Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Ramirez was the target of a drug trafficking investigation, and wiretaps were placed on his phones, providing access to voice and text conversations. Torres was a member of the Latin Kings, and purportedly a methamphetamine supplier for Ramirez. Torres and nine co-defendants were charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(A) and 846.During the first and second days of Torres's trial, the government presented the testimonies of multiple witnesses. On the second day, the last government witness finished at 7:09 P.M. Defense counsel informed the court that Torres intended to testify, expressing that it would take “several hours” to complete direct examination. Torres took the stand at 7:13 P.M. After approximately 50 minutes of direct examination, the judge declared an overnight recess and dismissed the jury. The court instructed Torres: You are to talk to no one about your testimony. The judge told defense counsel: You may not speak to him. Now that he’s started his testimony, you may not consult with him anymore.Convicted, Torres was given a within-Guidelines sentence of 240 months of imprisonment. The Fifth Circuit reversed. Torres’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when he was barred from speaking with his attorney during an overnight recess. View "United States v. Torres" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied the motions for authorization to file a successive federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2244 and for a stay of execution. Movant was convicted of capital murder for killing his aunt and sentenced to death. The court concluded that, even if movant establishes a prima facie showing under section 2244(b)(2), he fails to demonstrate that either claim is within the one-year period of limitations provided in section 2244(d). Furthermore, while the one-year time limitation may be equitably tolled, movant makes no argument that equitable tolling is warranted here. The court also concluded that, because the necessary factual predicate for movant's false and misleading testimony claim could have been discovered through due diligence more than a year ago, this claim is also untimely. View "In Re: Jones" on Justia Law

AAAPC and UAS filed suit against Quest for conspiring to force them out of the market of providing allergy and asthma testing. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).The Fifth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs' claims alleging that Quest violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and the Texas antitrust law are not time-barred. The court explained that plaintiffs' allegations about Phadia and Quest's continued meetings with providers and payors do not restart the statute of limitations; plaintiffs' allegations regarding the June 2015 policy change does not suffice to restart the statute of limitations; but plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Phadia and Quest were involved in the alleged conspiracy and that the allegation regarding Phadia's May 2014 email reset the statute of limitations. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's dismissal as to the state and federal antitrust claims. The court also reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs' misappropriation of trade secrets claim, concluding that plaintiffs have sufficiently pled they could not have discovered their misappropriation injury using reasonable diligence. Moreover, nothing in the complaint forecloses their potential rejoinder to the statute of limitations defense. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the civil conspiracy and tortious interference claims. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' request for leave to amend their complaint. View "Academy of Allergy & Asthma in Primary Care v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc." on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part Defendants McClaren, Keelen, Fortia, Scott, and Allen's convictions for numerous crimes related to their participation in a New Orleans street gang. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to sever McClaren and Scott's trials; the district court did not clearly err in its Batson determinations; challenges to co-conspirator testimony rejected; Allen, Fortia, and Keelen's convictions for RICO conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) affirmed; Fortia, Keelen, and Allen's VICAR convictions under 18 U.S.C. 1959(a)(3) affirmed; Fortia, Keelen, McClaren, and Scott's convictions for engaging in a drug-trafficking conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. 846 affirmed; and the victim's murder was sufficient to demonstrate Fortia's ratification of the drug and RICO conspiracies.The court affirmed Keelen, McClaren, and Scott's sentence under 21 U.S.C. 846, but vacated Fortia's conviction and remanded for resentencing; reversed Keelen's conviction under 18 U.S.C. 924(j); affirmed McClaren and Scott's convictions under 18 U.S.C. 924(o); concluded that defendants are not entitled to a new trial because of the admission and use of the plea agreement documents; affirmed the district court's denial of defendants' motion for a new trial; and affirmed Scott and McClaren's sentences. View "United States v. McClaren" on Justia Law

After Hurricane Dolly severely damaged a public housing development in Port Isabel, the conditional grant money that the CCHA was supposed to receive fell through. CCHA then filed suit against the City under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and other statutes, dismissing the FHA claims for lack of standing.The Fifth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the CCHA's injury-in-fact of which they complain -- the total elimination of federal funding that occurred on December 1, 2015 -- is not fairly traceable to the City. In this case, the summary judgment record makes clear that plaintiffs' December 1 loss of federal funding was the combined result of third-party actions and self-inflicted harm. In this case, it was the Lower Rio Grande Valley Development Council that sank the four-unit proposal, and it was the Council that enforced the December 1 deadline. View "Cameron County Housing Authority v. City of Port Isabel" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against police officers and the City of Shreveport, alleging that members of the police department used excessive force in effecting plaintiff's arrest. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that the police officers' conduct—forcing him to the ground and then beating him in order to place him in handcuffs—violated his rights protected by federal and state constitutional law, as well as Louisiana tort law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers in their official capacities on all claims and denied summary judgment as to all of plaintiff's claims against the City, as well as his section 1983 and Louisiana law claims against the officers in their individual capacities. The officers appealed.The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that the district court erred in concluding that factual issues preclude application of qualified immunity as to plaintiff's claims against the officers in their individual capacities. In this case, the facts and circumstances in their entirety created a scenario sufficiently "tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving" to place the officers' takedown of plaintiff, even if mistaken, within the protected "hazy order between excessive and acceptable force," established by then-existing Fourth Amendment excessive force jurisprudence. Furthermore, the district court erred in not granting summary judgment in the officers' favor relative to the force used against plaintiff while he was on the ground. View "Tucker v. City of Shreveport" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm and upheld the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence of a firearm discovered during a stop and frisk. The court concluded that reasonable suspicion supported the stop and frisk where defendant was encountered in a high-crime area, and in light of defendant's connection to the stolen vehicle and his interaction with others in and around the vehicle. In this case, the officers were reasonable in suspecting that at least some of the people around and inside the vehicle had been involved in the aggravated robbery. Furthermore, the officers' need to proceed cautiously was obvious in light of them being outnumbered and unable to secure all six people because they had only four sets of handcuffs.The court also concluded that defendant's detention did not exceed the permissible scope of the investigatory stop where the officers' actions were reasonable under the circumstances and the stop was not converted into an arrest prior to defendant being frisked. Finally, the court concluded that the police department's local policy does not affect the constitutionality of the officers' conduct. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law

James Boudreaux was injured during his employment by Owensby & Kritikos, Inc. as an equipment-testing technician on platforms located on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). Plaintiff's injury resulted from an automobile accident on his way to his work for Owensby on the OCS. Primarily at issue in this case is whether, in light of Pacific Operators Offshore, LLP v. Valladolid, 565 U.S. 207 (2012) (establishing substantial-nexus test), an onshore injury en route to a rig platform on the OCS is recoverable under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), as extended by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA). The ALJ determined that Boudreaux's injury arose out of, and occurred in the course of, his employment by Owensby; and, Boudreaux's injury had a substantial nexus to extractive operations on the OCS. The BRB affirmed.The Fifth Circuit applied the substantial-nexus test in Valladolid, holding that Boudreaux's injury is covered under OCSLA. Among the facts relevant to the court's inquiry, the court found persuasive Boudreaux's: being compensated by Owensby for both time and onshore mileage while traveling to and from the OCS; being on-the-job when he was injured; necessarily traveling to an intermediary pickup location to be transported from onshore to the OCS; and transporting his testing equipment in his vehicle. Furthermore, Owensby had another employee pick up Boudreaux's testing equipment to take it to the OCS after his accident. Therefore, each of these factors support Boudreaux's injury occurring as the result of operations conducted on the OCS. The court denied Owensby's petition for review, dismissed Boudreaux's cross-application based on lack of jurisdiction, and granted Boudreaux's request for reasonable attorney's fees incurred in defending against the petition, pending the court's decision on the amount to be awarded. View "Owensby & Kritikos, Inc. v. Boudreaux" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit withdrew its prior opinion and substituted the following opinion.Plaintiff filed suit against T-Mobile and Broadspire, alleging transgender discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from his treatment while working as a retail employee at a T-Mobile store. The court concluded that, at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, its analysis of the Title VII claim is governed by Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002)—and not the evidentiary standard set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under Swierkiewicz, there are two ultimate elements a plaintiff must plead to support a disparate treatment claim under Title VII: (1) an adverse employment action, (2) taken against a plaintiff because of her protected status. The court explained that when a complaint purports to allege a case of circumstantial evidence of discrimination, it may be helpful to refer to McDonnell Douglas to understand whether a plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded an adverse employment action taken "because of" his protected status as required under Swierkiewicz.Applying these principles here, the court concluded that there is no dispute that plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action. However, the court concluded that plaintiff has failed to plead any facts indicating less favorable treatment than others "similarly situated" outside of the asserted protected class. In this case, the Second Amended Complaint does not contain any facts about any comparators at all, and there is no allegation that any non-transgender employee with a similar job and supervisor and who engaged in the same conduct as plaintiff received more favorable treatment. Therefore, the complaint does not plead any facts that would permit a reasonable inference that T-Mobile terminated plaintiff because of gender identity. Furthermore, plaintiff's Americans with Disabilities Act discrimination claim fails for similar reasons, and plaintiff's retaliation claim under Title VII is untimely.The court rejected plaintiff's contention that Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020), changed the law and created a lower standard for those alleging discrimination based on gender identity. Rather, the court concluded that Bostock did not constitute an intervening change of law that warrants reconsideration under Rule 59(e). The court explained that Bostock defined sex discrimination to encompass sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination, but did not alter the meaning of discrimination itself. Therefore, where an employer discharged a sales employee who happens to be transgender—but who took six months of leave, and then sought further leave for the indefinite future, that is an ordinary business practice rather than discrimination. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying further leave to amend. View "Olivarez v. T-Mobile USA, Inc." on Justia Law

This action stemmed from the collapse of Robert Stanford's Ponzi scheme. Plaintiffs, investors who purchased certificates of deposits (CDs) with Stanford International Bank, Ltd. (SIBL), filed suit against SEI Private Trust Company, businesses that had a longstanding relationship with SIBL.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion for a continuance for further discovery and award of summary judgment to SEI where the district court concluded that SEI did not control the primary securities violations of Sanford Trust Company (STC). The court rejected plaintiffs' contention that the district court applied the wrong legal standard and ignored factual disputes as to SEI's asserted control. Rather, the court concluded that the district court correctly identified that plaintiffs need not prove that SEI participated in the fraudulent transaction. The court also concluded that SEI has offered competent evidence that it lacked power to control the STC's primary securities violations. View "Lillie v. Office of Financial Institutions State of Louisiana" on Justia Law