Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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Plaintiff filed suit alleging that he was denied proper medical treatment after his shoulder was injured while defendant was escorting him to the shower, seeking relief under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The district court accepted the magistrate judge's findings and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.The Fifth Circuit concluded that the Western District of Louisiana may be an improper venue for plaintiff's FTCA claim and that venue may be a jurisdictional issue in FTCA cases. The court vacated the district court's order dismissing the FTCA claim and remanded for determination of whether venue is proper. The court also affirmed the district court's implicit denial of plaintiff's implicit motion to amend his complaint to include a Bivens claim. View "Moler v. Wells" on Justia Law

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The Fifth Circuit granted the government's motion for summary affirmance, denied the government's alternative motion for an extension of time to file a brief, and affirmed the district court's judgment. Defendant pleaded guilty to illegal reentry and was sentenced to 50 months in prison based on the ten-year maximum because of his prior felony conviction. Defendant argues that the enhancement of his sentence based on the prior felony is unconstitutional because it is based on facts neither alleged in his indictment nor proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. However, defendant concedes that this issue is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 239-47 (1998). View "United States v. Garza-De La Cruz" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Aviles worked for ADT, installing security systems in customers’ homes; he spied on customers using cameras he had installed. ADT discovered Aviles’s misconduct, fired him, and reported him to the authorities. The Richmonds, citizens of Texas, among Aviles’s victims, sued Aviles and ADT in Texas state court. The Richmonds’ contract with ADT contained an arbitration clause. ADT filed a federal suit under the Federal Arbitration Act, alleging complete diversity between the Richmonds and ADT, which is a citizen of Florida and Delaware.The Fifth Circuit vacated the dismissal of the suit. A federal court can hear a suit to compel arbitration only if it could hear “a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties,” 9 U.S.C. 4. To define that “controversy,” a federal court must “look through” the FAA petition “to the parties’ underlying substantive controversy.” If a federal court could hear a suit arising from that “whole controversy,” then that court can hear the FAA suit. The district court looked through ADT’s federal suit to the Richmonds’ state-court complaint, which named Aviles and ADT as defendants, and concluded that the “whole controversy” included Aviles, ADT, and the Richmonds. Those parties lacked diversity of citizenship because Aviles is from Texas. The district court erred in extending the “whole controversy” analysis to define the “parties” to that controversy. View "ADT, L.L.C. v. Richmond" on Justia Law

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Guzman applied for an Allstate life insurance policy in 2017. In his application, Guzman disclosed his history of seizures but denied using tobacco or nicotine products. After receiving some of Guzman’s medical records and the results of his blood and urine tests, Allstate issued him a $250,000 policy at a “Standard Non-Tobacco” annual premium rate. Guzman, then 28 years old, died in 2019, after suffering a seizure at work. Allstate began a contestable-claims investigation and obtained additional medical records, most of which described Guzman as a smoker. Two underwriting referrals determined that Guzman would not have been issued the same policy as a smoker. Allstate informed Gusman’s wife, Mirna, that it was rescinding the contract and gave her a $433 premium refund.Mirna sued Allstate for breach of contract and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practice–Consumer Protection Act, and the Texas Insurance Code. Mirna denied that her husband was a smoker and submitted an affidavit from Guzman’s sister, Martha. The district court granted Allstate summary judgment. The Fifth Circuit reversed. Mirna’s and Martha’s affidavits are competent summary judgment evidence. Though self-serving, their testimony created a genuine dispute of material fact. Allstate’s evidence was insufficient to carry its summary judgment burden. The medical records were inconsistent and Allstate has not identified definitively the sources of the medical records information. View "Guzman v. Allstate Assurance Co." on Justia Law

Posted in: Insurance Law
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The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's 2016 motion for post-conviction relief based on the ineffective assistance of counsel. In this case, defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The court concluded that defendant failed to brief claims concerning the effectiveness of his trial counsel and has therefore abandoned those claims. In regard to defendant's claim that trial counsel failed to advise him before he entered into the plea agreement that he could be subject to a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence under the ACCA, defendant did not present this claim to the district court, and he neither sought nor obtained a certificate of appealability on the issue.In regard to defendant's sentencing, he contends that the collateral-review waiver does not bar his challenge to his sentence because he reserved his right to appeal a sentence imposed in excess of the statutory maximum. The government counters that waiver only reserved the right to appeal, not collaterally attack, a sentence imposed in excess of the statutory maximum. The court concluded that resolution of the waiver issue would be more difficult than resolving whether defendant's state convictions were serious drug offenses. Applying this alternative course, the court concluded that defendant's convictions under La. R.S. 40:966(A) for possession with intent to distribute are serious drug offenses for the purpose of sentence enhancement under the ACCA. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's sentence. View "United States v. Barlow" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Arulnanthy, part of Sri Lanka’s Tamil ethnic minority, entered the U.S. through Mexic in 2018. He was immediately apprehended. An asylum officer conducted a credible-fear interview, 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(B). Arulnanthy described two 2018 encounters with the Sri Lanka Police after officials discovered that Arulnanthy was planning to participate in a local election as a member of the Tamil Party. The first encounter involved detention and beating. The asylum officer determined that Arulnanthy had established a credible fear of persecution based on his political opinion. Arulnanthy indicated that he intended to apply for asylum and withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). His application's description of his police encounters differed from his previous account. Arulnanthy submitted documentary evidence, some pertaining to his police encounters, and the rest concerning country conditions in Sri Lanka, particularly the situation facing many Tamils.The IJ denied relief, finding that Arulnanthy was not a credible witness based on three omissions and discrepancies. The BIA dismissed Arulnanthy’s appeal. In 2020, Arulnanthy was removed from the United States. The Fifth Circuit remanded, first holding that the appeal was not mooted by Arulnanthy’s removal. The adverse credibility finding was fatal to Arulnanthy’s asylum claim but not to his CAT claim. The BIA violated the CAT regulations by ignoring Arulnanthy’s hundreds of pages of evidence about country conditions in Sri Lanka. View "Arulnanthy v. Garland" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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Houston began working for TDA in 2012. Houston’s responsibilities required on-site inspections to confirm compliance with state and federal regulations. Houston suffers from lupus, anemia, and other illnesses, requiring her to be absent from work and sometimes take leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). In 2016, Houston returned to her position after a long-term medical leave and submitted a request for accommodations permitting her to telework and to work a compressed workweek. TDA allowed Houston to work four 10-hour days but denied the telework request because Houston’s duties could not be performed solely from home and Houston needed training to improve performance.Later in 2016, Houston received warnings for “failure to meet expectations,” excessive absenteeism and tardiness, inadequate job performance, insubordination, leaving work early, accruing overtime without approval, late arrivals to sites being audited, failure to submit accurate and timely administrative reviews, and failure to follow TDA’s travel policy. An April 2017 warning notified Houston that she was on a 90-day probation period. When the probationary period ended, TDA discharged Houston because of her failure to correct her performance deficiencies, excessive absenteeism and tardiness unrelated to protected FMLA leave, and insubordination. The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment, rejecting Houston’s FMLA retaliation claim, 29 U.S.C. 2601, and her Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701, discrimination claim.TDA established legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Houston’s termination; Houston failed to raise a disputed material fact showing that those reasons were pretextual. View "Houston v. Texas Department of Agriculture" on Justia Law

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In the first suit between the parties, the state trial court entered judgment against plaintiffs in August 2018. Plaintiffs then filed this second suit in federal court, asserting the same state law claims in addition to claims under the federal Clean Water Act (CWA).The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the state law claims as precluded by res judicata; dismissal of the CWA claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim; and denial of plaintiffs' motion for injunctive relief. In this case, the non-CWA claims existed at the time of the state court judgment, and are the same as those asserted in the state court litigation. Furthermore, plaintiffs have forfeited any argument that the district court erred in dismissing the CWA allegations in the original, first, and second amended complaints. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' subsequent Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration, which included a request for leave to file a third amended complaint. View "Stevens v. St. Tammany Parish Government" on Justia Law

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The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's order dismissing with prejudice plaintiff's claims stemming from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Plaintiffs complied with all pretrial orders (PTOs) except for PTO 68, which required plaintiffs to provide past and present information about their medical conditions. Plaintiffs thrice attempted to comply with PTO 68 but the district court found their responses "puzzling" and "hard to make sense of" at the show cause hearing. The court concluded that there is a clear record of delay by plaintiffs in complying with PTO 68 and that no lesser sanction than dismissal with prejudice would serve the interests of justice. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing plaintiffs' claims with prejudice. View "Moore v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc." on Justia Law

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Mary and James Nelson, a married couple with daughters, formed Longspar limited partnership in 2008; each had a 0.5% general partner interest. The limited partners were Mary and trusts that had been established for their daughters. The Nelsons also formed a trust in 2008. Mary was the settlor, James was the trustee. James and the daughters were the beneficiaries. In 2008-2009, Mary transferred her Longspar limited partner interests to the trust in a gift (valued at $2,096,000.00) and then a sale for $20,000,000. An accountant valued a 1% Longspar limited partner interest at $341,000. The Nelsons used that value to convert the dollar values in the transfer agreements to percentages of limited partner interests—6.14% for the gift and 58.65% for the sale. Those percentages were then listed on Longspar’s records, included in Longspar’s amended partnership agreement, and listed on the Nelsons’ gift tax returns.The IRS audited the Nelsons’ tax returns. The Nelsons amended their records and reallocated previous distributions. The Commissioner issued Notices of Deficiency listing $611,708 in gift tax for 2008 and $6,123,168 for 2009. The Tax Court found that the proper valuation of a 1% Longspar limited partner interest was $411,235; the transfer documents' language was not a valid formula clause that could support reallocation; Mary had transferred the percentage of interests that the appraiser had determined to have the values stated in the transfer documents; those percentages were fixed once the appraisal was completed. The Fifth Circuit affirmed; the Nelsons each owed $87,942 in gift tax for 2008 and $920,340 for 2009. View "Nelson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law