Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After Hurricane Laura damaged an offshore platform owned by Genesis Energy, Genesis contracted with Danos, LLC to perform repairs. To support the project, Genesis also chartered a vessel from a third party to house and transport the repair crew and equipment. During the course of repairs, a Danos employee was injured while being transferred from the platform to the vessel and subsequently sued Danos, Genesis, and the vessel owner. Genesis filed a crossclaim against Danos, seeking defense and indemnification under a 2008 Master Services Agreement, arguing that the contract required Danos to indemnify Genesis for such claims.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment from Genesis and Danos. The district court determined that the contract between Genesis and Danos was not a “maritime contract” under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) and relevant Fifth Circuit precedent, specifically In re Larry Doiron, Inc. As a result, Louisiana law applied, which rendered the indemnification provision unenforceable. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Danos, denied Genesis’s motion, and dismissed Genesis’s crossclaim with prejudice. The court’s order was designated as a final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), and Genesis appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the contract was not a maritime contract because the parties did not expect the vessel to play a substantial role in the completion of the repair work; its functions were limited to transportation, housing, and ancillary support, which are insufficient under the applicable legal standard. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that Louisiana law applied and the indemnification provision was unenforceable. View "Genesis Energy v. Danos" on Justia Law

A citizen of Mexico, who had been a lawful permanent resident in the United States since 1982, was convicted twice for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon—first in 2011 for shooting his ex-wife and again in 2018 for assaulting a roommate with a knife. These felony convictions led the Department of Homeland Security to initiate removal proceedings against him under Section 237(a)(2)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which concerns firearm offenses. An immigration judge ordered his removal after he completed his sentences, finding him ineligible for relief due to his convictions.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the removal order in 2020. The individual’s first petition for review to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was dismissed as untimely. In 2022, he filed his first motion to reopen or reconsider with the BIA, arguing that a Supreme Court decision, Borden v. United States, changed the legal landscape regarding his removability. The BIA denied this motion, finding Borden inapplicable because his removal was based on a firearm offense, not an aggravated felony, and that the motion was untimely. In 2024, he filed a second motion to reopen, again citing Borden and seeking equitable tolling of both the time and numerical limits on motions to reopen. The BIA denied this second motion, holding that the statutory limit of one motion to reopen applied and that equitable tolling did not extend to the numerical bar.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s denial. The court held that the statutory “number bar” in the INA, which generally allows only one motion to reopen, is not subject to equitable tolling. The court dismissed the petition in part and denied it in part, concluding that the BIA did not err in refusing to reopen the removal proceedings. View "Garcia Morin v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A 78-year-old inmate in a Texas men’s prison, who identifies as a transgender woman, sought sex-reassignment surgery after being diagnosed with gender dysphoria in 2013. The inmate received hormone therapy and was chemically castrated, but was ultimately denied surgery by prison medical staff. The inmate alleged that state officials discriminated by providing reconstructive vaginoplasty to female inmates while denying similar surgery to transgender inmates, claiming a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas initially denied motions to dismiss based on sovereign immunity, finding that the inmate was similarly situated to cisgender female inmates and that the claims met the requirements of the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity. On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s orders, holding that the inmate had not adequately pled that any defendant was sufficiently connected to enforcement of the challenged policy. On remand, after further proceedings and discovery, the district court granted judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the defendants were either improper under Ex parte Young or that the requested relief was not permitted, and dismissed the lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that the inmate lacked standing. The court found that the alleged injury was not fairly traceable to the defendants, as there was no evidence that any treating physician had determined the inmate was a suitable candidate for surgery or would refer the inmate for the procedure. Without such evidence, the injury could not be redressed by a favorable judicial decision against the defendants. View "Haverkamp v. Linthicum" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs initiated a lawsuit against eleven defendants, alleging a scheme involving breach of employment agreements, misappropriation of funds, embezzlement, and fraud. The suit was originally filed in the Circuit Court of Harrison County, Mississippi. Defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, citing diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiffs sought to remand the case to state court, relying on a provision in three defendants’ contracts that specified venue in Harrison County, Mississippi, and included language about consent to personal jurisdiction and venue solely within those forums, along with a waiver of objections to those forums.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi interpreted the contractual provision as a waiver of the defendants’ right to remove the case to federal court. The district court reasoned that the provision gave the first-filing party the sole right to choose the court, and that by waiving objections to venue and personal jurisdiction, the defendants had also waived their removal rights. Consequently, the district court remanded the case to state court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s interpretation of the contractual waiver de novo, applying Mississippi law. The Fifth Circuit held that the contract provision did not constitute a clear and unequivocal waiver of the defendants’ right to remove the case to federal court. The court found that the language regarding venue and jurisdiction could reasonably refer to geographic location and did not explicitly or implicitly waive removal rights, especially since the contract contemplated litigation in both state and federal courts in Harrison County. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s remand order. View "Gulf Coast Pharmaceuticals Plus, L.L.C. v. RFT Consulting" on Justia Law

In early 2023, police responded to a disturbance at a residence in Odessa, Texas, where Deimon Nolan Simpson, who had recently been evicted, attempted to enter the house he believed was still his. After being blocked by the new tenant, Simpson retrieved a firearm from his car, entered through a window, and shot the tenant’s dog. Simpson, a convicted felon with prior convictions including possession of a controlled substance, evading arrest or detention with a vehicle, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits felons from possessing firearms.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas denied Simpson’s motion to dismiss the indictment. Simpson then pleaded guilty, admitting to the relevant prior felony convictions. On appeal, Simpson challenged the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) as applied to him under the Second Amendment, and also raised facial and Commerce Clause challenges, which he acknowledged were foreclosed by existing Fifth Circuit precedent.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the constitutional challenge de novo. The court held that the felon-in-possession statute is constitutional as applied to Simpson because his predicate felony—evading arrest or detention with a vehicle—involved violent conduct, and there is a historical tradition of disarming individuals who pose a credible threat of violence. The court found that both historical and contemporary laws support permanent disarmament in such circumstances, and that the statute does not broadly restrict firearm rights but targets those with demonstrated threats to public safety. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. View "USA v. Simpson" on Justia Law

An ordained minister served as Executive Director of a regional Baptist convention, where he was responsible for implementing a joint ministry agreement with a national Baptist mission board. Disagreements arose between the minister and the mission board regarding the execution of their shared evangelical objectives, particularly concerning missionary selection, funding, and work requirements. The mission board expressed dissatisfaction with the minister’s leadership and gave notice to terminate the partnership agreement. Subsequently, the regional convention’s board unanimously voted to terminate the minister’s employment, citing concerns about his leadership and spiritual disposition. After his termination, the minister publicly criticized the mission board and its president, which led to further actions by the board, including security measures and the posting of a no-entry photograph of the minister at its headquarters.The minister filed suit in Mississippi state court against the mission board, alleging tortious interference with business relationships, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The mission board removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi and moved to dismiss, arguing that the church autonomy doctrine barred the claims. The district court initially denied the motion to dismiss but later granted summary judgment for the mission board, concluding that the First Amendment’s church autonomy doctrine precluded adjudication of the minister’s claims. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit previously reversed and remanded, finding it premature to apply the doctrine at an early stage. After further discovery, the district court again granted summary judgment for the mission board on church autonomy grounds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment. The court held that the church autonomy doctrine, rooted in the First Amendment, bars civil courts from adjudicating employment-related claims that would require inquiry into religious doctrine, internal management, or ministerial decisions. The court concluded that all of the minister’s claims were precluded by this doctrine, regardless of the organizational structure of the Baptist entities involved. View "McRaney v. N Amer Mission Bd" on Justia Law

A dispute arose over the ownership of real property located at 829 Yale Street in Houston, Texas. In 2019, Nicholas Fugedi, acting as trustee for the Carb Pura Vida Trust, initiated a quiet title action against several defendants. The central issue became whether the trust, and specifically Fugedi’s appointment as trustee, was used as a device to create diversity jurisdiction in federal court, given that Fugedi was a citizen of Michigan while the underlying parties were Texas residents.Initially, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas ruled against Fugedi, finding the deed void under Texas law. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed that decision but noted that the district court could consider new evidence on remand regarding whether the trust was a sham created to manufacture diversity jurisdiction. On remand, the district court found that Fugedi had been appointed as a sham trustee solely to create diversity jurisdiction, and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1359.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo, and its factual findings for clear error. The Fifth Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. § 1359 applies to trusts and that a trust can be used as a device to improperly manufacture diversity jurisdiction. The court found no clear error in the district court’s factual findings that Fugedi was appointed as a sham trustee for the purpose of creating federal jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Fugedi v. Initram" on Justia Law

Two former officers and directors of a Texas community bank faced regulatory action after the bank failed in 2013 following significant losses during the 2008 financial crisis. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) alleged that the individuals engaged in unsafe and unsound banking practices, breached fiduciary duties, and filed materially inaccurate reports. The OCC’s claims centered on three main strategies: the bank’s practice of making loans to finance purchases of its holding company’s stock (which were then counted as capital), aggressive and risky sales of real estate owned by the bank, and improper accounting for nonaccrual loans. These actions allegedly overstated the bank’s capital and masked its true financial condition, ultimately resulting in substantial losses.After the OCC initiated an enforcement action in 2017, the matter was reassigned to a new Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) following the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucia v. SEC. The new ALJ ratified prior rulings, conducted a hearing, and issued a recommendation. The Comptroller adopted most of the ALJ’s findings but imposed industry bans and civil penalties on both petitioners, concluding that their conduct warranted prohibition from banking and monetary sanctions. The petitioners then sought review from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.The Fifth Circuit denied the petition for review. The court held that the OCC’s enforcement action fell within the public rights doctrine, so the petitioners were not entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. The court also found that the ALJ’s appointment was constitutionally valid, the enforcement action was timely under the applicable statute of limitations, and the agency’s evidentiary and procedural rulings were supported by substantial evidence. The court further upheld the Comptroller’s decision to impose prohibition orders and civil penalties, finding the preponderance of the evidence standard appropriate for such administrative proceedings. View "Ortega v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency" on Justia Law

A native of Uzbekistan and citizen of Israel entered the United States on a visitor’s visa in 2009, married a U.S. citizen, and had two children who are U.S. citizens. After his visa expired, he was placed in removal proceedings, conceded removability, and was ordered removed. He sought to adjust his status based on marriage, but after divorcing in 2017, that petition was withdrawn. He then applied for cancellation of removal on two grounds: (1) that his removal would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his U.S. citizen children, and (2) that he was eligible for special cancellation under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) due to alleged battery or extreme cruelty by his ex-wife.An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied both applications, finding his testimony credible but insufficient without corroborating evidence such as medical records for his daughter, proof of child support payments, or tax returns. The IJ also found that his ex-wife’s conduct did not rise to the level of battery or extreme cruelty required by statute. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, agreeing that the evidence did not meet the statutory standards for either form of relief and that the lack of corroboration was fatal to his claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision. The court held that it had jurisdiction to review the application of legal standards to established facts as mixed questions of law and fact. The court concluded that the BIA correctly determined the petitioner failed to provide required corroborating evidence for hardship and that the ex-wife’s actions did not constitute battery or extreme cruelty under the statute. The petition for review was denied. View "Simantov v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Luis Alfredo Lezama-Ramirez, a noncitizen who had previously been removed from the United States, pleaded guilty to unlawfully reentering the country in violation of federal law. After his guilty plea, the Probation Office prepared a presentence report (PSR) that included a list of standard and special conditions for supervised release. At sentencing, Lezama-Ramirez’s counsel indicated there were no objections to the PSR, and the district court adopted it. The court imposed a one-year term of supervised release, referencing compliance with standard and special conditions, but did not read these conditions aloud. The written judgment later included the same conditions as those in the PSR.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana entered the judgment, and Lezama-Ramirez appealed, arguing that there were discrepancies between the oral pronouncement of supervised release conditions at sentencing and those listed in the written judgment. He specifically challenged the imposition of certain standard and special conditions that were not read aloud, as well as differences between the oral and written versions of two particular conditions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that because Lezama-Ramirez had notice of the supervised release conditions through the PSR and did not object at sentencing, there was no reversible error in imposing the conditions that were not read aloud. However, the court found that the written version of one special condition (Special Condition 2) imposed an additional reporting requirement not included in the oral pronouncement, which constituted an impermissible conflict. The Fifth Circuit vacated the imposition of Special Condition 2 and remanded for the district court to conform it to the oral pronouncement, while affirming the remainder of the judgment. View "United States v. Lezama-Ramirez" on Justia Law