Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants Galman, Sutton, and the City of New Orleans, alleging a violation of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983, as well as various state law claims including assault, battery, and false arrest. Plaintiff also alleged a section 1983 claim against the City for failure to hire, train, supervise, or discipline officers, as well as various state law claims including negligent hiring, negligent supervision and retention, and vicarious liability. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from Galman and Sutton's actions harassing plaintiff while he was sitting at a local bar in his military fatigues and beating plaintiff unconscious. Galman and Sutton were local police officers who were off duty. The district court dismissed plaintiff's federal claims because it found that the officers were not acting under color of law.The Fifth Circuit concluded that plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to support all of his claims where plaintiff has adequately pleaded facts which establish that Galman and Sutton acted under color of law. In this case, plaintiff alleges that when he exited the bar, Sutton acted as a police officer and gave plaintiff a direct order to stop and not leave the patio area of the bar; plaintiff obeyed; when plaintiff attempted to drive away after getting violently beaten, Sutton and Galman ordered him to stop and to step out of his vehicle; and, because they acted like police officers, plaintiff believed he was not free to leave, and did as he was ordered. However, the court concluded that plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to support a Monell claim against the City based on the officers' actions. The court further concluded that plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts to support his state-law negligent hiring, retention, and supervision claims against the City. Finally, the district court correctly dismissed the vicarious liability claim against the City. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Gomez v. Galman" on Justia Law

Carver, a corrections officer at the Stiles Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ), sued three of her former coworkers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging they had sexually assaulted her at the Stiles Unit. The complaint specified that Carver was suing these defendants in their official capacities. Carver also brought section 1983 claims against TDCJ and the Stiles Unit. The court dismissed TDCJ on sovereign-immunity grounds and also dismissed Carver’s claims against the Stiles Unit. None of the individual defendants responded to their summonses or defended the suit in any way. The clerk entered a default. The court ordered the individual defendants to “show cause” why a default judgment should not be granted.Without giving Carver notice or an opportunity to respond, the court subsequently dismissed her claims against the individual defendants with prejudice. The court reasoned that, because Carver had sued the three in their official capacities for money damages, the suits were prima facie barred by sovereign immunity. The Fifth Circuit reversed. Both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Fifth Circuit precedents preclude the dismissal of the complaint sua sponte and with prejudice. The Rules give plaintiffs a variety of ways to fix a defective complaint. View "Carver v. Atwood" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for possessing a gun in furtherance of a drug trafficking conspiracy. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's conviction. However, the court vacated the forfeiture award, concluding that forfeiture was plainly erroneous under Honeycutt v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1626 (2017), because it imposed joint and several liability for proceeds defendant did not personally obtain. View "United States v. Moya" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the BIA's decision denying petitioner's second motion to reopen his immigration proceedings. Petitioner, a native and citizen of India, was ordered to be deported in absentia in 1996 by an IJ, but was not actually deported. The court concluded that petitioner failed to demonstrate that he lacked notice, and the BIA did not err in concluding that his second motion to reopen for lack of notice was time and number barred. In this case, petitioner does not contest the IJ's legal determination or factual findings that it was his burden to inform the immigration court of his correct address and he failed to do so. The court also concluded that Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), is inapplicable to petitioner's case because it deals with a materially different statute. Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Pereira did not warrant reopening of petitioner's deportation proceedings. View "Maradia v. Garland" on Justia Law

This appeal stems from a dispute between Great American and Employers Mutual regarding their respective obligations to contribute to a $7 million settlement of a wrongful death suit arising out of a motor-vehicle accident. The district court assumed without deciding that the Employers Mutual policy was required to provide coverage before the Great American policy. However, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Employers Mutual and concluded that Great American failed to allocate damages between covered and non-covered claims.The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that the district court was correct in its assumption that the EMC Umbrella Policy had priority of coverage but erred in granting summary judgment for Employers Mutual because Great American's evidence created a factual dispute on allocation. In this case, if true, the affidavits at issue established that the covered claims Great American paid on behalf of Employers Mutual were worth at least $7 million—thereby triggering and exhausting the EMC Umbrella Policy. View "Great American Insurance Co. v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co." on Justia Law

Gray claims that officers came to his cell, attacked Gray without provocation, took him to a shower, where, despite complying with all orders, he was sprayed with a chemical agent, and passed out. Upon waking up, he was placed in restraints and dragged to a transportation van. Officers continued to beat him. Gray’s injuries included a broken nose and a bruised kidney. These allegations are contradicted by the disciplinary reports indicating that officers went to Gray’s cell for a targeted search. Gray was intoxicated. There was vomit on the floor and Gray failed to answer questions. The officers moved Gray to the shower area, where he resisted by kicking and spitting, necessitating the use of a chemical agent to gain compliance. He knocked a radio from an officer's belt, breaking it. The prison disciplinary board found Gray guilty of intoxication, defiance, aggravated disobedience, property destruction, and having synthetic marihuana in his cell. Gray sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Fifth Circuit vacated in part. Gray’s claims cannot be deemed to be Heck-barred because it is impossible to know which of his allegations might necessarily contradict his disciplinary convictions. The allegations of excessive force after Gray left the shower area were properly dismissed because Gray failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, as required by 42 U.S.C. 1997e. View "Gray v. White" on Justia Law

Santos alleges that he witnessed six prison officers beating another inmate. Santos intervened. He claims that he was then knocked to the ground, hit, kicked, choked, handcuffed, and dragged so that his head hit poles. He was then placed in a shower cell, where Captain Wells sprayed him in the face, genitals, and anus with a chemical agent. Wells allegedly cut Santos with a knife and threatened to kill him. Santos was ultimately transferred to a medical center where, he alleges, he was denied adequate attention. According to prison officials, Santos physically attacked them. Despite initially being restrained, he hit Wells hard enough to break his dentures. His actions necessitated the use of a chemical agent to gain compliance. A prison disciplinary board concluded that Santos was guilty of defiance, aggravated disobedience, property destruction, and unauthorized area.Santos sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, determining that Santos’s claims were barred by “Heck” because prison disciplinary reports contradicted Santos’s allegations. The Fifth Circuit upheld the decision to admit the disciplinary reports, rejecting a hearsay argument, but remanded with regard to the application of Heck. The reports were offered to demonstrate that the disciplinary board found Santos guilty, not to prove the truth of the assertions. Whether the board’s findings related to the assault on Wells bar the corresponding claims by Santos must be determined by a fact-specific analysis. View "Santos v. White" on Justia Law

BVS, a company owned by Palasota, and Palasota separately filed voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions. An amended 2015 “joint” reorganization plan described the amounts BVS owed a secured creditor, Prosperity, and provided that Prosperity would have an Allowed Secured Claim of $1,812,472.43, to be paid based upon a 120-month amortization with interest at 5% per annum. Commencing on November 8, 2015, BVS was to make 59 equal payments of $19,224.72; the 60th payment would be of all outstanding principal and interest. Palasota, individually and on behalf of BVS, signed the 2015 Plan, which was confirmed. For 38 consecutive months, BVS made payments, which Prosperity applied to BVS’s principal and interest obligations.BVS then stopped making its monthly payments and, in 2019, again filed for bankruptcy. In the second bankruptcy, Prosperity filed a proof of claim for $1,333,695.84. After a hearing, the bankruptcy court allowed Prosperity’s claim. The district court and Fifth Circuit affirmed. BVS’s claim objection is barred by res judicata because Prosperity’s claim in the second bankruptcy—as it relates to whether Prosperity’s claim in the 2015 Plan was correct—arises out of the same transaction that was the subject of the 2015 Plan and BVS could have made this argument in the first bankruptcy but did not. View "BVS Construction, Inc. v. Prosperity Bank" on Justia Law

After a grocery went bankrupt, a creditor filed a proof of claim for about $325,000, the balance on a loan it had made to the grocery. In the business's Chapter 11 plan, the bankruptcy court awarded the creditor the grocery store and the land where it was located. After assessing the value of the property at $225,000, the bankruptcy plan reduced the outstanding balance on the loan to $100,000, which the owners of the grocery remained liable for. The owners then filed for bankruptcy and the creditor again filed a proof of claim for the entire debt. The creditor argued that the $225,000 credit against the guaranteed loans should not apply in the owners' personal bankruptcy, because the store had not yet been transferred and the vacant property had declined in value.The Fifth Circuit concluded that the terms of the first bankruptcy are binding in the second bankruptcy. The court explained that, under section 1141(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the provisions of a confirmed bankruptcy plan bind both the debtor and its creditors. Therefore, the creditor is bound by the provision of the first bankruptcy plan awarding it the grocery store in exchange for a fixed-value credit against the guaranteed debt. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment upholding the bankruptcy court's orders sustaining the owners' objection and confirming their individual bankruptcy plan. View "New Falls Corp. v. LaHaye" on Justia Law

This case concerns OSHA's November 5, 2021 Emergency Temporary Standard requiring employees of covered employers to undergo COVID-19 vaccination or take weekly COVID-19 tests and wear a mask.The Fifth Circuit granted petitioners' motion for a stay pending review, holding that the Nken factors favored a stay. The court concluded that petitioners' challenges to the Mandate are likely to succeed on the merits. The court stated that, on the dubious assumption that the Mandate does pass constitutional muster, it is nonetheless fatally flawed on its own terms. The court wrote that the Mandate's strained prescriptions combine to make it the rare government pronouncement that is both overinclusive (applying to employers and employees in virtually all industries and workplaces in America, with little attempt to account for the obvious differences between the risks facing, say, a security guard on a lonely night shift, and a meatpacker working shoulder to shoulder in a cramped warehouse) and underinclusive (purporting to save employees with 99 or more coworkers from a "grave danger" in the workplace, while making no attempt to shield employees with 98 or fewer coworkers from the very same. The court found that promulgation of the Mandate grossly exceeds OSHA's statutory authority and found arguments to the contrary unavailing.The court also concluded that it is clear that denial of petitioners' proposed stay would do them irreparable harm where the Mandate threatens to substantially burden the liberty interests of reluctant individuals, companies, and the States. In contrast, the court stated that a stay will do OSHA no harm whatsoever. Finally, the court concluded that a stay is firmly in the public interest. View "BST Holdings, LLC v. Occupational Safety and Health Administration" on Justia Law