Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, Michael Hagar, is an individual convicted of cyberstalking and making interstate threats. He submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for a copy of a specific email he sent in 2016, which became part of the FBI’s investigation. Hagar specifically sought the unredacted “To” line of recipients and the email’s complete header information, which includes technical metadata such as server paths and timestamps. The FBI initially provided the email with recipient information redacted, citing privacy exemptions, and declined to produce the header metadata, arguing it would require the creation of a new record.Following his FOIA request, Hagar filed a pro se lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. The magistrate judge terminated Hagar’s initial summary judgment motion as premature, set a schedule for further briefing, and allowed the FBI to move for summary judgment. After the FBI sent Hagar an unredacted copy of the email, the magistrate judge recommended granting summary judgment for the FBI, agreeing that the header information would require creation of a new record and, alternatively, was exempt under FOIA. The district court adopted this recommendation, entered judgment for the FBI, and denied Hagar’s post-judgment motions and misconduct claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that because Hagar had received the “To” line information, his claim for that was moot. The court further held that FOIA does not require agencies to create new records to satisfy requests, and thus the FBI was not obligated to produce the header information. The court affirmed the district court’s rulings, including denial of post-judgment motions, and dismissed Hagar’s judicial misconduct claims as meritless. View "Hagar v. FBI" on Justia Law

Two development companies owned land in Johnson County, Texas, within the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the City of Mansfield but outside the city’s corporate boundaries. To develop this land, the companies needed access to retail water services, which, under state law, could be provided only by the Johnson County Special Utility District (“JCSUD”) because it held the exclusive certificate of convenience and necessity (CCN) for the area. However, a contract between JCSUD and the City of Mansfield required JCSUD to secure Mansfield’s written consent, which could be withheld at the City’s discretion, before providing water services within the city’s extraterritorial jurisdiction. The developers’ efforts to obtain water service were unsuccessful, as Mansfield demanded annexation and additional fees, ultimately refusing to formalize an agreement.After unsuccessful negotiations and attempts to compel service through the Texas Public Utility Commission, the developers sued the City of Mansfield in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. They alleged violations of the Sherman Act and brought state-law claims. The district court, adopting a magistrate judge’s recommendation, dismissed the antitrust claims with prejudice, holding that Mansfield was entitled to state-action antitrust immunity under Texas law, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether Mansfield was entitled to state-action immunity. The Fifth Circuit held that, although Texas law authorizes monopolies for water utilities through CCNs, it does not clearly articulate or authorize the City of Mansfield to act anticompetitively concerning the area in question, since the CCN belonged to JCSUD. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s grant of state-action immunity and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Megatel v. Mansfield" on Justia Law

The Securities and Exchange Commission initiated an enforcement action against Timothy Barton and related entities, alleging violations of federal securities laws. The district court subsequently appointed a receiver to manage properties allegedly acquired with funds from Barton’s fraudulent activities. Certain properties and entities, including TC Hall, LLC (owner of the Hall Street property), Goldmark Hospitality LLC (owner of Amerigold Suites), BM318, LLC, and JMJ Development, LLC, were placed within the receivership because they had received or benefitted from assets traceable to the alleged misconduct.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas oversaw the receivership and issued several orders approving property sales and settlements. Barton previously appealed the appointment of the receivership and its scope. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in an earlier decision (SEC v. Barton, 79 F.4th 573 (5th Cir. 2023)), vacated and remanded for reconsideration; on remand, the district court narrowed and reappointed the receivership. The Fifth Circuit later affirmed the new receivership order in SEC v. Barton, 135 F.4th 206 (5th Cir. 2025). While appeals were pending, the district court issued orders related to the sale of Amerigold Suites, settlements involving JMJ and BM318, and the sale of the Hall Street property.In the current appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded it lacked appellate jurisdiction to review the cancelled Amerigold Suites sale and the two settlement agreements, dismissing those portions of the appeal. The court found jurisdiction to review the approval of the Hall Street property sale and affirmed the district court’s order, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in approving the sale, which complied with statutory requirements and was in the best interest of the receivership estate. View "Securities and Exchange Commission v. Barton" on Justia Law

A professional pilot was asked to operate a Cessna Citation 550 aircraft whose tail number had recently been changed by its owner from N550ME to N550MK. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) approved the new registration and issued new documents, but denied a new airworthiness certificate because the aircraft required further inspection. Believing the registration had reverted to the old number due to the denial, the owner had the physical tail number altered back to N550ME using tape, while the aircraft carried documents for both the old and new registrations. The pilot, after being told about “paperwork issues” and noticing the taped number, proceeded to fly the aircraft on two flights without confirming the correct registration and without a valid airworthiness certificate for the current registered tail number. After the first flight, FAA inspectors issued a written notice warning that further operation would violate federal regulations; the pilot disregarded this and completed the return flight.The FAA suspended the pilot’s license for 150 days, citing violations of various regulations requiring proper display of the registered tail number and possession of a valid airworthiness certificate. The pilot appealed the suspension to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), where an Administrative Law Judge affirmed the FAA’s order after a hearing. The full NTSB then affirmed the ALJ’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case, applying a deferential standard to the agency’s findings and sanction. The court held that the NTSB’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious. The court concluded that the pilot’s reliance on the owner’s explanation was unreasonable and that the penalty was not excessive, even if the violations were administrative. The court also found no improper disparity in sanctioning compared to another pilot. The petition for review was denied, and the suspension was upheld. View "Hardwick v. FAA" on Justia Law

Intuit, Inc., the seller of TurboTax tax-preparation software, advertised its “Free Edition” as available at no cost for “simple tax returns.” However, the majority of taxpayers did not qualify due to various exclusions, and those individuals were prompted during the tax preparation process to upgrade to paid products. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) brought an administrative complaint in 2022, alleging that these advertisements were deceptive under Section 5 of the FTC Act. After an initial federal court suit for a preliminary injunction was denied, the FTC pursued the matter through its internal adjudicative process instead.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that Intuit’s advertisements were likely to mislead a significant minority of consumers. The FTC Commissioners affirmed this decision, issuing a broad cease-and-desist order that barred Intuit from advertising “any goods or services” as free unless it met stringent requirements. This order was not limited to tax-preparation products. Intuit petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for review, asserting, among other arguments, that the FTC’s adjudication of deceptive advertising claims through an ALJ, rather than an Article III court, was unconstitutional.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that deceptive advertising claims under Section 5 of the FTC Act are akin to traditional actions at law or equity, such as fraud and deceit, and thus involve private rights. According to recent Supreme Court precedent in SEC v. Jarkesy, such claims must be adjudicated in Article III courts, not by agency ALJs. The Fifth Circuit granted Intuit’s petition, vacated the FTC’s order, and remanded the case to the agency for further proceedings consistent with its holding. View "Intuit v. Federal Trade Commission" on Justia Law

An 18-year-old high school senior from Texas was indicted by a federal grand jury for transmitting threats in interstate commerce, based on statements he made while using the online gaming platform Roblox. The statements, made in a virtual “Church” experience, referenced possessing firearms, preparing munitions, and intentions to commit violence at a Christian event. Other Roblox users, located in Pennsylvania and Nevada, reported these statements to the FBI, believing them to be serious threats rather than mere role-play or trolling. The government alleged the defendant's remarks corresponded to a real concert scheduled in Austin and supported its case with evidence from the defendant’s internet history and statements captured by a keylogger.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed the indictment before trial, concluding no reasonable juror could find that the defendant’s statements constituted “true threats” outside the protection of the First Amendment. The court found the context—a role-playing video game environment filled with extreme and offensive avatars—undermined the seriousness of the statements, and excluded evidence of the defendant’s conduct outside Roblox as irrelevant. The district court released the defendant without conditions, later imposing some conditions after a government request.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the question of whether the statements were “true threats” is a factual issue that should ordinarily be decided by a jury at trial, not by the judge on a pretrial motion. The court found that disputed facts and contextual uncertainties required a trial on the merits, and that the district court erred by resolving these issues prematurely. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the indictment and remanded for further proceedings. The appeal regarding the defendant’s release was dismissed as moot. View "United States v. Burger" on Justia Law

A police officer suffered severe injuries during a protest in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, when a demonstrator threw a heavy object that struck him in the face. The protest was organized in response to police conduct and was led by a prominent activist who had previously participated in similar events that sometimes turned violent. On the day of the incident, the leader was observed directing protestors, including leading them onto a highway and not discouraging violent behavior as the situation escalated. The officer’s injuries were significant, resulting in lasting physical and psychological harm and the end of his law enforcement career.The officer sued the activist, Black Lives Matter, and related entities in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, alleging negligence and other tort claims. The district court dismissed most of the claims with prejudice, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed as to the negligence claim against the activist. The Supreme Court of the United States vacated that decision, remanding for clarification of Louisiana negligence law. The Supreme Court of Louisiana confirmed that state law recognizes a duty not to negligently precipitate third-party crimes under the circumstances alleged. After further proceedings, the district court again granted summary judgment for the activist, finding no duty, lack of causation, and First Amendment protection.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment. The court held that there is sufficient evidence for a jury to consider whether the activist’s leadership and actions breached a duty of care and were a cause-in-fact of the officer’s injuries, and that such a claim is not foreclosed by the First Amendment. The case was remanded for trial. View "Ford v. Mckesson" on Justia Law

Arturo Mendoza created and uploaded fourteen images of morphed child pornography using Adobe Photoshop and cloud storage services. The images depicted adult sexual activity with the faces of two minor girls, ages twelve and six, photoshopped onto adult women’s bodies. Mendoza was indicted and pleaded guilty to one count of transporting child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1), (b)(1). At sentencing, the presentence report recommended certain financial conditions related to restitution and a location-monitoring condition for supervised release.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas adopted the presentence report and sentenced Mendoza to 120 months’ imprisonment, an above-Guidelines sentence, followed by ten years of supervised release. The district court left restitution open for ninety days but never entered an order for restitution, as no hearing was requested or held. The written judgment included special conditions: a location-monitoring requirement (with unclear duration and a home-detention component), and financial-disclosure and credit-approval conditions. Mendoza appealed, challenging these supervised release conditions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court erred by imposing a home-detention component in the written judgment when only standalone location monitoring was pronounced orally, and by failing to specify the duration of the location-monitoring condition, violating due process. Additionally, the appellate court held that the financial-disclosure and credit-approval conditions were imposed in error because restitution was never ordered and the record did not support these restrictions. The Fifth Circuit vacated all three challenged conditions and remanded for proceedings consistent with its opinion, specifically for correction of the location-monitoring condition and for further proceedings regarding the financial conditions. View "United States v. Mendoza" on Justia Law

Corelle, a company that sold Instapot multifunction cookers, entered into a 2016 master supply agreement (MSA) with Midea, the manufacturer. Under this arrangement, individual purchase orders (POs) were used for each transaction, detailing specific terms such as price and quantity. Each PO typically included Corelle’s own terms, including indemnity provisions. In 2023, Corelle filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and, as part of its reorganization plan, sold its appliances business and assigned the MSA to the buyer. However, Corelle sought to retain its indemnification rights for products purchased under completed POs made before the assignment.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas denied Midea’s objection to this arrangement, finding that the POs were severable contracts distinct from the MSA. This meant the indemnification rights related to completed POs remained with Corelle. Midea appealed, contending that the MSA and all related POs formed a single, indivisible contract that should have been assigned in its entirety. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision, emphasizing that the structure of the MSA and the parties’ course of dealing supported the divisibility of the POs from the MSA.On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the standards applied by the lower courts, the interpretation of the contracts, and the application of 11 U.S.C. § 365(f). The appellate court held that the bankruptcy court did not err in finding the POs were divisible from the MSA, that Corelle’s retention of indemnification rights did not violate bankruptcy law, and that the lower courts applied the correct standards of review. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "GuangDong Midea v. Unsecured Creditors" on Justia Law

Police in Gautier, Mississippi, used an automatic license plate reader (LPR) system to identify a vehicle associated with Elijah Porter, who was wanted on an outstanding warrant for aggravated assault. Officer Hoggard received an LPR alert, confirmed the vehicle’s connection to Porter through a computer check, and conducted a traffic stop. During the stop, Hoggard detained Porter and, while interacting with him, observed the barrel and slide of a firearm, as well as a silver automatic conversion switch, protruding from under the driver’s seat. The officer later retrieved the firearm—a Glock pistol equipped with a machinegun conversion switch—during an inventory search of the vehicle.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi denied Porter’s motions to suppress both the LPR-derived vehicle location data and the firearm, ruling that use of the LPR data did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, that the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, and that the plain view and inevitable discovery doctrines applied to the firearm. The court also rejected Porter’s argument that 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), which prohibits possession of a machinegun, was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. Porter waived a jury trial and was found guilty in a bench trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. It held that use of the LPR system to identify Porter’s vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment because there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in movements on public roads or in license plate information, and the LPR data was not as comprehensive as cell-site location data. The court further held that the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, the firearm was lawfully seized under the plain view doctrine, and Fifth Circuit precedent foreclosed Porter’s Second Amendment challenge to § 922(o). The conviction was affirmed. View "United States v. Porter" on Justia Law