the district court concluded that SEI did not control the primary securities violations of Sanford Trust Company (STC). The court rejected plaintiffs' contention that the district court applied the wrong legal standard and ignored factual disputes as to SEI's asserted control. Rather, the court concluded that the district court correctly identified that plaintiffs need not prove that SEI participated in the fraudulent transaction. The court also concluded that SEI has offered competent evidence that it lacked power to control the STC's primary securities violations. View "Lillie v. Office of Financial Institutions State of Louisiana" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied a petition for review challenging petitioner's order of removal after he threatened to commit a religiously motivated act of terrorism. Petitioner, who suffers from schizophrenia, was reported by his brother after petitioner made threats of killing kuffars (non-believers).The court concluded that the Attorney General interpreted 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(A)(iv) correctly as a matter of law. The Attorney General first determined that the plain meaning of "reasonable grounds" comports with the well-established standard for "probable cause." The Attorney General then determined that "a danger to the security of the United States" means "[a]ny level of danger to national security . . . ; it need not be a 'serious,' 'significant,' or 'grave' danger." Therefore, petitioner is ineligible for asylum under section 1158(b)(2)(A)(iv). The court also held that the BIA's determination that petitioner was a threat to national security was supported by substantial evidence as a matter of fact. View "Mirza v. Garland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against T-Mobile and Broadspire, alleging transgender discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from his treatment while working as a retail employee at a T-Mobile store.The Fifth Circuit held that, under Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020), a plaintiff who alleges transgender discrimination is entitled to the same benefits—but also subject to the same burdens—as any other plaintiff who claims sex discrimination under Title VII. In this case, the court concluded that plaintiff does not allege facts sufficient to support an inference of transgender discrimination—that is, that T-Mobile would have behaved differently toward an employee with a different gender identity. The court explained that, where an employer discharged a sales employee who happens to be transgender—but who took six months of leave, and then sought further leave for the indefinite future, that is an ordinary business practice rather than discrimination. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiff's remaining issues on appeal are likewise meritless. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Olivarez v. T-Mobile USA, Inc." on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision upholding the IJ's determination that defendant was subject to removal from the United States because he had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The IJ determined that the plea agreement signed by petitioner, his defense counsel, and the prosecutor was clear and convincing evidence of a criminal conviction because it contained an indication of guilt and the sentence imposed. Applying a deferential standard of review, the court concluded that petitioner failed to show that the IJ or BIA violated a statutorily imposed evidentiary requirement by finding that the plea agreement at issue proved the existence of a forgery conviction by clear and convincing evidence. Therefore, it is not, as a matter of law, deficient or inadmissible. View "Vu Quang Nguyen v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit vacated defendant's sentence for making false statements and representations regarding firearm records. USSG 2K2.1(a)(4)(B) provides for a base offense level of 20 if, inter alia, the offense involved a semiautomatic firearm that is capable of accepting a large capacity magazine. In United States v. Longoria, 958 F.3d 372, 377 (5th Cir. 2020), the court held that the commentary to the Guidelines, which further defines what it means for a firearm to be capable of accepting a large capacity magazine, is authoritative and must be enforced.In this case, after Longoria was decided, the district court applied section 2K2.1(a)(4)(B), but not the accompanying commentary. Nor did the presentence report indicate that a magazine capable of holding over fifteen rounds of ammunition was either attached to or in close proximity to the firearm in question—let alone bear sufficient indicia of reliability to be considered as evidence during sentencing—as required under the commentary. Accordingly, the court remanded for resentencing consistent with both the Sentencing Guidelines and the accompanying commentary. View "United States v. Abrego" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) & 924(e). In this case, defendant was approached by police officers after a tip was received that he was illegally selling CDs outside of a store in a high-crime area. After defendant voluntarily opened the trunk of his vehicle, he was arrested for unlawful labeling of CDs. A search of defendant and his vehicle uncovered a loaded pistol, magazine, cash, drugs, and drug paraphernalia.The court concluded that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress defendant's voluntary statements made prior to being in custody after finding the police had reasonable suspicion to detain defendant and probable cause to arrest him and search his vehicle. The court explained that, although the totality of the circumstances suggest that defendant was not free to leave, his restraint had not yet reached the level necessary to necessitate Miranda warnings. In light of Shular v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 779, 782 (2020), persuasive authority in the court's sister circuits, and the court's own precedent, the court concluded that the district court correctly concluded that defendant's convictions could serve as predicates for his Armed Career Criminal Act enhancement. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not err by applying a four-level sentencing enhancement under USSG 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for being a felon in possession of a firearm. View "United States v. Bass" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for malicious injury of property located on "Indian country" in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1152 and 1363. On Columbus Day in 2017, defendant poured red paint on a statue of Nestora Piarote, an Indigenous woman, and placed a wooden cross in front of it. The statue was located in El Paso County, Texas, on land reserved to the Yselta Del Sur Indian Tribe (also known as the Tigua Indian Tribe).The court concluded that, with respect to crimes prosecuted via section 1152, settled and reconcilable Supreme Court doctrine, as well as principles of statutory construction, demonstrate that, when the victim is Indian, the defendant's status as Indian is an affirmative defense for which the defendant bears the burden of pleading and production, with the ultimate burden of proof remaining with the Government. In this case, defendant did not raise the issue of Indian status at trial as an affirmative defense, and thus the Government met its burden to prove the jurisdictional element of section 1363 (as extended by section 1152) by introducing evidence sufficient to establish that the offense occurred in Indian country. Finally, the court rejected defendant's contention that the district court erred at sentencing by incorrectly applying USSG 2B1.5, because it should have used the repair cost of $1,800 as the "value" of the statue for purposes of applying the enhancement, rather than its $92,000 purchase price. Rather, the text of section 2B1.5 foreclosed defendant's argument and the Sentencing Commission's explanation of why it promulgated section 2B1.5 further cuts against defendant's view. View "United States v. Haggerty" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former boss, the St. John the Baptist Parish Sheriff, for race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and for retaliatory discharge under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The district court granted summary judgment against plaintiff.The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment, concluding that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the sheriff's proffered reason for firing plaintiff -- sleeping on the job -- is pretext for Title VII race discrimination and FMLA retaliation. In regard to plaintiff's Title VII claim, the court explained that plaintiff has produced substantial evidence of pretext based on disparate treatment. In this case, the sheriff treated plaintiff worse than a similarly situated white male who also was caught sleeping on the job. In regard to the FMLA claim, the court explained that the record reflects that "sleeping on the job" is not an infraction that results in termination, the sheriff tolerated "sleeping on the job" by at least one other dispatch supervisor, and the sheriff could not recall any dispatcher that he had ever fired for this reason. Furthermore, when combined with the discredited reason of "sleeping on the job," the near-immediate temporal proximity of the discharge to the protected activity leaves no room to doubt that plaintiff has carried her summary-judgment burden of producing substantial evidence that the sheriff would not have fired her but for her FMLA-protected activity. View "Watkins v. Tregre" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of sovereign immunity in an action brought by voters and political organizations against the Texas Secretary of State seeking to enjoin the enforcement of HB 1888, a state law that bars counties from operating mobile or pop-up early voting locations.The court concluded that Mi Familia Vota v. Abbott, which held that the Secretary has no connection to the enforcement of Texas Election Code 85.062–85.063 because local officials are responsible for administering and enforcing those statutes, is controlling in this case. The court explained that, if the Secretary has no connection to the enforcement of section 85.062 or 85.063, then it follows that she has no connection to the enforcement of HB 1888, as codified in the neighboring section 85.064, which governs the days and hours of voting at temporary branch locations. Because the Secretary is not sufficiently connected to the enforcement of HB 1888, the court need not consider her argument that plaintiffs are seeking improper relief under Ex parte Young. Accordingly, the court remanded from this interlocutory appeal with instructions to dismiss. View "Texas Democratic Party v. Hughs" on Justia Law