Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In an action concerning the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP) created by the Secretary of DHS on December 20, 2018, and purportedly rescinded by DHS in a memorandum on June 1, 2021, the district court concluded that DHS's purported rescission of MPP violated, inter alia, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).After determining that the States' claims are justiciable, the Fifth Circuit denied the Government's motion for an emergency stay pending appeal of the district court's permanent injunction enjoining and restraining DHS from implementing or enforcing the June 1 Memorandum and ordering DHS to enforce and implement MPP in good faith. The court held that DHS failed to satisfy the four Nken stay factors. The court concluded that the Government is not likely to succeed on either its APA arguments or its 8 U.S.C. 1225 arguments, let alone that the Government is likely to succeed on both. Therefore, the Government has not come close to a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the merits. In this case, the Secretary failed to consider several relevant factors and important aspects of the problem, including the States' legitimate interests, MPP's benefits, potential alternatives to MPP, and section 1225's implications. Furthermore, the Government's counterarguments are unpersuasive.The court also concluded that the Government has not shown that it will be irreparably injured absent a stay pending appeal; the States have suffered, and will continue to suffer, harms as a result of the termination of MPP; and the Government is also wrong to say that a stay would promote the public interest by preserving the separation of powers. Finally, the court rejected the Government's contention that a stay is warranted because the district court should have remanded without vacating the June 1 Memorandum or issuing an injunction. View "Texas v. Biden" on Justia Law

The Texas legislature enacted a "sexually oriented business" fee (SOBF) in 2007, imposing a $5-per-customer charge on businesses that serve alcohol in the presence of "nude" entertainment. The Comptroller promulgated a rule eight years later that clarified the definition of "nude" under the SOBF statute to apply to dancers who wear opaque latex over their breasts (the Clothing Rule).TEA filed suit against the Comptroller, challenging the Clothing Rule on First Amendment, due process, and equal protection grounds. The district court granted partial summary judgment to TEA on its First Amendment freedom of expression claim and its claim that the Clothing Rule violated due process. After a bench trial, the district court held that the Clothing Rule was not overbroad in violation of the First Amendment, but that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court's conclusion that TEA had associational standing to challenge the Clothing Rule and dismissal of the Comptroller's other jurisdictional claims. On the merits, the court concluded that the Clothing Rule fails strict scrutiny under the First Amendment. In this case, the Clothing Rule is directed at the essential expressive nature of the latex clubs' business, and thus is a content based restriction subject to strict scrutiny. Furthermore, the Comptroller does not present an argument that the Clothing Rule satisfies this high burden. The court also concluded that the retroactive imposition of the SOBF upon the latex clubs via the Clothing Rule constitutes a violation of due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, the court concluded that TEA's equal protection claim lacks merit because none of the examples proffered by TEA or employed by the district court are "in all relevant respects alike" to the latex clubs at issue. Therefore, TEA failed to prove that similarly situated individuals were treated differently. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment with respect to its jurisdictional, First Amendment, and due process rulings. The court reversed with respect to the district court's equal protection ruling and rendered judgment in favor of the Comptroller as to TEA's equal protection claim. View "Texas Entertainment Ass'n, Inc. v. Hegar" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer on his state-law disability-discrimination and retaliation claims, as well as his claims for retaliation and interference under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Plaintiff's claim stemmed from his termination after taking time off of work for open-heart surgery.The court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's disability discrimination claim under Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code where there simply is no medical evidence in the record except for plaintiff's own statements that he was qualified to return to work at any point, let alone before his FMLA leave expired; plaintiff failed to establish that he was qualified for either of two positions at work; and there was no other request for accommodations outside of the ability to attend dialysis treatments nor any reasonable explanation to account for the contradictory statements about plaintiff's physical capabilities made in the application for social security benefits. The court also concluded that plaintiff failed to support that he engaged in any protected activity under state law that led to retaliation by his employer.In regard to plaintiff's FMLA claims, the court concluded that the district court correctly determined that plaintiff did not show the prejudice necessary to prevail on an FMLA interference claim. However, in regard to plaintiff's FMLA retaliation claim, the adverse employment action occurred approximately one month after plaintiff's FMLA leave expired. The court concluded that a month is close enough in time to create a causal connection. Therefore, the burden shifts to the employer to offer legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for the adverse reaction. Although the employer offered three reasons, the court concluded that they have been adequately rebutted for purposes of summary judgment. Accordingly, the court affirmed on all claims except for the FMLA retaliation claim, which it reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Campos v. Steves & Sons, Inc." on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit, en banc, vacated the district court's permanent injunction declaring Senate Bill 8 (SB8), which prohibits a particular type of dilation and evacuation (D&E) abortion method, facially unconstitutional.The district court held that SB8 imposes an undue burden on a large fraction of women, primarily because it determined that SB8 amounted to a ban on all D&E abortions. However, viewing SB8 through a binary framework—that either D&Es can be done only by live dismemberment or else women cannot receive abortions in the second trimester—is to accept a false dichotomy. Rather, the en banc court concluded that the record shows that doctors can safely perform D&Es and comply with SB8 using methods that are already in widespread use. The en banc court also concluded that the district court, in permanently enjoining SB8, committed numerous, reversible legal and factual errors: applying the wrong test to assess SB8, disregarding and misreading the Supreme Court's precedents in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey and Gonzales v. Carhart, and bungling the large-fraction analysis. Because remanding to the district court would be futile as the record permits only one conclusion, the en banc court concluded that plaintiffs have failed to carry their heavy burden of proving that SB8 would impose an undue burden on a large fraction of women. View "Whole Woman's Health v. Paxton" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was run over by a barrel-racing horse at a Texas rodeo, she filed suit against Kosse Roping Club, the rodeo operator, for negligence. Ten months later, plaintiff filed suit against the club's directors.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims against the directors as untimely. The court need not decide the validity of plaintiff's tolling theory because it concluded that, under Texas law, plaintiff could not pierce the club's corporate veil based solely on evidence that the club was undercapitalized. Therefore, plaintiff's veil-piercing theory failed and, along with it, any argument that the limitations clock against the directors was tolled by her suing Kosse. View "Ledford v. Keen" on Justia Law

During Castilleja's 15 years as Bexar County Community Supervision and Corrections Department (CSCD) community service officer, he had multiple reprimands and termination warnings. After Castilleja was transferred in 2014, his new manager suspected Castilleja was violating overtime rules. An investigation by Assistant Chief Kelly confirmed Castilleja was routinely taking unapproved overtime and using his work computer to send union-related emails. Castilleja only received counseling and was put on a “performance improvement plan.” Castilleja’s 2015 evaluation rated him “satisfactory” overall but gave him the lowest rating in multiple categories. In 2016, Castilleja was sworn in as president of the Bexar County Probation Officers Association (BCPOA), having served in the union since 2007. Castilleja switched units and other issues came to light, resulting in an audit of Castilleja’s former cases. Brady recommended termination, citing Castilleja’s disregard of “the basic ten[e]ts of case management,” multiple policy violations, plus two instances of conducting union business while at work, and one use of work email to send union-related emails. Meanwhile, the BCPOA issued a no-confidence petition calling for Anderson’s removal. Days later, Anderson heard Castilleja’s appeal. Anderson fired Castilleja.Castilleja and the Union sued Anderson and Brady in their individual and official capacities, claiming that Castilleja was fired in retaliation for union-related speech and association in violation of the First Amendment, 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all claims. The evidence established valid reasons for firing Castilleja. View "United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial & Service Workers International Union v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Lindsey, a registered nurse, alleged that, after 17 years of service, her employer, BMA, terminated her because she was compelled to take Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2615(a)(1) leave in response to a series of personal tragedies that included a fire in her home and the hospitalization of her son. BMA claimed she was fired for poor attendance and missed deadlines.The district court granted BMA summary judgment on her FMLA discriminatory retaliation claim. The Fifth Circuit reversed. Lindsey’s employment records suggest BMA offered attendance issues as a post hoc rationalization to justify her firing. BMA was not able to list specific dates or times of her purported absences; summary judgment evidence suggested that the deadlines were hortatory rather than mandatory and that she was never informed that failure to meet these deadlines could result in discipline of any kind, let alone termination. BMA did not follow its own progressive discipline policy, which instructs that “corrective action be escalating.” View "Lindsey v. Bio-Medical Applications of Louisiana, LLC" on Justia Law

After obtaining a default judgment in state court against defunct entities, six plaintiffs filed this coverage action to collect on that judgment from the entities' insurer. Although the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the district court's determination that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue the insurer without either an adversarial judgment against the entities or a valid assignment from the entities, the court agreed with the district court that plaintiffs' claims against the entities fell outside the scope of the entities' liability insurance coverage. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Cincinnati. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying intervenor's motion to intervene. View "Turner v. Cincinnati Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an employee of Offshore Marine, injured her neck in a collision caused by REC Marine in 2015. After plaintiff injured her neck again by slipping and falling on an Offshore Marine vessel in 2018, Offshore Marine sought contribution from REC Marine for plaintiff's maintenance and cure.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of REC Marine, concluding that under governing circuit precedent Offshore Marine has brought forth genuine issues of material fact as to whether REC Marine caused in part plaintiff's need for maintenance and cure. In this case, plaintiff's deposition, her medical records, and Offshore Marine's proposed expert's report support the conclusion that plaintiff had the same neck injury from the time of the 2015 injury onward, and that the 2018 slip and fall simply worsened it to the point of plaintiff needing maintenance and cure. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Poincon v. Offshore Marine Contractors, Inc." on Justia Law

Gonzalez-Hernandez, a citizen of El Salvador, arrived in the U.S. at age six. In 1992, he became a lawful permanent resident. In 2001, Gonzalez-Hernandez pled guilty under Texas law to “Deadly Conduct,” knowingly discharging a firearm at or in the direction of one or more individuals or a habitation, building, or vehicle while being reckless as to whether that habitation, building, or vehicle is occupied. A Notice to Appear (NTA) charged Gonzalez Hernandez as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) as an alien who committed an aggravated felony defined by 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F) as a crime of violence. Gonzalez-Hernandez unsuccessfully sought withholding of removal. Gonzalez-Hernandez was removed to El Salvador, where he remains. In 2018, the Supreme Court held (Dimaya) that 18 U.S.C. 16(b) (defining “crime of violence”) as incorporated into 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F) is unconstitutionally vague.An IJ denied a “Motion to Reconsider and Terminate in Light of Sessions v. Dimaya” as untimely because it was not filed within 30 days of the final administrative order of removal nor within 30 days of the date Gonzalez-Hernandez learned of the change in the law. The BIA dismissed an appeal. The Fifth Circuit denied a petition for review, noting the differences between a motion to reopen and a motion to reconsider and upholding the BIA decision not to consider the motion as one to reopen, although, taking tolling into account, it was timely filed before the 90-day statutory deadline. View "Gonzalez-Hernandez v. Garland" on Justia Law