Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Three business entities and individuals associated with the operation of a retail store in Cedar Park, Texas, were subject to enforcement under a city ordinance banning “head shops”—stores selling items commonly used to ingest or inhale illegal substances. After receiving notices from the City, two of the appellants were charged in municipal court and fined for violating the ordinance, while the third appellant, a related business entity, was not charged. Following the municipal court’s judgment, the two charged parties appealed for a trial de novo in the county court, which annulled the municipal court’s judgment and began new criminal proceedings. They also pursued state habeas relief, which was still ongoing at the time of this appeal.Separately, the appellants filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, challenging the ordinance’s validity and constitutionality under federal and state law, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court dismissed all claims as barred by the doctrine announced in Heck v. Humphrey, which precludes certain civil claims that would imply the invalidity of existing criminal convictions. The district court also dismissed a distinct claim related to termination of utility services.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that because the municipal court’s judgments were annulled by the trial de novo and criminal proceedings were still pending under Texas law, there were no outstanding convictions to trigger the Heck bar. Thus, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the claims challenging the ordinance and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the standalone water termination claim, as the appellants had disclaimed any intent to pursue it. View "Kleinman v. City of Cedar Park" on Justia Law

A citizen advocacy group and two individuals challenged five provisions of a city ordinance in Kerrville, Texas, that regulated "canvassing" and "soliciting" activities at private residences and public streets. The ordinance defined "canvassing" as door-to-door advocacy on topics like religion, politics, or philosophy, and "soliciting" as seeking donations or advertising services, with both activities subject to restrictions on timing, signage, permitting, and location. Plaintiffs argued that these rules chilled their protected speech, including political canvassing, religious outreach, and commercial solicitation, and feared fines under the ordinance.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas considered the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction. After a hearing, the district court found that the plaintiffs had standing as to most provisions except the rule applying to minors. On the merits, the district court enjoined enforcement of the permitting requirement for solicitors but declined to enjoin the hours, signage, and street restrictions, finding those likely constitutional under intermediate scrutiny.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The Fifth Circuit agreed that plaintiffs had standing except as to the minor-related provision. It held that the hours and signage restrictions—because they targeted canvassing based on content—must be reviewed under strict scrutiny rather than intermediate scrutiny, and remanded for reconsideration. The court also found the city failed to justify the streets provision even under intermediate scrutiny and remanded for further injunction analysis. It affirmed the injunction against the permitting requirement but vacated it as overbroad, directing the district court to limit relief to the plaintiffs. The Fifth Circuit denied as moot the motion for an injunction pending appeal. View "LIA Network v. City of Kerrville" on Justia Law

Aramark, a company that self-funds employee health benefit plans governed by ERISA, contracted with Aetna to serve as third-party administrator for these plans. Under the agreement, Aetna was responsible for processing claims, managing provider networks, and handling various administrative tasks. Aramark alleged that Aetna breached its fiduciary duties by paying improper or fraudulent claims, retaining undisclosed fees, providing inadequate subrogation services, making post-adjudication adjustments detrimental to Aramark, and commingling plan assets.Aramark filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, asserting ERISA claims for breach of fiduciary duty and prohibited transactions. Aetna responded by seeking to compel arbitration in a Connecticut federal district court, relying on the arbitration clause in the parties’ Master Services Agreement (MSA), and moved to stay the Texas proceedings pending arbitration. The district court denied the stay, holding that the parties had not “clearly and unmistakably” delegated the threshold question of arbitrability to an arbitrator. The court found that the MSA's arbitration clause carved out disputes seeking equitable relief—such as Aramark’s ERISA claims—from arbitration and that these claims were equitable in nature.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of a motion to stay litigation pending arbitration de novo. It held that the threshold issue of arbitrability was not clearly and unmistakably delegated to an arbitrator under the terms of the MSA, especially given the placement of the carve-out for equitable relief. The Fifth Circuit further held that Aramark’s ERISA claims constituted equitable, not legal, relief under Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit precedent. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders, finding no error or abuse of discretion. View "Aramark Services v. Aetna Life Insurance" on Justia Law

A former professional football player sought disability benefits from a retirement plan administered under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), arguing that he qualified for the highest tier of benefits due to multiple concussions suffered during his career. The plan granted him some benefits but denied the top category. He filed suit, claiming improper denial of benefits and lack of a full and fair review.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas ruled in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the plan to award the higher benefits and granting approximately $1.2 million in attorney’s fees, plus $600,000 in conditional fees. On appeal, however, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment, holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to reclassification to the highest benefits tier due to his failure to immediately appeal the denial, making any further review futile. The panel remanded for entry of judgment for the plan.On remand, the district court nonetheless reaffirmed its prior fee award, reasoning that the plaintiff’s success in exposing flaws in the plan’s review process, as reflected in favorable factual findings, constituted sufficient success to support attorney’s fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, reviewing the fee award for abuse of discretion, reversed the district court’s decision. The Fifth Circuit held that under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1), attorney’s fees may only be awarded if a party achieves “some degree of success on the merits,” which requires more than favorable factual findings or moral victories. Because the plaintiff received no relief—monetary, injunctive, or declaratory—the award of attorney’s fees was improper. The court reversed the fee award. View "Cloud v. NFL Player Retirement Plan" on Justia Law

Kun Liao, a native and citizen of China, sought relief from removal by applying for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. An Immigration Judge denied these applications. Liao appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed his appeal on April 10, 2025. He then filed motions to reconsider and to reopen the case; however, the motion to reconsider was deemed untimely, and the motion to reopen was denied for lack of new evidence. Liao also moved to stay removal, which the BIA denied as moot.Following the BIA’s final order denying his motions on July 2, 2025, Liao filed a petition for review with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. His petition was received by the clerk on August 11, forty days after the BIA’s order, exceeding the statutory thirty-day deadline set by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). The government promptly moved to deny Liao’s petition for untimeliness. The Fifth Circuit noted that Liao’s previous petition had been dismissed for failure to file his brief timely.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the thirty-day filing deadline for petitions for review is a mandatory claim-processing rule, as clarified by the Supreme Court in Riley v. Bondi. Because the government did not waive its objection to Liao’s untimely filing and Liao failed to satisfy the requirements of the prison mailbox rule, the Fifth Circuit enforced the deadline and denied the petition for review. All other motions pending with the case were dismissed as moot. View "Liao v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The essential facts of this case involve an individual who was convicted in Mississippi state court for failing to pay child support, an offense punishable by up to five years in prison but for which he ultimately received only probation. After repaying the owed child support and completing probation, the individual was later indicted under federal law, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits firearm possession by anyone previously convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. The predicate offense for the federal charge was the non-payment of child support.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, the defendant twice moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to him, among other constitutional challenges. The district court denied both motions. The defendant subsequently pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement that preserved his right to appeal the Second Amendment issue, leading to this appeal before the Fifth Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that, under the historical inquiry required by the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, there is no historical tradition supporting the permanent disarmament of a person convicted solely of non-payment of child support, particularly where the debt had been repaid and probation completed. The court rejected the government’s analogy between debtors and thieves, noting that founding-era practices treated debtors differently, allowing for temporary disarmament only until the debt was paid. The Fifth Circuit therefore held that the application of § 922(g)(1) to the defendant violated the Second Amendment and reversed the conviction, remanding for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "United States v. Cockerham" on Justia Law

Several individuals who worked as waitstaff at a club operated by Benelux Corporation brought a lawsuit in 2024, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act. In 2020, Benelux had distributed an arbitration agreement to its employees. The agreement included two signature boxes—one for the employee and one for Benelux’s representative—and stated that by signing, both parties represented that they had read and understood the agreement and agreed to be bound by its terms. One employee, Cadena, signed both signature boxes, but Benelux’s general manager did not sign the agreement due to an oversight.After being sued, Benelux moved to compel arbitration based on the unsigned agreement. Cadena argued that the agreement was not enforceable because Benelux had not signed it, stating she did not intend to be bound unless Benelux also signed. The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation and denied Benelux’s motion to compel, finding that the agreement required signatures from both parties to be enforceable, and Benelux had not signed.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. Applying Texas contract law, the Fifth Circuit held that the language of the arbitration agreement clearly required signatures from both the employee and Benelux’s representative for the agreement to be enforceable. Because Benelux did not sign, there was no valid arbitration agreement between Benelux and Cadena. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment denying Benelux’s motion to compel arbitration. View "Mertens v. Benelux Corporation" on Justia Law

James Devins, a pro se plaintiff, sought to sponsor a Nepali citizen, Rita Raut, for a U.S. student visa as part of his religious practice, which he described as involving “parental and patriotic guidance” and “spiritual and intellectual mentorship.” Raut’s visa applications were denied three times between 2021 and 2023. After the last denial, Devins filed three separate lawsuits relating to the visa refusal, each time alleging a violation of his rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed Devins’s first suit against the Director of United States Citizenship and Immigration Services for lack of standing, without prejudice. In his second suit against the Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs, the district court also dismissed the case without prejudice, citing a lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on standing and the doctrine of consular nonreviewability. In his third and current action, Devins again sued the Assistant Secretary, raising substantially the same claim based on the same events and added no new factual allegations.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision to dismiss the third action with prejudice based on the doctrine of res judicata. The Fifth Circuit held that all requirements for res judicata were met: the parties were identical or in privity, the prior judgments were final and on the merits as to jurisdiction, and the same claim was involved in all actions. The court concluded that further litigation was precluded, as Devins had not alleged any new injury or change in circumstances that would alter the prior jurisdictional rulings. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal with prejudice. View "Devins v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

A passenger, after being injured in a hit-and-run rear-end collision while riding in a vehicle arranged through a rideshare application, sought damages for bodily injuries. The passenger alleged that the rideshare company, its subsidiary, and its insurer either provided or were required by law to provide uninsured motorist (UM) coverage, and that their rejection of such coverage violated Louisiana law.The action began in Louisiana state court, initially naming only the insurer as a defendant. The passenger later amended the complaint to add the rideshare company and its subsidiary, arguing that they were not permitted to reject UM coverage. With all defendants’ consent, the insurer removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, citing diversity jurisdiction. Multiple motions followed, including motions to dismiss by the rideshare entities and a motion for summary judgment by the insurer. The district court found that Louisiana statutes allow transportation network companies to reject UM coverage and that the defendants had properly done so. Accordingly, the district court dismissed all claims with prejudice and denied the passenger’s request to certify a question to the Louisiana Supreme Court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo. The court concluded that Louisiana Revised Statute § 45:201.6 incorporates, by general reference, the provisions of § 22:1295, including the right to reject UM coverage. The court found support for this interpretation in state appellate decisions and statutory context. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and denied the motion to certify the question to the Louisiana Supreme Court. The holding is that transportation network companies in Louisiana may reject uninsured motorist coverage if they follow the procedures in § 22:1295. View "Guerrera v. United Financial Casualty Co." on Justia Law

The case centers on Kristal Glover-Wing, who founded and operated Angel Care Hospice (ACH) in Louisiana, a Medicare-certified hospice provider. ACH’s business model involved recruiting local physicians as medical directors who referred patients and certified them as terminally ill, even when evidence showed many patients maintained active lifestyles inconsistent with terminal illness. Glover-Wing instructed staff to emphasize patients’ worst conditions in records and resisted discharging patients who no longer qualified, sometimes directing staff to falsify records or reenroll patients after hospitalizations. An investigation revealed that, for at least twenty-four patients, hospice services were provided and Medicare reimbursed ACH over $1.5 million, despite the patients not meeting eligibility criteria.Following a whistleblower complaint and investigation, a federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana indicted Glover-Wing and two physicians for conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud and three counts of healthcare fraud. During trial, the jury asked if the conspiracy charge could include ACH employees as coconspirators, leading to a dispute over jury instructions. Glover-Wing requested judicial estoppel to prevent the government from expanding the conspiracy beyond named defendants, arguing she relied on prior government representations. The district court denied her requests, and the jury convicted Glover-Wing on all counts while acquitting the physicians. Post-trial, the district court denied Glover-Wing’s motions for acquittal and a new trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed Glover-Wing’s sufficiency-of-evidence and judicial estoppel claims. The court held that sufficient evidence supported all convictions, as a rational jury could find Glover-Wing knowingly participated in fraud and conspiracy. It further held that judicial estoppel did not apply because the government’s positions were not plainly inconsistent, nor accepted by the court, and Glover-Wing failed to show unfair detriment. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Glover-Wing" on Justia Law